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Abstract 
 
This thesis both draws from and contributes to the ongoing project of critiquing and 
reconstructing the theory of the public sphere; an undertaking that has been 
characterised as both valuable and necessary by Fraser (2005: 2) and many others.  
The subsection of theory variously described as ‘postmodern’, ‘radical’, or 
‘agonistic’ informs an intensive practical and theoretical critique of the pre- and 
post-‘linguistic turn’ iterations of the Habermasian ideal, before culminating in the 
articulation of a concise and operationalisable ‘neo-Habermasian’ public sphere 
ideal. This revised model retains the Habermasian public sphere as its core, but 
expands and sensitizes it, moving away from normative preoccupations with 
decision-making in order to effectively comprehend issues of power and difference, 
and to allow publicness “to navigate through wider and wilder territory” (Ryan, 
1992: 286). 
This theoretical framework is then mobilised through a critical discourse analytical 
approach, exploring three cases of hacktivist counterpublicity, and revealing the 
emergence of a multivalent, multimodal discourse genre capable of threatening and 
fracturing hegemony. The case studies are selected using Samuel’s (2004) 
taxonomy of hacktivism, and explore the ‘political coding’ group, Hacktivismo; the 
Creative Freedom Foundation and the ‘performative hacktivism’ of their New 
Zealand Internet Blackout; and the ‘political cracking’ operations carried out by 
Anonymous in protest against the Australian government’s proposed Internet filter.   
The analysis focuses on how the discursive form and content of hacktivism 
combines to function counterhegemonically; that is, how hacktivists work to 
provoke widespread political preference reflection and fracture the hegemony of the 
publics they are oriented against.  This approach generates a fruitful feedback loop 
between theory and empirical data, in that it enriches and extends our understanding 
of new modes of counterpublicity, as well as providing a detailed account of the 
under-researched yet increasingly widespread phenomenon of hacktivism. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
…the public sphere theory is in principle an important critical-
conceptual response that should be reconstructed rather than jettisoned, 
if possible. 
(Fraser 2005: 2) 
 
 
The fulcrum upon which this thesis rests is the Habermasian concept of the public 
sphere, as elucidated in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and in 
Habermas’s later, ‘post-linguistic turn’ iterations.  Some version of the public 
sphere has always been linked to democracy (Dahlgren 1991: 1), but since its 
translation into English in 1989, this seminal text and Habermas’s subsequent 
reconfigurations of its central concept have provoked much critical attention, with 
the enduring popularity of the concept in its various forms testament to its 
fundamental theoretical power and utility.  
The central importance of the concept of the public sphere is that it allows us to 
generate ideal conditions for and boundaries to the kind of deliberation regarded as 
democratically legitimate.  It is of central importance to the wider field of 
deliberative democratic theory, which seeks to transform the democratic process 
from one that merely aggregates individual preferences, into one that transforms 
these preferences through processes of deliberation and debate. It asserts that 
political communication cannot serve democracy unless it is deliberative and occurs 
amongst an inclusive and heterogeneous group of participants (Witschge 2004: 
110). This envisaged state of affairs has become commonly understood as ‘strong 
democracy’ (Barber 1984), and advocates the recurring participation of all people in 
activities of self-governance, urging “that we take ourselves seriously as citizens” 
(Barber 1984: xvii). It seeks to collectively relocate power downwards, rendering 
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governments less susceptible to distortion or domination by social or economic 
elites. 
However, as Fraser notes in the quote above, and as has been echoed by countless 
others (see: Calhoun 1992; Dahlgren 1991: Kellner 2000), the very significance of 
the public sphere theory demands that we do not rest on our laurels and uncritically 
accept its status and definition as fixed, by deferring only to Habermas’s 
articulations (inarguably sophisticated though they are).  As with almost any theory, 
it should not be viewed as a static achievement, but an ongoing project of 
refinement and reformulation.  Indeed, coming to some kind of final and enduring 
consensus on how we should conceive of public sphere theory is an impossible task 
(much as achieving any kind of rational consensus is a similarly impossible task, as 
is argued within) – the inherent social embeddedness of the concept necessitates 
constant revision and re-articulation in order that it may keep pace with fluidity and 
dynamism of society (Dahlgren 1991: 3). 
This thesis is intended as a contribution to this ongoing project.  It seeks to build 
upon the thread of public sphere criticism and reformulation variously described as 
postmodern, post-structuralist, radical, or agonistic, through synthesizing the 
manifold perspectives this thread contains into a concise and operationalisable 
theoretical iteration, dubbed neo-Habermasian public sphere theory.  This 
theoretical synthesis project retains the Habermasian public sphere as its core, but 
expands and sensitizes it in keeping with Fraser’s influential criticisms (1992), 
moving away from normative preoccupations with decision-making in order to 
more effectively comprehend issues of power and difference, and to allow 
publicness “to navigate through wider and wilder territory” (Ryan 1992: 286).  This 
breaking of new theoretical territory requires, amongst several other 
redevelopments, that the Habermasian requirements of the ideal speech situation be 
relaxed, thus allowing contestatory forms of communication such as non-coercive 
activism into the global network of public and counterpublic spheres. 
This theory is then applied in the interpretation of hacktivism, or online direct 
action.  This is a phenomenon that emerged during the nineties, and although it has 
received some notable academic attention, its investigation through a public sphere 
theoretical lens is sorely lacking.  Broader interpretations of its democratic 
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significance have been made, but the intersection of actually occurring hacktivism 
and the public sphere theory generates fruitful new understandings and directions 
for both fields, providing a focused perspective on hacktivism that counters the 
negative associations it is so often tarred with due to its hacker ancestry, as well as 
necessitating extension and innovation within the theory of the public sphere.   
 
1.1 An overview of the thesis chapters 
 
Chapter 2 provides and overview of the methodological journey and choices 
informing the research, beginning with a reflection on the difficulties encountered 
in researching hacktivism.  It presents a rationale for the change in methodological 
approach from quantitative to qualitative, and the decision to utilise critical 
discourse analysis (CDA).  It gives an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the CDA approach, and outlines the key CDA theories and texts used to construct 
the particular focus and framework applied within the thesis.  The theoretical 
framework or tripartite hacktivist typology proposed by Samuel (2003) is 
introduced and applied in the selection of three thesis case studies.  The case studies 
and the data corpus associated with each of them are briefly identified.  Finally, the 
two core research questions for the thesis are defined. 
Chapter 3 comprises the first half of the literature review on hacking and 
hacktivism.  It introduces the concept of hacking and the evolutionary progression 
of computer hacking, and outlines the seven generations of computer hacker 
outlined in the academic literature, from the early or ‘true’ hackers experimenting 
with and innovating on early mainframe computers, through the corporatised and 
criminalized iterations of the practice, to the resurgence of ‘hacking for a cause’ 
embodied by the free and open source software movement (FLOSS) and 
hacktivism.  The core tenets of an enduring ‘hacker ethic’ are elucidated, as is the 
polysemic and contested nature of ‘the hack’ and the media’s ongoing 
characterisation of all hackers as ‘electronic bogeymen’.  Primary material from 
interviews with New Zealand hackers is used to ground the secondary research 
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summarised in both this chapter and the conclusion to the literature review provided 
in the following chapter. 
Chapter 4 concludes the literature review with a detailed summary of the significant 
existing literature on hacktivism, and extends upon the introduction to the practice 
provided in the previous chapter.  From the theoretical hacktivism proposed and 
anticipated in early literature, to the actual materialisation of the practice in the early 
nineties, this chapter explores the emergence and variety of this new form of digital 
direct action or protest.  It summarises hacktivism’s inheritance of the media-fuelled 
image problems associated with hacking, and situates the practice within a broader 
‘repertoire of electronic contention’.  It assesses various attempts at generating an 
internal typology of hacktivism before identifying the most successful of these 
attempts, and concludes with an identification of the need for hacktivism to be 
explored through a public sphere theoretical lens. 
Chapter 5 introduces this theoretical lens by starting with what is commonly 
regarded as the central textual hub of public sphere theory – Jürgen Habermas’s The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.  It summarises this seminal text’s 
tracking of the rise, transformation and decline of the historically specific 
Westphalian-national bourgeois public sphere in England, France and Germany.  
The contradictory exclusions inherent to these partially realised public spheres are 
explored, as is the subsequent refeudalisation of society and the public sphere, with 
particular attention paid to the role of the mass media in this process.  The chapter 
concludes with a concise summary of Habermas’s ‘post-linguistic turn’ work on 
public sphere theory, with particular attention paid to the concepts of and tension 
between the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’, and his theory of communicative legitimacy 
and articulation of the procedural constraints of the ‘ideal speech situation’. 
Chapter 6 extends from this theoretical hub, beginning with an exploration of the 
historical inaccuracies or practical criticisms of the Habermasian public sphere as 
elucidated in Structural Transformation; specifically, Habermas’s overidealisation 
of the internal function of the bourgeois public sphere; his lack of acknowledgement 
of the existence of multiple historical public spheres and of class- and gender-based 
exclusions inherent in the bourgeois public sphere; and his over-pessimistic analysis 
of the contemporary media and public sphere.  Nancy Fraser’s renowned theoretical 
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criticism of the Habermasian public sphere (1992) is first summarised, with its 
central critical tenets then providing a framework for an extended exploration of the 
wider universe of theoretical criticisms stemming from what has been variously 
described as a postmodern, poststructuralist, radical, or agonistic theoretical 
perspective on deliberative democracy and the public sphere.  These criticisms 
focus on: the theorization of multiple public spheres, particularly the 
transnationalisation of the concept and the idea of counterpublic spheres; the 
erosion of the theoretical barrier between public and private, particularly the 
impossibility of bracketing status differentials and the failure of rational-critical 
debate; the democratic advantages in allowing private interests into the public 
sphere; and the failures of the concept of rational consensus.  The chapter concludes 
with the synthesis of this body of criticisms into a new normative public sphere 
ideal, postulating a ‘neo-Habermasian’ view of the public sphere that more 
adequately accounts for issues of power and difference, and answering the first 
research question of the thesis. 
Chapter 7 brings together the two threads established in chapters 3 to 6 through 
summarising the literature of hacktivism and assessing the resulting definition of 
hacktivism through the neo-Habermasian theoretical lens established in the previous 
chapter.  This assessment established that hacktivism is, by its very definition, a 
legitimate form of neo-Habermasian public sphere communication, in that it induces 
political preference reflection in a disruptive but non-violent and non-coercive 
fashion (as does any other form of non-violent activism).  The chapter serves to 
introduce the second research question of the thesis, which is addressed within the 
subsequent three chapters and their focus on the three hacktivist case studies 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 8 explores the case of Hacktivismo, a multi-national group of ‘political 
coders’ (Samuel 2003).  It begins with an introduction to the group and their early 
activities, before briefly outlining the central utility of each of the ‘political coding’ 
projects or political software programmes they have been involved in creating.  A 
broad discourse analysis of the textual artifacts available on their website and in 
other locations is conducted, thus establishing the central collective ideology or 
purpose of their hacktivist counterpublicity.  The chapter also introduces the 
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‘Hacktivismo Declaration’ – the group’s central ideological text or code of practice, 
which comprises the central text subjected to a close critical discourse analysis later 
on in the chapter.  This close analysis is preceded by an identification of the 
‘constellation of publics’ Hacktivismo exists in relation to; that is; the dominant or 
pseudopublics they are opposed to and the publics or counterpublics that comprise 
their audience.  The analysis itself focuses on the self-presentation and negative-
other presentation encoded in the Declaration, before concluding with an analysis of 
the way in which the group’s textually articulated ‘intellectual ideology’ (Billig et al 
1988) is launched into wider circulation through their software project, and how this 
and the projects themselves effect political preference reflection and attempt to 
destabilise the dominant publics Hacktivismo is engaged in counterpublicity 
against. 
Chapter 9 focuses on the New Zealand Internet Blackout led by the Creative 
Freedom Foundation (CFF), a group of New Zealand-based ‘artist-activists (Samuel 
2003).  The Blackout was mobilised against proposed amendments to New Zealand 
copyright legislation that would have rendered it “arguably the world's harshest 
copyright enforcement law” (Saarinen 2009).  A broad discourse analysis of the 
CFF’s website is used to establish their intellectual ideology and the ways the 
website and its attendant web technologies operate in aid of the dissemination of 
this ideology.  The chapter then gives an account of the Blackout as an episode of 
performative hacktivism (Samuel 2003), before the CFF’s constellation of publics is 
articulated.  The central Blackout text is then subjected to a close discourse analysis, 
and the Blackout itself interpreted in terms of its subversion of the usual channels of 
access to publicity, and the way in which it generated a viral flow of 
counterpublicity that provoked widespread political preference reflection and 
destabilised the dominant or pseudopublics the CFF run counter to. 
Chapter 10 rounds out the trio of case studies with an account of the ‘political 
cracking’ (Samuel 2003) campaign carried out by the internet-based 
hacktivist/prankster collective known as Anonymous, against the Kevin Rudd-led 
Australian Labor government, and their proposed national internet filter.  It begins 
with an introduction to the collective and their various activities, before exploring 
wider opposition to the planned censorship.  The two hacktivist ‘Operations’ 
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mobilised by Anonymous are detailed, and the central text articulating the 
collective’s intellectual ideology and other informative textual artifacts are analysed 
in order to then identify Anonymous’s constellation of publics.  The chapter then 
surveys the way in which Anonymous’s Operations both launched their textually 
articulated counterpublicity into broader circulation and constituted an inherent 
critique of the filtering plan in and of themselves, in order to provoke political 
preference reflection and destabilise the dominant or pseudopublics they were 
opposed to.  
The thesis is concluded in Chapter 11, which summarises the major contributions of 
the thesis, and what has been discovered with relation to the two research questions.  
It begins with a summary of the findings drawn from the case studies with regards 
to the second empirical research question, before contextualising these findings in 
light of neo-Habermasian public sphere theory and the first theoretical research 
question.    It provides suggestions for those engaging in further research on the 
subject, and argues for both the ongoing importance of the concept of the public 
sphere, and the need for public sphere theory to keep pace with the ongoing 
dynamics of societal and communicative change. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology and research questions 
 
There are no right or wrong methods. There are only methods that are 
appropriate to your research topic and the model with which you are 
working.  
(Silverman 2010: 124) 
 
Hacktivism is a relatively new topic of research, and neo-Habermasian public 
sphere theory, although built upon an extensive historical theoretical background, is 
a new theoretical concept.  Needless to say, the intersection of the two does not 
have any well-beaten path to follow.  As such, this thesis is more of an exploratory 
journey than a re-examination or slight departure from an established theoretical 
and methodological tradition within a particular topic of research.  This journey has 
had its challenges and setbacks, and while these have been frustrating, they have 
been mistakes that have facilitated greater learning. Indeed, I believe that the 
process of working past these difficulties has been one of the most personally 
fruitful aspects of this research.  As such, this methodology chapter is loosely based 
on the ‘natural history’ form suggested by Silverman (2010). Rather than being 
strictly impersonal and passively voiced, it will offer what Silverman, borrowing a 
phrase from Alasuutari, calls “fieldnotes about the development of one’s thinking” 
(1995: 192, in Silverman 2010).  This approach does not attempt to substitute style 
for substance – the key methodological questions are still answered – but it grants 
the reader access to the research thought process and the degree of self-criticality of 
the researcher. 
The rationale behind this approach is twofold.  Firstly, “a highly formal chapter can 
be dull to read as well as dull to write” (Silverman, 2010: 334).  It is hoped that this 
thesis provides an interesting and even enjoyable read, as well an informative one, 
and a methodological chapter in continuation rather than in contrast with this goal is 
surely preferable.  Secondly, “‘methodology’ has a more flexible meaning in 
 11 
qualitative research than in its quantitative sister” (ibid.: 334). In qualitative 
research, a methodology refers to “the choices we make about cases to study, 
methods of data gathering, forms of data analysis etc. in planning and executing a 
research study. So our methodology defines how one will go about studying any 
phenomenon” (ibid: 110).  A more richly descriptive, active explanation of these 
choices thus makes more sense than a “series of blunt assertions in the passive 
voice” (ibid.: 334). Thirdly, a thesis is intended to show research competence. 
Hence, it is appropriate to include some kind of historical component to the 
methodology, including “difficulties and dead ends” (ibid.: 335). 
 
2.1 Finding an appropriate methodology: False starts and dead ends 
 
This research stemmed from what can best be described as enthusiastic and 
interested but rather vague beginnings.  I did not encounter either the concept of 
hacktivism or the public sphere until the Honours year of my undergraduate degree, 
but in that same year, quickly became fascinated by the wider field of media 
political economy within which public sphere theory is situated, and by the general 
debate over the democratic potential of the Internet. The limited amount of reading I 
had done on the theory of the public sphere and on Internet activism in general and 
hacktivism in particular, suggested that there was both fresh research ground to be 
broken in this intersection of theory and subject.   
I thus began my research with the intent of assessing whether hacktivism fulfilled 
the Habermasian ideal of the public sphere, as outlined in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere and later post-linguistic turn Habermasian 
texts. My original methodological plan was to procure a sample of recorded 
hacktivist actions and websites that was representative (that is, provided a typical 
subsection) of hacktivism as a whole, and perform a content analysis in order to 
assess the extent to which they met Habermas’s criteria of democratic 
communicative legitimacy.  This content analysis was to be combined with 
responses from hackers/hacktivists to a survey designed to gauge their beliefs 
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regarding hacktivism and tease out any opinions relevant to hacktivism as 
counterpublic activity, and with follow-up interviews and personal communication 
with amenable parties.  The initial plan, therefore, was to use content analysis to 
generate the primary data for this research, and supplement it with findings from a 
survey and interviews. 
 
2.1.1 Difficult subjects, and the inappropriateness of quantitative 
methods 
 
However, the more I learnt about hacktivism, the more I realised that my plan to 
conduct a content analysis on a representative sample of hacktivist texts was 
unfeasible.  Hacktivism itself is extremely diverse, and the records of hacktivist 
events and groups even more so.  Not all hacktivist groups have websites upon 
which they detail their intentions and political opinions, there is no ‘directory of 
hacktivism’, or central population record from which to take a sample, and 
hacktivism utilises a variety of tools and approaches, the permanent records of 
which (if they exist) vary widely, therefore there would be insufficient 
comparability between the texts analysed. 
Furthermore, the pilot survey I distributed to hackers asking them about their own 
activities, about any hacktivism they might have been involved with, and about their 
thoughts on hacktivism in general, met with abortive results. I distributed this 
survey, which included both quantitative and qualitative elements, at the first ever 
New Zealand hacker’s conference, Kiwicon, at the end of 2007. I was lucky that 
this conference occurred when it did (and has continued to occur), in that it gave me 
first hand experience of and with a subsection of the hacker community, which is a 
rare experience for an ‘outsider’, given that hackers do not often come together in 
such numbers, and indeed, had not previously done so in New Zealand.  This 
provided me with an important chance to ground my increasing understanding of 
the diversity of hacking, and of the inaccuracies in the media portrayal of the 
activity. Seeing hackers and/or computer security professionals present their work, 
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simply observing them interacting with one another, and acquiring a first-hand 
experience of the actuality of the community rather than simply reading about it in 
the abstract was a valuable experience for me.   As one of the organisers of the 
event put it (in a personal communication stemming from my attendance of the 
conference, further details of which will be discussed shortly): 
 
I would think Kiwicon would be a pretty unique opportunity for people 
interested in observing hackers in their natural environment – there’s 
never been an event on the scale of Kiwicon before in New Zealand.  
(Metlstorm 2007) 
 
Given the short duration of the conference (2 days), I would not go so far as to 
make any structured ethnographic claims regarding the research value of the 
experience, but it certainly brought my research topic out of the abstract and into a 
concrete focus, and corroborated some of the information gleaned through the 
literature review. 
However, although I spoke to several hackers at and after the conference, only one 
of them hinted at having any involvement with hacktivism (and politely declined to 
talk about it, citing (justifiable) ‘paranoia’, although was happy to discuss it with me 
in the abstract). Furthermore, I received only five survey returns out of around 200 
conference attendees, despite distributing the survey in person at the conference, 
and through the conference’s mailing list.  I had expected a poor response rate, but 
not quite that poor.  As one of the attendees spoken to (the CEO of a computer 
security corporation) suggested, the increasing refinement and harshness of New 
Zealand cybercrime laws (and indeed, international laws) does not provide a 
comfortable environment for the relaying of one’s sometimes illegal exploits to 
some random and unknown researcher, even one offering contractually defined 
anonymous and pseudonymous communication: 
 
I can’t support, condone nor have nor would be involved in activity that 
goes against government cybercrime laws/acts and “good behaviour”. 
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A few years ago, you probably would have had people open to talking 
quietly about their exploits (it was more of a game then) but time has 
moved on and anyone involved in this activity in the US, Australia and 
New Zealand etc for example would be/is just plain dumb – the laws are 
pretty well defined now and people are being jailed.  
(Drazic 2007) 
 
My literature review on hacking and hacktivism corroborates the difficulty of 
making contact with hackers and hacktivists – the majority of literature on the 
subjects deals with media representations and legal interpretations of them and their 
activities, but there are very few authors who have actually gained personal 
communicative access to computer hackers (in the illicit sense of the word), or to a 
wide range of hacktivists.  
It was thus obvious that a survey was not an appropriate tool with which to gather 
research data.  However, the five respondents I did acquire were all willing to speak 
to me using their real names or a ‘handle’ that could easily be traced back to their 
‘real life’ identity, and to be questioned further about hacking and hacktivism in 
general.  As such, I utilised the limited contact made, and either spoke to in person 
or communicated via email with each of the respondents, obtaining answers to some 
of the qualitative components of the survey and added statements they wished to 
make.  These interviews and personal communications were not, ultimately, used to 
answer the research questions posed per se, but they did provide useful material on 
the concepts and history of hacking and hacktivism, which provide the essential 
background for this research, and their statements and my observations at the 
conference have thus been used to ground some of the literature reviewed.  
Moreover, I no longer believed a content analysis (even if I had been able to 
conduct one) would yield any rich or meaningful results.  Having derived a 
definition for and understanding of both hacktivism and the neo-Habermasian 
public sphere, my research question shifted from a ‘how much?’ form into ‘how?’  I 
was no longer exploring to what extent (or ‘how much’) hacktivism was a 
legitimate public sphere activity, but rather, how hacktivism works to generate neo-
Habermasian counterpublics aimed at fracturing hegemony. This kind of 
constructivist ‘how?’ research question is clearly more suitably approached using a 
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qualitative methodology (Silverman 2010: 118), and by focusing on a few specific 
cases of hacktivism, and exploring them in detail, with the idea being to develop as 
full an understanding of those cases as possible within the parameters of the 
research question (Punch 1998: 150). 
 
2.2 A qualitative methodology 
 
Any good researcher knows that your choice of method should not be 
predetermined. Rather you should choose a method that is appropriate to 
what you are trying to find out… This suggests a purely pragmatic 
argument (‘horses for courses’), according to which our research 
problem defines the most appropriate method.  
(Silverman 2010: 10) 
 
Having ascertained that a qualitative methodology based on analysing an 
appropriate yet manageable number of case studies would be most appropriate, the 
methodological questions then became: 
 
1. Which cases of hacktivism should be selected, so as to best: 
a. Provide a representative sample of the diverse range of hacktivist 
activities, but also; 
b. Remain focused enough to ensure some element of cohesion within 
the sample; 
c. Provide a corpus of data for analysis? 
2. How should this data be analysed in aid of answering the research 
question?  
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2.2.1 Constructing a ‘data pool’ of possible cases for analysis 
 
Constructing a ‘data pool’ of potential cases of hacktivism for analysis poses two 
related problems.  Firstly, unless you are directly affected by hacktivism or have 
access to hacktivists, you must rely on media coverage of such incidents to alert you 
to their presence.  Secondly, once you do become alerted to a hacktivist incident, 
the incident may be over before you have the chance to view it ‘in the wild’, and 
you must therefore rely on others, generally either mainstream or alternative/niche 
media, to provide the traces of the activity, in the form of accounts and screenshots.  
Given the previously discussed difficulty in gaining access to most hacktivists, there 
was no way to avoid this reliance on secondary information.  Although this would 
be crippling to some research, given the focus of this research, it is actually rather 
appropriate.  As much hacktivism relies on the media to amplify its initial publicity, 
utilising this media publicity in terms of both data selection and collection provides 
a snapshot of the external or public orientation of hacktivist incidents, which is what 
this thesis explores.  That is, although both an emphasis on public orientation and 
on internal dynamics fall within the wider or holistic public sphere perspective, the 
emphasis within this research is on the external as opposed to internal dynamics of 
hacktivist counterpublics. 
Given this fact, and my lack of access to hacktivists themselves, I instead used the 
data on hacktivism that I did have access to – that is, I used external accounts of 
hacktivism to build my knowledge of a pool of possible cases. I constantly 
monitored and also did historical searches of news media, both mainstream and 
niche/alternative, and thus gained awareness of a wide range of hacktivist incidents 
and groups, both current and historical.  This searching and monitoring was 
supplemented by the hacktivist groups and incidents mentioned in the literature I 
reviewed on hacking and hacktivism. 
That is not to say that there are no biases with this method of identifying possible 
cases for analysis. Due to my monolinguality, it preselects towards hacktivism done 
by English speaking hacktivists in English speaking nations, and given my 
Australasian location, also skews towards hacktivism occurring in the same 
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geographical region.  These would be an issue no matter what my research topic 
was, but it is best to acknowledge rather than occlude such a limitation, given that 
hacktivism is an inherently global phenomenon. Of more serious concern is the fact 
that relying on media reportage and previous literature for awareness of hacktivist 
activity preselects towards the most ‘successful’ hacktivist incidents and groups – 
i.e. the ones that have garnered the most publicity.  However, given that I had no 
other means of access to possible cases, this was unavoidable, and given the focus 
of this research, this lack of access to hacktivist counterpublics with a failed or at 
least limited external orientation is not a severe limitation. 
The problem then became one of narrowing down the material I wanted to work 
with, as it is obviously impossible to study each and every instance of hacktivism 
that one is aware of.  Furthermore, “the validity of qualitative analysis depends 
more on the quality of the analysis than on the size of the sample” (Mitchell 1983, 
in Silverman 2010: 54).  As such, I decided that three case studies, selected using a 
theoretical or purposive sampling procedure, would be sufficient, and that I would 
utilise a critical discourse analytical methodology in exploring them.  I will discuss 
the selection of this sample shortly, but first present a brief rationale for the choice 
of critical discourse analysis as the form of analysis used, through an explanation of 
the fundamental characteristics of this research tradition.  
 
2.2.2 An overview of critical discourse analysis 
 
Critical discourse analysis has never been and has never attempted to be 
or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific 
methodology characteristic of research in CDA.  Quite the contrary, 
studies in CDA are multifarious. Derived from quite different 
theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and 
methodologies… Hence we suggest the notion of using a ‘school’ for 
CDA, or of a programme, which many researchers find useful and to 
which they can relate.  
(Wodak & Meyer 2009: 5) 
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Critical discourse analysis, while not always explicitly acknowledged as such, 
extends from the language-based critical perspective of Western Marxism, which 
includes such key members and groups as Gramsci and the Frankfurt School 
(including Habermas) and their ‘Critical Theory’ (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 261, 
Wodak & Meyer 2009: 6)). Like discourse analysis, it is interested in naturally 
occurring language; focuses on larger units of language than isolated words and 
sentences; looks beyond sentence grammar towards a study of action and 
interaction; extends to non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual) aspects of 
interaction and communication; focuses on dynamic interactions, studies the 
functions of contexts of language use; and analyses a vast number of phenomena of 
text grammar and language use (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 2). However, in addition to 
this, critical discourse analysis is “by its nature interdisciplinary, combining diverse 
disciplinary perspectives in its own analyses” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 271), 
and it also takes a constitutive and problem oriented approach (Wodak & Meyer 
2009: 2), which manifests itself in two main ways. 
Firstly, CDA sees discourse (or language) as constitutive of society – as “a form of 
‘social practice’” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258) and thus probes texts and 
discourse practices in order to discover “hidden meanings and value structures” 
(Jaworski & Coupland 1999: 33).  It rejects the merely descriptive tradition of some 
discourse analysis, and instead is concerned with discourse as being responsible for 
the social construction of reality, and with the construction of ideology in particular 
(ibid.: 34). Ideologies are inherently associated with power relations, exclusions and 
inequality; hence, CDA is oriented towards a forensic examination of the 
construction and maintenance of ideologies, as well as resistance to these 
ideologies.   
It assumes a dialectical or two-way relationship between discourse and social 
structures – “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped… It is 
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the status quo, 
and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 
258).  Discursive practices can both help generate and reify ideological effects or 
hegemony, as well as constitute resistance to these societal power stratifications.  
“Both the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations 
 19 
of power which underlie them are often unclear to people. CDA aims to make more 
visible these opaque aspects of discourse.” (ibid.).   
As such, it is sensitive to ongoing struggles for ideological dominance and 
resistance, and has a central concern with ideology and power. It generally 
understands power in the Foucauldian sense, as “a systemic and constitutive 
element/characteristic of society” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 9), because it sees text as 
a manifestation of social action that is determined by social structure. It also 
concerns itself with competing discourses in public spaces, with an understanding 
that “[p]ower does not necessarily derive from language, but language can be used 
to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and long 
term.” (ibid.).  CDA is also increasingly interested in and accepting of 
multimodality: 
 
Critical discourse analysis has moved beyond language, taking on board 
that discourses are multimodally realised, not only through text and talk, 
but also through other modes of communication such as images… 
Overall, then, critical discourse analysis has moved towards more 
explicit dialogue between social theory and proactive, richer 
contextualisation, greater interdisciplinary and greater attention to the 
multimodality of discourse.  
(van Leeuwen 2006: 292, in Wodak & Meyer 2009: 16) 
 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the critical orientation, and thus CDA, is 
“not merely ‘deconstructive’; it may aim to be ‘reconstructive’, reconstructing 
social arrangements” (Jaworski & Coupland 1999: 35).  Rather than attempting to 
maintain an objective and dispassionate stance, critical discourse analysts generally 
take a political stance – they “see themselves as politically engaged, working 
alongside disenfranchised social groups” (ibid.).  Indeed, social science as a whole 
is inherently connected to issues of politics and policy formation, and is socially 
embedded (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 7); CDA is simply much more explicit about this 
political orientation: 
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 What is distinctive about CDA is both that it intervenes on the side of 
dominated and oppressed groups and against dominating groups, and 
that it openly declares the emancipatory interests that motivate it… This 
certainly does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other research: 
standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis apply with equal 
force to CDA as to other approaches.  
(Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 259).   
 
Like all critical theories, it is intended to “produce and convey critical knowledge 
that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination 
through self-reflection” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 7).   
 
The use of CDA is particularly appropriate in a world where language has become 
increasingly bound up with a range of social processes. The general shift towards 
service economies, and the increasingly media-saturated socio-political environment 
has amplified the socially constructive force and scope of discourse and language, 
necessitating the deployment of analytical tools capable of turning a critical 
perspective on this discursive universe.  Indeed, CDA, as a tool of this nature, is 
merely an academicisation of something all citizens regularly engage in. 
 
A critical awareness of discursive practices and an orientation to 
transforming such practices as one element in social (class, feminist, 
anti-racist, green, etc.) struggles, - or in Gidden’s terms, in the reflexive 
construction and reconstruction of the self – is a normal feature of 
everyday life.  The critical analysis of discourse is therefore firstly a 
feature of contemporary social life, and only secondly an area of 
academic work.  And critical discourse analysis as an academic pursuit 
is firmly rooted in the properties of contemporary life.  
(Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 260) 
 
 
 
CDA does not, however, simply replicate this everyday critique. It draws upon 
specific theories and methodologies not available in everyday life, and “has 
resources for systematic and in-depth investigations which go beyond ordinary 
experience” (ibid.: 281).  Indeed, it is always very strongly based in theory, 
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although many different theories may be operationalised or translated into, as well 
as explored through CDA’s “instruments and methods of analysis” (Wodak & 
Meyer 2009: 23), 
 
Rather than the usual (but certainly not exclusive) CDA focus on dominating or 
repressive discourses, the analysis undertaken here stems from the understanding 
that discourse or language “can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter 
distributions of power in the short and long term.” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 10).  
Some within CDA have argued for more of this analytical orientation, calling it 
‘Positive Discourse Analysis’ (PDA), in that it describes what texts ‘do well’ or ‘get 
right’ (Martin & Rose 2003; Martin 2004).  I believe Martin is indeed correct when 
he supposes “it would be going too far to propose a 10 year moratorium on 
deconstructive CDA, in order to get some constructive PDA off the ground” (2004.: 
24), and am not convinced that his dichotomisation of PDA as constructive and 
CDA as deconstructive is fair – deconstruction is often inherently re-constructive in 
and of itself.  However, the focus here is certainly on what hacktivist texts and 
discourses attempt to ‘do well’ – how they attempt to challenge dominant power 
structures. 
 
In terms of the analytical framework applied in the critical discourse analysis of the 
selected case studies, it is once more a case of creativity. Hacktivism is multi-modal 
in a way not generally considered by CDA, in that its multi-modality involves 
software, or code, as well as the usual multi-modal elements of images as well as 
text.  It arguably constitutes a range of new discursive or speech genres (Bakhtin 
1986), and hence previous discourse analyses based on specific and well-established 
genres and discursive forms are of little direct use.  As a result, rather than 
following one particular trend within CDA, or focusing on one particular aspect of 
the text, such as transitivity, or nominalisation, as is sometimes the case, the 
following framework will be applied.  This framework will provide the general 
outline for the analyses, but it will be bent and interwoven when and as necessary, 
in order to better comprehend what is being explored. 
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2.2.2.1 Context 
 
A firm understanding of context is essential for CDA.  In order to fully comprehend 
this, we must of course have a good grasp of the details of the case of hacktivism 
being analysed.  This essential contextualisation will be provided by a detailed 
explication of each instance of hacktivism, what it is in aid of, and of the hacktivists 
involved in it.  This will establish a format within which each case will be addressed 
separately, and the particular environment and background for each case study will 
be outlined, and will necessary involve some broad analysis of the wider discourse 
of the hacktivist groups involved, where this wider discourse is present. 
 
2.2.2.2 Text 
 
This section of the analysis of each case will be based upon a close analysis of the 
primary hacktivist texts constructed for and involved with each case of hacktivism.  
These texts vary from case to case, and will be clearly introduced and identified 
within the analysis itself, but they will each be closely analysed utilising a 
perspective borrowed from van Dijk’s ‘ideological discourse analysis’ (a sub-
category of CDA) (1995b, 1995c, 2006). This perspective understands ideologies as 
“organized by well-known ingroup-outgroup polarization”, and expects to find such 
polarization to be “‘coded’ in talk and text” (van Dijk 2006: 126).  As such, it is 
immensely useful for exploring the linguistic components of the texts produced by 
hacktivists. 
There are many ways in which this general strategy can be encoded linguistically 
within discourse, some more relevant within hacktivism than others.  The analysis 
here will draw on the “toolkit of analytical categories” provided by Barker and 
Galasinski (2001), who in turn, draw upon Halliday (1978, 1994), Halliday and 
Hasan (1985), and Beaugrande’s (1991) discussion of Halliday’s work, in 
combination with van Dijk’s orienting perspective or focus.  While any discourse 
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analysis is necessarily interpretive, and is “laden with researchers’ attitudes and 
beliefs as well as the assumption that there is no ultimately ‘correct’ interpretation 
of texts (Wodak, 1999)”, linguistic analysis anchored in systemic-functional 
linguistics goes some way towards reducing interpretive arbitrariness (Barker & 
Galasinski 2001: 64).   
 
The analytical toolkit follows Halliday and Hasan’s division of texts into three 
functional categories – the ideational, the interpersonal, and the textual (Barker & 
Galasinski 2001: 68). Due to our focus on hacktivism and van Dijk’s focus on 
ingroup-outgroup polarisation, it is logical for the analysis to focus on the ideational 
and interpersonal elements of the hacktivist texts.    The ideational function refers to 
texts’ abilities to refer to external realities, and thus render their representation of 
the world intelligible.  It focuses on such elements as transitivity, nominalisation, 
and vocabulary. The interpersonal function refers to interactions between the 
speaker and the addressee through the text, and focuses on such elements as mood, 
metalanguage, modality, and forms of address. Relevant linguistic elements within 
each of these two functions will be identified and interpreted, and will be 
accompanied by a consideration of intertextuality and non-linguistic semiotics 
where appropriate. This analysis will also, as and when is appropriate, utilise 
Goffman’s concept of ‘face’ (1967), and the politeness theory of Brown and 
Levinson (1987), specifically, the concept of ‘face-threatening acts’. 
 
 
2.2.2.3 Access and control 
 
Once the context and text have been established, analysed and interpreted, each case 
will then be explored in terms of the analytic category of discursive access and 
control, following van Dijk (1996).  This category considers how patterns of access 
to and control of discourse are a major element in the enactment, reproduction and 
legitimation of the dominance of certain groups and institutions.  However, as van 
Dijk states, “’access’ is rather a vague notion” (ibid.: 87); hence, he outlines a more 
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detailed schema of discursive access, which may be applied to any given “social 
domain, profession, organisation, or situation” (summarised from van Dijk 2006: 
87-89): 
Firstly, we should consider who is in control of planning a communicative event.  
Planning will generally involve decisions to do with the setting (or time and place) 
of the communicative event, the discursive agenda, and with who is entitled (or 
ordered) to participate.  We should also consider who is in control of the setting of a 
communicative event. This links back strongly to the planning component, in that 
the time, place, and circumstances of a given discursive events may be controlled by 
certain participants.  These powerful or ‘interaction-controlling’ participants may 
also determine who is entitled or ordered to participate, and in what role. 
Differentials in distance and position, as well as differential access to ‘props of 
power’ (such as uniforms, being at the head of the table, etc.) may also obstruct 
equality of access. 
Furthermore, we should consider who is in control of the various dimensions of 
speech, talk or text itself.  Participants may have differential access to specified 
modes of communication (i.e. spoken or written), to the language being used, to the 
genres of discourse allowed, to various types of speech acts, and to discursive 
sequencing (i.e. who may take turns or interrupt).  Furthermore, participants may 
have differential access to topics, style or rhetoric: 
 
“That is, virtually all levels and dimensions of text and talk may have 
obligatory, optional or preferential access for different participants, for 
example, as a function of their institutional or social power.  Or rather, 
such power and dominance may be enacted, confirmed and reproduced 
by such differential patterns of access to various forms of discourse in 
different social situations.  Thus, having access to the speech act of a 
command presupposes as well as enacts and confirms the social power 
of the speaker” (van Dijk 1996: 88) 
 
Finally, we should consider the issues of audience scope and audience control. The 
power to control who may or may not listen to a particular discourse is also 
differential.  “That is, discourse access, especially in public forms of discourse, also 
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and most crucially implies audience access” (van Dijk 1996: 88).  The size of the 
audience is important, as is how successful one is at ‘accessing’ the minds of the 
audience. 
These categories are (as is likely obvious) generally applied to a dominant 
discourse.  However, as van Dijk himself states, discursive dominance is “seldom 
absolute; it is often gradual, and may be met by more or less resistance or counter-
power by dominated groups” (ibid.: 85). As such, these analytic categories lend 
themselves equally well to investigating such ‘counter-power’, and thus provide a 
general outline for each case study.  This analysis will again utilise the concepts of 
‘face’, and of ‘face-threatening acts’ when and as relevant.  
 
 
2.2.3 The use of theoretical sampling to select case studies 
 
As previously stated, I wanted the cases analysed to provide explanations of 
hacktivism that were “generalisable in some way, or have a wider resonance” 
(Mason 1996: 6, in Silverman 2010: 139).  That is, I wanted the findings within my 
particular cases to be able to be applied more generally (Silverman, 2010: 434).  In 
quantitative analysis, this quality is usually obtained through the use of statistical 
sampling methods, which involve the selection of a random or representative 
sample of data from a predefined population (a sample typical of the population as a 
whole) using statistical criteria, with generalisations and inferences about the 
population in its entirety being extended from the findings within this sample (Arber 
1993: 38). Generally, the larger the sample taken from within the population, the 
stronger the inferences that may be drawn. 
 
This kind of large-scale and statistically guided sampling from predefined 
populations is not possible in most qualitative analysis, and is certainly neither 
possible nor appropriate for a critical discourse analysis of hacktivism.  There is no 
predefined population whose parameters are known, and critical discourse analysis 
is too intensive and detailed to be applied to a large and fully representative sample 
 26 
(even if one could be generated). However, generalisability in qualitative analysis 
can be obtained through the use of purposive and/or theoretical sampling.  These 
kinds of sampling are often treated as synonyms, and indeed, “the only difference 
between the two procedures applies when the ‘purpose’ behind ‘purposive’ 
sampling is not theoretically defined” (Silverman 2010: 143).   
 
As such, I used a theoretical sampling procedure to generate cases for a collective 
case study.  Theoretical sampling generally involves selecting “groups or categories 
to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical 
position ... and most importantly the explanation or account which you are 
developing”, with this method being “designed to provide a close-up, detailed or 
meticulous view of particular units which may constitute ... cases which are relevant 
to or appear within the wider universe” (Mason 1996: 93-4, 92, in Silverman 2010: 
145).  
 
However, as my theoretical framework (neo-Habermasian public sphere theory) is 
not suitable for selecting a generalisable sample of cases of hacktivism, but is rather 
a lens through which these cases may be interpreted, I based this theoretical 
sampling upon Samuel’s proposed taxonomy of hacktivism (2004a). This taxonomy 
is arguably the most sophisticated and well-supported internal categorisation of 
hacktivism available, and outlines three types; political cracking, performative 
hacktivism, and political coding. This taxonomy will be discussed in more detail 
within the literature review on hacktivism, but a brief description of it is merited 
here.   
 
The taxonomy is constructed by the intersection of various hacktivist origins 
(hacker-programmer or artist-activist) and orientations (transgressive or outlaw) to 
generate three categories of hacktivist or hacktivism. Some potential overlap is 
recognised, with the origins recognised as more stable than the orientations, and the 
sub-characteristics of each category are more fluid still (ibid.).  Transgressively 
oriented hacktivism “challenges the legal and political order, but still exists in 
relation to it and even shares some norms… such as legitimacy and accountability”, 
whereas outlaw orientated hacktivism “completely rejects the legal and political 
order” (ibid.: 37).  Generally (but not always), transgressive hacktivists tend to work 
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in medium-size groups and collaborate multinationally, whereas outlaw hacktivists 
tend to work solo or in small groups and collaborate nationally, multinationally and 
internationally.  National collaborations target governments, businesses or 
organisations within their own country; multinational collaborators band across 
borders to attack a common target at the subnational, national or multinational level; 
and international collaboration involves hacktivists from one country targeting a 
government, business or organisation in another country, sometimes generating a 
reciprocal engagement (ibid.: 50). 
 
Furthermore, political crackers, performative hacktivists, and political coders use 
different nymity practices. Political crackers use robust pseudonymity both to avoid 
legal consequences and declare that they are accountable to no one; political coders 
use weak pseudonymity to construct a digital persona that is accountable to wider 
Internet community, but in digital rather than physical terms, and performative 
hacktivists do not use pseudonyms, thus embracing their accountability to the real 
world (ibid.: 220).  They treat anonymity as “a political tool, with different nymity 
choices conveying different kinds of claims about political strategy, risk, and above 
all, accountability” (ibid.; 222).   
Table 1 (on the following page) illustrates these taxonomic variations.  It is to be 
noted that the common forms within each category are linked to broader taxonomic 
differences, as they are too diverse and variable to be dealt with as structural 
variations in and of themselves.  Furthermore, certain variations are shared by more 
than one of the categories of hacktivism. 
Using Samuel’s taxonomy as a base for the theoretical sampling of hacktivist 
incidents, i.e. selecting one case from each category – political cracking, 
performative hacktivism, and political coding – is thus the best way to ensure that 
the diverse nature of hacktivism is represented as fully as possible. The following 
variations within hacktivism will definitely be represented: 
 
1. Origin: artist-activist or hacker-programmer; 
2. Orientation: transgressive or outlaw; 
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And as such, further variations within hacktivism will also likely be represented in 
the case studies: 
3. Nymity practices: hacktivism can be carried out by groups and 
individuals ranging from anonymous to pseudonymous to named; 
4. Group size: individual or small to medium; 
5. Collaborative scope: national to international; 
 
VARIATIONS / TYPE 
OF HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
(1) ORIGIN Hacker-programmer Artist-activist Hacker-programmer 
(2) ORIENTATION Outlaw 
 
Transgressive 
 
(3) NYMITY 
PRACTICES Robust pseudonymity Use real names Weak pseudonymity 
(4) GROUP SIZE Solo or small 
 
Medium 
 
(5) COLLABORATIVE 
SCOPE 
National, 
multinational or 
international 
 
Multinational 
 
FORMS 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS 
attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins 
Software 
development 
Table 1: The variations within hacktivism represented by Samuel's (2004a) 
taxonomy 
 
Choosing one case from each of Samuel’s categories of hacktivism thus ensured 
that the three cases, when looked at collectively, provided a generalisable sample of 
hacktivism in general.  However, I also wanted to ensure that there was some 
element of cohesion between the cases analysed.  The best way to achieve this 
without compromising the generalisability achieved by utilising and extending upon 
Samuel’s taxonomy was to select case studies involving hacktivism being used in 
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aid of a particular cause. My selection of this ‘binding cause’ is based upon what I 
view as an increasingly false dichotomy within the literature on hacktivism.   
 
2.2.3.1 A rationale for the ‘binding cause’ for the case studies 
 
Jordan and Taylor (2004), in their explanation of mass action hacktivism (MAH), 
and digitally correct (DCH) hacktivism, categories that are subsumed into Samuels’ 
tripartite taxonomy, argue that digitally correct hacktivists are generally more 
interested in the ‘bandwidth rights’ component of human rights than their mass 
action counter parts.  While they are correct in identifying tension between the two 
groups in terms of how their actions affect the Internet architecture (a tension that is 
also noted by Samuel and Vegh (both 2003)), bandwidth or Internet rights, in terms 
of unhindered Internet access, and in terms of the struggle for control over the 
Internet architecture and content, are becoming increasingly inseparable from 
human rights as a whole.  This struggle is bound up with the basic human right 
detailed in Article 19 of the 1948 International Declaration of Human Rights: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. 
(‘The International Declaration of Human Rights’) 
 
 
The Internet is increasingly the medium through which many of us seek, receive 
and impart information, as well as practise our freedom of opinion and expression, 
not to mention conduct many more mundane aspects of daily life.  Furthermore, it is 
through this exchange of knowledge and facilitation of activity that many other 
basic human rights are increasingly facilitated and upheld.  As such, holding 
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bandwidth or Internet rights separate from other human rights is increasingly 
erroneous, and is only likely to become more so. 
This perspective and belief is corroborated by much recent research.  The Pew 
Internet and American Life Project has published research report after research 
report, all freely available on their website, confirming the increasing importance of 
Internet access to people’s daily lives, and particularly their political lives (‘Pew 
Internet and American Life Project’).  We increasingly access news, information 
and other media of all kinds via the Internet (Purcell et al. 2010), from a multitude 
of traditional and alternative media sources.  We also engage with governmental 
information and services online (Smith 2010), both for activities of everyday life 
and during election campaigns.  Indeed, over half of the adult population of the 
Unites Sates of America went online to get involved in the political process or to get 
news and information about the 2008 presidential election (Smith 2009).  This trend 
towards political engagement via the Internet is particularly strong amongst young 
people (Kohut 2008; Smith et al 2009), suggesting that the trend is only likely to 
accelerate.  
There is no doubt that the selection of this cause, and the cause itself, exhibits a 
post-industrial bias.  In a world where many have yet to achieve access to basic 
necessities such as adequate water, nutrition and shelter, let alone telephone 
connections or Internet access, focusing on struggles over unhindered Internet 
access, and over the governance of Internet architecture and content, may seem at 
best, ignorant, and at worst, arrogant.  Indeed, even amongst those who do have 
Internet access, the demographics of political and civic involvement continue to 
echo offline biases towards those with higher levels of income and education – 
although the trend towards blogs as prominent sources of information, and political 
activity on social networking sites amongst younger netizens hints at possible 
upheavals within these participatory demographics (Smith et al. 2009).  However, 
hacktivism is already a privileged activity – it occurs on the Internet, and is done by 
citizens who have Internet access in terms of both a physical connection and 
technological know-how and skills. As such, this thesis is already biased towards a 
post-industrial perspective and topic.  
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Furthermore, hacktivism involved in struggles over the control of the Internet tends 
to be aimed at securing an ideal Internet that the hacktivists see as best serving 
citizens, as opposed to governmental or corporate elites.  As such, it is aimed at 
preserving, promoting and maintaining an ideal Internet not only for current, but 
also prospective or future ‘netizens’.  And there is no doubt that citizens on both 
sides of the digital divides (Selwyn 2004; van Dijk & Hacker 2003) recognise the 
importance of Internet as a communicative medium.  The BBC World Service 
recently commissioned a survey (administered by GlobeScan) of over 27,000 adults 
across 26 countries, only 14,000 of whom were actually Internet users, asking them 
about their perceptions of the importance of the Internet to modern life (‘Global Poll 
on Internet Access’ 2010). A massive four in five adults (78%) saw access to the 
Internet as a fundamental human right, with 87% of the Internet users and 71% of 
the non-Internet users surveyed holding this opinion (ibid.: 1).   
Indeed, this belief is something that has been legislatively ratified by several 
nations, with Finland, France and Estonia making Internet or broadband access a 
human right for their citizens.  Internet-using respondents to the BBC survey valued 
the Internet most highly for sourcing information of all kinds, and for 
communicating and interacting with other people.  90% and 78%, respectively, felt 
that the Internet was a good place to learn and that it gave them greater freedom 
(ibid.: 4). As the BBC’s Bill Thompson summarised: 
 
As a long-time contributor to Digital Planet, the BBC World Service 
programme about the impact of digital technology on people's lives, I've 
seen the growing awareness within the developing world that computers 
and connectivity matter and can be useful. It's not that computers matter 
more than water, food, shelter and healthcare, but that the network and 
PCs can be used to ensure that those other things are available. 
(Thompson 2010) 
 
 
Further research provides more evidence of this across-the-board belief in the 
importance of Internet access, and particularly high-speed Internet access.  The 
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Social Science Research Council (SSRC) recently researched the adoption of 
broadband in low-income American communities (including homeless citizens and 
those relying on governmental welfare for survival).  While previous research 
(mostly quantitative and survey based) done by the Pew Internet and American Life 
project has identified various proportions of non-Internet users who do not use the 
Internet because they see it as ‘not relevant’ to their daily lives, the SSRC research, 
which had a smaller sample size but engaged research subjects much more deeply, 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, found a different 
reality: 
 
…we found no such group, even among respondents with profound 
histories of marginalization—the homeless, people with long-term 
disabilities, people recently released from lengthy prison sentences, 
non-English speakers from new immigrant communities, and residents 
of a rural community without electricity or running water. No one 
needed to be convinced of the importance of Internet use or of the value 
of broadband adoption in the home.  
Indeed, most respondents viewed broadband connectivity to be of 
paramount importance. Over 90% of our non-adopter respondents 
reported personally using the Internet. Taking into account proxy use 
via family members and friends, the number approaches 100%. Even 
respondents with the highest barriers to use, such as those with very 
limited literacy in any language, reported making efforts to use the 
Internet. Social networking, games, and media sites—especially 
YouTube – seem to be common gateways for these low-skill users. But 
the strongest drivers by far among our respondents are access to 
employment, education, and government services. 
(Dailey et al. 2010: 15) 
 
Clearly, those on both sides of the digital divides share a belief in the importance of 
Internet access, and particularly high-speed Internet access.  Those who do not have 
Internet access know they are missing out, and their numbers are decreasing 
constantly (and will hopefully continue to do so apace).  We still have a long way to 
go before we can claim global connectedness, but there is a strong sense that this is 
a goal of fundamental importance.  While hacktivism in the name of debating 
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control over the Internet’s architecture and content is not directly involved in 
securing broader Internet access, it is engaging with rights that should not be set 
aside from other ‘offline’ rights.  The Internet is part of and generated by a 
significant proportion of modern humanity, and deserves to be recognised in terms 
of general human rights, rather than set aside as something important only to the 
privileged, particularly as access continues to grow.  We would do well to 
remember that: 
 
[t]he Internet is only that wire that delivers freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, and freedom of the press in a single connection. It's only 
vital to the livelihood, social lives, health, civic engagement, education 
and leisure of hundreds of millions of people (and growing every day). 
(Doctorow 2008) 
 
 
As such, I believe that the selection of this particular ‘binding cause’, while 
certainly following the post-industrial bias of this thesis in general, is not as elitist 
as it may initially appear. Certainly, hacktivism is a form of protest used by and 
differentially available to a technological and socio-economic elite, and on what is 
still a (globally) technologically and socio-economically elite medium.  But as 
access to the Internet is ever-increasingly accepted as a fundamental human right 
(even if, like many other rights, it is not globally upheld in actuality), hacktivism 
engaging with this cause is arguably little more elitist than that engaging with many 
other causes.  Furthermore, given that this cause is inherently associated with the 
very platform upon which hacktivism occurs, and that the increasing 
‘mainstreaming’ of unhindered Internet access as a fundamental human right goes 
some way towards bridging the schism between the trends of mass action and 
digitally correct hacktivism identified by Jordan and Taylor (2004), it is hoped that 
it is seen as a considered and logical choice for providing cohesion between the 
following case studies.   
As such, the three cases (as depicted in Tables 2 to 4) were theoretically sampled 
using Samuel’s typology, and the ‘binding cause’ of the struggle for control over 
 34 
the current state and evolutionary future of the Internet. No further detail on each 
case will be provided at this stage, as the analysis of each will necessarily provide a 
detailed description of them. For now, it is sufficient to see that each case deals 
primarily with a single category within Samuel’s hacktivist taxonomy, and that in 
combination, the three cases cover the vast majority of the variations within 
Samuel’s typology of hacktivism (2004a). Bold entries indicate specificities within 
cells with multiple variations, and unknown variations are indicated with italics. 
The tables representing each case are placed so as to avoid breaking across pages. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Case One: Hacktivismo 
 
VARIATIONS / TYPE 
OF HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
(1) ORIGIN Hacker-programmer Artist-activist Hacker-programmer 
(2) ORIENTATION Outlaw 
 
Transgressive 
 
(3) NYMITY 
PRACTICES 
Robust 
pseudonymity Use real names Weak pseudonymity 
(4) GROUP SIZE Solo or small 
 
Medium 
 
(5) COLLABORATIVE 
SCOPE 
National, 
multinational or 
international 
 
Multinational 
 
FORMS 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS 
attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins 
Software 
development 
Table 2: Hacktivist variations within the case of Hacktivismo 
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2.2.3.3 Case Two: The Creative Freedom Foundation and the New 
Zealand Internet blackout 
 
VARIATIONS / TYPE 
OF HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
(1) ORIGIN Hacker-programmer Artist-activist Hacker-programmer 
(2) ORIENTATION Outlaw 
 
Transgressive 
 
(3) NYMITY 
PRACTICES 
Robust 
pseudonymity Use real names Weak pseudonymity 
(4) GROUP SIZE Solo or small 
 
Medium (to large) 
 
(5) COLLABORATIVE 
SCOPE 
National, 
multinational or 
international 
 
Multinational 
 
FORMS 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS 
attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins 
Software 
development 
Table 3: Hacktivist variations within the case of the Creative Freedom 
Foundation and the New Zealand Internet blackout 
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2.2.3.4 Case Three: Anonymous and Australian Internet censorship 
 
VARIATIONS / TYPE 
OF HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
(1) ORIGIN Hacker-programmer Artist-activist Hacker-programmer 
(2) ORIENTATION Outlaw 
 
Transgressive 
 
(3) NYMITY 
PRACTICES 
Robust 
pseudonymity Use real names Weak pseudonymity 
(4) GROUP SIZE Solo or small Medium (to large) 
(5) COLLABORATIVE 
SCOPE 
National, 
multinational or 
international 
 
Multinational 
 
FORMS 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS 
attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins 
Software 
development 
Table 4: Hacktivist variations within the case of Anonymous and Australian 
Internet censorship 
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2.2.3.5 The overall representativeness of the case studies 
 
Table 5: The overall representativeness of the three case studies 
 
 
All bar one cell or defined variation within hacktivism is shaded if the three case 
studies are taken as a whole; hence, they work in combination to provide a 
representative sample of hacktivism, as is represented by Figure 5.  The omission of 
a case of hacktivism carried out by a small group or lone individual is regrettable, 
but given the difficulty of actually ascertaining how many hacktivists are involved 
with or behind certain actions, particularly in cases of political cracking (carried out 
by individuals using robust pseudonymity), is not seen as overly problematic.  The 
lack of coverage of a case of international engagement is also compensated for by 
the fact that two out of three of the possible variations within collaborative scope 
are represented, and especially given that these variations are much more 
inconsistent than the main taxonomic variations of hacktivist origin and orientation.  
VARIATIONS / TYPE 
OF HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
(1) ORIGIN Hacker-programmer Artist-activist 
Hacker-
programmer 
(2) ORIENTATION Outlaw 
 
Transgressive 
 
(3) NYMITY 
PRACTICES 
Robust 
pseudonymity Use real names Weak pseudonymity 
(4) GROUP SIZE Solo or small 
 
Medium 
 
(5) COLLABORATIVE 
SCOPE 
National, 
multinational or 
international 
 
Multinational 
 
FORMS 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS 
attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins 
Software 
development 
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In line with this variability and lack of fixedness within types, each case study is 
predominantly aligned with a single category within Samuel’s hacktivist typology, 
but there are some areas of category permeation, thus the cases provide evidence of 
the taxonomic fluidity possible within hacktivism.  Not all forms of hacktivism are 
represented or discussed – within the category of political cracking, sabotage and 
data theft are not addressed – but given the diversity of hacktivism, this is hardly 
surprising.  The broader structural and taxonomic variations are accounted for, and 
furthermore, covering each and every form of hacktivism through critical discourse 
analysis would be too large a project. As such, these three case studies aggregate 
into a theoretically selected and sufficiently representative sample of hacktivism as 
whole. 
 
2.2.3.6 The selection and collection of a data corpus for each case study 
and critical discourse analysis 
 
As previously outlined, the three cases are analysed using a critical discourse 
analytic methodology.  As such, a corpus of data on each case was necessary to 
provide both contextual information and a text or texts for close analysis.  The 
selection and collection of this corpus used a necessarily flexible technique – each 
case study had different documents associated with it, so there could be only a 
flexibly defined central method of collecting data or texts for each.   
Hacktivism is not something that is always represented by discrete texts – it is 
something that is re-presented or recounted through secondary accounts and 
archived traces of the hacktivism. As such, the data for this aspect of the research 
question was generated using whatever useful and reliable material could be found – 
screenshots of defaced pages; mainstream and alternative media accounts; 
statements from targets; software; information disseminated by hacktivist groups or 
individuals by way of websites, forums or other texts – essentially, any textual or 
visual artefact that contributed to a better understanding of the hacktivism.  As 
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many artefacts as possible were used to build an understanding of the form of the 
hacktivism that took place, in order to overcome any possible omissions or 
inaccuracies present in any one artefact.  In the case of the Creative Freedom 
Foundation, I also interviewed one of the founders of the group (Bronwyn 
Holloway-Smith) to gain background information unavailable elsewhere.  This was 
made possible both by her geographical accessibility (being based in New Zealand) 
and willingness to discuss their (definitively legal) hacktivist campaign. 
 
The selection of texts for close analysis used similar methods, but was limited to 
records of textual or visual statements produced by the hacktivists pertinent to each 
case.  These include screenshots of defaced pages; mainstream or alternative media 
reproductions of email statements issued, or other hacktivist-produced textual 
messages otherwise archived; software; and information disseminated by hacktivist 
groups or individuals by way of their websites, forums or other texts.  Due to this 
necessarily eclectic method and variance between cases, the specific text or texts 
selected for close analysis in each case is further clarified and specified within the 
critical discourse analysis itself. 
 
2.2.4 Research questions 
 
2.2.4.1 A ‘theoretical turn’: Research question 1 
 
As previously outlined, I initially intended to apply Habermas’s criteria of 
communicative rationality to hacktivism to ascertain whether or not it fulfilled the 
criteria for inclusion into the Habermasian public sphere. However, the more I 
researched the theory of the public sphere, the more it became apparent to me that 
there were grave issues with the Habermasian ideal.  Although some of the 
literature stemming from the Habermasian public sphere involved applying the 
rational-critical procedural criteria to different situations, such as online forums, and 
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assessing their degree of democratic communicative legitimacy, the vast majority of 
it was more concerned with critiquing the public sphere in both its pre- and post-
linguistic turn iterations.  I became increasingly uncomfortable with the thought of 
uncritically accepting the Habermasian ideal as an appropriate yardstick by which to 
measure legitimate public sphere activity.  At the same time, I began to identify 
repetitive themes within the critiques I was reading, and in related deliberative 
democratic literature, in terms of both their deconstructive and reconstructive intent. 
This resulted in a ‘theoretical turn’ within my research, as the sheer mass of 
criticism aimed at the Habermasian ideal, combined with the lack of any ‘joining of 
the dots’ between the literature in the  ‘post-modern’, ‘radical’, or ‘agonistic’ public 
theoretical tradition led me down the route of a theoretical synthesis project.  Rather 
than simply accepting and operationalising the Habermasian ideal, in the form of 
the rational-critical procedural criteria, I began to work on synthesising the 
aforementioned theoretical tradition, with the intent of constructing a holistic and 
concisely definable ‘new’ public sphere model. As such, the first research question 
posed and answered by this thesis is: 
 
R1: How can the critical democratic intent behind the Habermasian 
ideal of the public sphere be reconciled with both: 
a) the practical and theoretical criticism levelled at it, and  
b) the diverse reconstructive projects undertaken within the ‘post-
modern’ ‘radical’ or ‘agonistic’ public sphere and deliberative 
democratic theoretical traditions, which attempt to remain sensitive to 
issues of difference and power; 
in a manner that generates a concise, holistic and operationalisable 
definition of the public sphere, that accounts and is appropriate for the 
modern mediated communicative environment? 
The theoretical framework constructed in Chapter 6 provides the answer to this 
question, and also establishes that hacktivism, be definition, fulfils the criteria for 
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being a legitimate form of participation within the global network of neo-
Habermasian public and counterpublic spheres. 
This framework also made it clear that there were two ‘public sphere orientation’ 
based perspectives I could take on hacktivism.  Neo-Habermasian public sphere 
theory envisages neo-Habermasian publics and counterpublics as being public in 
that they have an outwards orientation – they aim to engage with other public 
spheres – as well as having an inwards, group-solidarity-based orientation.  As such, 
I needed to decide which orientation I was most interested in investigating. The 
latter orientation would be aimed at uncovering the internal solidarity mechanisms 
of hacktivist groups and associations.  However, there were two problems with this 
option.  Firstly, Samuel (2004a) had already done an extensive and admirable 
investigation into the identity and group-solidarity based aspects of hacktivism.  
Secondly, I was not particularly interested in an explicit exploration of this aspect of 
publics, hacktivist or otherwise.  I was and continue to be more interested in how 
they present themselves to their targets and audiences – how they construct the 
external manifestations of their counterpublicity, and to what end.   
 
 
2.2.4.2 Hacktivism as counterpublic spheres: Research question 2 
 
As such, the second research question this thesis explores is: 
 
R2: How does hacktivism, through discursively constructed and 
externally oriented publicity, function as a counterpublic sphere or 
counterhegemonic project oriented towards the provocation of political 
preference reflection and the destabilisation of a given dominant or 
hegemonic public?   
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Neo-Habermasian public sphere theory (and indeed, any conception of the public 
sphere) sees publics and counterpublics as discursively constructed. Political 
conflicts, and thus interactions between counterpublics, are foremost discursive 
struggles, with discourses generally understood as “shared set[s] of concepts, 
categories, and ideas that provide [their] adherents with a framework for making 
sense of situations, embodying judgments, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions, 
and intentions” (Dryzek 2006: 1).  However, hacktivism clearly effects the 
discursive construction of counterpublics in inventive and creative ways. As such, 
this second research question can be further segregated into two parts, which will 
both be explored using the previously outlined critical discourse analytic 
methodology: 
 
R2.1: How does the discursive form of hacktivism, as a counterpublic 
sphere or counterhegemonic discursive project, contribute to the 
provocation of political preference reflection and the destabilisation of 
a given dominant or hegemonic public? 
 
R2.2 How does the discursive content of hacktivism, as a counterpublic 
sphere or counterhegemonic discursive project, contribute to the 
provocation of political preference reflection and the destabilisation of 
a given dominant or hegemonic public? 
 
Having defined the methodology and the research questions, we will now proceed 
to a review of the literature on hacking and hacktivism, thus establishing that an 
investigation of hacktivism through a public sphere theoretical lens is a valid and 
compelling research direction. 
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Chapter 3 
The evolution and current form of hacking: An investigation of existing 
knowledge 
 
Fundamentally, hacktivism can be defined as the following: 
hacktivism = Internet (hacking + activism) 
 
That is, it is the melding of various combinations of the techniques and ideologies 
of traditional social activism with various combinations of the techniques and 
ideologies of hacking, as practised in the context of the Internet.   
However, the reality is, inevitably, much less simple.  For instance, it should be 
immediately noticeable that, in contrast to the usual mediated representation of 
hacking, the activity is not necessarily set within the context of the Internet. As 
such, an in-depth investigation into the history of and literature on hacking is 
necessary to obtain a firmer grasp of what this dynamically evolving and variously 
perceived practice and its associated terminology actually constitute.  As will be 
shown, this is no easy task - the origin of the term and the identity it refers to are 
both obscure, as it has been and is used in a variety of contexts and connotations.   
This literature review, which is embellished with excerpts from interviews and 
personal communication1 with organisers and attendees of the first New Zealand 
hackers conference, Kiwicon, in November 2007 (‘Kiwicon’), does not aim to 
achieve a simultaneously detailed and concise definition of either the hacker or 
hacking – that is an impossible task.  Instead, the floating polysemy of the term will 
be fully explored, generating a multi-layered and dynamic theoretical concept that 
illustrates the praxis and identity of hacking more accurately than any brief 
                                                
1 All communications are [sic] – i.e. any errors in quotes from Kiwicon attendees have been 
reproduced verbatim from the original communication, and are not transcription errors.  
Furthermore, the hackers spoken to were given a choice of identifying themselves by their real 
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definition. This exploration will provide the context for the ensuing review of 
hacktivism. 
 
3.1 The emergence and evolution of hacking: Motivations and 
perceptions 
 
Since its emergence into popular consciousness, computer hacking is a concept and 
activity that has captured the attention of both academia and the public imagination, 
as well as having obvious significance to those who practise it (and are exposed to 
it).  Indeed, “[h]acking is undoubtedly one of the buzzwords of the computer age” 
(Vegh 2003: 151).  However, “[t]he origin of the word is obscure, and the term has 
been used to mean rather different things” (Cornwall 1987: 18), and as such, the 
definitions of the action and its actor, the hacker, remain mercurial. 
Even hackers, when asked to define the activity, have extremely varied responses, 
as is shown by the statements of the New Zealand hackers spoken to.  One describes 
hacking in such a way that it was clear he sees it as involving gaining access to 
some system (presumably a computing system) that you are not supposed to have 
access to – the access is gained through: 
 
[t]he use of security exploits, holes and ignorance.  It can also be used to 
describe quick fix solutions for software (getting rarer now though).  
(Parsons 2007) 
 
The second part of his statement refers to a more archaic or specialised usage – one 
that is not generally recognised by the media, as we shall see - and one that he feels 
is falling from fashion.  There is a clear self-awareness as to the floating polysemy 
of the term – the term ‘hacking’ can be used to describe more than one activity, and 
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its meaning has changed (and is still changing) over time.  Another hacker, one of 
the organisers of the conference, described hacking in purposefully vague terms, as: 
 
…gaining control of the target.  
(Bogan 2007) 
 
 
There is no presupposition of either target or intent – diverse targets can be hacked 
using diverse means and for diverse ends, but these means and ends always 
presuppose an achievement of control or mastery.  This open-endedness was more 
fully elucidated by one of his fellow organisers, who further differentiates the action 
of hacking from the various human qualities driving it: 
 
Hacking in the strict computer sense I see as a manipulation of the 
technology to perform some action that was unintended by the 
designers/operators. 
In a larger sense, I see hacking as an expression of curiosity and a desire 
to understand the operation of complex systems, in the same category as 
other enthusiasts.   
In neither case do I include motivation or ethics as part of the definition 
– these are qualities of people, not hacking.  
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
 
In line with this, the answer to the double-question “What is a hacker? Aren’t 
hackers bad?’ provided in the Kiwicon FAQ reveals a wider group corroboration of 
the polysemy of the hacker identity and associated activity.  It also recognises the 
very specific and therefore limited media portrayal of hackers, a phenomenon much 
discussed within the following literature review: 
 
 46 
Hackers are compulsive destroyers of "Warranty Void if Broken" 
stickers. They are people who enjoy exploring, understanding, and using 
technology creatively. Many hackers are interested in the security of 
computer systems, but as technology develops, hackers of different 
kinds are pushing the limits of cars, gadgets, and various media.  
However, the general perception of a 'hacker' is synonymous with 
'computer criminal', and indeed some computer criminals are hackers. 
However, the prevention of electronic crimes and the defenses of 
modern networked systems are ensured by computer security 
professionals; the best of whom will often self-identify as hackers!  
Hackers value elegant, creative and often playful solutions to technical 
challenges; combining the role of inventor and artist in an industry that 
many laypeople would consider staid. In a world where society's 
technological dependence is as obvious as the technology itself is 
opaque, hackers provide the tools and language for social conscience, 
balance and freedom. 
(‘Kiwicon FAQ’) 
 
This polysemy, and tendency towards abstract as opposed to concrete forms of 
definition are in evidence throughout the academic literature on hacking.  Both the 
origin of the terms ‘hacking’ and ‘hacker’ and the identity they refer to is obscure, 
and they have been and are used in a variety of contexts and connotations. Indeed, 
the concept of meaning ‘all things to all men’ could scarcely be more applicable.  
As such, a comprehensive examination of the central literature pertaining to the 
subject is prerequisite to a holistic and multi-dimensional appreciation of its core 
theories, practices and debates. 
Literature on hacking began to emerge in the mid Eighties, as the computer and the 
idea and growing reality of personal computing began to insert itself more firmly 
into public discourse.  While computers had been in existence for some time in one 
form or another, it was only during the Seventies and Eighties that they began their 
transition from exclusively institutional and often massive mainframe equipment 
into the more compact and multi-functional personal computers familiar to us today.  
As computers became more widely accessible and penetrable to individuals other 
than those holding engineering degrees and associated with institutional computer-
owners – a paradigm shift in part effected by hacking itself – their role and 
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prevalence in daily life became ever more pronounced.  This generated more 
hackers, as well as a public more likely to find discourse on the practice interesting 
and relevant. 
Accordingly, a number of texts, ranging in tone from pseudo-academic to 
definitively populist, emerged throughout the Eighties and early Nineties examining 
the ‘hacker phenomenon’.  Some notable examples are Levy (1984), Hackers: 
Heroes of the Computer Revolution; Hafner & Markoff (1991), Cyberpunk: 
Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontiers (written by a pair of American 
journalists); Mungo & Clough (1992), Approaching Zero: The Extraordinary 
Underworld of Hackers, Phreakers Virus Writers and Keyboard Criminals (written 
by a pair of British journalists); Sterling (1992), The Hacker Crackdown: Law and 
Disorder on the Electronic Frontier; and Slatella & Quittner (1995), Masters of 
Deception: The Gang that Ruled Cyberspace.   
These texts make for interesting and entertaining reading, and offer some valuable 
insights into early hackers and hacking practices, often from a personally familiar 
viewpoint.  However, as might therefore be expected, none of these are exactly 
objective examinations of the practice.  They tend to take a distinctly idealistic and 
even affectionate perspective, presenting hackers as likeable figures despite their 
sometimes-criminal activities – the Robin Hoods of the computer world.  This 
mythologising tendency is apparent throughout the literature on hackers, though the 
more academic and therefore more valuable texts attempt to deconstruct the myth to 
get at the realities behind it, as well as examining the process of its construction. 
Nevertheless, some of these texts will be referred to in passing to take advantage of 
various discrete insights, and one in particular is worthy of more thorough review.  
This is Stephen Levy’s (1984) Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution.  It is 
notable in that a significant proportion of the academic literature on hackers refers 
back to general categorisations and summations made by Levy.  Hackers is 
essentially a historical account of the early years of hacking throughout the Fifties, 
Sixties and Seventies.  It constitutes an examination of what has retrospectively 
been referred to as the first three generations of hackers, or ‘First Wave’ (Chandler 
(1996), Jordan (2001, 2004), Jordan & Taylor (1998, 2004), Taylor (1998, 1999, 
2000). 
 48 
3.1.1 Generation one: The true or original hackers 
 
These were “the pioneering computer aficionados who emerged in the earliest days 
of computing” (Jordan & Taylor 2004: 10), and experimented with mainframe 
computer capabilities during the Fifties and Sixties at such academic institutions as 
MIT, UC Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon, Cambridge, and Stanford.  Many of these 
individuals were not allocated or did not require significant computer access as part 
of their study; rather, they had to inveigle access to the mainframe equipment of the 
time, such as the TX-0, PDP-1 or the PDP-6.  Their applications of their allotted 
time were various, an example being the Model Tech Railroad Club who saw 
computing as a way to enhance the functions of their beloved trains, but their usage 
became increasingly focused on expanding and enhancing the capabilities of the 
computing equipment they had access to.  “To the hackers, the system was an end in 
itself” (Levy 1984: 117).  These individuals, painted as obsessive yet lovable misfits 
by Levy, were responsible for the evolution of the earliest programming techniques.  
They were “tolerated with grudging admiration” (Nissenbaum 2004: 198) and 
respect by the other students and staff, many of whom had superior access to the 
equipment, but were routinely outstripped in skill and achievement by the ‘hackers’.  
The significance of their occasionally semi-illicit access to and usage of this 
institutional equipment was even wryly acknowledged by Defensive Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), who provided funding intended for 
‘legitimate’ study at MIT (Levy 1984: 122). 
 
3.1.1.1 The contested nature of ‘the hack’ 
 
Levy also introduces the contested nature of the hacking terminology, another 
concept that is recurrent throughout the literature.  He acknowledges that its true 
origin is obscure, but identifies the term ‘hack’ as ‘ancient’ MIT lingo for an 
elaborate practical joke, such as covering the campus dome with tin foil. Thus, a 
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hack designated a project with no real constructive goal, just a “wild pleasure taken 
in mere involvement” and “imbued with innovation, style and technical virtuosity” 
(1984: 9-10). This tradition continues today, and is chronicled on the MIT 
Interesting Hacks to Fascinate People Gallery website (‘IHTFP Hack Gallery’). 
The site FAQ specifically contests the common understanding of hackers as “people 
that break into computer networks”, asserting that a hacker is rather “someone who 
does some sort of interesting and creative work at a high intensity level. This 
applies to anything from writing computer programs to pulling a clever prank that 
amuses and delights everyone on campus” (ibid.) 
Notably, this original connotation does not necessarily have anything to do with 
computers – the object or subject of the hack is undefined.  Although current 
understandings of the term tend to lock in an association with computing of some 
kind, this initial non-specificity persists in many ways, contributing to the mercurial 
terminological status of the activity.  Much hacking involves some element of 
‘wetware’ hacking or social engineering, thus maintaining a link to both the 
ephemerality and prank-relatedness of the original term.  It is also not uncommon 
within certain circles (generally those with some connection to computing 
technology) to refer to any kind of playful, creative, ingenious interaction, 
modification or manipulation of an object or subject as hacking.  The popular 
website Lifehacker is a well-known example (‘Lifehacker’). It dispenses advice on 
how to hack various elements of ones’ life – computers, certainly, but also food, 
clothes, homeware, even oneself - in the interests of greater productivity.  This trend 
towards productivity or purposiveness, although not originally a factor, has 
intensified with the chronological evolution of the hack, and was apparent in even 
the first generation or original hackers. However, the other characteristics of 
pleasure, style, innovation and virtuosity also remain integral. 
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3.1.2 Generation two: The hardware hackers 
 
Levy’s second generation are “the computer innovators who, beginning in the 
1970’s, played a key role in the personal computing revolution which served to 
widely disseminate and dramatically decentralise computing hardware” (Jordan & 
Taylor 2004: 10). This generation was odd in that it was both countercultural and 
commercial – helping to bring computing power to the people, but also managing to 
generate some significant profits.  Groups such as the Homebrew Computer Club 
developed the first kitset or fully assembled personal computers, and began selling 
to the public.  It must be acknowledged that this ‘public’ was still largely comprised 
of professional or amateur electronics enthusiasts, but the ideological impetus and 
technical development was towards equipment that would allow ‘Joe (or Jane2) 
Public’ to take part in the ‘computer revolution’.   
Some enterprises were spectacular examples of mismanagement and failed, but 
others succeeded equally as spectacularly.  Perhaps the most widely cited example 
of this was Apple Computers, headed by the young Steven “Woz” Wozniak and 
Steven Jobs, a “[v]isionary, bearded, non-hacking youngster who took Wozniak’s 
Apple II, made lots of deals and formed a company that would make a billion 
dollars” (Levy 1984: xiii).  Many of the millions of Apple fans clutching their 
iPads™ and iPhones™ today are doubtless unaware that their gurus’ business began 
by selling ‘little blue boxes’ that allowed the user to hack into the phone system 
using specific tonal frequencies and thus place free phone calls.  This practice, 
commonly referred to as ‘phreaking’, is a good example of extra-computer hacking, 
with the infamous John Draper (a.k.a. ‘Cap’n Crunch’3) its most well known 
proponent.   
                                                
2 Although it is worth noting that Levy’s book paints an almost exclusively masculine profile of 
hackers.  This is no oversight or prejudice on his behalf, simply a reflection that the community 
was and indeed, is, largely male. 
3 Draper was known by this moniker due to his having found that if he held his finger partially over 
the end of a toy whistle found in a carton of ‘Cap’n Crunch’ breakfast cereal, he could generate a 
tone of the exact frequency needed (2,600 hertz) to trick the phone system, which worked via 
tonal recognition, into effectively thinking that a toll call had been terminated and thus returning 
to operator mode, whereupon Draper could ‘phreak’ his way through the phone system at no cost.  
He was eventually charged with telecommunication fraud. 
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Levy depicts these hardware hackers as almost single-handedly bringing 
‘computing power to the people’, and indeed, statements made by the heads of 
various computing firms at the time indicate their lack of vision (in Himanen 2001: 
187): 
 
I think there is a world market for maybe 5 computers.   
(Thomas Watson, president of IBM, 1943) 
 
There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home.  
(Ken Olsen, chairman of Digital Equipment Corporation, 1977) 
 
However, the maximal credit Levy attributes to hackers in the process of disproving 
this perspective is disputable.  Pre-existing large corporations did have a large role 
to play in the distribution of computing.  Nonetheless, it may be fairly argued that 
the ‘hardware hackers’ did provide a significant driving force as well. 
 
3.1.3 Generation three: The software or game hackers 
 
This third generation were “innovators who focused more and more on elegant 
means of changing or creating programs to run on the hardware being hacked up, 
often by their friends or colleagues, the hardware hackers” (Jordan & Taylor 2004: 
10).  They were responsible for leading the evolution of computer game 
architecture, sometimes pirating copies of existing game software in order to ‘hack 
it up’ into a more advanced version.  Unlike the previous generations, their 
motivations were not entirely altruistic; while some of the hardware hackers did 
make massive profits, they were largely unforeseen by-products of their desire to 
diffuse computing throughout society.  For many game or software hackers, “[t]heir 
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motivation was a fast buck, and their instincts were often entirely commercial” 
(Mungo & Clough 1992: 74).  Here we can begin to see a subtle shift in the 
definition of ‘hacker’, with notes of personal gain and the further suggestion of 
illicit activity creeping in.  This shift in ethics, both perceived and actual is 
significant, as we shall see.  
 
3.1.3.1 The hacker ethic 
 
In addition to delineating these first three generations, Levy also introduced the idea 
of the hacker ethic, and provided an elucidation of its core tenets.  This 
categorisation has been frequently cited throughout the subsequent literature on 
hacking, and is worth reproducing in full: 
 
1) Access to computers – and anything which might teach you 
something about the way the world works – should be unlimited and 
total.  Always yield to the hands-on imperative! 
2) All information should be free. 
3) Mistrust authority – promote decentralisation. 
4) Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as 
degrees, age, race, or position. 
5) You can create art and beauty on a computer. 
6) Computers can change your life for the better. 
(Levy 1984: 27-33) 
 
Tenets two and three bear further comment.  The idea that all information should be 
free was grounded in the fact that computers need an unhindered internal flow of 
information if they are to work optimally, but has come to signify much more.  It is 
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now widely understood as standing in opposition to the increasingly corporate-
friendly regulation of intellectual property, and as advocating the free flow of 
information generally, usually in the context of the Internet.  As such, this 
challenging ethic will crop up in further literature under review.  The third tenet is 
related in its critique of bureaucracy and corporate hierarchy, with IBM -  “The 
Enemy” – and its hated “batch-processed and intolerable” IBM 700, the epitome of 
corporate dominance and bureaucratic inefficiency and inelegance (Levy 1984: 
xiii).  Furthermore, the advocacy of decentralisation has become of utmost 
relevance in the context of the Internet, and provides further conflict concerning 
intellectual property and other corporate agendas.  Despite Levy’s informal style 
and non-academic approach, the discussed concepts and categories provide an 
invaluable starting point for the ensuing academic literature under review, and 
Levy’s work has been given prominence and relied upon by most academics since.  
As such, his work and concepts are more than worthy of inclusion. 
 
3.1.4 Generation four: The hacker as criminal (a.k.a. the cracker) 
 
The next notable subtopic within the literature and generation within hacking’s 
evolution is dealt with in Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce’s (1988) ‘The Process of 
Criminalisation – The Case of Computer Crime Laws’, in which they dichotomise 
Levy’s hacker ethics and newly developed cybercrime legislation.  The ongoing 
criminalisation and pathologisation of hacking (both legal and reputational) is 
linked in with a fourth generation of hacker, both actual and imagined – the 
hacker/cracker.  This generation, and the generations five through seven to follow, 
are typological extensions to Levy’s (1984) first three generations, and are outlined 
later in Jordan and Taylor (2004).  These extensions, despite having a temporal or 
chronological dimension, are not seen as mutually exclusive – rather, they identify 
different ideological subgroups within hacking, and are immensely useful in terms 
of grasping the diversity and evolution of the practice.  
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This fourth generation embodies the illicit nature of the hack, and its members are 
largely defined by their intent to achieve unauthorised access to computers and 
networks.  This unauthorised access can be in pursuit of personal gain or out of 
sheer destructive malignancy, but can also be driven by more benign motivations, 
such as curiosity, challenge, or a desire to reveal (and thus prompt the patching of) 
weaknesses in computing systems.  This generation and the issues it generated will 
be discussed in more detail, but suffice to say, hacking was and continues to be of 
increasing concern to both the public, and governmental and corporate institutions.  
Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce’s text surveys the new legislature and regulations 
being installed in an attempt to define and control the legal limits of the new 
computer environment, and the resulting effective criminalisation of hacking 
involving unauthorised computer entry (regardless of motive).  Beyond this basic 
lack of consideration for intent, these laws were often incompletely thought out and 
ineffective for a number of reasons, a tendency elaborated upon in ensuing literature 
on the subject.  
Further literature addresses hacking from this criminological/legal perspective, such 
as Johnson’s (1994) Crime, Abuse and Hacker Ethics and Loper’s (2001) thesis, 
The Criminology of Computer Hackers, with the disjunction between hacker ethics 
and legislation often central to the discussion.  These texts are part of a larger subset 
of literature found within computer industry, business and military publications, 
which tends to disregard any discussion of motive, and often considers hacking as 
criminal by default.  Some notable examples are: Adams (1996); Evers (1996); 
Furnell (1999); Hancock (1998); Neighly (2000); Onstad & Rose (1996); 
Richardson (1997) and Weisenburger (2001).  This literature is of limited 
usefulness here, as it involves little discussion of the hackers or hacking themselves, 
and focuses rather exclusively on potential preventative and protective measures to 
be taken against them and their actions. 
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3.1.4.1 The media and the beginning of the myth of the ‘electronic 
bogeyman’ 
 
Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce (1988) are also important in that they note the 
importance of the news media in the criminalisation process - specifically, the way 
in which their sensationalistic coverage of hacking fuels public concern and has 
often prompted new legislation and amendments to pre-existing legislature.  This 
‘electronic bogeyman’ (Smith 2001: 66)4 phenomenon is of central importance 
throughout the literature to be discussed; hence, this early recognition of the trend is 
notable.  It had been acknowledged in some of the earlier populist texts, such as 
Hafner & Markoff (1991), but this was arguably the first academic identification of 
the phenomenon and is therefore significant, despite its lack of empirical evidence. 
Amanda Chandler’s (1996) essay, ‘The Changing Definition and Image of Hackers 
in Popular Discourse’ continues in this theme, discussing the mass-mediated images 
of hackers in the U.S.A. and Britain.  Chandler acknowledges the contested 
definitional nature of the hack, and drawing on Levy’s (1984) first three generations 
and the work of Hafner & Markoff (1991) and Clough & Mungo (1992), explicitly 
recognises the fourth generation, who “appropriated the word ‘hacker’ and with 
help from the press, used it to define themselves as password pirates and electronic 
burglars.  With that, the public perceptions of hackers changed.  Hackers were no 
longer seen as explorers, but as malicious intruders” (Hafner & Markoff 1991: 11).  
The emergence of computer viruses and worms and their usage by hackers in the 
Eighties had further entrenched this actual and perceptual paradigm shift.  Chandler 
identifies five categories of image as prevalent in the mass-mediated representation 
                                                
4 “[E]lectronic bogeyman: a hacker, instrument of a hacker, or anonymous source portrayed in the 
mainstream media as a menace to society.” (ibid.. in main text)  Smith’s text is a chapter entitled 
'Upon Hearing of the Electronic Bogeyman', in You Are Being Lied To: The Disinformation 
Guide to Media Distortion, Historical Whitewashes and Cultural Myths (2001).  It is a biting 
criticism of the perceived idiocy of the mass media and governmental and military officials with 
regards to hacking, citing numerous examples of endless recycling of incorrect information, 
including several April Fool’s day hoaxes that ended up in military reports.  While amusing 
reading, it is more an opinion piece than an academic text, and as such, will not be reviewed 
further. 
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of hackers; ‘Cowboys and the Electronic Frontier’, ‘Intellectual Joyriders’, 
‘Hackers/Murderers’, ‘Mad Hackers, and ‘Spies’.   
Concerning the images of hackers as cowboys on the electronic frontier, Chandler 
cites a number of news media sources and the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(‘EFF’) as representative of a wider impression of hackers as heroic, mythical 
individuals exploring the uncharted geography of cyberspace.  Their adherence to 
an individual code of conduct and disregard for or circumvention of computer crime 
legislation is also identified as parallel to the frontier ethos of the Western United 
States compared to the Eastern States during the ‘winning of the West’.  Chandler 
rationally posits that this image is one “for which the Americans have a sneaky 
admiration” (1996: 236), as is evidenced by its prevalence in American advertising 
and marketing. 
Hackers are also linked to the ‘folk devil’ of the joyrider – “youngsters in stolen 
high-performance cars” (ibid.: 237).  This association is based upon a similarity 
with the tendency for hackers to be young males, and to the antisocial, potentially 
dangerous, yet exciting nature of the practice.  These connections with antisocialism 
and menace are extended upon by the murderous images of hackers, constructed by 
the news media’s tendency to focus on their potential to cause fatalities – the 
“standard nightmare scenario” (Sterling 1993: 40) - and films such as Die Hard 2: 
Die Harder and War Games, in which hackers knowingly or unknowingly interfere 
with air traffic and nuclear weapons systems.  This trend continues today, with Die 
Hard 4.0: Live Free or Die Hard revisiting the theme, and the evil robots known as 
‘Decepticons’ in Transformers and Transformers 2: Revenge of the Fallen engaging 
in malicious hacking activity, not to mention the almost weekly news articles 
warning of impending doom via cyberwar. The pathological nature of hacking 
terminology (e.g. viruses, worms) also continues to embellish these images of 
lethality. 
‘Mad Hacker’ images construct hackers as individuals beset by a pathological 
addiction or compulsion; so obsessed with computers that they are unable to take 
care of themselves, shy away from social interactions, and have trouble 
differentiating reality and fiction.  Allusions to sexual voyeurism and masturbation 
embroider the impression of psychological instability, as do those to inhumanity.  
 57 
Despite Computer Dependency, the 1989 study by Shotton, finding that only a very 
small number of computer users were dependant and that this was not necessarily a 
bad thing for either them or civil society, this image set was widespread, with 
Charlesworth’s (1993) ‘Addiction and Hacking’ providing a unconvincing legal 
perspective on the concept.  Indeed, it continues to have significance in the modern 
discourse on hacking, as part of a wider and growing concern over ‘Internet 
addiction’ that pathologises the Internet in general, as well as hacking specifically. 
Chandler’s (1996) last image group of hackers as spies also resonates with the 
discourse on cyberespionage and cyberterrorism evident today (which will be 
further discussed shortly). 
Overall, Chandler found the images to be uniformly negative in nature, although 
those presented in the U.S.A. were found to be slightly less negative overall, due to 
the tempering effect of the American-friendly cowboy and frontier images.  There is 
no doubt that the negative representational trend identified by Chandler was and 
continues to be an actuality, and her selection of qualitative evidence is varied and 
compelling.   
The same year also saw the publication of Duff & Gardiner’s (1996) article, 
‘Computer Crime in the Global Village: Strategies for Control and Regulation - In 
Defense of the Hacker’.  Noteworthy for their simultaneously ‘pro-hacking’ yet 
legal viewpoint, they make a legal assessment of hacking that recognises the 
importance of motive in the criminalisation process.  They differentiate between the 
“clever/curious” and the “malicious/devious” (1996: 218), and acknowledge that the 
legal response in Britain and the U.S.A. had not yet made this distinction, nor had 
British or American state legislature distinguished between entry to a computer 
system and actual damage done.  They also acknowledge the change in meaning of 
‘hacker’, and the media’s role in this process: “Hacking has become a term loved by 
the media who have both mythologised and demonized the hacker” (ibid.: 215), and 
the link with the increasing control of public space and privatization of knowledge.  
Their rebuttal of the arguments for criminalisation hinges upon the notions of 
deterrence and retribution.  They address the problematic issues of detection and 
enforcement, and the fact that this combination of unlikely punishment and 
elevation of mystique may actually promote further hacking.  The actual moral 
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status of the practice is also seen as far from clear, as ‘curious’ hacking may 
actually further security measures through the identification of system flaws, and 
posit that the data owner should be responsible for ensuring that system security is 
at least adequate.   
Theirs is, indeed, a refreshing change from the usual legal perspective, and they 
raise some valid points, but their text suffers from a sometimes uncomfortably self-
conscious use of ‘cyberjargon’, and one gets the sense that they themselves are less 
than immune to the glow of hacker mythology.  As Vegh neatly summarises, “their 
essay is rather a journey of two law school professors into the digital underground, 
given their superficial understanding of hackers and cyberpunks… and their falling 
into the same trap of sensationalizing what they otherwise rightfully acknowledge 
the media are doing” (2003: 224-5).   
 
3.1.5 Generations five and six: The Microserfs and the free/libre and 
open source software (FLOSS) movement 
 
Gisle Hannemyr (1997, 1998) introduces the idea that the methods and ethics of 
hacking are capable of generating software superior to that produced by the rigidly 
Taylorist methods of specialisation and standardisation that were commonplace in 
software engineering at the time.  This positive perspective may seem surprising, 
given that Hannemyr is a Norwegian computer security officer.   
 
3.1.5.1 Black hat / White hat 
 
However, many ‘compsec’ or ‘infosec’ professionals consider themselves hackers, 
albeit ‘ethical’ ones, and hacker conferences or ‘cons’ such as the NZ Kiwicon or 
the US/global DEF CON (‘DEF CON’) pull together both ‘black hat’ (hackers who 
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break the law) and ‘white hat’ (ethical hackers or computer security professionals) 
participants, not to mention all the shades of ‘grey hat’ in between.  The Kiwicon 
Wikipedia entry, which appears to have been written by involved parties (in that it 
is in the style of the text on the Kiwicon website – see Figure 1), gives a good 
account of the general atmosphere at a hacker con:  
 
Kiwicon provides a venue for hackers and computer security 
professionals as well as other interested parties to get together and share 
knowledge, war stories and to consume a startling amount of beer. In 
the spirits of DEF CON and Ruxcon, Kiwicon intends to bring together 
the best and brightest from academia, the computer security industry, 
the hacker underground, those who manage critical infrastructure and 
law enforcement.  
(‘Kiwicon: Wikipedia’)   
 
 
Figure 2: The Kiwicon 2K7 website homepage5 
 
This diversity of attendance was apparent at the conference, with the maxim of 
‘knowing your enemy’ (and even having a beer with them) being strikingly apt.   
                                                
5 Image from: http://2007.kiwicon.org/ 
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The distinction between black hat and white hat or ethical hackers, and the 
proportions of each at hacker cons was something one of the Kiwicon attendees, the 
CEO of Securus Global (an Australian/global computer security company), made 
comment on (‘Securus Global’).  When asked whether he classed the work he and 
his colleagues did as hacking, he replied: 
 
The “hacking” (ie; testing websites and access points for clients) is just 
a small part of what we do. We perform a raft of other activities whose 
goal is to help secure our client’s environments […] Do we call the 
hacking part “hacking” ….yeah….it is what it is and our clients are 
happy to call the “tests” hacking / pen [penetration] tests. They want to 
know what hackers could do to them but we try to shut down these 
paths before they potentially impact our clients.  
(Drazic 2007a) 
 
 
In relation to this, and in response to a question regarding the distinction between 
hacker and cracker, and the media’s role in negatively defining the term ‘hacker’ for 
the general public, he also made it clear that he felt the media pathologisation of the 
term ‘tainted’ all Kiwicon attendees and hackers in general with suspicions and 
negative connotations, whether they deserved them or not: 
 
It’s tough with the media sometimes because they like to sensationalise 
it.  They would love to think and certainly like to allude to events like 
Kiwicon being full of rogue hackers.  While some in attendance may fit 
that bill, most are not… just because you know IT well and can perform 
this work, there seems to be a grey cloud above those people.  
(Drazic 2007a) 
 
 
 
Clearly, as evidenced by this statement, and in the previous self-descriptions of 
Kiwicon, hackers are most certainly not blind to their poor public reputation or the 
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media’s role in this, with one of the organisers of Kiwicon also characterising media 
coverage of hacking as ‘sensationalistic’ (Metlstorm 2007a). 
Returning to Hannemyr’s argument, he compares ‘hacker’ and ‘non-hacker’ 
software, for example, the Linux OS vs. MS Windows, summarising that: 
 
…[s]oftware constructed by hackers seems to favour such properties as 
flexibility, tailorability, modularity and open-endedness to facilitate on-
going experimentation.  Software originating in the mainstream is 
characterised by the promise of control, completeness and immutability.  
(Hannemyr 1997) 
 
These characteristics reflect the differing production environments, citing the 
benefits of an “agoristic, integrated and holistic attitude” as opposed to a 
“proprietary, fragmented and reductionist” one (ibid.).  The Linux OS and the GNU 
project are cited as examples of the programming success the hacking approach can 
achieve, and he concludes that it should be considered, at the very least, as a 
complementary approach to Taylorism. 
The concept of hacking as a work ethic had been previously touched upon by 
Turkle (1995), and Raymond (1999), and was extended in Himanen’s (2001) The 
Hacker Ethic: A Radical Approach to the Philosophy of Business.  None of these 
texts are worthy of further examination due to their excessively lyrical, subjective or 
glancing perspectives on hacking.  Hannemyr’s articles are also of limited current 
relevance, as feedback on this matter sought from various software engineering 
professionals indicates that their workplaces currently practise systems of 
production that incorporate exactly the hybridity that Hannemyr is suggesting.  This 
merely recognises that Hannemyr’s texts are perhaps somewhat dated (an 
inescapable reality in a rapidly evolving and relatively young industry) or idealistic, 
but far from invalid.   
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Indeed, Hannemyr’s texts hint at the fifth and sixth generations of hacker identified 
by Jordan and Taylor (2004) – the Microserfs and the free/libre and open source 
software (FLOSS) movement. Microserfs may be broadly understood as 
hackers/computer programmers who have been co-opted by computer programming 
corporations such as Microsoft, thus ‘selling out’ on the hacker ethics of anti-
bureaucracy, anti-authority and informational freedom.  Presumably, ethical hackers 
or computer security professionals are also partially characterised by this category, 
although one suspects (from those spoken to) that this descriptor would not likely be 
well received.  
Conversely, those involved in the FLOSS movement are hackers who have stayed 
true to these ethics, and instantiated them in the dispersed and collaborative 
production of free and/or open source software.  Richard Stallman, the GNU Project 
and operating system (OS) and the associated GNU General Product Licence 
(GPL); the Free Software Foundation; Linus Torvalds, the Linux project, and 
particularly the Linux distribution Ubuntu OS, which now has an estimated user 
base of over 12 million (Kerner 2010); all are prominent examples and 
embodiments of the FLOSS movement and ethos.  (The FLOSS movement is a 
fascinating evolutionary offshoot of hacking, and is worthy of much research in its 
own right, but will be dealt with only briefly here.) 
Hannemyr effectively pits these two generations against one another in terms of 
both work ethic and productivity.  As previously argued, the distributed, 
collaborative work ethic of the FLOSS movement (or of hacking as Hannemyr sees 
it) has also been co-opted to some extent by the corporate programming world, but 
there is no doubt that the informational freedom ethics of the two generations are 
well and truly in direct contrast.  The four freedoms of the free software definition 
are as follows: 
 
Freedom 0: The freedom to run the program for any purpose, 
Freedom 1: The freedom to study how the program works, and change it 
to make it do what you wish, 
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Freedom 2: The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your 
neighbor, 
Freedom 3: The freedom to improve the program, and release your 
improvements (and modified versions in general) to the public, so that 
the whole community benefits. 
(‘The Free Software Definition’) 
 
 
These clearly run in direct contravention to the proprietary ethos underpinning 
corporations such as Microsoft and Apple. The open source philosophy shares many 
of the same principles, although free software purists often look down upon open 
source as a development methodology as opposed to a social movement. “For the 
Open Source movement, non-free software is a suboptimal solution. For the Free 
Software movement, non-free software is a social problem and free software is the 
solution” (‘Why “Free Software” is better than “Open Source”’). Nevertheless, both 
are anathema to proprietary, bureaucratically and hierarchically organised software 
development or ‘Microserfdom’. 
Hannemyr’s texts also recognise the media’s (by now well-established) role in 
hacking’s gradual popular and legal criminalisation, and the contested nature of the 
terminology, with the author taking hacking as a set of ethics and open, anti-
hierarchical labour methods, best embodied by Jordan and Taylor’s sixth 
generation, the FLOSS movement. 
 
3.1.6 Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor: A summarisation and extension of 
hacking and its generational evolution 
 
The late Nineties also marked the beginning of Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor’s 
extensive combined body of work on hacking, with their (1998) article, ‘A 
Sociology of Hackers’, refuting the popular perception of hackers as the 
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pathological “obsessed, isolated” (ibid.: 775) individuals of Chandler’s (1996) third 
and fourth categories of media images.  This pathologisation is allegedly reflective 
of a wider fear of computers and the unknown, which hinders any true 
understanding of hacking.  They make their argument through a sociological 
investigation of hacking communities, drawing heavily on interviews with hackers.  
Initialising the article with a discussion of the terminology, they subscribe to the 
concept of hack described by Turkle (1984). A hack must demonstrate: 
 
1) Simplicity: It must be simple but impressive, 
2) Mastery: Despite its simplicity, the hack must derive from 
sophisticated technical expertise, and 
3) Illicitness: The hack must be against some institutional, legal or even 
just perceived rules.                
(Turkle 1984: 236, in Jordan & Taylor 1998: 759) 
 
 
This definition of the hack draws clear parallels with Levy’s (1984) definition, 
additionally defining illicitness as more than a purely legal condition, interlinking 
with Levy’s first, second and third ethical tenets.  Given the hegemonic stabilisation 
of the capitalist ideology in the modern environment, a philosophy calling for 
unlimited (by price or artificial scarcity) access to and circulation of computing 
resources and information is certainly illicit in Turkle’s sense, and a mistrust of and 
resistance to centralised authority is similarly ‘against’ the hierarchical power bases 
that govern both political and economic modern life. 
The hack is further identified as an end in itself, and the more it is copied, the more 
diminished its status becomes – following a pre-hacked protocol will not garner 
hacker respect (Jordan & Taylor 1998: 760).  By this stage, the Internet and World 
Wide Web were well established, with hackers and hacking embracing this 
expansion of the digital environment, and this text exists firmly within this context.  
This identification of the fundamental requirement of originality in the pursuit of 
hacker ‘kudos’ is a clear response to the rise of Internet-enabled ‘script kiddie’ 
 65 
activity.  A script kiddie is a term the hacker community use to describe someone 
who runs scripts or programmes written by someone else and distributed via the 
Internet in order to attack computer systems, rather than ‘scripting’ their own 
(Jordan & Taylor 2004: 8).  Script kiddies may be seen as a debased subsection of 
the hacker/cracker generation, although many ‘real’ hackers would argue that script 
kiddies are not really worthy of being described as hackers at all.  
 
3.1.6.1 The collective identity negotiation of hackers 
 
Jordan & Taylor’s sociological analysis of hacking communities addresses 
demographics, cultural aspects and external factors.  No real demographic 
conclusions are drawn because of the confounding factors of anonymity, sample 
self-selection, and reticence founded on fears of prosecution.  The data from the 
three surveys examined in an attempt to judge the size of the hacking community is 
inconclusive due to variable sample sizes, statistical methods and results.  However, 
six cultural factors are extracted from the interviews with hackers, and hypothesised 
as providing internal community cohesion through collective identity negotiation.  
These factors are summarised below: 
 
1) Technology: Hackers share an easy, innovative relationship with all 
technology, not just computers. True hackers hack anything and everything.  
 
2) Secrecy: Hackers have an ambivalent relationship with secrecy. They 
keep their actions secret from authority but visible to their peers, in order to 
share information and garner recognition or kudos for their feats.  
 
3) Anonymity: This factor is linked to secrecy, in that offline identities are 
kept secret while an online persona is actively constructed. 
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4) Membership Fluidity: Hacker communities are informal networks with 
high member turnover.  This is due to the organic reasons of growing out of 
hacking and the massive commitment needed to remain ‘up to date’ in such 
a dynamically changing environment, but also because it makes detection 
and prosecution much more difficult. 
 
5) Male Dominance:  Little evidence of female hackers was found.  This is 
linked to the fact that computer science is generally male dominated, 
through childhood socialisation factors and a masculine learning 
environment.  The macho competitiveness of hacking and possibility of 
online misogyny fuelled by anonymity are also faulted, but no evidence 
provided sufficiently explains this gender anomaly. 
 
6) Motivations:  The motivations uncovered by Jordan and Taylor through 
their interviews were feelings of addiction and compulsion; curiosity; being 
online as an act of escapism from a boring offline existence; feelings of 
power; the desire for peer recognition and acceptance, and an altruistic 
desire to improve network security. 
 
Several of these findings were corroborated by observations made at Kiwicon 2007 
and through communication with attendees.  There were very few women attendees 
at the conference, and many of them appeared to be the partners or friends of male 
hackers involved in organising the conference, and were helping out with 
administrative tasks such as staffing the door, and distributing tickets, programmes 
and lanyards.  Out of the 16 presenters, none were women, and the Kiwicon 
organising team was self-described (albeit self-deprecatingly, in reference to a 
communication breakdown) as “a group of dudes” (Metlstorm 2007a).  There was 
no obvious misogyny demonstrated, but a strong sense of aggressive 
competitiveness was present, with much heckling of presenters who botched aspects 
of their live demos, and even instances of audience members hacking into the live 
demos presenters were projecting onto the conference screen, and posting messages 
referring to the presenter being ‘pwned’ (hacker slang for taking control 
of/dominating/humiliating a target) and calling him names.  The tone of all this 
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behaviour was light-hearted rather than truly malicious, but it did certainly fit the 
usual socially constructed notions of ‘macho’ as opposed to ‘feminine’ behaviour.   
With regards to having an easy, innovative relationship with technology, 
Metlstorm’s previously reproduced statement described hacking as:  
 
…an expression of curiosity and a desire to understand the operation of 
complex systems, in the same category as other enthusiasts.  
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
 
This speaks to a wider engagement with complex systems (or technology) of 
multiple types, and clearly, all who presented demonstrated extremely advanced 
programming proficiency and knowledge of computing systems.  Those spoken to 
identified a range of motivations behind their hacking, corroborating all those 
described by Jordan and Taylor, with the notable exception of ‘feelings of addiction 
or compulsion’, with many adding that another primary motivation for them was to 
get or keep/do a job (as a compsec professional).   
Jordan and Taylor’s third portal into the hacking community examines the manner 
in which they maintain their external boundary. This is done through an act of 
constitutive exclusion - an ‘us vs. them’ mentality that is maintained through their 
relationship with the computer security (compsec) industry. Given the significant 
cross-over evidenced in the New Zealand hacker community (or at least that portion 
of it attending Kiwicon), it is unclear how relevant or accurate this information is – 
perhaps it is just that it is slightly dated and from a different context – but the issues 
raised over online-offline crime analogies are worth mentioning.  In Jordan and 
Taylor’s interviews, the hackers are variously described by the compsec 
professionals interviewed as ‘stupid kids’, ‘vermin’, and ‘vandals’; similarly, the 
hackers collectively described the compsec industry as being comprised of arrogant 
control freaks on a power trip (ibid.: 770).   
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However, it was acknowledged that some crossover occurred, with some hackers 
ending up working for the CSI and others involved in security testing, as previously 
outlined. The tendency for the compsec industry to draw analogies with physical 
crimes such as theft and breaking and entering, and the disfunctionality Jordan and 
Taylor identify within these analogies is significant, as physical crime analogies 
have been and still are consistently utilised in anti-hacking rhetoric and cybercrime 
legislation.  As Jordan & Taylor explain, likening data theft to physical theft is 
flawed in that taking a digital artefact does not diminish the existence of the original 
copy, and breaking and entering or trespass as offline equivalences to hacking are 
also problematic, in that hackers frequently cause no damage, and sometimes even 
help the victim to identify a security flaw. 
In summation, they define Levy’s (1984) hacker ethic as an articulation of “the 
complex construction of a collective identity” (Jordan & Taylor 1998: 775).  
Despite their exclusive reliance upon the self-articulated reflections of hackers on 
hacking (hardly objective sources), their conclusions are valuable, especially given 
the ‘imagined community’ thrust of their argument.  They mark the beginning of an 
impressive chain of literature from the duo, which makes significant headway into a 
sociological understanding of hacking. 
Tim Jordan’s (1999) Cyberpower does not focus exclusively on hackers, but on the 
wider subject of its title.  Cyberpower is defined as “the patterns of social relations 
that create systems of domination, whose articulation in cyberspace fuels an even 
more dominant elite” (1999: 141).  However, a brief discussion of hacking is 
undertaken.  In Jordan’s opinion, hackers can be “some of the most powerful 
inhabitants of cyberspace”, despite many not having access to the latest and best in 
computing resources (ibid.: 90).  He acknowledges that cost and access can be 
problems, but can also be “radically overestimated, particularly within developed 
countries” (ibid.).  Expertise is seen as more of a barrier than cost, and hackers 
defined by being willing to put in the time and effort necessary to enable their 
equipment to take control of more powerful machines.  The fact that hacking rarely 
requires a great deal of audiovisual computing resources, and the inexpensiveness 
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of satisfactory second-hand computers6 are given as further reasons for the 
comparative irrelevance of possessing the latest tools.  
 
There are numerous examples of hackers using astonishingly outdated 
equipment to control the most powerful resources of cyberspace … 
Hackers demonstrate the extreme end of the technopower elite, where 
material resources are close to zero, though never actually zero, and 
expertise is monumental.  
(Jordan 1999: 139)   
 
This point has been re-verified recently; the so-called ‘Pentagon hacker’, Gary 
McKinnon, committed what one prosecutor has called “the biggest military hack of 
all time” with a dial-up modem (Boyd, 2008), and although this status is debatable 
(Ruffin 2009a), McKinnon penetrated several supposedly secure military networks 
with what is generally regarded as outdated equipment.  Jordan’s observations are 
useful for tentatively situating hacking within wider patterns of socio-economic 
privilege, although he fails to really address the idea that hacking ‘know-how’ is 
stratified along similarly socio-economic lines. 
Paul Taylor expands upon the sociological analysis of Jordan & Taylor (1998) with 
his (1999) volume, Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime.  Similarly, this text 
relies heavily upon interviews conducted by the author with Dutch hackers, and is 
packed with quotes from interview transcripts.  Taylor organises these in such a 
way as to support his main points, which are largely an extension of the hacker 
sociology he and Jordan previously proposed.  The book is a rich source of insights 
into the hacking psyche, and a fascinating, accessible read that is likely to be 
enjoyed by the public and academia alike.  
 
                                                
6 This is seen as largely a result of Moore’s law holding more or less true (Manners 1996, and 
Rafferty & Tran 1996, in Jordan 1999: 91): it states that processing power will double every 
eighteen months, which means that every eighteen months computer prices should accordingly 
have dropped by half, or that double the processing power should be available for the same price.  
Therefore, second-hand computers are cheap. 
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Taylor re-acknowledges the contestability and gradual criminalisation of the term, 
noting its currently accepted meaning as related to “the unauthorised access to and 
subsequent use of other people’s computer systems” (1999: xi).  He sees this as a 
result of “hyperbolic misrepresentation” (ibid.: xii) in the media, which is bound to 
the information revolution.  As a society struggling to cope with the instability and 
generational discrepancies generated by rapid technical change and a world viewed 
in increasingly informational terms, hackers “serve to remind us of our technical 
vulnerability/ignorance” (ibid.: 1), with otherwise powerful groups particularly 
susceptible to fears that “their own apparent strength and superiority may prove to 
be an Achilles heel” (ibid., p. 8).7  However, it is also acknowledged that hackers 
have a tendency to play up this mystification with their penchant for threatening 
pseudonyms and group monikers; e.g. The Legion of Doom, Bad Ass 
Motherfuckers, Toxic Shock, etc. (ibid.: 6).  This tendency has been confirmed in 
this authors’ own interactions with hackers – Metlstorm, Bogan and Headhntr were 
some of the typically hard-edged hacker ‘handles’ in evidence at Kiwicon, amongst 
many others. 
Taylor again refers back to Levy (1984) and Turkle (1984) for their 
characterisations of the hack and hacker ethics, and proposes a further two 
generations, or ‘second wave’ be added to those of Levy (1984) – the previously 
mentioned hacker/crackers and Microserfs (who he names after Douglas 
Coupland’s eponymous novel). As Taylor acknowledges, these generations are not 
discrete, but they are, nonetheless, a useful means of categorisation.  This proposed 
categorisation is reformulated in ‘Hackers: Microserfs or Cyberpunks?’ (Taylor, 
2000), with the author drawing upon fictional representations of hackers to bifurcate 
the fifth generation into  “the empty regimented capitalism” of ‘Microserfs’ and the 
“anarchic individualism” of ‘Cyberpunks’8 (2000: 55) – a differentiation later 
                                                
7 An amusing example of this is given by Taylor (2000).  In 1983, Robert Morris Senior, then Chief 
Scientist at the U.S. National Computer Security Centre, is on record as stating that “[t]he notion 
that we are raising a generation of children so technically sophisticated that they can outwit the 
best efforts of the security specialists of America’s largest corporations and military is utter 
nonsense.  I wish it were true.  That would bode well for the technological future of the country” 
(Lundell 1989: 11, in Taylor 2000: 42).  Five years later, his son, Robert Morris Junior created 
and unwittingly unleashed ‘The Internet Worm’, one of the first self-propagating computer 
viruses, which caused widespread destruction in large sections of the Internet and damages 
variously estimated at multiple millions of dollars. 
8 Cyberpunk is a genre of literary fiction, the most famous example being William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer.  Cyberpunk literature is often characterised by a narrative environment of constant 
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abandoned.  The erosion of the original, anti-authoritarian hacker ethic into 
‘Microserfdom’ is seen to result from hackers’ interest in the intellectual thrills of 
hacking as an end in itself subsuming their interest in hacking as a means of 
political expression (Taylor 2001: 489).  
Taylor (1999) reiterates the cultural aspects he sees as integral to the internal self-
definition of hacking communities, adding youth to the list and providing a more 
thorough examination of hackers’ overwhelming masculinity, though again 
acknowledging that socio-cultural and psychological factors still fall short of a 
comprehensive explanation (ibid.: 26-42).  The reassessment of hacker motivations 
retains some of those given in Jordan & Taylor (1998), and two new motivations are 
also introduced: boredom with the formal computing education system, and political 
acts.   
 
3.1.6.2 Hacking as an explicitly political act 
 
Boredom as motivation is self-explanatory, but the identification of politically-
motivated hacking is extremely relevant in terms of its antecedence to hacktivism 
proper (and its interpretation through a public sphere theoretical lens) and 
connection back to Levy’s (1984) first three ethical tenets.  According to Taylor, 
“[s]ome hackers claim that they are a principled force within society dedicated to 
opposing the re-establishment of traditional values in the newly emerging 
information society” (1999: 61).  Specifically, they are opposed to what they see as 
the unjustified privatisation and commodification of information, and rather than 
demonising technological artefacts like many countercultures, “they prefer to use 
them to their fullest advantage” (ibid.: 62).  This utilisation occurs through software 
production and computer systems intrusion that specifically targets information 
commodification and copyright enforcement. Metlstorm’s identification of his 
opposition to digital rights management (DRM) tools and software patents as a 
                                                                                                                                    
change, an addiction among its protagonists to transcending the ‘prison of the flesh’ via online 
avatars, and a tension between freedom and corporate cooption. 
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motivation for his hacking, in that they represent a ‘threat to open computing’ is 
exemplary of this perspective (2007b), as is the last portion of the answer to the 
‘What is a hacker?’ question in the Kiwicon online FAQ: 
 
In a world where society's technological dependence is as obvious as the 
technology itself is opaque, hackers provide the tools and language for 
social conscience, balance and freedom. 
(‘Kiwicon FAQ’) 
 
In a continuation of Taylor’s work, Andrew Ross’s ‘Hacking Away at the 
Counterculture’ (2000) examines the media discourse on hacking as a 
systematically constructed panic to defend the corporate agendas regarding 
intellectual property and copyright law, and to ensure the severest possible 
prosecution of apprehended hackers.  Echoing the previously discussed literature, 
Ross states that “[a]n increasingly criminal connotation today has displaced the 
more innocuous, amateur-mischief-maker-cum-media-star role reserved for hackers 
until a few years ago”, and sees the function of this demonisation as allowing 
property law to be rewritten “to contain the effects of the new information 
technologies” (2000: 250-251).  In response to this, he presents a range of the most 
common defences of hacking, worth reproducing in full, that run from “the 
appeasement or accommodation of corporate interests to drawing up blueprints for 
cultural revolution: 
 
a) Hacking performs a benign industrial service of uncovering security 
deficiencies and design flaws. 
b) Hacking, as an experimental, free-form research activity, has been 
responsible for many of the most progressive developments in software 
development. 
c) Hacking, when not purely recreational, is an elite educational practice 
that reflects the ways in which the development of high technology has 
outpaced orthodox forms of institutional education. 
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d) Hacking is an important form of watchdog counterresponse to the use 
of surveillance technology and data-gathering by the state, and to the 
increasingly monolithic communications power of giant corporations. 
e) Hacking, as guerrilla know-how, is essential to the task of 
maintaining fronts of global resistance and stocks of oppositional 
knowledge as a hedge against a technofascist future. 
(Ross 2000: 252) 
 
The explicitly political nature of hacking, having run through the literature since 
Levy (1984), has clearly started to gather growing momentum and significance in a 
technological environment increasingly under corporate and governmental control.   
Ross argues that the reason hacking is less positively associated with counter-
cultural activity than, for example, the hippies, is that its counter-cultural side is 
harder to recognise due to the anonymous and covert nature of the activity.  He 
refutes the dismissal of hackings’ political significance as made by Dennis Hayes, 
who contended that “teenage hackers resemble an alienated shopping culture 
deprived of purchasing opportunities more than a terrorist network” (in Ross 2000: 
259).  Hacking’s significance as one of these cultures lies less in its complex 
articulation of a political philosophy than in its “embryonic or protopolitical 
languages and technologies of opposition to dominant parent systems of rules” 
(ibid.: 259-60) (italics in original). This protopolitics, based on a belief in open 
access to computing technology and to knowledge and information, is evident in a 
statement made by Metlstorm in a response to a general question about hacker 
ethics or ideologies: 
 
Certainly a pretty reasonable proportion of people-with-hacker-powers 
are of an ideological bent, especially those of the older generation for 
whom access to information and computer systems was a motivation for 
learning.  
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
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Ross sees increasing digital surveillance – the digital panopticon – as a system of 
social management that promotes a siege mentality by cultivating the identification 
of omnipresent domination.  Hacking is a siege breaker, critiquing existing 
technologies and cultural programmes while offering new alternatives, thus 
encouraging ‘technoskepticism’, which he sees as a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for social change (ibid.: 262-267).  Ross is perhaps somewhat 
idealistic in his overall assessment of hacking, but he definitively articulates the 
inherent and potential political significance of hacking in an innovative and 
invaluable manner, while acknowledging the obscuration of this potential through 
corporate-sponsored media discourse. 
The new millennium also brought the publication of Thomas’s (2000) ‘Criminality 
on the Electronic Frontier: Corporality and the Judicial Construction of the Hacker’.  
This deals primarily with the concepts of physicality and prosecution, arguing the 
inappropriateness of forcing physical standards of legality on a non-physical act.  
This argument has obvious connections with Duff & Gardiner (1996), and with the 
deflation of physical analogies for hacking as espoused by Jordan & Taylor (1998) 
and Taylor (1999).  Thomas deconstructs the law enforcement discourse regarding 
hacking in terms of its constant reference to corporeality, situating the body as the 
“primary locus for the jurisdictional construction of the hacker” (2000: 34).  He 
notes the norms of prosecuting hackers for their ownership of potentially illegal 
technology as opposed to their use of this technology, with “[t]he constitutive act of 
possession … transformed judicially into the performative act of hacking” (ibid.: 
25); and of similarly prosecuting their unauthorised presence in computer systems 
rather than the actual harm effected.  The non-corporeal criminal nature of hacking 
is unable to be dealt with by either the media or law creation/enforcement 
institutions, with:  
 
…outmoded standards of legality and characterisations of criminality … 
forced upon hackers.  […] The discourse surrounding hacking reveals 
little about hackers themselves, but, instead, tells us a great deal about 
social attitudes to technology. 
(Thomas 2000: 35, 27)   
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Like Jordan and Taylor, Ross sees the general fear of hacking as reflective of a 
more general discomfort with technology – their ‘easy relationship with technology’ 
(Jordan & Taylor 1998; Taylor 1999) makes us uncomfortable about our own use of 
and reliance on technology, and hence, uncomfortable about our place in the world.  
However, like Jordan and Taylor, these intuitively valid hypotheses are not backed 
up with any real evidence, although admittedly, these kind of conceptual 
correlations would be difficult to support in an objective empirical fashion.  Nor 
does Thomas suggest any alternative and superior philosophy of dealing with 
hacking in a legislative context.  
 
3.1.7 The seventh generation: The emergence and identification of 
hacktivism proper 
 
Paul Taylor’s (2001) ‘Hacktivism – In Search of Lost Ethics?’ and (2004) 
‘Hacktivism: Resistance is Fertile?’; and Jordan & Taylor’s (2004) Hacktivism and 
Cyberwars each reiterate the complicity of the media in fear mongering and 
criminalising the image of hackers. Taylor (2001) cites a characterisation of media 
reportage on hacking by (1) its obsession with hypotheses about what might have 
happened – the “standard nightmare scenario” (Sterling 1993: 40) mentioned 
previously – rather than what actually happened; (2) an abuse of anonymous 
sourcing and secrecy; and (3) paranoid gossip (Smith 2000, in Taylor 2001: 68-9).  
Jordan & Taylor (2004) again place this fear within the context of ‘viral times’, in 
which the communication systems of advanced capitalism have “created conditions 
that allow information to act in viral-like ways” (2004: 20).  The public fear of 
hacking is thus a function of a wider vulnerability to viral information, due to the 
disconnect between our reliance upon networked technologies and our ability to 
maintain and control these technologies (ibid.: 21).  Hackers are scapegoats for 
these feelings of vulnerability.   
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The media are also condemned for failing to differentiate between hackers and 
crackers.  Crackers are defined as criminal hackers (ibid.: 4), highlighting yet again 
the contested terminology observable throughout the hacking literature.  What 
exactly Jordan & Taylor’s definition of ‘criminal’ constitutes is not made perfectly 
clear, but we might contend that it intends to differentiate those hackers who 
knowingly and intentionally cause malicious and ideologically aimless damage to 
the computer systems they have entered on an unauthorized basis.  There is no real 
way of knowing their true lexical intention, but this is a useful interpretation to 
make.   
Furthermore, each text again harks back to Levy (1984) and Turkle (1984) for their 
definitions of hacking, and their significant advance on the generations of hacking 
as previously proposed by Levy (1984) and Taylor (1999, 2000) is solidified in 
Jordan & Taylor (2004).  Generations four, five, and six of this ‘second wave’ have 
been delineated previously, but are recapped below, with the additional seventh 
generation of hacktivism included. 
 
4) Hacker/Cracker: This generation is seen as having emerged during 
the Eighties, and its members defined as those “who illicitly break[s] 
into other people’s computer systems, though not always for malicious 
reasons” (2004: 11).  ‘Hacker’ is acknowledged as the term in general 
usage, while ‘cracker’ is often used internally among the community to 
preserve the original meaning of ‘hacker’ (ibid.: 12). 
 
5) Microserfs: “[C]omputer programmers who, while exhibiting various 
aspects of the hacker subculture, nevertheless have become co-opted 
into the structure of larger corporate entities, such as Microsoft” (ibid.), 
their “corporate-friendly hacker characteristics … harnessed to silicon 
capitalism” (Ross 1991: 90, in ibid.:15). 
 
6) Open Source: “This community connected its concern for the 
individual hack to a disdain for ‘bloated’ commercial software and set in 
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chain processes for producing free, elegant (hopefully) and constantly 
peer-reviewed software” (ibid.:12). 
 
7) Hacktivism: This is defined as “the merging of hacking activity with 
an overt political stance” (ibid.), and emerged during the Nineties. 
 
The perceived ethical content of hacking peaked during Levy’s (1984) first and 
second generations, fell during generations two through six (with Microserfs 
comprising “the nadir of the original hacker ethic” (Taylor 2001: 63)), and began to 
peak again with the rise of hacktivism (Taylor 2001: 61).  The final two generations 
emerged as a backlash to the corporate cooption of hacking, and “mark a retreat 
from such a pervasive intrusion of commodified values into social life, and a 
concomitant reassertion of more countercultural values” (2004: 15-16).  Jordan & 
Taylor again acknowledge that this schematisation is difficult because there are 
overlaps in time and ethics, as well as depictions of hacking being contested both 
within and without the hacker community (2004: 9-10),. As such, these generations 
are best understood in what might be best described as Foucauldian genealogical 
terms – they articulate the every-thickening discourse surrounding hacking (and, by 
extension, hacktivism) rather than providing any kind of strictly demarcated 
chronological evolution.  Each new generation builds upon rather than replaces the 
previous one, generating an ever more dense and interlinked discursive field.  Even 
though it is not chronologically accurate in any strict sense, this final realisation of 
the ‘generations’ of hacking is valuable in the overall trends and diffusions it 
identifies within the movement.   
 
3.1.8 The increasing conflation of hacking and cybterterrorism 
 
Jordan and Taylor also recognise the increasing media conflation of hacking and 
cyberterrorism, with cyberattacks often more hyped than fatal physical attacks 
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(ibid.: 26-28), an observation which leads us into the literature of Sandor Vegh. His 
(2003) doctoral thesis focuses (in part) on the change in public discourse concerning 
hacking and hacktivism before and after 9/11, investigating an increasing conflation 
with cyberterrorism as a recent evolution on the criminalising discourse on hacking, 
as hinted at by Jordan & Taylor (2004).  
He begins by acknowledges the original non-computer-specific understanding of the 
hack, defining it as “a challenge to social or cultural norms and customs … usually 
serving the interests of the producers in society” (2003: 152).  Understood in this 
sense, he identifies all hacks as counterhegemonic, in that they break or overcome 
‘functional fixations’ – limitations in artifacts “imposed by social conventions 
rather than original design” (ibid.: 152-3).  Elite forces therefore obviously wish to 
constrain this deviance, especially since hacking “attacks data, the dominant 
property of the information age.  The corporation’s two greatest fears are revenue 
losses and deterioration of public image, exactly what a hack can bring about…” 
(ibid.: 153).  He sees the media’s role in demonising hacking as resulting primarily 
from a concerted indoctrination effort on the part of the combined forces of 
corporations and the American government, attempting to simultaneously control 
hacking and effect legislation supporting their own agendas.  This will be discussed 
further in the next section, but it marks an intensification of the perceived 
purposiveness of the media fear mongering noted in previous literature. 
Vegh also corroborates previous findings regarding the near-impossibility of 
accurately compiling meaningful statistics on hacking attacks, citing a document 
recommending sentencing guidelines for American courts.  This document, signed 
by Stanford University’s Centre for Internet and Society, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and the National Association of Criminal Defence Lawyers, notes that 
individuals convicted of computer crime tend to receive far harsher punishment than 
those convicted of comparable offline crimes, and that they are generally punished 
according to the worst-case scenario rather than what they actually do (Granick et al 
2000, in Vegh 2003: 210).  The proposed post-9/11 Cyber Security Enhancement 
Act is also provided as evidence of this legislative tendency (ibid.: 208).  The initial 
unamended Act proposal would have lumped most hacks in with terrorism, 
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rendering them prosecutable in the same secretive, unmonitored manner and 
punishable by life imprisonment. 
The relevant literature on hacking concludes with Helen Nissenbaum’s (2004) 
‘Hackers and the Contested Ontology of Cyberspace’.  Her analysis of the mediated 
image of hacking parallels that of Vegh, in that she sees its shift toward negativity 
not only as a function of the sensationalist media, but the result of “an ontological 
shift mediated by the supportive agents of key societal institutions: legislative 
bodies, the courts and the popular media” (Nissenbaum 2004: 195).  She contends 
that the government and private sector consciously demonise hackers, constructing 
them as a new, post-Cold War enemy and justifying their harsh punishment.  In 
doing so, these elite sectors both retain control of normative ideology in a changing 
techno-social environment – the hackers are ‘bad’, examples of what not to be – and 
can justify further defence, security and law enforcement expenditure, as well as 
generally tightening their control on the free and open exchange of information 
(ibid.: 2000).   
The corporate and regulative normalization of the Internet, contributing to the 
transformation of a “relatively intimate and mildly anarchistic environment to one 
governed by institutionally-imposed order” is a “sea-change” that has “stranded” 
hackers (ibid.: 202).  In the new social ontology of cyberspace, hackers’ status is as 
“agents who willfully defy the rules” (ibid.: 203), with Nissenbaum citing Bowker 
& Star (1999) and Boyle (1997) as corroboration of the potential political power of 
‘naming’ or classification.  This phenomenon of the world shifting around hacking 
was also described by the CEO of Securus Global: 
 
…what was once fun and and less open to someone getting in trouble is 
now a crime that could see you in jail for 20 years. There’s been quite a 
few stories in the press. So what does a local hacker do? Most are 
decent people having fun so they stop the illegal part of their work and 
try to turn that skill into “research”. Some continue. I would estimate 
10%.  
(Drazic 2007a) 
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In this environment, not only is hacking legislatively criminalised, but the public is 
no longer in possession of even the vocabulary needed to conceive of the original, 
‘good’ meaning of hacker.  One need only contrast the literature on hacking with 
the coverage given to the activity in the mainstream media to recognise the truth in 
this statement.  In any given news article, the hacker/cracker generation is likely to 
stand in for hackers in general, and only hackers and those studying hackers have 
access to knowledge of the incredibly polysemous nature of the term and practice.  
The FLOSS movement has gone some way towards reclaiming hackers’ power to 
name themselves, but the mass mediated definition appears to be the victorious 
hegemonic project.  Nissenbaum’s hypothesis is founded upon a simple recognition 
of institutional resource superiority in influencing the media’s construction of 
reality, hence ‘reality’ reflects the media viewpoint rather than that of under-
resourced opposition movements.   
 
3.1.9 Conclusion 
 
This review of the literature concerning hacking provides an explication of the 
history, terminology, ethics and various perceptions of the practice, as well as 
illustrating the contested and constantly evolving nature of many of its components.  
From a non-specific initial application, hacking has become firmly entrenched 
within the technological, networked context of our times – within “the social 
structure resulting from the interaction between the new technological paradigm and 
social organisation at large” - what Manuel Castells terms ‘the network society’ 
(2005: 3).  If we accept Castells’ persuasive assertion that networks have become 
the basic units of modern society, and that real power is now located within these 
networks rather than within traditional geographically-bounded power hubs, then 
the ease and skill with which hackers navigate and manipulate these networked 
spaces of modernity lends them considerable advantages within this global mode of 
society.  If indeed “nowadays wealth, power, and knowledge generation are largely 
dependent on the ability to organize society to reap the benefits of the new 
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technological system, rooted in microelectronics, computing, and digital 
communication” (ibid.), then hackers possess considerable latent and actual social, 
cultural and economic, but also political power.  Politics is now “largely dependent 
on the public space of socialize communication [therefore] the political process is 
transformed under the conditions of the culture of real virtuality. Political opinions, 
and political behaviour are formed in the space of communication” (ibid.: 14).  As 
we shall see, hacktivists are particularly attuned to this facet of the information or 
network society in which we now live, and this sensitivity, combined with their 
ability to manipulate these spaces of communication, means that they are 
increasingly puissant players in the game of networked global politics. 
As such, the range of societal powers hackers possess is threatening to the status 
quo of established interests (particularly political-economic interests), and hackers 
have experienced ongoing image management issues in relation to this.  These 
issues have been exacerbated by the floating polysemy of the terms hacker and 
hacking, which has left hackers vulnerable to attempts at external meaning making 
and fixing. Governments and corporate media often frame them as purely criminals 
or terrorists, conflating the term with the practices of cracking and cyberterrorism. 
These illegal and destructive practices are arguably best understood as a specific 
subsection of the increasingly dense discursive field surrounding computer hacking, 
but they are not representative of the practice at large. The programmers ‘hacking 
up’ code for money or love, for proprietary or free/open source projects, at work, at 
home, and in hackspaces, and the ‘ethical hackers’ or computer security 
professionals, are all hackers. They almost certainly comprise the vast bulk of the 
global hacker community in terms of sheer numbers. They are simply not as 
‘newsworthy’ as those hacking into a power plant’s SCADA9 system or a bank’s 
credit card records, or into Google, Adobe or Intel’s corporate network to steal 
intellectual property. 
It is clear that hacking, as a philosophy and practice, has been anti-authoritarian and 
countercultural from the outset, with this fundamental ideological vein guiding its 
eventual expansion into a more overtly political form; hacktivism. Building upon 
                                                
9 SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems are industrial control systems used to 
monitor and control processes within large power, water, manufacturing, transport or 
communication facilities or infrastructures, such as power plants and airports. 
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the foundation of hacking, the phenomenon of hacktivism as first introduced by 
Taylor (2001) will be investigated, placing it within both the recently constructed 
context of hacking, and that of the wider repertoire of ‘electronic contention’ 
(Costanza-Chock 2001).  Its differentiation from this wider repertoire will be 
addressed, as will attempts to categorise its varying internal threads. 
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Chapter 4 
Hacktivism: The revival and extension of the political ideology within hacking 
 
Hacktivism is something, in my opinion, that we’ve not really seen in 
action yet.  It’s one of those lurking things we know can be used to great 
effect, but hasn’t really yet been exploited to it’s full power. 
(Metlstorm 2007) 
 
 
The previous chapter on hacking has provided us with a rich context for the ensuing 
review of hacktivism.  Like, hacking, hacktivism is also a diverse practice, but, as a 
subgroup or evolutionary offshoot of hacking proper, can be defined somewhat 
more precisely.  A review of the literature on hacktivism, grounded with examples, 
and further supplemented with excerpts from interviews and personal 
communication with organisers and attendees of Kiwicon, will establish a holistic 
understanding of the evolution, context and nature of the practice.  This review will 
also assess various proposed models for an internal division or categorisation of 
hacktivism, and will establish the need for a public sphere theoretical treatment of 
the practice. 
We have heard one description of hacktivism previously, from Jordan & Taylor 
(2004), who identify it as a trend emerging from hacking during the Nineties, and 
define it as “the merging of hacking activity with an overt political stance” (2004: 
12).  The conciseness and general thrust of this definition were echoed in definitions 
offered by two of the organisers of Kiwicon, who described hacktivism as below: 
 
Hacking for a political cause.  
(Bogan 2007) 
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[The] [u]se of hacking techniques for politically motivated goals. 
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
 
 A comprehensive appraisal of the literature on hacktivism will extend upon this 
understanding, linking it firmly to the previous literature and knowledge on 
hacking, and to the wider contexts of online activism and an increasingly 
informational society.  Various trends within hacktivism will also be identified. 
 
4.1 The imaginary hacktivist 
 
Curiously enough, the first texts on hacktivism worth assessing address it in a 
purely theoretical or hypothetical sense.  Certainly, politically motivated web site 
defacements had already occurred, and hacking itself can be considered a form of 
political expression, as we have seen.  However, these texts consider the additional 
possibility of less discrete, more systematic, communal, and creative applications of 
hacking practice for explicitly political ends – phenomena that had not yet occurred. 
 
4.1.1 Hacktivism and Netwar 
 
The first of these texts is John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s (1993) ‘Cyberwar is 
Coming!’, published in the defence journal Comparative Strategy.  It is perhaps not 
surprising that the possibility of hacktivism was first identified by members of the 
elite institutional network potentially threatened by it, rather than by academia.  
Indeed, the knowledge of hacktivism appears to have diffused right through into the 
news media before any non-activist or non-military-aligned/consulted academics 
took an interest in it.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s article is a rethinking of the theory 
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and practice of warfare and conflict, and the significance of knowledge in these 
emergent modes of conflict.  They argue that “[i]nformation is becoming a strategic 
resource that may prove as valuable and influential in the post-industrial era as 
capital and labour have been in the industrial age” (1993: 24-5).  
In line with this, they conceive of the rise in prominence of two forms of networked, 
informationally grounded conflict: ‘Cyberwar’ and ‘Netwar’.  Cyberwar is the main 
concern of their article, and is an exclusively military-level affair, but their 
peripheral concept of Netwar arguably includes the first rough theorisation of 
hacktivism.  It is defined as (probably) non-violent “information-related conflict at a 
grand level between nations or societies”, targeted primarily at information or 
communication systems:  
 
It means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population 
“knows” or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it.  A 
netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both.  It may involve 
public diplomacy measures, propaganda, and psychological campaigns, 
political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local 
media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to 
promote a dissident or opposition movements across computer 
networks.  
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1993: 28-29) 
 
 
The practice of hacktivism incorporates several of these strategies.  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt conclude that networks can defeat institutions, and, as such, networked 
forms of opposition may require networked responses, warning that “[t]he future 
may belong to whoever masters the network form” (ibid.: 40).  As one of the 
organisers of Kiwicon put it: 
 
As is often discussed in information warfare texts, the network is a 
multiplier – you can be instantly anywhere on the virtual battlefield, 
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communicate seamlessly, and the scale of your attack isn’t limited by 
the size of your force.  
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
 
This article is only a vague intimation of the potential occurrence of hacktivist 
practices, and does not differentiate them from a wider subset of non-military, 
networked conflict strategies.  Nor is the scope of the word “grand’ explained, but it 
seems from this and from the war terminology that that the authors were thinking 
along the lines of strategic and ongoing multi-participant engagement.  Hacktivism 
is not confined to this form.  Nonetheless, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ is worth 
acknowledging for its prescience and the direction from which this prescience 
came. 
 
4.1.2 The Critical Arts Ensemble and electronic civil disobedience 
 
The next set of literature on hacktivism came from an almost diametrically opposed 
direction – the “broad based artist as activist collective” founded in 1986 and known 
as the Critical Arts Ensemble (CAE).  The group of six core members is at least 
semi-academic: appearing regularly on the art and academic circuit; publishing 
regularly in art journals; producing several publications; and creating “[s]ituationist-
style performances, street theatre and other disturbance ‘art’” (Liu 2004: 361).  
Their art and literature is firmly and knowledgably grounded in postmodern theory, 
such as that of Deleuze & Guattari, Foucault, Baudrillard and Debord, with their 
methods proceeding on “the basis of a primarily Deleuzean critique of the social, 
economic, political and military powers of dominance” (ibid.). 
CAE’s contribution to the discourse on hacktivism began with The Critical 
Disturbance (1994), a collection of essays.  One of the critical observations of this 
collection is that the forces of global dominance no longer reside in physical 
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locations, but exhibit ‘rhizomatic mobility’, using the instantaneous world flow of 
capital as their new instrument of domination: 
 
Elite power, having rid itself of its national and urban bases to wander 
in absence on the electronic pathways, can no longer be disrupted by 
strategies predicated upon the contestation of sedentary forces.  The 
architectural monuments of power are hollow and empty, and function 
now only as bunkers for the complicit and those who acquiesce.  They 
are secure places revealing mere traces of power… These places can be 
occupied, but to do so will not disrupt the nomadic flow.  
(CAE 1994: 23) 
 
As such, CAE urge the transferal of resistance to the new virtual geography of 
cyberspace, proposing the ‘electronification’ of traditional methods of civil 
disobedience.  They envisage a small group of hackers covertly bringing the 
“destructive force of inertia into the nomadic realm” (ibid.: 25) by disrupting or 
blocking the command and control of information, just as traditional protesters 
create blockages or disruptions in physical space.  However, at the time of writing, 
they acknowledge that this is a purely fictitious scenario.  The hacking community 
is seen as too apolitical and fragmented, with their ‘free information’ ethic in 
opposition to the disruption of the structures of cyberspace.  Perceiving futility in 
asking them to “destabilize or crash [their] own world”(ibid.: 26), CAE encourage 
artist-activists to take up the mantle and encourage “speculation on a model of 
resistance within emerging techno-culture” (ibid.: 27), before electronic power 
relations are fully solidified and “we are left with only critique as a weapon” (ibid.).  
(This differentiation between politicised hackers and, for lack of a better word, 
‘hackerised’ activists, is prescient in that it identifies a future actual schism within 
hacktivism.) However, they pessimistically conclude that when “[c]onsidering the 
history of utopia in ruins, the probability that this opportunity will be successfully 
used looks discouraging” (ibid.: 125). 
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CAE extend this discourse in Electronic Civil Disobedience and Other Unpopular 
Ideas (1996), exhorting activists to comprehend that the streets are “dead capital”: 
 
Nothing of value to the power elite can be found on the streets, nor does 
this class need control of the streets to efficiently run and maintain state 
institutions.  For C[ivil] D[isobedience] to have any meaningful effect, 
the resisters must appropriate something of value to the state.  
(CAE 1996: 11) 
 
This is information, with its blockage and disruption striking most effectively at the 
core on the institution.  This hypothetical new form of civil disobedience (CD) 
gives the book its title: Electronic Civil Disobedience (ECD).  This term is one that 
is later sometimes conflated with hacktivism as a broader set of practices, but the 
distinctions between the terms and their individual relevance will be teased out 
through the subsequent literature. 
An important point of note here is that although the CAE are arguably correct in 
identifying information as having become the most valuable political-economic 
resource (as opposed to the concrete artifacts of ‘the street’), they go too far in 
classifying the streets as entirely ‘dead capital’.  There is, of course, still much value 
to be found in traditional street-based protest, as the 2010 New Zealand anti-mining 
protest and any number of constantly-occurring overseas protests show.  
Furthermore, the nexus between the streets and the internet is also proving 
immensely valuable, with most online protests incorporating some form of offline 
dimension, and many offline protests relying on web technologies for organisation 
and co-ordination. 
Nonetheless, the CAE’s call for activism to move to the electronic pathways is an 
important one (provided we avoid their extremist denial of the power of protest in 
the offline world), and they identify the schism between hackers and activists as the 
primary obstacle to the realisation of their vision.  Because hacking is an extremely 
time-consuming form of constant self-education, hackers have little time left for 
politics, and tend to stay within their own community, hence, the opportunity for 
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hackers and activists to socialise is rare.  Activists are lacking in the technical 
knowledge to effect ECD (ibid.: 19-20), hence “the schism between knowledge and 
technical skill has to be closed, to eliminate the prejudices held by each side (hacker 
intolerance for the technologically impaired, and activist intolerance for those who 
are not politically correct)” (ibid.: 20). (Oddly enough, it turns out that hacker 
intolerance for activist ‘digital incorrectness’ is more of a problem, as we shall see 
in section 5.4.3). 
Drawing on negatively fraught media representations of hacking, CAE also posit 
that ECD will be demonised, conflated with malicious computer criminality without 
regard for motive, identifying the reasoning for this and their counter-argument as 
below: 
 
While the computer criminal seeks profit from actions that damage an 
individual, the person involved in electronic resistance only attacks 
institutions…Conflating electronic civil disobedience (ECD) with 
criminal acts makes it possible to seal off cyberspace from resistant 
political activity.  Attacks in cyberspace will carry penalties equivalent 
to those merited by violent attacks in physical space…The same legal 
penalties that apply to CD should also apply to ECD.  
(CAE 1996: 17-18)                        
                                                          
Some might argue that the literature of CAE is irrelevant; its authors lacking 
institutional academic status and their writing too subjective, rhetorical and 
hypothetical to be of any real use.  However, their identification of the possibilities 
inherent in the convergence of hacking and activism is remarkably insightful.  
Furthermore, there is a strong argument for it having actually inspired its own 
realisation, in some instances at least.  Finally, their prediction that ECD would be 
institutionally conflated with computer crime is yet another indicator of the 
perceptiveness of these texts.  
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4.2 The emergence of a hacktivist reality 
 
One of the groups arguably inspired by CAE, the Electronic Disturbance Theatre 
(EDT), assembled over the next few years.  Co-founded by one-time CAE member 
Ricardo Dominguez, it consists of four core artist-activists who consolidated in 
support of the Zapatista rebellion in the Chiapas region of Mexico.  They began 
holding ‘virtual sit-ins’ in 1998, operationalising ECD as envisaged by CAE. A 
virtual sit-in can take a number of forms, with the most common based on page 
reload requests, but all have the intention of overloading a target server with an 
inundation of electronic information, thus effecting system/network slowness or a 
total crash. The EDT initially achieved their sit-ins manually, organising a 
collective pushing of the page reload icons on browsers targeted at a particular site.  
This progressed into the development of the FloodNet Tactical System (FloodNet) 
or the Swarm, software that automates the process (see Figure 2, next page).  
Zapatista supporters downloaded this software, and instituted several simultaneous 
attacks on a variety of Mexican and U.S. sites aligned with the Mexican 
government. An attack on September 9, 1998, was particularly noteworthy.  
Websites belonging to the Mexican President Zedillo, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
and the Pentagon all reportedly received 600,000 hits per minute.  The Pentagon 
rather controversially fought back by redirecting FloodNet users to a site containing 
a JavaScript Applet (‘HostileApplet’) that overwhelmed the browsers of the 
estimated 10,000 protesters.   
Dominguez and the EDT are still together and still engaged in hacktivist activity – 
their most recent project, the ‘Transborder Immigrant Tool’ utilises cellphone-based 
GPS technology to direct illegal Mexican immigrants to safe routes, shelter, food, 
water, and sympathizers during their attempted border crossings (‘Transborder 
Immigrant Tool’).  Unsurprisingly, this project has attracted a lot of criticism, and 
Dominguez, now an Associate Professor of Visual Arts at the University of 
California, San Diego, is, as of early 2010, facing criminal action and calls for the 
revocation of his tenure. 
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Figure 3: The FloodNet user interface (in Netscape)10 
 
Tactics such as these and different hacktivist organisations will be gone into in more 
detail as required, but the main point to be grasped here is that 1998 marked the 
growing recognition of hacktivism as a reality.  There were reports of ‘hacktivity’ 
on almost every continent (Wray 1998) and the New York Times published a front-
page article (Harman 1998), thus inserting it into pubic discourse.  This partially 
purposive garnering of media interest was, however, in direct opposition to the 
covertness advocated by CAE. 
Another co-founder of the EDT and a then-postgraduate student, Stephan Wray, 
published ‘Electronic Civil Disobedience and the World Wide Web of Hacktivism’ 
in the same year.  Wray proposes five portals for consideration, originally into 
hacktivism, but then thinks better of using the term and defines them instead as 
gateways into “the wider world of extraparliamentarian direct action Net politics” 
(Wray 1998), although he slips back into using the term ‘hacktivism’ later in the 
article.  This inconsistency is the major flaw in an otherwise clearly executed 
                                                
10 Image from: http://trasescena.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/zapatista-tactical-floodnet.jpg 
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discussion; as seen in the discussion of hacking, naming and categorization can be 
powerfully significant acts, and providing a consistent terminological framework is 
privileged in academia.  Nonetheless, Wray’s article is important as it marks the 
first attempt to demarcate hacktivism both internally, and from the wider context of 
online activism.  
The first of these portals, ‘Computerised Activism’, is “the use of the Internet 
infrastructure as a means for activists to communicate with one another, across 
international borders or not” – a practice correctly identified as having been in 
existence since the mid-Eighties, but having remained marginal until the “explosion 
of the Internet” and the World Wide Web in the early-to-mid-Nineties (ibid.).  The 
next portal, ‘Grassroots Infowar’, is an intensification of the first, describing a shift 
beyond activists merely sharing information towards the incitement and 
organisation of real world action.  From there, the intensity is wound up yet again, 
with ‘ECD” and then ‘Politicised Hacking’.   
ECD is as theorized by CAE and applied by the EDT, and is defined as using “the 
Internet infrastructure as both a means for communication and a site for direct 
action” (ibid.).  Politicised Hacking is the practice of web site defacements for 
explicitly political motives, which Wray acknowledges is not a strictly recent (circa-
1998) phenomenon.  It is differentiated from ECD by its methods, but also by the 
fact that it tends to be an anonymous, individual activity, as opposed to the public, 
collective nature of ECD – primarily because it is much more unequivocally illegal.  
Wray’s final portal is ‘Resistance to Future War’; a hypothetical utilization of all 
the previous tactics in a generalized resistance, such as was present regarding the 
Vietnam or Gulf Wars, but computer-assisted.  
He closes with an assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of these 
techniques, now referring to them collectively as hacktivism in contradiction to his 
initial statement regarding the term.  His assessment encompasses political, legal, 
tactical, technical and ethical factors; central issues raised are that hacktivism is 
likely to be supplementary or complementary to offline activism – a way to garner 
publicity but perhaps not likely to swell “the ranks of the disaffected” (ibid.).  He 
also notes the potential that there will be disagreements over the appropriateness of 
disrupting bandwidth amongst otherwise politically cohesive groups, echoing the 
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internal schisms suspected by the CAE, but more correctly identifying their 
provenance.  Nonetheless, Wray feels sure that hacktivism is on the rise, and is 
likely to continue to gain attention. 
 
4.3 The conflation of hacktivism and cyberterrorism: Hacktivism’s 
inheritance of hacking’s image problems, pre-9/11 
 
Dorothy E. Denning’s (2000) ‘Hacktivism: An Emerging Threat to Diplomacy’ 
marks another contribution to the discourse from a defensive standpoint.  
Hacktivism, according to Denning is “not benign, and it threatens US Embassy 
computers and diplomatic missions.  It can compromise sensitive or classified 
information and sabotage or disrupt operations.  At the very least, it can be an 
embarrassment to those attacked and erode public confidence in the U.S. 
government” (Denning, 2000).  No real advances in terminology or categorization 
are made; indeed, Denning’s article is largely an account of various website 
defacements and automated Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and 
alarmist statements to the effect that things could have been and probably will 
become much worse. 
Automated or server-side DDoS attacks occur when a hacker illicitly gains control 
of a network of computers (often referred to as a botnet) and uses them to wage an 
individually or multi-individually controlled, automated version of a virtual sit-in.  
The botnet is generally comprised of appropriated computers (bots), and usually 
established with trojans or viruses proper.  Trojans are programmes disguised as 
something else, e.g. an email attachment, that self-install and either attack the 
victim computer or establish remote access for their creator/distributor.  
Automated/server-side DDoS attacks are different from virtual sit-ins because there 
is no collective element to their deployment.  Virtual sit-ins may also be referred to 
as client-side or ethical DDoS attacks.  The various usages of these terms differ 
from source to source, but we will persist with the usages already expressed, i.e. we 
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will use ‘DDoS attack’ to refer to server-side DDoS attacks, and ‘virtual sit-in’ to 
refer to client-side DDoS attacks.   
Denning’s examples include the June 1998 anti-nuclear defacements and alleged 
data theft and destruction enacted by an international group of hackers referring to 
themselves as Milw0rm, against India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre; the site 
defacements relating to the 1999 Kosovo conflict and accidental bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces; and the simultaneous and massive 
server-side DDoS attacks on various commercial web sites, including Amazon.com, 
Yahoo.com, eBay.com and CNN.com in February 2000.  
Amongst Americans, Dutch and Britons, it may interest local readers that New 
Zealand hackers were apparently part of the mix of hackers involved in the Bhabha 
hack.  There was also a NZ connection in the 1989 WANK (Worms Against 
Nuclear Killers) worm incident, in which US Department of Energy and NASA 
computers all over the world were infected with a worm which changed their login 
screens to display a message informing the user that their system had “officially 
been WANKed”, and accusing them of talking of times of peace for all but 
preparing for war.  In a nod to New Zealand’s nuclear-free status, the worm code 
contained specific instructions informing it to avoid New Zealand computers 
(Assange, 2006)11.  
Denning concludes that “[h]acktivism poses a genuine threat to U.S. government 
operations, particularly abroad”, but that so far as defensive tactics go, it can be 
lumped in with any type of cyberattack.  These tactics are fundamentally run-of-the-
mill security measures and processes that one would hope most personal computer 
owners, let alone governmental institutions, would practise.  However, the real 
importance is in Denning’s casual grouping of hacktivism with all other 
cyberattacks.  One gets the distinct impression that it is not seen as so very far from 
cyberterrorism, despite the fact that hacktivism was and is generally understood to 
exclude actions resulting in the public suffering physical harm or fatalities.   
                                                
11 Perhaps just as interestingly, the author cited here is Julian Assange, now director of 
Wikileaks.com, who started life as one of Australia’s most prominent hackers. 
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This increasing conflation with cyberterrorism is addressed by Manion & Goodrum 
(2000) in ‘Terrorism or Civil Disobedience: Toward a Hacktivist Ethic’.  They 
define hacktivism as “the (sometimes) clandestine use of computer hacking to help 
advance political causes” (2000: 14).  It confronts both the corporate 
commodification of information and the violation of human rights, thus posing a 
threat at both the “private industry/intellectual property level and the national 
governmental/national security level” (ibid.).  Their article’s intent is to establish 
whether or not hacking activity can “reasonably be defined as an act of civil 
disobedience” (ibid.: 15), in line with the discourse of CAE and EDT.  The 
principles determined as core to this definition are that the ‘hacktions’ must not be 
for personal profit, be demonstrably ethically motivated, and not result in human, 
financial or infrastructural casualties.  Their essential recommendation is to assess 
each hacktion on a case-by-case basis, but that overall, hacktivism is a form of CD 
and therefore is ECD.   
 
4.3.1 Electronic civil disobedience or hacktivism? 
 
Like Wray (1999), Manion and Goodrum’s terminology is somewhat confused, as 
web site defacements, which they mention, are not particularly analogous to the CD 
tactics of blockage and disruption.  Graffiti or culture-jamming are surely more 
appropriate analogies.  Furthermore, CD is almost exclusively a collective action, 
which website defacements rarely are. Defacements or DDoS attacks, however, may 
involve a single individual (or a small group of individuals) temporarily rendering a 
website unavailable or replacing its usual content, unlike virtual sit-ins, which 
attempt to harness the power of collective mobilization.  Obviously, the 
differentiation is not incontrovertible12, nor is it attempting to judge defacements as 
‘bad’; it simply aims to dispute the suitability of terming them ECD, and to argue 
that ECD is but a subset of hacktivist actions. 
                                                
12 Indeed, much defacement appears to be the work of two or more hackers.  Furthermore, there is 
often no way to know how large a support group is behind any one defacement or DDoS attack.   
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Nevertheless, Manion & Goodrum’s assertion that hacktivism is being conflated 
with cyberterrorism rather than considered in terms of its motivations and extremity 
of effect, with significant repercussions for both its image and the punishment of its 
practitioners, is of value.  They see this as a purposive strategy on the part of 
governmental and corporate institutions to control copyright issues, legitimate the 
erosion of property rights and ignore a larger critique of information ownership and 
Internet commercialization (ibid.: 17).  Defining hacktivism as a form of CD is 
integral to ensuring punishments that are in line with CD rather than with terrorism, 
and to allowing its continued practice as a critique of ‘techno-control’.  Despite 
Manion & Goodrum’s use of the term CD, these sentiments are fundamentally 
sound, though as previously, no data is provided to support these allegations. 
The following year saw further publications by Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Denning, all 
as part of a report, edited by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and entitled Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy.  Sponsored by the American 
Office of the Secretary of Defence and conducted in the military think-tank RAND 
(National Defence Research Institute), its research perspective is predictable.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt expand on their concept of Netwar, generously differentiating 
between its ‘dark side’ of “terrorists, criminals, and ethnonationalist extremists” and 
‘light side’ of “civil-society activists” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001: ix).  The 
impression is given that the ‘brighter’ face is, in itself, still not particularly 
desirable, but has “positive potential if it can be harnessed” (ibid.: x).  It is not 
precisely clear on which side of the coin hacktivism lies – Denning’s chapter on it is 
in the ‘light’ section of the book, although her discussion ranges through to 
cyberterrorism, and the editors’ note further muddies the waters13 – and how exactly 
civil society activists who might be opposing aspects of the current American 
regime might be ‘harnessed’ to positive effect is somewhat mystifying.  Their 
intentions appear to be good, but their tone comes across as rather patronising.  One 
can almost hear them congratulating themselves for their munificence towards the 
activist universe.   
                                                
13 “Hacktivists and Cyberterrorists have not posed much of a threat to date, but this could change if 
they acquire better tools, techniques, and methods of organisation, and if cyberdefences do not 
keep pace.” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt in Denning 2001: 239) 
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Their deconstruction of Netwar into five levels of theory and practice; 
technological, organisational, social, doctrinal, and narrative level, is valid if not 
particularly innovative.  Similarly, their identification of ‘swarming’ (sustained 
series of attack pulses on centralised target/s by decentralised network cells (ibid.: 
12)) as the key doctrinal approach to watch out for is also relevant, if borrowing 
rather heavily from the idea of smart/flash mobs.  Various other refinements are 
made to their initial model of Netwar, but none are particularly useful in terms of 
hacktivism. 
However, Denning’s chapter is rather more useful.  She conceptualizes a continuum 
of online protest much like Wray (1998), but culminates in cyberterrorism rather 
than a combination of the previous practices.  The continuum runs from activism, to 
hacktivism, to cyberterrorism, with the boundaries between the categories defined 
as “fuzzy”.  Hacktivism is defined as “the marriage of hacking and activism”, and 
covers  “operations that use hacking techniques against a target’s Internet site with 
the intent of disrupting normal operations but not causing serious damage” 
(Denning 2001: 241).   
It is split into four categories; virtual sit-ins and blockades; email bombs; web hacks 
and computer break-ins (including site defacements, site redirects, and data theft or 
destruction); and computer viruses and worms. Email bombs are an attempt to 
overwhelm a target server with an automated flood of email messages, usually 
bearing some political message; and the basic difference between viruses and 
worms is that worms autonomously self-propagate whereas viruses are attached to 
files or segments of code, using their movements as a vehicle for distribution.  
However, due to evolution in their levels of sophistication, this difference is 
becoming less and less relevant.  These are semi-valid divisions, but email bombs 
are a form of blockade and do not really merit their own category, as Denning 
herself admits.   
Cyberterrorism is “the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism.  It covers 
politically motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss 
of life or severe economic damage” (ibid.).  Denning’s concern is that the tools of 
hacktivism can just as easily be the tools of cyberterrorism (ibid.: 280), and sees 
activism as the most effective means of protest, presumably because it is less likely 
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to be demonised by institutions acting on the inflammatory advice of consultants 
such as herself.  What needs to be remembered with relation to all this discourse 
about the looming threat of cyberterrorism and semi-inclusion via proximal mention 
of hacktivism is that firstly, it was purely hypothetical in 2001 (see Vegh 2003), and 
is arguably still hypothetical now, depending on which definition of terrorism is 
utilised.   
The 1975 USA Taskforce on Disorders and Terrorism (run by National Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals) classified terrorism into six 
categories, one of which was ‘Official or State Terrorism’.  If we accept that state 
actors can perpetrate terrorism, then the recent Stuxnet worm (which is widely 
regarded as malware of a development standard only made possible through state-
sponsorship of some kind (MacLean 2010, Markoff 2011)) does indeed fit the bill 
of cyberterrorism, as it caused extensive economic damage. However, the very idea 
of state terrorism is quite controversial (see Primoratz 2005) – as Jeremy 
Greenstock, the then-Chairman of the UN Security Council Counter-terrorism 
Committee summarised in the Security Council’s 4453rd Meeting, state terrorism is 
not recognised as a legal concept in the international community: “If States abuse[d] 
their power, they should be judged against international conventions dealing with 
war crimes, international human rights and international humanitarian law” 
(‘Addressing Security Council’ 2002).  The then-Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi 
Annan, also went on to say that “[e]ach country by itself cannot have its own of 
special definition of terrorism” (‘Press Conference with Kofi Annan’ 2002), which 
specifically problematises the 1975 definitions generated by the USA’s Taskforce 
on Disorders and Terrorism. . In terms of cyberterrorism, we may refer to Vegh 
(2003) who defines state-associated cyberattacks as ‘cyberwar’, in keeping with this 
international legal standard. In summary, as Denning, Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s 
research was both conducted and published prior to ‘9/11’ and seems to endorse this 
wider understanding of terrorists as non-state actors, their heavy focus on and 
promotion of the control of the online environment and disapproval of online 
activism or hacktivism appears to be even more ideologically-based and 
unjustifiable. 
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Paul Taylor’s (2001) ‘Hacktivism: In Search of Lost Ethics’ essentially places 
hacktivism in the slightly updated context of the generations of hacking as 
formulated by Levy (1984), Jordan & Taylor (1998), Taylor (1999) and Taylor 
(2000)14, signifying a second peak in the ethical content of hacking.  Apart from 
recognizing (but not providing empirical evidence) that hacktivism’s media image 
is going the way of hacking’s, Taylor contributes little fresh information; the main 
content of the text is to use Denning’s internal framework for hacktivism to explore 
her examples and a few of his own choosing in a more definitively positive light.  
Overall, it is somewhat repetitive and disappointing when compared to Taylor’s 
other work on the subject. 
 
4.3.2 Hacktivism and publicity: An unavoidably necessary evil 
  
The final apparently pre- 9/11 text on hacktivism came once more from CAE.  
Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media (2001) is essentially a critique 
of the way in which their vision has been operationalised.  They reassert their belief 
that ECD should be a covert tactic in line with the hacker tradition.  Courting 
publicity is “only modestly effective if not counterproductive” (CAE 2001: 11), 
with activists having no hope of outdoing the massive resources and publicity 
machines of “capitalist structures” and the media allegiance to the status quo (ibid.: 
17).  CAE accept that ECD has already been “sold for its 15 minutes of fame”, but 
urge activists to make a concerted effort to engage in actions that provide only “bad 
copy’, thus halting the media event.  However, they also argue that ECD must be 
rescued from the current situation, in which cyberspace trespass or blockage in the 
U.S. results in jail for a first conviction as opposed to physical CD, which, if 
actually culminating in an arrest, is punished by a $25 fine and a night’s detainment 
with other protesters.  
                                                
14 This has already been discussed thoroughly in the preceding section, but as a reminder: (1) 
True/Original; (2) Hardware; (3) Software/Game; (4) Hacker/Crackers; (5) Microserfs; and (6) 
Hacktivism. 
 100 
The state can be generous here, since such tactics are purely symbolic in 
the age of nomadic capital.  Such generosity is not shown when the 
political action could actually accomplish something.  This is a situation 
that must be changed… If we lose the right to protest in cyberspace in 
the era of information capital, we have lost the greater part of our 
individual sovereignty.  We must demand more than the right to speak; 
we must demand the right to act in the “wired world” on behalf of our 
own consciences and out of goodwill for all. 
(CAE 2001: 33-4, 37) 
 
This final point and their assessment of the dangers of submitting one’s cause to the 
distortions of the mass media and associated institutions are entirely valid.  
However, it seems all too easy for CAE to criticise the actions of others while 
remaining safe in their citadel of words. Contrary to CAE’s beliefs, dallying with 
the media is a necessary evil, one that hacktivists cannot escape and can only 
attempt to manage to their own advantage.   
 
4.4 Hacktivism and the post-9/11 world 
 
The media trend towards the increasing conflation of hacking, hacktivism, and 
cyberterrorism became even more pronounced following the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centre ‘twin towers’ and other American targets.  Following 9/11, 
several authors addressed the intensification of this media trend and the limitations 
it places upon hacktivism. 
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4.4.1 Hacktivism and the repertoire of electronic contention 
 
Sasha Costanza-Chock’s (2001) ‘Mapping the Repertoire of Electronic Contention’ 
has the dubious honour of being the first discussion of hacktivism in a post-9/11 
context.  He refers to it throughout as ECD (noting that it is commonly referred to 
as hacktivism elsewhere) but includes tactics such as site defacements and DDoS 
attacks that have been argued as a poor fit to the term.  Borrowing Tilly’s (1983) 
phrase, he proposes a tactic/outcome matrix intended to map out the ‘repertoire of 
electronic contention’.  The tactic styles are borrowed from Tarrow (1998), and the 
outcomes from Staggenborg (1995).  The matrix is summarised in Table 6, with the 
shaded cells identifying those tactics considered to be ECD (Costanza-Chock 2001). 
 
 
 
POLITICAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
MOBILISATION 
OUTCOMES 
CULTURAL 
OUTCOMES 
CONVENTIONAL 
TACTICS 
e-lobbying 
e-petitions 
non-flooding 
email and fax 
campaigns 
mobilisation 
coordination 
 
information distribution 
alternative news, commentary and 
publishing 
oppositional e-art 
e-fundraising and merchandising 
e-research 
representation 
 
DISRUPTIVE 
TACTICS 
campaigns 
utilising all 
tactics to the 
right ! 
and conventional 
tactics 
collective email/fax 
floods 
virtual sit-ins 
 
site-defacement and redirection 
data theft and destruction 
DDoS attacks 
automated individual email/fax 
floods 
viruses, worms and Trojans 
 
 
VIOLENT 
TACTICS 
 
? "cyberterrorism! ? 
Table 6: Costanza-Chock's (2001) tactic/outcome matrix for the repertoire of 
electronic contention 
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Costanza-Chock’s matrix is a useful framework for considering ‘electronic 
contention’ as a whole, but as he admits, there is much actual and potential category 
overlap, and cyberterrorism is classified as too complex to theorise, presumably 
because it had not (and arguably still has not) occurred.  Nonetheless, the matrix 
serves to further advance the theoretical differentiation of hacktivism from a wider 
electronic background.  His recognition of the post-9/11 legislative and media trend 
towards the conflation of hacking/hacktivism and cyberterrorism as limiting the 
political opportunity structure of disruptive electronic contention and limiting the 
diffusion of its tactics is also well-founded, despite the lack of supporting empirical 
evidence. 
 
4.4.2 Hacking for democracy: Media representations of online public 
resistance to elite control 
 
The status of hacking and hacktivism both before and after 9/11 is one of the 
subjects of Sandor Vegh’s (2003) doctoral thesis, Hacking for Democracy: A Study 
of the Internet as a Political Force and its Representation in the Mainstream 
Media.15  The wider focus of Vegh’s work is the struggle between elite control and 
public resistance on the Internet.  He conceives of a three-actor model, with the 
government (privileging national security interests) and corporations (privileging 
corporate interests) generally united against the wider public and their priority on 
civil liberties.  The basic assertion is that the Internet is a potential tool for 
democratization if it is allowed and shaped to be, but that as everywhere, “certain 
counterhegemonic or politically empowering activities are appropriated for the 
goals of the elite with the help of the mass media under their control to serve as 
pretext for interventions to preserve the status quo” (Vegh 2003: 32).  Hacking and 
hacktivism are included among these activities, as has been alleged in the previous 
literature.   
                                                
15 Vegh published articles stemming from this in both 2002 and 2005.  Both merely repeat thesis 
content, therefore, the thesis will be primarily focused on. 
 103 
In line with Manion & Goodrum (2000), Vegh sees a purposive governmental and 
corporate agenda behind the negative media images, intended to legitimize the 
installation of oppressive legislature controlling wider political opposition, not just 
computer crime.  Vegh makes a good argument in support of this theory, but it is 
ultimately exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to prove.  However, this seems 
less a statement about the author’s credibility than about his high ambitions, and he 
makes an extremely valuable empirical contribution to the discourse on hacking and 
hacktivism in the media. 
 
4.4.2.1 Differentiating hacktivism from cyberwar, and internally 
differentiating hacktivists 
 
After outlining a successful framework for strategies of control on the Internet, 
Vegh similarly attempts to categorise online resistance.  The resistant activities are 
categorised as privacy protection, alternative news, online advocacy, hacktivism, 
and cyberwar.  These categories are claimed to be “exclusive and comprehensive” 
(ibid.: 132), but considering that the development of software intended to protect 
the privacy of the user is commonly included amongst hacktivist activities, such as 
Six/Four and CameraShy, they are somewhat flawed.  Vegh’s assertion that their 
techniques may blur but their use will not is too brief to overcome this, and 
subsequent discussion of examples does not adequately clarify the terminological 
discrepancy.   
Hacktivism and cyberwar are grouped together as cyberattacks, which Vegh 
proposes should be considered in terms of perpetrator identity, target identity, 
method of occurrence, frequency of occurrence, goal, and damage caused (ibid.: 
165-6).  Hacktivism is defined as “a politically motivated single incident online 
action, or a campaign thereof, taken by non-state actors in retaliation to express 
disapproval or to call attention to an issue advocated by the activists” (ibid.: 167), 
with two categories stemming from the hacktivists’ background; ‘wired activists’ or 
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‘political hackers’.  (This differentiation is given a more through treatment by 
Taylor (2004) and Jordan & Taylor (2004), as is discussed later).  Cyberwar is 
defined relatively, as hacktivism “elevated to the state level (in agenda or in terms 
of actors) and [becoming] a sustained engagement between parties connected to an 
ongoing conventional armed conflict” (ibid.: 168).   
 
4.4.2.2 Hacktivism and publicity: An unavoidably necessary evil (redux) 
 
Vegh also recognises the reciprocal relationship between the media and hacktivism, 
likening hacktivists’ attempts to garner positive publicity for their cause to an 
attempt to hack the very process of reporting (ibid.: 199-200).  Again, the 
conclusion is that this is often unsuccessful.  Pre-9/11, hacking and hacktivism were 
feared because of their threat to the networks that had become “the life line of 
developed post-industrial nations” (ibid., p. 209), and post-9/11, because they are 
increasingly conflated with cyberterrorism.  Even though (as he repeatedly points 
out) cyberterrorism is still hypothetical, Vegh believes that its media prominence is 
a function of governmental desire to maintain it as a valid threat, “under the 
disguise of which legislation can be passed that increases the power of the 
government” (ibid.) (and by association, corporations) and restricts civil liberties 
and individual rights.  Legislative examples are the so-called Patriot Act and 
proposed Cyber Security Enhancement Act. 
Vegh establishes through the quantitative and qualitative analysis of articles from 
five American newspapers16 mentioning the word ‘hack’ or some variant in the year 
encompassing 9/11, that media coverage of hacking is generally negative and 
became more so in the 6 months after the attack on the World Trade Centre.  
Overall trends identified were the tendency to use the conditional tense but 
overshadow this through the use of strongly negative, sensationalistic language; 
overuse anonymous ‘official sources’; and be vague about the place, time and 
                                                
16 The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, San Jose Morning News, and USA 
Today. 
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nature of the attacks or attackers, but much more precise when referring to the 
actual and possible targets.  The ‘standard nightmare scenario’ is again apparent, 
with air traffic control, nuclear power plants and electrical and water infrastructures 
the ‘usual suspects’.  The coverage as a whole became more negative post-9/11, 
despite a decreased actual incidence of reported hacking and hacktivism17.  Most 
significantly, ‘attackers’ were increasingly identified as cyberterrorists rather than 
criminals, as part of a larger focus on the subject of cyberterrorism (despite its non-
occurrence).  This empirical analysis is a major contribution to the literature on 
hacktivism, finally providing some quantitative proof of hacking and hacktivism’s 
fraught relationship with the mass media. 
The ‘necessary evil’ component of hacktivism’s representation in the news media 
was something that all the Kiwicon organisers and attendees spoken to had similar 
views on, in that media exposure is often an integral part of successful hacktivism, 
but that hacktivists need to manage this exposure if it is to benefit them.  Several 
stated that they felt the negative media and public perceptions of hacking were a 
disadvantage to hacktivist methods when compared with traditional activism, with 
this ‘vilification’ and the increasing “privitisation and development of undemocratic 
mechanisims” online (Farrell 2007) lessening the impact of the political message. 
 
the challgenges faced are intergral to the paradigm. there is an attempt 
to fight against what is happening to the online world, however it is 
these changes that are reducing the capability. there is also the 
vilification- we are scared to exercise any rights online for fear of being 
discredited or defamed.  
(Farrell 2007) 
 
 
Metlstorm discussed the publicity prank the Kiwicon organizers used to advertise 
the conference as an example of the perception management required when utilising 
hacker or hacktivist techniques in aid of causes, be they political or otherwise: 
                                                
17 Vegh argues that this was essentially the result of the majority of hackers and activists wanting to 
give the U.S.A. ‘a break’ following the events of 9/11. 
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the “pranks” we pulled to advertise Kiwicon were pretty good examples 
of low-level hactivism style techniques, but of course without a political 
motivation. In this case, we were dissatisfied with the lack of attention 
paid to our media release, and decided that if the media wouldn’t write 
our story, we’d write it for them. :) We used XSS (cross site scripting) 
to inject a fake story into several media sites (and continue to maintain 
the ability to do so!) to attempt to bait other journalists into reporting on 
their competitors misfortune. It was effective … 
[They used XSS to hack the New Zealand Herald website, one of New 
Zealand’s major newspapers, and the story was covered by their 
competitor, the Fairfax-owned Stuff.co.nz website which agglomerates 
New Zealand’s other major newspapers’ content (see Figure 4: The 
Stuff.co.nz coverage of the Herald.co.nz XSS 'hack'). 
Computerworld.co.nz was also hacked.] 
… The coverage we received for the Kiwicon incidents (IDG’s 
coverage of it’s own hack, Fairfax coverage of the Herald hack) was 
sensationalist, and would have been wildly inaccurate had we not 
ensured that we talked to the journalists and spun things “right”. 
Reporting of technology issues in the mainstream media is always poor, 
and if you’re trying to use the media, you have to be very proactive in 
spin control.  
(Metlstorm 2007a) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Stuff.co.nz coverage of the Herald.co.nz XSS 'hack' 
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Figure 3 shows the coverage given to the prank by Stuff.co.nz, with Metlstorm’s 
comments explaining that the article was clearly marked as a joke, in that it 
contained ‘wildly unreasonably comment that no sane person would believe” 
(‘Hackers hit NZ Herald website’). 
 
4.4.3 Mass Action and Digitally Correct: An internal differentiation of 
hacktivism 
 
Paul Taylor’s (2004) ‘Hacktivism: Resistance is Fertile?’ generally reiterates 
previously identified concepts such as hacktivism’s relevance in opposing 
increasingly abstracted capitalist structures and its evolution from the previous 
generations of hacking.  In line with CAE’s hopes, Taylor sees hacktivism as a 
convergence of increasingly politically aware hackers and increasingly 
technologically ‘savvy’ activists.  However, like Vegh, he argues that these 
different origins have led to two distinct trends in hacktivism, the first constituted 
by web hacks and computer break-ins such as site defacements, and the second by 
acts of ECD such as virtual sit-ins.  Little elaboration on these terms is given; hence, 
it is not precisely clear where their boundaries lie.  Hacktivism as a whole is 
compared to culture jamming, in that it seeks to “reverse engineer global capital” 
(Taylor 2004: 487); and hacktivists to spiders who spin dynamic webs of resistance 
on the static networks of global capitalism (ibid.: 494-5).  This metaphor is 
borrowed from Klein (2001) and Lash (2002). 
Hacktivism and Cyberwars was also published in 2004, another joint sociological 
effort from Taylor and Jordan.  Like Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime (1999), 
it relies heavily on interviews with hacktivists and various statements and 
manifestos made by different hacktivist groups.  As such, it presents a slightly 
idealised image of the protagonists, though it is a broadly appealing read that offers 
new insights into potential internal categories of hacktivism.  As discussed in the 
previous section, and as initialized by Taylor (2001, 2004), hacktivism is seen as an 
ethically resurgent final generation in the evolution of hacking: 
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Hackers remain obsessed with a wilful immersion in the abstract 
environment of computer code, whereas hacktivists connect this 
immateriality to the importance of a social or political rationale, even 
when an action is coordinated in cyberspace or is about cyberspace. 
(Jordan & Taylor 2004: 35) 
 
The wider context of the information age is the second thread leading into 
hacktivism, with hacktivism emerging in the lacunae of the “complex 
communication systems of advanced capitalism… where institutional control 
becomes increasingly difficult” (ibid.: 20).  The mass-mediated vilification of 
hacktivism is again a function of wider feelings of technological and informational 
vulnerability.  The third thread is simply that of modern social protest and 
resistance, especially that of the anti-Neoliberal-globalisation movement.  
Hacktivism is “an attempted solution to the problem of carrying out effective 
political protest against a system that is expanding its global reach in increasingly 
immaterial forms” (ibid.: 30). 
Hacktivism generally is defined as “a combination of grassroots political protest 
with computer hacking… Hacktivism is activism gone electric” (ibid.: 1).  
Expanding on Vegh (2003) and Taylor (2004), two distinct but not mutually 
exclusive trends are identified within hacktivism.  These two categories are dubbed 
‘Mass Action Hacktivism’ (MAH) and ‘Digitally Correct Hacktivism’ (DCH).  
MAH is the virtualisation of street protest; effectively ECD, it is “a combination of 
politics and inefficient technology.  It is an attempt to defy the lack of physicality in 
online life, in favour of a mass collection of virtual bodies that are yet not present to 
each other” (ibid.: 69).  Hacking influences DCH more than street protest; it is “the 
political application of hacking to the infrastructure of cyberspace.  It is an attempt 
to use the lack of physicality in online life to amplify a political message” (ibid.). 
An example of MAH is the use of FloodNet by EDT, which has already been 
mentioned.  Other virtual sit-ins are also included, such as those carried out by the 
now-defunct Electrohippies as part of the ‘Battle in Seattle’ in 1999 against the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) summit, which reputedly attracted 450,000 
participants over five days, and crashed the WTO servers twice (ibid.: 75).  
Community accountability is privileged; as Ricardo Dominguez said: “All we are 
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doing is creating the unbearable weight of human beings in a digital way” (Meikle 
2002: 142).  Parody mirror sites such as those used during the etoy.com/etoys.com 
conflict18 and by ®™ark19 and the ‘Yes Men’, and other satirical performance-
based hacktions are also included under the mantle of MAH.  
DCH is generally more interested in the ‘bandwidth rights’ component of human 
rights, which can bring some of its proponents and other hackers into opposition 
with MAH.  They see virtual sit-ins as bandwidth abuse, as they can slow down 
sections of the Internet ‘near’ but unrelated to their target, which contravenes the 
hacker ethic privileging the free flow of information.  The 1999 use of FloodNet by 
EDT in support of the Zapatistas actually brought threats from other hackers, who 
threatened to ‘shut them down’ in retaliation to their disruption of the network 
(ibid.: 90).  The ‘Foreign Minister’ of the hacktivist group Cult of the Dead Cow 
(cDc), Oxblood Ruffin, is cited as calling them “illegal, unethical and uncivil… One 
does not make a better point in a public forum by shouting down one’s opponent” 
(Ruffin 2002. in ibid.).  Others are merely concerned that MAH is inventing “the 
first self-drowning politics” (ibid.: 167-8).   
Hacktivismo, an offshoot of cDc committed to circumventing Internet censorship, 
have undertaken a number of projects exemplifying DCH, including Peek-a-Booty, 
Back, Six/Four, and Camera/Shy.  These projects will be discussed in more detail 
later in the thesis, but in short, their intents are as follows.  Peek-a-Booty is 
essentially a distributed anonymous network acting as a server and using 
cryptographic techniques to elude detection, thus allowing its users or network 
nodes to bypass firewalls and censorship.  For example, a Chinese citizen could use 
                                                
18 The etoy.com/etoys.com conflict occurred in 1999 as the result of etoys.com, an online toy store, 
trying unsuccessfully to buy out etoy.com’s domain name.  etoy.com are an artist-activist 
collective, and reacted to the injunction obtained against them by etoys.com by undertaking an 
online smear campaign, which included parodying the etoys.com site.  The result was that 
etoy.com kept their domain, etoys.com’s share price fell 70% over the period of the incident, and 
they eventually collapsed.  Although this could not be linked conclusively to etoy.com’s 
campaign, it seems significant. 
 
19 ®™ark were a web-based activist group (‘RTMark’) who essentially attempted to subvert the 
corporate universe.  Perhaps their most infamous stunt was swapping voice boxes of three 
hundred Barbies™ and G.I.Joes™ then putting them back on the shelves, where they were sold.  
They created a parody of the WTO website, and a software tool for generating mirror sites for 
satirical purposes.  Their WTO parody site (‘World Trade Organisation’) was passed over to the 
Yes Men (‘The Yes Men’), two activists who respond to the emails sent to them in error as WTO 
members, and thus gain the opportunity to give satirical presentations to unsuspecting applicants. 
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it to safely view a Falun Gong website excluded by the Chinese Internet gateways 
or servers.  Six/Four is similar, while Camera/Shy is a steganography tool that 
encodes text in images (digital steganography of this kind is the concealment of 
information within computer files; for example, using the bits or binary code in an 
image file and modifying them in such a way as to embed a message within the 
image but have the alterations remain invisible to the naked eye (which is possible 
due to the huge amount of digital information necessary for image files)). However, 
there is some concern that DCH may occasionally fall foul of the retrograde hacker 
tendency to privilege the means of the hack over the end (ibid.: 169). 
Jordan’s 2008 Hacking, although offering new insight into the FLOSS movement, 
Creative Commons and other ‘non-programming’ hackers, does not add anything 
substantial to his and Taylor’s previous work.  Hacktivism is grouped in with 
cyberwar, cyberterror, and cybercrime, all of which are collectively described as 
“hacking the social” (2008: 66).  “[T]he social” is defined as “various aspects of the 
way we live in twenty-first-century societies” (ibid: 70), and is differentiated from 
‘society’ in that these forms of hacking do not address the entirety of what we call 
society, and simultaneously address extra- or co-societal systems such as politics 
and economics.  These four forms of hacking: 
 
…address aspects of ‘the social’ in the following areas: grassroots or 
popular political activism, conflict between nation states, the nature of 
security and terror and shifting forms of crime. 
(ibid: 70) 
 
The section on hacktivism largely reiterates ideas and cases previously addressed in 
Jordan and Taylor’s previous literature, although what was previously known as 
digitally correct hacktivism is now described as informational hacktivism.  Jordan 
continues to maintain that mass action and informational hacktivists 
overwhelmingly gravitate towards different kinds of political issues, a thesis that is 
borne out within the somewhat dated cases and examples used within the text, but 
that is arguably increasingly redundant, as is evident in the more recent cases 
explored within this thesis.  Informational hacktivists’ focus on the politics of free 
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informational flows is seen as distinct from those of mass action hacktivists, who 
apparently “have their eyes firmly on other political issues, particularly those 
developing from the alter-globalisation movement” (ibid: 76).  As Chapter 7 
contends, this is an increasingly false or outdated distinction, as there is ample 
evidence of mass action hacktivism being used to campaign against disruptions to 
the free flow of information online.  Jordan’s description of hacktivism as applying 
primarily to “the politics that dominates the front pages of our newspapers” as 
opposed to “the politics that dominate discussion in the backroom of IT support” is 
a clear articulation of this assumed dichotomy (ibid: 71) – technological politics are 
ever increasingly incorporated into and coterminous with the ‘front page’ world of 
mainstream politics, at least within post-industrial societies, and are engaged with 
by all kinds of hacktivists. 
 
4.4.4 Political coders, performative hacktivists and political cracking: An 
improved internal differentiation of hacktivism 
 
Furthermore, Jordan & Taylor (2004) and Jordan (2008) fail to discuss web site 
defacements and other potentially individually undertaken hacktions within their 
typology.  This gap is closed by Alexandra Samuel (2004a) with her doctoral thesis 
Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation.20  Samuel uses hacktivism to 
address three key questions: why do people choose to participate in collective 
political action; when do political actors pursue policy circumvention rather than 
policy change; and can the Internet foster new forms of political participation?  She 
defines hacktivism as “the non-violent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital 
tools in pursuit of political ends” (Samuel 2004a: iii), differentiated from hacking 
by its explicitly political nature, from online activism and cyberterrorism in that it is 
transgressive rather than conventional or violent (see Constanza-Chock 2001), and 
from traditional CD in that it is online (ibid.: 3-4).  Samuel provides a clear and 
                                                
20 Like Vegh, Samuel published a book chapter stemming from her thesis (2004).  However, only the 
thesis will be referred to as it encompasses the content of the chapter. 
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empirically supported internal taxonomy of hacktivism, revealing much about the 
hacktivists themselves in the process.  Furthermore, she begins to place hacktivism 
within a wider political context, extending upon the intentions of others before her. 
 
 
 
FORMS 
 
ORIGINS ORIENTATION 
POLITICAL 
CRACKING 
 
Defacements 
Redirects 
Automated DDoS attacks 
Sabotage 
Information theft 
 
Hacker-programmers Outlaw 
 
PERFORMATIVE 
HACKTIVISM 
 
Parodies 
Sit-Ins Artist-activists Transgressive 
 
POLITICAL 
CODING 
 
Software development Hacker-programmers Transgressive 
Table 7: Samuel's (2004a) taxonomic matrix of hacktivism 
 
 
She proposes a taxonomy of hacktivism constructed by the intersection of various 
hacktivist origins (hacker-programmer or artist-activist) and orientations 
(transgressive or outlaw).  It is built upon and supported by a number of interviews 
Samuel conducted with hacktivists or those connected to them.  Some potential 
overlap is acknowledged, with the origins recognised as more stable than the 
orientations (ibid.).  Hacktivism that is transgressive in orientation “challenges the 
legal and political order, but still exists in relation to it and even shares some 
norms… such as legitimacy and accountability”, whereas outlaw orientation 
“completely rejects the legal and political order” (ibid.: 37).  Transgressive 
hacktivists tend to work in medium-size groups and collaborate multinationally, 
whereas outlaw hacktivists tend to work solo or in small groups and collaborate 
nationally, multinationally and internationally.  National collaborations target 
governments, businesses or organisations within their own country; multinational 
collaborators band across borders to attack a common target at the subnational, 
national or multinational level; and international collaboration involves hacktivists 
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from one country targeting a government, business or organisation in another 
country, sometimes generating reciprocal hacktivism (ibid.: 50).  Her taxonomy is 
best presented in the matrix illustrated in Table 7 (ibid.: 101).  It should be noted 
that performative hacktivism and political coding are analogous to Jordan & 
Taylor’s (2004) MAH and DCH respectively. 
 
 
4.4.4.1 Hacktivism as a form of identity construction 
 
The question of why hacktivists participate in hacktivism is addressed through the 
responses given by hacktivists and those associated with them to a questionnaire 
distributed by Samuel.  She argues that hacktivists tend to choose their methods of 
hacktivism before they choose their political agenda; therefore, Samuel reasons that 
specific political goals may not always be at the heart of political participation 
(ibid.: 105-6).  She posits that their participation is founded on identity incentives, 
which “reflect individuals’ desire to confirm or enhance their sense of belonging to 
a group, where membership in that group enhances their self-image or self-esteem” 
(ibid.: 122).  This hypothesis is tested and supported by attempting to predict which 
form of hacktivism individuals will pursue by their backgrounds.  The findings are 
reflected in the origin component of Samuel’s taxonomic matrix.   
Furthermore, hacktivists tend to collaborate rather than work alone when there is no 
real necessity to do so because of instrumental rather than interactive incentives.  
Hacktivist collaborations are less about social interaction, and more about increased 
productivity and the desire to affirm one’s own identity and self-esteem through 
affirming that one belongs to a group that shares the same identity and values.  
Thus, the kind of hacktivism one engages in and the group one collaborates with 
represent purposive statements about personal identity and values (ibid.: 134).  
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4.4.4.2 Political coding and policy circumvention 
 
Samuel addresses her second question (asking when political actors pursue policy 
circumvention rather than policy change) through an assessment of two case studies 
of political coding, which is almost exclusively concerned with policy 
circumvention.  Policy circumvention is defined as “a strategic political response to 
a specific policy, law, regulation, or court decision”, which aims to nullify the 
effects of that policy, law, regulation, or court decision.  It creates excludable 
benefits for its individual practitioners, but also some non-excludable benefits such 
as issue awareness, declining enforceability of the given law, changes in norms 
concerning policy compliance, and possibly even policy change (ibid.: 156-8).  It is 
important in that it “shunts the state to the status of a side-show whose co-operation 
is non-essential to obtaining desired political outcomes” (ibid.: 158).   
Samuel’s case studies support her hypothesis that the emergence and success of any 
given instance of policy circumvention hinge upon the presence of political 
entrepreneurs, a low cost of failure ensuring high participation, and a governing 
state that faces political constraints on repressing the circumvention (ibid.: 164).  
Policy circumvention is likely to become more common in an increasingly 
informational society, with increasing political and economic repercussions, and 
Samuel advises that policies will have to become much more robust and enforceable 
if they are to hold up to the onslaught (ibid.: 197-98). 
 
4.4.4.3 Hacktivism, free speech, and accountability 
 
Samuel’s third question, regarding new forms of political participation on the 
Internet, addresses hacktivism’s challenges to traditional deliberative democratic 
requirements of free speech and accountability.  Hacktions such as site defacements 
tamper with the speech of others, therefore are they instances of free speech or 
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actually rebukes to the concept?  Performative hacktivists and political crackers 
work on the belief that access to free speech is not equal, and therefore take an 
‘ends over means’ approach to having their say.  This perspective also incorporates 
the need to have their speech heard, not just spoken, thus, the concept of free speech 
in the context of the Internet expands to encompass notions of audience access.  
Conversely, political coders are focused almost exclusively on maintaining an 
absolute standard of free speech, in line with the original hacker ethic that all 
information should be free (Levy 1984).  This ideological opposition is a reframing 
of what was discussed in Jordan & Taylor (2004). 
Accountability is also problematised by the different nymity practices of hacktivists.  
Anonymity has been variously theorised as having the potential to be good for 
deliberative discourse, as it can promote the free flow of ideas, protect unpopular 
idea from prosecution and privilege the speech act itself rather than the speaker.  
However, on the down side, it may have a deleterious effect in that it removes 
accountability, makes it impossible to judge the motivations of the speaker and may 
even promote uncivil behaviour.  Anonymous hacktivism could thus be judged from 
either perspective.  However, through the interviews conducted, Samuel establishes 
that hacktivists make nymity choices not as a matter of principle but as deliberative 
statements in themselves, which have the added bonus of further reinforcing their 
individual and group identity.  Political crackers use robust pseudonymity both to 
avoid legal consequences and declare that they are accountable to no one; political 
coders use weak pseudonymity to construct a digital persona that is accountable to 
wider Internet community, but in digital rather than physical terms, and 
performative hacktivists do not use pseudonyms, thus embracing their 
accountability to the real world (ibid.: 220).  Hacktivists therefore treat their nymity 
choices as “a political tool, with [different choices] conveying different kinds of 
claims about political strategy, risk, and above all, accountability” (ibid.; 222). 
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4.4.5 The imagined community of hacktivism 
 
The identity issues raised by Samuel (2004a) were added to by Still (2005) in 
‘Hacking for a Cause’.  Various reassertions of previously made statements about 
the evolution of hacktivism and its mass-mediated image issues are made, with Still 
noting that hacktivists make concerted efforts at clear self-definition and 
explanation of their motives, not only through the messages contained in their 
hacktions but by their self-organisation into groups with declarations and codes of 
ethics (Still 2005).  He posits that “the action on behalf of the cause is just as 
important as the result, especially if that action draws attention to the cause 
represented by the “hack” and, as a corollary, presents the hacker in a more pro-
active, cause-oriented light” (ibid.).   
These explicit efforts towards community bounding are in line with Jordan & 
Taylor (1998), Taylor (1999) and Samuel (2004b).  Hacktivist communities are 
likened to the ‘imagined communities’ of Benedict Anderson (1983) with their 
distant but virtually co-present members, and the  ‘virtual neighbourhoods’ 
described in Appadurai (1996).  These neighbourhoods are both created by and 
creative of hacktivists, as well as being both a product of and having an effect on 
their wider social environment.  Appadurai’s observation that they are “often 
explicitly constituted to monitor the activities of the nation state” (1996: 168, in 
ibid.) is particularly relevant in light of the criminalisation and conflation with 
cyberterrorism that hacktivism experiences.  This process is again seen as a way for 
the state to create a ‘discourse of danger’ (Campbell 1992: 54, in ibid.), and thus 
normalise truths about how we should and should not behave.  Still’s article may be 
little more than a reassertion of the content of previous literature, but these 
reassertions serve to emphasise central contentions regarding hacktivism.  
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4.4.6 The morality (or lack thereof) of hacktivism 
 
The final text on hacktivism to be considered is Himma’s (2007) ‘Hacking as 
Politically Motivated Digital Disobedience: Is Hacktivism Morally Justified?’.  
Published as part of a book edited by Himma on computer security, it is essentially 
a rebuttal of the assertion that hacktivism, understood as electronic civil 
disobedience, is morally justifiable.  As previously argued, the assumption that all 
hacktivism is or intends to be an electronic form of CD is incorrect.  However, 
Himma’s argument can be generalised as an assessment of which instances of 
hacktivism are morally acceptable (in his opinion).  He defines hacktivism as 
“involving unauthorized digital intrusions for the purpose of protesting some 
injustice or advancing come political agenda” (Himma 2007: 86).  This definition is 
clearly inferior to that determined by Samuel (2004b) and others, as it does not take 
into account what Samuel referred to as ‘political coding’.   
Himma’s framework for judging the morality of hacktions is also unsound.  The 
framework considers the magnitude and nature of the harm caused; whether or not 
the hacktivists are prepared to accept responsibility; whether the hacktivists’ 
political agenda is plausible and supported by adequate reasons; and whether the 
hacktivists are in cognitive possession of an explanation for their support of this 
political agenda.  Himma considers the most morally justifiable attacks to be on 
public, non-commercial websites, due to a concern for business losses and the free 
speech of individuals.  Certainly, no instance of a hacktion targeting an individual’s 
personal website springs to mind, but Himma’s concern for commercial entities 
seems either naïve or biased.  In terms of accepting responsibility, he feels that 
hacktivists’ frequent pseudonymity does not suffice, and that they should be 
prepared to accept the legal consequences of their actions.  The fact that these 
consequences would frequently be out of all proportion to the crime seems to escape 
him.  Again, he seems more concerned that their anonymity might cause financial 
hardship for corporations who feel compelled to spend more on computer security 
(something which they should really be doing in the first place, in case of truly 
malicious attacks).  He also likens hacktivist groups to terrorists in that they both 
often operate under group names, although contends that this is “merely to illustrate 
 118 
that there is morally significant difference between claiming responsibility and 
accepting responsibility” (ibid.: 90).   
He effectively judges hacktivism in support of general human rights and aimed at 
“oppressive non-democratic governments” as acceptable, but that “in support of the 
“hacker ethic”” as unacceptable, apparently not considering such rights as open 
access to the Internet, denied to millions of Chinese, North Koreans and Iranians21 
(regimes one feels sure Himma disapproves of) as part of a wider human rights 
agenda (ibid.: 91-93).  His argument is based on privacy and property rights, and a 
wilfully literal interpretation of Levy’s original three ethics as well as an 
idealisation of Western democracies as entirely free from human rights 
manipulations.  Lastly, Himma interprets most hacktivism as lacking any clear 
articulation of their agenda.  However, his only example to back this up is site 
defacements, which are sometimes characterised by unsophisticated political 
slogans.  He does not recognise the overwhelming evidence against his assumption, 
such as the websites and other documents of many hacktivist groups, which provide 
pages of motivations and explanations.   
Overall, Himma’s position seems to be that most hacktivism is morally 
reprehensible.  He sums up by blaming any negative media images of hacktivists on 
the hacktivists themselves, due to having “committed acts that are far more 
obviously problematic from a moral view than the positions they seek to attack” 
(ibid.: 94).  This is an almost unbelievably simplistic perspective on the situation, 
and fails to take into account any wider power structures and political or corporate 
agendas.  Himma’s final recommendation is that anonymous hacktivism should be 
“punished to the full extent under the law” (ibid.: 95), as this will discourage 
anonymous hacktivism, and deter all anonymous cyberattacks, including, one 
presumes, cyberterrorism.  One would have thought that individuals who are willing 
to sacrifice their lives for their organisations’ cause are unlikely to be dissuaded 
from cyberterrorism by the prospect of having ‘the book thrown at them’.  It would 
seem that all the heeding of this advice is likely to accomplish is numerous 
hacktivists being punished unnecessarily harshly, effecting a general chilling of 
moderate and non-violent online political dissent – a trend already encouraged. 
                                                
21 Amongst many others. 
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4.4.7 Hacking and hacktivism: Conclusions and the lack of a public 
sphere theoretical interpretation of hacktivism 
 
In summary, there has clearly been a reasonable amount of academic attention paid 
to the subjects of hacking and hacktivism.  This is unsurprising; in a rapidly 
changing and increasingly complex socio-technological environment, it is only 
natural for the actions of those who are at the forefront of and comfortable with this 
environmental evolution to be objects of fascination.  Understandably, this 
fascination has been and is shared by the general population, and is coupled with a 
widespread inability to grasp the full technological complexities of hacking.  This is 
not intended as a condemnation – the average citizen22 can no more be expected to 
understand the full technological complexity of computers and the Internet than 
they can be expected to grasp, say, quantum physics.  
However, the difference is that we do not interact with the equipment used by 
quantum physicists in our daily lives, whereas most of us within the post-industrial 
world do interact with computers and the Internet on an exceedingly regular basis.  
At the very least, we understand that they provide a large proportion of our global 
communications and financial infrastructure, and thus have an immense role to play 
in facilitating slows of political-economic power.  It is this combination of 
interactional familiarity, reliance, and incomprehension, coupled with an increasing 
tendency towards malicious activity within certain branches of hacking, that has 
contributed to the installation of the negative popular image of hacking that exists 
within society and the mainstream media today.  The negativity of this perception is 
both echoed and reified by ever-increasing and unnecessarily harsh legislative 
criminalisation of the activity, invoked by state and corporate concerns over its anti-
authoritarian nature and tendency towards agendas incompatible with the 
commercialisation and control of digital information.  
This popular perception of hacking has been given much attention within the 
literature discussed, with a variety of qualitative and quantitative research on the 
                                                
22 The author wishes to make it clear that she includes herself in this category. 
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media’s role in promulgating it provided in support.  It is also clear that hacktivism 
if sometimes tarred with the same brush, and that this negative characterisation of 
both hacking and hacktivism has only been exacerbated since the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Formerly, hacking (and by extension hacktivism) was 
portrayed and regarded as the online equivalent of offline crimes such as breaking 
and entering, trespass, fraud and vandalism.  As discussed, the sentences applied to 
such crimes certainly tended to be harsher than those applied to their offline 
equivalents, arguably due primarily to a legislative fear of the unknown and the 
desire to discourage a form of crime that is notoriously difficult to detect and 
control.  Nevertheless, the crimes of which hackers stood accused were 
fundamentally mundane, their glamour imparted largely by their online status and 
technological sophistication.   
However, since the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the demonisation of hacking 
(and therefore hacktivism, as a branch of hacking) has become more pronounced, as 
Costanza-Chock (2001) and Vegh (2002, 2003, 2005) have shown.  Illegal or 
borderline-legal hacking of any kind has been increasingly and erroneously 
conflated with cyberterrorism, just as terrorism has been conflated with Islam.  It 
does not take too much effort to identify the common denominators within these 
chains of association – a fear of the unknown (be that unknown technological, 
cultural, political, or religious), and of the fact that everyday technical 
infrastructures can be subverted and turned back upon those supposedly in control 
of them.  Indeed, is not the hijacking and utilisation of American aeroplanes as 
weapons against American lives and property nothing if not a massively simple and 
violent hack, in the original and ephemeral sense of the word? 
This conflation attempts to characterise all hacking activity as running counter to 
democracy and freedom, when the reality is infinitely more complex and nuanced.  
Certainly, some strands of hacking are criminal and malicious and could never, by 
any stretch of the imagination, be aligned with democratic values.  However, 
hacktivism is a new form of political participation, as has been explored by some of 
the literature reviewed.  This literature has broadly explored hacktivism’s role in 
democracy, and has begun to explore its function as a form of deliberative 
 121 
democratic participation, and as such, has briefly engaged with public sphere 
theory. 
However, this theory has been paid only minimal attention within the literature, and 
what attention it has received has been rather shallow and unsatisfying.  It has 
largely been passed over in favour of investigations into the sociology of hacking 
and hacktivism; into categorically defining hacktivism’s emergence from the 
evolutionary tree of hacking; into the construction of typologies to demarcate 
different groups and group identities within hacktivism; and into the crisis of public 
perception suffered by all hacking, be it political or not.  This is not to say that these 
projects are invaluable – far from it.  They have served to lay down a foundation 
that facilitates and eases the continued and extended study of the subject area.  
Indeed, the concentrated application of public sphere theory to the phenomenon of 
hacktivism is a logical investigative path revealed by some of this prior literature.  
Vegh (2003) and Samuel (2004a) in particular have tangentially highlighted its 
appropriateness to the study of hacktivism, and as such, have substantiated the 
presence of a direction for new research. 
Vegh (2002, 2003, 2005) assessed hacking and hacktivism from a broad democratic 
theory perspective, using it as a window with which to explore his thesis that the 
U.S. government and corporations use the media to negatively characterise 
politically empowering Internet-based activities, in order to legitimise the 
installation of oppressive legislature and thus control widespread instances of 
political opposition.  However, his engagement with both online and offline 
democracy theory is somewhat scattered and unfocused – he does not engage 
strongly with any one particular theory.  His interest lies more with the general 
democratising potential of the Internet and the forces opposing it, than with 
assessing this potential through any strongly coherent and well-defined theoretical 
lens.   
This is even truer with regards to his discussion of hacktivism – it is regarded as a 
form of democratic political participation per se, rather than this status being 
explored through any particular theoretical lens.  This is not to say that this 
assumption is wrong, just that it is worthy of deeper and more complex attention 
and investigation.  A more thorough exploration of how exactly hacktivism 
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functions as form of democratic political participation is required.  Additionally, 
while Vegh does refer to the concept of the public sphere several times in passing, 
he does not rigorously examine or apply it with any theoretical complexity, depth, 
or precision, and certainly not with regards to hacktivism, merely with regards to 
the Internet in general.   
Samuel (2004, 2004a) engages with the concept of deliberative democracy a little 
more deeply, but it is essentially tangential to her primary goals of investigating the 
motivations for and forms of political participation, and the relationship of these to 
the identity of participants.  Her assessment of hacktivism’s relation to the 
traditional deliberative values of free speech and accountability is perceptive and 
valuable, but like Vegh, the democratic theory she deploys is quite broad, and does 
not home in on any strongly unified theoretical subsection, or engage significantly 
with (any particular) concept of the public sphere.  It should be noted that these 
comments regarding Vegh and Samuel’s work are not intended as criticisms – both 
authors have made intensely valuable contributions to the literature on hacktivism 
within their own particular theoretical fields and approaches.  But they are the two 
contributors to the literature on hacktivism who have come closest to assessing it 
through the lens of public sphere theory, and neither has done so adequately (an 
understandable omission, given that this was not the intent of their theses). 
Following from this deficiency in the literature on hacktivism, this thesis will 
explore hacktivism through a public sphere theoretical lens.  Before proceeding to 
the theoretical chapters that focus this lens, let us first briefly recap the definitions 
of hacking and hacktivism that have emerged from the literature review as a whole. 
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4.5 A summary of the literature and emergent definitions  
 
4.5.1 A ‘definition’ of hacking 
 
As the last two chapters have shown, there is little doubt that hacking is “one of the 
buzzwords of the computer age” (Vegh 2003: 151). Yet the definition of the action, 
and of its actor, the hacker, remains mercurial. As we have seen, the origin of the 
terms and the identity they refer to is obscure, and they have been and are used in a 
variety of contexts and connotations.  
Despite this ongoing disagreement over even its most basic level of meaning, 
hacking is arguably best understood as a playful, creative, ingenious interaction, 
modification or manipulation of an object or subject, often in a manner originally 
unintended for that object or subject. A certain spirit inherent in the activity remains 
constant, but the actor, their intent, and that which is acted upon do not. Fashion, 
craft, architecture – any aspect of life can, theoretically, be hacked. People or 
‘wetware’ can be hacked. Hardware can be hacked. And, of course, computer 
systems and networks can also be hacked. 
These latter types of ‘hackable objects’ (computer systems and networks) support 
the most common general meaning of ‘hacking’, but even this narrowed 
categorisation contains fractures and contradictions. As the seven generations 
previously identified attest, ‘computer hacking’ has been and is used to mean rather 
different things. Are hackers ‘heroes of the computer revolution’ (Levy, 1984), or 
are they ‘electronic bogeymen’?  Do they hack for fun, ‘kudos’, political reasons, or 
out of greed and malignancy?  Is what they do illegal, or does it represent a 
particular work ethic and means of production? The answer is all of the above, and 
more. Computer hacking has been occurring for six decades, and the practice has 
evolved in numerous directions, for numerous reasons, and with numerous 
outcomes. It is highly heterogeneous and polysemic. 
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This floating polysemy has left the terms hacking and hacker vulnerable to attempts 
at external meaning making and fixing. Governments and corporate media often 
frame hackers as purely criminals or terrorists, conflating the term with the practices 
of cracking for personal gain our out of malice, or with cyberterrorism or 
cyberwarfare. These practices are certainly branches on the evolutionary tree of 
computer hacking, but they are not particularly representative of the practice at 
large. The programmers ‘hacking up’ code for money or love, for proprietary or 
free/open source projects, at work, at home, and in hackspaces, not to mention 
‘ethical hackers’ or computer security professionals, are all hackers. They quite 
possibly comprise the vast bulk of the global hacker community in terms of sheer 
numbers. They are simply not as ‘newsworthy’ as those hacking into a power 
plant’s SCADA system or a bank’s credit card records, or into Google, Adobe or 
Intel’s corporate network. 
Hacking should be understood as a practice, approach or toolkit. What it is 
ultimately used for can vary widely. It is a means, not necessarily an end in and of 
itself (although many hackers do see hacking as inherently enjoyable). 
 
4.5.2 A comparative definition of hacktivism 
 
Hacktivism, broadly defined, is an amalgamation of the techniques and ideologies 
of traditional activism or protest with the techniques and ideologies of hacking, in 
the aid of a political cause or ideology.  Given the floating polysemy of the term 
‘hacking’, this is not a particularly precise definition. However, we can at least 
narrow down the hacking component of hacktivism to that associated with and done 
on computers and computer networks, and particularly on the Internet.  This still 
leaves us with a multitude of possible hacktivist activities, but this diversity of form 
is one of the fundamental characteristics of hacktivism – it is not so much what is 
done (as long as it causes disruption as opposed to damage, as will be summarised 
shortly), but who it is done by and why it is done that defines an activity as 
hacktivism or not.  The New Zealand hackers spoken to agree with this intent- as 
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opposed to action-based definition. When presented with a list of possible forms of 
hacktivism (such as virtual sit ins, defacements, software production, etc), all 
concurred that any form of activity interpretable as computer hacking can be 
defined as hacktivism, if it is designed and enacted in aid of a political cause. 
 
Basically any of the activities could be if the motivation is to promote a 
particular ideology. Likewise none would be if ideology promotion is 
not the motivation, each act would need to be judged on its own merits.  
(Parsons 2007) 
 
We can further narrow down our definition of hacktivism if we understand it not 
only for what it is, but also for what it is not.  It shares the broader definition of 
‘hacking for a political cause’ with both cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare, but is 
differentiated from these practices through their perpetrators and their effects.  As 
such, synthesising from the literature reviewed, we may expand our previous 
definition as follows. 
Hacktivism is an amalgamation of the techniques and ideologies of traditional 
activism or protest with the techniques and ideologies of hacking, in the aid of a 
political cause or ideology.  Hacktivism is demonstrably politically motivated, and 
is disruptive without resulting in human, infrastructural or serious financial 
casualties. It may be peripherally aligned with an ongoing conventional armed 
conflict, but its perpetrators have no direct governmental, military or diplomatic 
connections. Any form of activity interpretable as hacking (with hacking being 
understood as a creative, ingenious interaction, modification or manipulation of an 
object or subject, often in a manner originally unintended for that object or subject) 
that is associated with and done on or with computers and computer networks, and 
particularly on the Internet, can be used in hacktivism. 
In contrast, cyberwarfare is politically motivated hacking of any kind that is directly 
connected to ongoing conventional armed conflicts, and is perpetrated by the 
governments and militaries involved in them. It may be merely disruptive, or it may 
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result in human, infrastructural or serious financial casualties. An example is the 
2008 crippling of the Georgian communication system, timed to coincide with the 
Russian military strike and apparently committed by government-directed hackers, 
as revealed in the ‘Grey Goose’ reports (‘Grey Goose 2’ 2009). Finally, the 
definition and indeed existence of cyberterrorism is somewhat contested 
(‘Cyberterrorism’ 2009), but it is essentially “the convergence of cyberspace and 
terrorism.  It covers politically motivated hacking operations intended to cause 
grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage” (Denning 2001: 241), 
perpetrated by terrorists, understood in the broad sense of being violent non-state 
actors (Mendelsohn 2005). 
 
4.5.3 An internal typology of hacktivism 
 
Hacktivism also has an internal typology, as the convergence of increasingly 
politically aware hackers and increasingly technologically savvy activists has led to 
several distinct trends within the practice.  
Jordan and Taylor first proposed a typology to make sense of these trends, 
identifying ‘mass action’ (MAH) and ‘digitally correct’ (DCH) hacktivism as two 
distinct sub-forms of hacktivism (2004). MAH draws upon street protest and civil 
disobedience, thus connecting most strongly with the activist origins of hacktivism. 
It defies “the lack of physicality in online life, in favour of a mass collection of 
virtual bodies that are not yet present to one another” (ibid.: 69). Virtual sit-ins and 
satirical performance-based hacktions such as the parody mirror sites of ®™ark and 
the Yes Men, are MAH. DCH, in contrast, use “the lack of physicality in online life 
to amplify a political message” (ibid.: 6). True to its hacker roots, DCH is often in 
aid of ‘bandwidth rights’, which sometimes brings it into conflict with MAH. The 
group ‘Hacktivismo’, with its overarching aim of circumventing Internet 
censorship, exemplifies DCH. 
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However, Jordan and Taylor’s proposed typology, while accurate and useful, is 
incomplete.  It does not account for website defacements and other potentially 
individually undertaken hacktions. Samuel (2004a) closes this taxonomic gap, 
providing us with an empirically grounded matrix of hacktivist origins (hacker-
programmer or artist-activist) and orientations (transgressive – challenging the legal 
and political order but still existing in relation to it, or outlaw – completely rejecting 
the legal and political order) (2004a: 37). ‘Performative hacktivism’ is done largely 
by artist-activists, and takes transgressive forms such as site parodies and virtual sit-
ins. Jordan and Taylor’s concept of MAH can be seen as the rough forerunner of 
this category. ‘Political coding’ is done largely by hacker-programmers involved in 
transgressive software development, and succeeds Jordan and Taylor’s concept of 
DCH. Her additional category, ‘political cracking’, is usually carried out by hacker-
programmers, and consists of outlaw permutations such as DDoS attacks, 
information theft, the use of viruses/trojans, and site alterations/redirections. 
Although the usage of the term ‘cracking’ is arguably inappropriate, the categories 
themselves provide a sophisticated typology. They are not rigid – the potential for 
overlap is recognised (2004a: 3-4) – but they provide an invaluable interpretive 
guide (see Table 8). 
 
ORIENTATION/ORIGIN HACKER-PROGRAMMER ORIGIN 
ARTIST-ACTIVIST 
ORIGIN 
TRANSGRESSIVE 
ORIENTATION Political Coding (DCH) 
Performative Hacktivism 
(MAH) 
OUTLAW ORIENTATION Political Cracking - 
 
Table 8: Samuel’s (2004a) typology of hacktivism, with Jordan & Taylor’s 
(2004) categories inserted. 
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Having armed ourselves with these definitions and typologies, we must complete 
our scholarly arsenal with strong understanding of public sphere theory.  This body 
of theory is not unified but fragmented, so we must also define which particular 
conception of the public sphere is to be used.  The following chapters take 
Habermas’s original conception of the public sphere as their starting point, and 
through a thorough assessment of the various critiques and reformulations 
associated with this original concept, synthesise a new understanding of the public 
sphere.  This ‘neo-Habermasian public sphere’ is based upon the ‘radical’ or 
‘agonistic’ tradition, and provides a more thorough comprehension of issues of 
power and difference.  
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Chapter 5 
The Habermasian public sphere 
 
The popularity and significance of deliberative democracy theory has risen in 
response to increasing dissatisfactions and disillusionment with the theories and 
realities of aggregative democracy.  Deliberative democracy aims towards 
transcending the crude aggregation of egotistical individual preferences by fostering 
the engagement of citizens in free, rational deliberation and debate, in which 
individual preferences are tested against others’, and are thus improved upon – the 
force of the better argument prevails, and an understanding is reached.  
“[E]gocentric calculations of success” are shunned (Dahlberg 2005: 111).  This 
unconstrained, rational deliberation takes place within, and simultaneously 
constitutes, the public sphere (or spheres).   
The concept of the public sphere is rather complex and there is much disagreement 
over its exact meaning (as will be explored fully in this chapter and the next), but its 
primary value lies in the way that its health constitutes “a concrete manifestation of 
society’s democratic character and thus in a sense the most immediately visible 
indicator of our admittedly imperfect democracies” (Dahlgren 1991: 2).  It provides 
a category against which the political communication of citizens in contemporary 
democracies can be assessed, and an ideal model to work towards.  “Its purpose is 
to help identify, critique, and challenge blockages to free and critical 
communication so that we can move towards the idealised public sphere and 
rational public opinion” (Dahlberg 2005: 127). 
In order to usefully investigate hacktivism through the theoretical lens of the public 
sphere and deliberative democracy, it is necessary to first conduct a thorough 
investigation of what exactly we believe the public sphere to be.  A broad 
conception of the public sphere has existed since Ancient Grecian times (Habermas 
1989: 4; Weintraub & Kumar 1997, in Butsch 2007: 3), and some version of it has 
always been linked to democracy (Dahlgren 1991: 1), but the theoretical treatment 
of the concept has progressively evolved into greater complexity, and has also been 
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multiply extended through the attention of several different schools of thought and 
contextual perspectives.  This extension has stretched the concept in several 
directions, not all of which are mutually compatible, leaving the theoretical field 
more networked than linear in character.  As such, for the sake of coherency and 
conviction, it is necessary to confer allegiance on the network subsection seen as the 
most legitimate.  However, the explication of this is best achieved in a radial 
fashion, starting with the network hub and exploring directionally outward.  As 
such, we must start here, with a through investigation of the core public sphere 
theory of Jürgen Habermas, the German academic widely regarded as “central to 
discussions about a public sphere in modern democratic societies” (Edwards 1992: 
127). 
 
5.1 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
 
As has already been explained, the textual hub around which the vast majority of 
contemporary public sphere theory revolves is Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere; An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (which will henceforth be truncated to Structural Transformation).  First 
published in 1962 in the author’s native German (as Strukturwandel Der 
Öffentlichkeit; Untersuchungen Zu Einer Kategorie Der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft), 
it quickly generated much critical attention, which was revived and extended with 
its English translation in 1989.  This attention has shown little sign of flagging in 
the years since, attesting to the continuing power and relevance of both the concept 
in general and Habermas’s analysis in particular. 
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 5.1.1 Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
 
Habermas is one of the younger (and hence, surviving) members of the ‘Frankfurt 
School’ of critical theory, based in the Institute for Social Research (Institut für 
Sozialforschung) at Frankfurt University.  He began his studies in philosophy and 
sociology there in 1956, under the tutelage of Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer.  Structural Transformation was written as a Habilitationschrift or 
post-doctoral dissertation, required for ascendancy to Professorship, but Adorno and 
Horkheimer rejected it.  There is some debate as to why exactly this was; Calhoun 
claims that it was because they both found it insufficiently critical of liberalism 
(1992: 4), in contrast to Wiggerhaus, who states that while Adorno found it 
acceptable, Horkheimer found it too radical, and demanded revisions that Habermas 
was not prepared to make (1996: 555, in Kellner 2000: 3).  It is unclear which 
account is correct, but the fact that in 1964 Habermas took over Horkheimer’s chair 
in sociology and philosophy at the Frankfurt School, with the strong support of 
Adorno, seems to give credibility to Wiggerhaus’s version.  In any event, Habermas 
successfully submitted Structural Transformation to the University of Marburg, and 
completed his Habilitation under Wolfgang Abendroth, publishing Structural 
Transformation as his first book in 1962. 
Despite its rejection by Habermas’s mentors, Structural Transformation is a clear 
product of the Institute for Social Research, both in its multidisciplinary approach 
and its criticism of the decline of democracy. It combines elements of sociology, 
economics, constitutional law, political science, and socio-cultural history; a 
daunting undertaking which Habermas himself acknowledges is more than any one 
author has the power to master in full (1989: xvii).  However, it is also an attempt to 
escape from the “pessimistic cul-de-sac” of the Institute (Calhoun 1992: 5), in that it 
ultimately calls for the renewal of democracy and provides a theory pertinent to this 
process.   
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5.1.2 The rise of the bourgeois public sphere 
 
Structural Transformation is primarily a historical and sociological analysis of the 
rise, transformation, and decline of the historically specific Westphalian-national 
bourgeois public sphere within England, France, and Germany.  The public sphere 
was simultaneously a category of bourgeois society and constitutive of it: “the 
reorganisation of society around the institutions of public criticism was one of the 
means by which bourgeois society came into being, conscious of itself as ‘society’” 
(Warner 2002: 48).  Habermas’s investigation is of the bourgeois public sphere 
“created out of the relations between capitalism and the state in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries” (Calhoun 1992: 5), but his underlying motive is to salvage the 
public sphere ideal “from its historically contradictory and partial realization” 
within the actual bourgeois public sphere (ibid.: 4). The public sphere ideal that 
emerges is a sphere between the private and public realms of life, where private 
people come together as a public, bracketing their private particularities and statuses 
in order to engage, as equals, in rational-critical debate over matters of public 
interest.  Its separation from the state allows it to function as a critical check upon 
and a guide to state activity. 
Habermas begins with a discussion of the pre-Enlightenment feudal form of 
representative publicity, status attributes through which the royalty and aristocracy 
“represented their lordship not for but ‘before’ the people” (Habermas 1989: 7).  He 
then traces the emergence of finance and trade capitalism in Europe in the thirteenth 
century.  This was initially incorporated smoothly into status quo power relations, 
but long distance trade required an ever-more regular and exact trade in information 
about distant happenings, and the private postal and trade newsletter service that 
emerged in response to this demand would prove the catalyst for a new social order 
(ibid.: 15-16).  The news contained in these newsletters was soon recognised as a 
generally saleable commodity, leading to the rise of the public press in the mid-
seventeenth century.  By the latter third of this century, the public journals and 
periodicals were providing not only information but also criticism and reviews 
(ibid.: 25).  Initially, this press was “systematically made to serve the interests of the 
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state administration” (ibid.: 22), with rulers directing the contributions of the 
emergent bourgeois strata of administrative officials, doctors, church officials, 
intellectuals, and various capitalists (merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, and 
manufacturers) (ibid.: 23).  However, this would soon change, and the critical light 
of the press would soon be turned upon authority, compelling it to “legitimate itself 
before public opinion” (ibid.: 25-26). 
At around the same time, English coffeehouses, French salons, and German 
Tischegesellschaften (table societies) and Sprachgesellschaften (literary societies) 
emerged, within which intellectuals, nobility and mercantile bourgeoisie mingled as 
a public, discussing and criticising literature, art and music (ibid.: 33-43).  This 
artistic debate gradually spread to political-economic debate, and despite differences 
in size, procedural style, debate climate and main concerns, was characterised in all 
these public institutions by “a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing 
the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” (ibid.: 36).  Furthermore, 
discussion regularly problematised areas and issues that had not previously been 
questioned, and participation was, in principle, wholly inclusive: “The issues 
discussed became ‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their 
accessibility: everyone had to be able to participate” (ibid.: 37). 
This habit of literary criticism was part of a wider popularisation of reading 
amongst the bourgeoisie.  This arose, in part, because of a peculiarly bourgeois 
focus on the private, autonomous sphere of the family, and individual introspection 
and self-constitution via this familial unit (ibid.: 44-48).  This resulted in a 
widespread “exploration of self-subjectivity” through letter writing (ibid.: 49).  
These letters were commonly written with the expectation that they might become 
public, and indeed, those of notable individuals were frequently published.  This 
‘age of letters’ led to a popularisation of fiction novels written in a serial or letter 
form, and a corresponding surge in literary society membership.  These societies re-
articulated the public that had outgrown the salons and coffeehouses and was 
holding itself together through the press.  The institutions of and skills developed 
within this rational-critical literary public sphere provided the platform for the 
ascendance of the political public sphere in the eighteenth century (ibid.: 51-52).  
The political public sphere opposed itself to absolute sovereignty, and “articulated 
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the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and [which] gradually 
came to assert itself (i.e. public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law” 
(ibid.: 53).  The public opinion in question was “born of the power of the better 
argument”, rather than through coercion or manipulation (ibid.). 
The political public sphere first arose in Britain, in the eighteenth century.  It was 
prefigured by the rise of the press as “a genuinely critical organ of a public engaged 
in critical political debate: as the fourth estate” (ibid.: 60); the demotion of the king 
to merely another member of parliament (ibid.: 63); and an increase in the size and 
frequency of public meetings (ibid.: 65).  The same process occurred in France, 
albeit at a much slower pace, but once the state debt accrued by Louis XVI was 
made public in 1781, the public sphere in France could no longer be eliminated, 
only repressed (ibid.: 67-68).  Soon after, the French revolution achieved practically 
overnight (though admittedly, less stably) what had taken Britain the course of a 
decade. “Club-based parties emerged from which parliamentary factions were 
recruited; there arose a politically oriented daily press” (ibid.: 70).  In 1771, the 
public sphere gained constitutional protection, and although this was soon quashed 
by Napoleon, the privileged status of the public sphere was gradually regained over 
time (ibid.: 71).  The public sphere was simultaneously emerging in Germany, but 
due to the fact that the bourgeoisie kept themselves much more separate from the 
nobility than in England or France, and the stronger dependence of the nobility on 
the courts, it was somewhat weaker and more limited than elsewhere.  However, the 
bourgeois strata did manage to participate through reading societies, based around 
political journals and debate (ibid.: 72-3).   
Nonetheless, by the start of the nineteenth century, the public sphere was in 
existence throughout these three nations, which had gradually transformed into 
bourgeois constitutional states.  The public sphere may be conceived of as above all 
“the sphere of private people come together as a public” to engage the authorities in 
a debate over the general rules governing relations in the sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labour.  “The medium of this political confrontation was 
peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason 
(öffentliches Rässonenment)” (ibid.: 27).  It was, in principle, open to all, and 
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participants were expected to ‘bracket’ their private status in order to deliberate 
rationally over matters of common or public interest. 
The public sphere was constitutionally protected through the upholding of rights 
such as free speech, freedom of assembly, equality under the law, and so on.  Its 
establishment corresponded with a move towards free market trade and laissez faire 
economics, and a faith that these logics would “function in a fashion that ensure 
everyone’s welfare and justice in accord with the standard of the individual’s 
capacity to perform” (ibid.: 79), hence ensuring a society free from coercion and 
domination.  State laws were expected to be similarly impartial; however, unlike 
market function, these needed to be “explicitly enacted” (ibid.: 80).  The public 
sphere was the method through which legislative guidance was effected.  “The 
constitutional state as a bourgeois state established the public sphere in the political 
realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the connection between 
law and public opinion” (ibid.: 81).  The public debate enacted within the public 
sphere “was supposed to transform voluntas into a ratio that in the public 
competition of private arguments came into being as the consensus about what was 
practically necessary in the interest of all” (ibid.: 83).  All parties affected by the 
deliberation were, in principle, included, and rational-critical debate and consensus 
on the common or public good was secured through the bracketing of status and 
transcendence of private interests within deliberation. 
 
5.1.3 The rationalisation of exclusion 
 
However, in stark contrast to this egalitarian rhetoric, there were still massive power 
inequalities within society.  Despite the public sphere being prefigured on an ideal 
of perfect inclusiveness, many citizens (predominantly the proletariat) were 
excluded from participating in it.  The public sphere was almost exclusively the 
domain of educated property owners.  Given that it was recognised that “[a] public 
sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely 
incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all” (ibid.: 85), this seems highly 
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problematic.  However, a peculiar logic based on the belief in the equalising power 
of the free market allowed this seemingly blatant contradiction to be rationalised out 
of existence.   
Exclusion from the public sphere was seen as acceptable if it could be viewed as 
simply the “legal ratification of a status attained economically in the private sphere, 
which is to say, the status of the private person who was both educated and owned 
property” (ibid.: 85).  The belief that the socio-economic conditions gave “everyone 
an equal chance to meet the criteria for admission: specifically, to earn the 
qualifications for private autonomy that made for the educated and property owning 
person” (ibid.: 86) legitimised wide-ranging and systematic exclusions from the 
public sphere.  Thus property owners or bourgeois became coextensive with 
homme, or human beings as such.  These two roles were combined under the 
common title of the ‘private’, and this was the space from which the political self-
understanding of the bourgeois public stemmed (ibid.: 29).  Clearly, as has since 
been repeatedly illustrated, the proclamation that a free market will realise a great 
leveling of society by providing the means for upward socio-economic mobility is 
not only false, but also ideological.  It obscures a continual reification of status quo 
power relations.  Then, as now, those who owned property (of any sort) were 
primarily those who gained education, and those who gained education were the 
ones who achieved property ownership.  It was, and is, nigh on impossible for the 
vast majority of society to break into this cycle, hence, a continual re-entrenchment 
of dominance occurs. 
And indeed, this was exactly the case with the bourgeois public sphere.  The 
identification of “property owner” with “human being as such”, or legitimate 
participant within the political public sphere, generated a public sphere within 
which “the interest of class, via critical public debate, could assume the appearance 
of the general interest, that is, in the identification of domination with its dissolution 
into pure reason” (ibid.: 88).  Habermas’s engagement with the work of Karl Marx 
within Structural Transformation illustrates in detail this internal contradiction of 
the public sphere.  Marx saw public opinion (as generated within the bourgeois 
public sphere) as a false consciousness that concealed class interests, and in its 
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opposition to proletarian interests, is fundamentally demoted to the status of a 
particular rather than public interest (ibid.: 125).     
 
[T]he dissolution of political domination in the medium of the public 
engaged in rational-critical debate did not amount to the purported 
dissolution of political domination in general but only to its perpetuation 
in different guise.  The bourgeois constitutional state, along with the 
public sphere as its central principle of organisation, was mere ideology.  
The separation of the private from the public realm obstructed at this 
stage of capitalism what the idea of the bourgeois public promised. 
(Habermas 1989: 125) 
 
However, Marx’s belief that the extension of the public sphere within a class 
society was impossible, and that a revolution was imminent, was incorrect.  The 
proliferation of the press and propaganda in the nineteenth century catalysed the 
informal extension of the public sphere.  With the beginnings of this expansion in 
participation, the internal contradiction stabilised by the specific context of the 
bourgeois public sphere was brought to the fore (ibid.: 88), undermining the 
coherence afforded by institutions of sociability and a relatively high level of 
education (ibid.: 132).  The needs of the proletariat, clearly unable to be satisfied by 
a self-regulating market, demanded fulfillment via state intervention.  The public 
sphere, which now had to deal with these demands, became an arena of competing 
interests fought out in increasingly non-rational-critical ways.   
 
5.1.4 The fall of the bourgeois public sphere 
 
The liberalism of Mill and Tocqueville illustrates vividly the crisis experienced 
within the public sphere due to the exposure of the internal contradiction it 
harboured.  While recognising that a belief that the latent equality in the private 
economic sphere also maintained open access to the public sphere was no longer 
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credible, and favouring, in principle, the opening up of the public sphere to the 
uneducated, unpropertied classes, they did not favour the effect this process had:   
 
…the unreconciled interests which, with the broadening of the public, 
flooded the public sphere were represented in a divided public opinion 
and turned public opinion… into a coercive force, where it had once 
been supposed to dissolve any kind of coercion into the compulsion of 
reason.   
(Habermas 1989: 133) 
 
They saw public opinion as degenerating into “the reign of the many and the 
mediocre… more of a compulsion towards conformity than [as] a critical force” 
(ibid.: 133), in line with Mill’s thesis of the ‘tyranny of the majority’.  The political 
public sphere was no longer functioning with the intention to dispel power; instead, 
it was merely generating public opinion aimed at limiting power: 
 
…the contours of the bourgeois public sphere eroded… While it 
penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its political 
function, namely; that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to 
the control of a critical public.  
(Habermas 1989:140) 
 
 
5.1.4.1 The refeudalisation of society and the public sphere 
 
Society, and the public sphere, underwent what Habermas calls ‘refeudalisation’ on 
a grand scale.  “[U]nder conditions of imperfect competition and dependant prices 
social power became concentrated in private hands” (ibid.: 144), and with the 
extension of participation in the public sphere, it became an increasingly unfit 
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platform for the resolution of conflicts within society.  Weaker economic actors 
appealed to the state for help, generating a conflict of organised interests, all trying 
to influence legislation in their favour.  This resulted in increasing state 
interventionism, which structurally transformed the relationship between the private 
and public spheres that served as the base for the bourgeois public sphere.  The 
masses had succeeded in transforming economic antagonisms into political 
conflicts, hence establishing a continuing connection between the asymmetric 
accumulation of capital and increased state interventionism. In general, state 
interventions “were guided by the interest of maintaining the equilibrium of the 
system which could no longer be secured by way of the free market” (ibid.: 146). 
State interventionism took the form of not only the expansion of traditional 
functions, but the assumption of new ones as well.  The state had already been 
involved with protecting, compensating, and subsidising weaker segments of 
society, but began attempting to actively shape long-term changes in the social 
structure.  It simultaneously took over services previously left to the private realm, 
by assigning private entities to public tasks, coordinating and planning private 
activity, and becoming actively involved in production and distribution (ibid.: 147).  
The social welfare state was born. 
With this, the previously private realm of the family became public.  A reliance on 
the state robbed families of their autonomy, and they increasingly lost control over 
their own education, protection, care and guidance.  Individual family members 
were now being socialised more by society directly, rather than within the familial 
unit.  However, a simultaneous gain in consumption ability and function gave the 
illusion of an intensified privacy, generating a pseudo-private state of being.  
Through consumption-based leisure activities, citizens increasingly came under the 
influence of semi-public authorities.  In general, there was a paradigm shift from a 
culture-debating to a culture-consuming public (ibid.: 155-160).  The private sphere 
became pseudo-public, and the public sphere, pseudo-private.  This interpenetration 
between spheres, the ‘societalisation’ of the state and ‘stateification’ of society 
destroyed the constitutive basis of the bourgeois public sphere. 
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5.1.4.2 The role of the mass media 
 
When the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labour also pervaded the sphere reserved for private 
people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be replaced 
by consumption and the web of public communication unravelled into 
acts of individuated reception, however uniform in mode.  
(Habermas 1989: 161)   
 
This hollowing out of the public sphere was facilitated in large part by the mass 
media.  Mass-mediated leisure activities, taking place within a social climate and 
privileging a private form of appropriation, “removed the ground for a 
communication about what had been appropriated” (ibid.: 163).  Certainly, debate 
still regularly occurred and occurs, but it had and has been commercialised.  We, for 
the most part, purchase the watching of or listening to debates, rather than 
participating ourselves.   
 
Discussion, now a “business”, becomes formalised; the presentation of 
positions and counterpositions is bound to certain prearranged rules of 
the game; consensus about subject matter is made largely superfluous 
by that concerning form.  
(Habermas 1989: 164) 
 
Literature has been ‘dumbed down’ and made cheaper, so more are able to access it, 
and the new electronic media (radio and television, at the time of Habermas’s 
writing) eradicate the rational-critical form of communication privileged by serious 
reading.  They foster no critical debate, only discussion about consumer preferences 
(ibid.: 171).  While “serious involvement with culture produces facility… the 
consumption of mass culture leaves no lasting trace; it affords a kind of experience 
which is not cumulative but regressive” (ibid.: 166). 
 141 
Furthermore, the mass mediation of the public sphere results in the assumption of 
advertising functions, hence it becomes “deployed as a vehicle for political and 
economic propaganda”, contributing to its further de-politicisation and pseudo-
privatisation (ibid.: 175).  The commercialisation of the press and media renders 
them manipulable; they become the “gate through which privileged private interests 
[invade] the public sphere” (ibid.: 185), and instead of merely transmitting or 
amplifying debate, the media have come to shape the debate (ibid.: 188).  The 
critical publicity of the public sphere has transformed into manipulative publicity, 
with the publicity displayed by elite private interest groups (who are among the few 
who can afford to participate in the commercially mediated public sphere) via 
publicity work or public relations, reminiscent of the performative or representative 
publicity displayed by feudal kings.   
Additionally, “because private enterprises invoke in their customers the idea that in 
their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to 
“address” its citizens like consumers.  As a result, public authority too competes for 
publicity” (ibid.: 195).  Hence, the public sphere is comprehensively refeudalised, 
and publicity is generated from above, in order to secure the agreement or 
acquiescence of the masses, but not to engage them in debate (ibid.: 177).  Societal 
domination is exercised through the “domination of non-public opinion: it serves 
the manipulation of the public, as much as legitimation before it” (ibid.: 178) -  
“[t]he public sphere becomes the court before which public prestige can be 
displayed, rather than in which public critical debate is carried out” (ibid.: 201). 
The political process becomes a hollow shell of its former self, lacking in dynamism 
and legitimacy.  Political debate amongst citizens is rarely critical, and often takes 
place only within close social groups, who are frequently politically homogenous to 
begin with.  Superficial, personality-based electioneering eclipses substantive 
issues, and mediated political publicity is usually oriented towards swing-voters, 
who tend to be relatively uninformed and acknowledgeable.  As such, this publicity 
is geared towards shallow manipulation rather than information.  The main body of 
voters are dogmatically party allegiant, influenced by opinion-leaders in society and 
are hence barely worth appealing to (ibid.: 213-215).  As a result, voting (the main 
means by which citizens are given democratic political expression in modern 
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representative democracies) is overwhelmingly illegitimate, because the political 
opinions informing it are not formed rationally, nor are they formed via deliberation 
or discussion.   
 
3.1.4.3 The modern ‘public sphere’ and the possibility of renewal 
 
Thus a public of citizens that had disintegrated as a public was reduced 
by publicist means to such a position that it could be claimed for the 
legitimation of political compromises without participating in effective 
decisions or being in the least capable of such participation. 
(Habermas 1989: 216) 
 
Due to the transformation of the public sphere, “[t]he process of the politically 
relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the 
private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public 
administration  The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit of 
power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute its acclamation” (ibid.: 176).  
Hence, the world and political system endorsed and “fashioned by the mass media 
is a public sphere in appearance only” (ibid.: 171).  Overall, Habermas believes that 
“the occupation of the political public sphere by the unpropertied masses led to an 
interlocking of state and society which removed from the public sphere its former 
basis without supplying a new one” (ibid.: 177).  He concludes by offering tentative 
proposals for the revitalisation of the public sphere, by “setting in motion a critical 
process of public communication through the very organizations that mediatise it” 
(Habermas 1989: 232), although he fails to provide any strategies or concrete 
proposals for this (Kellner 2000: 6). 
It should by now be abundantly clear that Habermas’s analysis of the rise and fall of 
the bourgeois public sphere is a powerful criticism of contemporary representative 
capitalist democracies.  Indeed, Structural Transformation characterises them as 
 143 
essentially illegitimate and corrupted.  But it should also be apparent that from 
within this criticism springs hope, and the possibility of emancipation through the 
abstraction of the public sphere ideal from its specific and failed bourgeois 
incarnation.  A vision of deliberative democracy emerges, within which legitimacy 
is conferred upon parliamentary proceedings through their steering by means of the 
rational-critically generated public opinion, generated in an egalitarian public sphere 
situated between the private and public realms, and free from state coercion and 
private inequalities.   
This is the true value of Structural Transformation; that it provides a normative 
ideal or analytic category against which the realities of contemporary democracies 
can be measured, and the realisation of which can be striven towards. Fraser’s claim 
that “no attempt to understand the limits of actually existing late-capitalist 
democracy can succeed without in some way or another making use of it” (1992: 
111) is quite correct.  How well the public sphere is functioning becomes “a 
concrete manifestation of society’s democratic character and thus in a sense the 
most immediately visible indicator of our admittedly imperfect democracies” 
(Dahlgren 1991: 2).  It is due to these qualities that Structural Transformation and 
the Habermasian concept of the public sphere continue to have resonance with the 
structures of contemporary society, and the reason for its continued importance and 
power as a text. 
 
5.2 Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’ 
 
This concern with generating a normative model of deliberative democracy 
continues within much of Habermas’s later work.  The reformulations and 
embellishments generated through this later work are often incorporated into an 
overall understanding of the ‘Habermasian public sphere’.  As such, a brief 
discussion of the main themes that emerge within the most notable of these 
subsequent texts is necessary for both our own understanding of the concept, and 
for the understanding of the body of criticism and revisionist modernisation that has 
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emerged around the author and his concepts.  As Salter states, restricting discussion 
to just Structural Transformation and not Habermas’s later work is a mistake (2003: 
118).  This work, while still focused on the concept of the public sphere and 
deliberative democracy, is distinguished by a significant and paradigmatic shift; 
Habermas’s famous (or infamous) ‘linguistic turn’ towards a theory of 
communicative action.  This theory presupposes that language itself contains norms 
that can criticise domination and foster democratisation.  
Habermas saw the exercise of reason through rational-critical debate as “the 
valuable kernel in the flawed ideology of the bourgeois public sphere…” (Calhoun 
1992: 2).  The deliberative use of reasoned criticism is seen to result in an educated 
opinion, which is markedly different and infinitely more democratically legitimate 
than a vulgar aggregation of preferences constituted without deliberation (ibid.: 17).  
However, the over-pessimism of his own critical theory within Structural 
Transformation (which will be explored more fully in the following chapter) leaves 
no institutional basis with which to begin the democratising process, and no active 
subjects to work on, hence the vagueness and tentativeness of his conclusions 
(Kellner 2000: 10).  As a result, he has come to believe that basing the theory of the 
public sphere on bourgeois liberal ideals and values is unsound, given the ‘civilised 
barbarisms’ of the twentieth century.   
 
When these bourgeois ideals are cashed in, when the consciousness 
turns cynical, the commitment to those norms and value orientations 
that the critique of ideology must presuppose for its appeal to find a 
hearing become defunct.  
(Habermas 1992: 422) 
 
As such, Habermas’s “inability to find in advanced capitalist societies an 
institutional basis for an effective political public sphere corresponding in character 
and function to that of early capitalism and state formation but corresponding in 
scale and participation to the realities of later capitalism and states” (Calhoun 1992: 
30), has led him to seek an alternative and “deeper” basis for democracy (Habermas 
1992: 422).  His later work has found this “less historical, more transcendental 
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basis” in “an evolutionary account of human communicative capacity that stressed 
the potential implicit in all speech” (Calhoun 1992: 32).  The theory of 
communicative action locates the basis for rational-critical deliberation not in 
institutional bases (as in the bourgeois public sphere) but in the transhistorical and 
dynamic communicative or rational capacities intrinsic to human communication.  
As such, “[t]he public sphere remains an ideal, but it becomes a contingent process 
of the evolution of communicative action, rather than its basis” (ibid.). 
 
5.2.1 Lifeworld and system 
 
He splits capitalist society into the categories of ‘lifeworld’ (constituted of personal 
relationships through to communicative action) and ‘system’ (the economy and the 
state, steered by money and administrative power).  This dichotomy was initially 
introduced in On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967) and Legitimation Crisis 
(1973), but only really came to full fruition in The Theory of Communicative Action 
(1987).  The theme is then continued throughout his following work (most notably 
in Between Facts and Norms (1996)).  The system is the domain of instrumental 
rationality, in which success is measured via the achievement of predefined goals, 
and governance is done by the ‘steering imperatives’ of money and power.  The 
lifeworld, in contrast, is the domain of communicative rationality, aiming for 
understanding and consensus between individuals, secured by communicative 
actions free from manipulation, coercion, deception and strategy.  The lifeworld is 
grounded in moral, aesthetic, practical and political considerations (Habermas, 
1987: 304-5), and only it has a legitimate claim to the coordination of society, not 
the system.   
However, the system is seen as constantly encroaching upon or ‘colonising’ the 
lifeworld, thus undermining its communicative rationality by imposing functional or 
instrumental rationality on lifeworld interactions through the system-steering 
imperatives of money and power (Habermas 1987).  This colonisation involves 
extensions of state bureaucracies, legal regulation, political socialisation and 
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economic privatisation (Edwards 1992: 115).  If it is allowed to succeed, then 
rational inter-citizen and citizen-state dialogue is replaced by “systemic and 
strategic exchanges of power.  Citizens offer the state legitimacy (in the form of 
votes for parties and basic compliance with laws) in return for the benefits of the 
welfare state, whilst the state ’spends’ its power in the form of the laws and policies 
it imposes on citizens; always mindful of the need to win votes” (Roberts & 
Crossley 2004: 8).   
As such, the primary project for democracy is to protect the lifeworld from these 
systemic imperatives through the reassertion of communicative rationality against 
the state and economy’s instrumental agendas.  However, from the outset of his 
system/lifeworld distinction, Habermas has “considered the state apparatus and 
economy to be systematically integrated action fields that can no longer be 
transformed democratically from within… without damage to their proper system 
logic and therewith their ability to function.” (1992: 444).  The system cannot be 
altered, only kept in check.  This is achieved through the exertion of communicative 
power generated by the public sphere against the system, achieving a permanent, 
democratically healthy equilibrium between communicative and instrumental 
rationality.   
This “[c]ommunicative power is exercised in the manner of a siege.  It influences 
the premises of judgment and decision-making in the political system, without 
intending to conquer the system itself.” (Habermas 1996: 486).  This siege or 
“democratic dam” must ensure that communicative power can prevail over the 
steering imperatives of money and administrative power and therefore “successfully 
assert the practically oriented demands of the lifeworld” (Froomkin 2004: 424).   
Elections are now seen as an important part of this articulation: “Informal public 
opinion-formation generates ‘influence’; influence is transformed into 
‘communicative power’ through the channels of political elections; and 
communicative power is again transformed into ‘administrative power’ through 
legislation” (Habermas 1996: 28). This shifts public sovereignty: 
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…into a flow of communication… in the power of public discourses 
that uncover topics of relevance to all society, interpret values, 
contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons and 
debunk bad ones.  Of course, these opinions must be given shape in the 
form of decisions by democratically constituted decision-making 
bodies.  The responsibility for practically consequential decisions must 
be based in an institution. Discourses do not govern.  They generate a 
communicative power that cannot take the place of administration… but 
can only influence it.  This influence is limited to the procurement and 
withdrawal of legitimation.  
(Habermas 1992: 452) 
 
The public sphere generating the public opinion and hence communicative action is 
later theorised in Between Facts and Norms (1996) as having a ‘core’ administrative 
complex, governed by rules and capable of action, and a ‘periphery’, which is the 
social space constituted through communicative action.  Issues and deliberation 
work their way through from the periphery to the core.  This public sphere must be 
grounded in a civil society composed of “those non-governmental and non-
economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communicative 
structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld” 
(Habermas 1996: 66-67).  ‘New’ or non-class-based social movements, seen as 
arising in response to conflicts at the “seam between the system and the lifeworld”, 
are considered an important component of this grounding (Habermas 1981: 36).  
The public sphere amplifies problems situated in the lifeworld, and “can best be 
described as a network for communicating information and points of view” (ibid.: 
360). 
We can begin to see how this understanding of the public sphere has resonance with 
hacktivism, which does not intend to seize control of any administrative role within 
the system, but instead exerts influence from the periphery of the lifeworld. 
Hacktivist discourses “do not govern”, but they aim to generate fields and flows of 
‘communicative power’ that both inform and come to constitute the wider public’s 
(or publics’) ‘procurement and withdrawal of legitimation’ through such 
mechanisms as voting. However, hacktivism transgresses the procedural constraints 
that Habermas sees as necessary to confer legitimacy upon the deliberative 
generation of this communicative power. 
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5.2.2 Procedural constraints and communicative legitimacy 
 
The legitimacy of the communicative action or power conducting the siege against 
system colonisation is conferred via the process of deliberation within the public 
sphere, which must, as far as possible, approach an ideal speech situation.  In a 
general sense, participants in the deliberation must come as close as possible to an 
ideal situation in which: 
 
 …(1) all voices in any way relevant get a hearing, (2) the best 
arguments available to us given our present state of knowledge are 
brought to bear, and (3) only the unforced force of the better argument 
determines the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses of the participants.  
(Habermas 1996: 13) 
 
Clearly, Habermas’s theory of communicative action both extends organically from 
Structural Transformation in that it continues his concern with the rational-critical 
public sphere and deliberative democracy, but also departs markedly from this 
previous text, in that the public sphere ideal and deliberative democracy he now 
advocates are not so much institutionally but strongly procedurally based.  Rational 
consensus is not ensured via the limiting of the scope and content of deliberation, 
but through the procedural constraints of the ideal speech situation.  These 
procedures will ‘weed out’ illegitimate and inferior discursive positions. 
Dahlberg (2004: 29-30) provides a concise and exact summary of these procedural 
features, taken from several Habermasian texts (1984: 1-26; 1990: 43-115; 1993: 
31-33, 56-76; 1996: 267-387; 2001): 
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1. Thematisation and reasoned critique of problematic validity claims… 
the positions put forward and the subsequent questioning are backed by 
reasons.  
2. Reflexivity.  Participants critically examine their values, assumptions, 
and interests, as well as the larger social context.                                           
3. Ideal role taking.  Participants attempt to understand the argument 
from the other’s perspective.  This involves empathetic listening, which 
in turn means a commitment to an ongoing dialogue with difference.                                           
4. Sincerity.  Deliberation is premised upon honesty or discursive 
openness in contrast to deception, including self-deception for which 
one must remain ‘critically alert”.  Further, rational judgement 
presupposes that participants make a sincere effort to make known all 
relevant information, including their intention, interests, needs and 
desires.                                                                                                                 
5. Inclusion and discursive equality.  Debate is open to all those affected 
by the concerns under consideration, and each participant has an equal 
opportunity to introduce and question any assertion whatsoever and to 
express attitudes, desires and needs.                                                            
6. Autonomy from state and economic power.  Deliberation is driven by 
the concerns of publicly oriented citizens rather than by money or 
administrative power. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
 
Habermas’s later conception of the public sphere thus retains the basic ideal of the 
old – that participants bracket their private selves in order to deliberate rationally as 
equals on matters of common or public interest, in order to secure a legitimate 
consensus on what will best serve the common good.  However, instead of being 
constituted through the institutions of the press or public meetings, the public sphere 
arises wherever the normative procedures of communication are instituted and an 
ideal speech situation arises.  Both former and latter conceptions have been 
criticised and reformulated individually, and sometimes in combination, from a 
wide range of perspectives. It is this fertile diversity of criticism that we will now 
investigate – moving past Habermas’s selectively-understood histories and the 
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problematic procedural constraints that would render hacktivism an illegitimate 
form of communicative power generation, and exploring how we might enable the 
theory of the public sphere to wander through “wider and wilder territory” (Ryan 
1992: 286). 
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Chapter 6 
The neo-Habermasian public sphere 
 
Despite the clear value of Habermas’s public sphere theory, or perhaps more 
accurately, because of it, there are and have been multiple criticisms leveled at 
Habermas and Structural Transformation, and his continuation of its themes within 
later work.  Indeed, “[f]ew books have been so systematically discussed, criticised 
and debated, or inspired so much theoretical and historical analysis” (Kellner 2000: 
7).  However, as Fraser has stated, “the public sphere theory is in principle an 
important critical-conceptual response that should be reconstructed rather than 
jettisoned, if possible” (2005: 2).  Calhoun concurs: “The most important destiny of 
Habermas’s first book may prove to be this: not to stand as an authoritative 
statement but to be an immensely fruitful generator of new research, analysis, and 
theory… an indispensable point of theoretical departure. It should also continue to 
inform a rich tradition of empirical work” (1992: 41).   
Indeed, there is little point in simply accepting Habermas’s conclusions, both pre- 
or post-linguistic turn – society remains constantly dynamic, hence the public 
sphere within it must be equally continually re-examined (Dahlgren 1991: 2).  An 
investigation of these criticisms and recontextualisations leads to a modernisation 
and reformulation of the public sphere ideal, which much more adequately deals 
with issues of power, exclusion and difference.  This ‘neo-Habermasian’ public 
sphere is also much more applicable and appropriate to the current social 
environment, and hence more useful to the investigation of the practice of 
hacktivism. 
 
 
 152 
6.1 Historical inaccuracies within the bourgeois public sphere: Practical 
criticisms 
 
One of the most fundamental criticisms leveled at Structural Transformation is that 
Habermas’s assessment of the historical bourgeois public sphere is over-idealistic, 
seemingly to the point of naïveté or ignorance (Calhoun 1992; Curran 1991; 
Dahlgren 1991; Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; Garnham 1992; Golding 1995; Kellner 
2000; Negt & Kluge 1992; Roberts & Crossley 2004; Ryan 1992; Thompson 1993).  
Although he does assert in his introduction to Structural Transformation that his 
investigation “presents a stylised picture of the liberal elements of the bourgeois 
public sphere” (1989: xix), criticisms regarding the extent of this stylisation are, 
nonetheless, well founded.  The values of the bourgeois public sphere are abstracted 
into a public sphere ideal, thus it is important that they be based upon reasonably 
accurate observations, or at the very least, observations that are explicitly aware of 
any lionising and contradictory tendencies within themselves.  Curran contends that 
Habermas’s analysis is deeply flawed in that “it is based on contrasting a golden era 
that never existed with an equally misleading representation of present times as a 
dystopia” (1991: 46).   
As such, there are four main critical assertions leveled: that Habermas over-
idealised the internal function of the bourgeois public sphere; that he ignored the 
existence of multiple historical public spheres, that he did not adequately and fully 
acknowledge the exclusion inherent to the bourgeois public sphere; and that his 
analysis of the contemporary media and public sphere is unnecessarily and 
unproductively pessimistic.  
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6.1.1 An over-idealisation of the internal function of the bourgeois public 
sphere 
 
The first of these is that the bourgeois public sphere (especially in terms of its 
institutional basis is the press) was not nearly as internally rational-critical as 
Habermas claims (Calhoun 1992; Curran 1991; Eley 1992; Garnham 1992; Golding 
1995; Kellner 2000).  The bourgeois press, rather than being an impartial domain 
governed by the force of the better argument and free from state control, was in fact 
rife with corruption and factions, and never broke completely free from political 
influence (Curran 1991: 41).  In addition, Golding claims that the press 
emancipation from state control that did occur was less the result of a heroic battle 
for the freedom of ideas and more to do with the press’s growing commercial 
viability (1995: 27).   Habermas also ignores the non-rational-critical elements of 
the bourgeois press, such as  ‘penny dreadfuls’ and scandal sheets (Calhoun 1992: 
33).  “This refutes the contrast made by Habermas between the early press as an 
extension of rational-critical debate among private citizens, and the later press as the 
manipulative agency of collectivised politics” (ibid.: 41-42).  Furthermore, he 
disregards the radical press of the times as non-rational, when in fact, they were 
merely challenging the bourgeois status quo of the mainstream press and public 
sphere, in an attempt to articulate the positions of the proletariat (ibid.: 41).  At this 
most basic of historical levels, we can begin to see the Habermasian tendency to 
overlook the true extent of the institutionalisation and normalization of exclusion, 
and, indeed, collude in the theoretical marginalization of alternative publicity. 
 
 
 
6.1.2 The existence of multiple historical public spheres 
 
This feeds directly into the second major historical criticism; that Habermas 
completely and inexcusably ignores a number of alternative public spheres that 
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were simultaneously present in society, choosing instead to assert that the unitary 
Westphalian-national bourgeois public sphere was the public sphere (Curran 1991; 
Dahlgren 1991; Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; Garnham 1992; Golding 1995; Negt & 
Kluge, 1992; Ryan 1992; Thompson 1993).  He fails to acknowledge the presence 
of a number of alternative, plebeian, popular, informal or oppositional public 
spheres (Dahlgren 1991: 6), seeing them only as late developments signaling the 
demise of the public sphere proper (Fraser 1992: 122).  Habermas has since 
acknowledged this flaw (1992: 424-427) but this basic criticism of Structural 
Transformation must nonetheless be noted as it has led to major theoretical 
revisions within the field, many of which prove to be integrally relevant to a public 
sphere theoretical conceptualisation of hacktivism.  
Negt & Kluge were the first to begin this critical project with the 1972 publication 
of Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung: Zur Organisationsanalyse von Bürgerlicher und 
Proletarischer Öffentlichkeit (Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of 
the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere), their nationality giving them a 
jumpstart on English academics.  The translation of this text was published in 1993, 
giving the English-speaking world a somewhat belated full access to their criticism 
of Habermas for not acknowledging the existence of plebeian and proletarian public 
spheres.  With regards to this text, one tends to agree with Downing, that there is “a 
strongly doctrinaire and abstractly utopian character to large parts of their 
argument” but that it is nevertheless important in questioning the concept of a 
unitary public sphere (2001: 29) 
Eley (1992) provides a further examination of non-bourgeois public spheres.  
Although Habermas did acknowledge a plebeian public sphere, he saw it as merely 
a suppressed variant of the bourgeois version (Habermas 1989: xviii).  This 
dismissal does not seem at all warranted, and seemingly served only to maintain the 
integrity of Habermas’s argumentative thrust.  For, as Eley explains, the presence of 
the plebeian public sphere illustrates that public spheres could arise from diverse 
origins: “The virtue of publicness could materialise other than by the intellectual 
transactions of a polite and literate bourgeois milieu” (Eley 1991: 304).  Ryan 
(1992) contributes to this discussion by detailing the existence of multiple 
nineteenth century American public spheres that combined rational-critical debate 
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with more rambunctious and conflictual behaviour.  Her discussion is set within a 
feminist interpretation of public sphere theory, more of which will be discussed 
shortly. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned radical press constituted a highly literate and 
combative public sphere; hence, rational-critical debate was not the exclusive 
domain of the bourgeois (Eley 1991: 304-305).  Eley also asserts that due to the 
international impact of the French revolution, public spheres arose all through 
Europe via conscious efforts on behalf of the citizenry in more “backwards” nations 
in an attempt to articulate their aspirations, rather than as the result of prior social 
development (ibid.: 305).  Eley’s underlying point is that by idealising the 
bourgeois public sphere and ignoring other forms, Habermas “misses the extent to 
which the public sphere was always constituted by conflict” (ibid.: 306), an 
assertion which has clear resonance with the subversive and provocative practice of 
hacktivism, and which is explored in further detail in the next category of criticism. 
 
6.1.3 Unacknowledged exclusions from the bourgeois public sphere 
 
The third criticism is integrally linked to the former two – that entry into the 
historical bourgeois public sphere was significantly more exclusive than Habermas 
acknowledged.  Habermas tends to speak of the confluence between bourgeois and 
homme that governed class exclusions within the public sphere as an essentially un-
premeditated condition arising from the societal structures of the time.  He briefly 
discusses the ideological nature of this conflation in his engagement with Marx, but 
this aspect is, for the most part, glossed over by his idealisation of the bourgeois 
public sphere.  This failure to attend to intentional exclusions has since been 
extensively criticised.  Furthermore, it is also argued that not only did exclusions 
arise along the axis of class, but along those of gender as well, in a similarly 
premeditated and systemic manner. 
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6.1.3.1 Class-Based Exclusions 
 
Habermas has been repeatedly criticised for failing to adequately acknowledge the 
fact that the bourgeois public sphere was not only oriented towards defending civil 
society from the state, but also towards the production of power relations within 
civil society and the repression of non-bourgeois strata (Calhoun 1992: 39; see also 
Curran 1991; Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; Golding 1995; Roberts & Crossley 2004).  It 
is true that he does go some way towards acknowledging this fact, but “not to the 
extent of compromising his basic historical claim” (Eley 1992: 293) and thus his 
conception of the public sphere.  Given the recognition that there were multiple 
forms of competing publics, the conflation of bourgeois with homme no longer 
seems accidental – it seems more a way of “defining an emergent elite, of setting it 
off from the older aristocratic elites it was intent on displacing on the one hand and 
from the various popular and plebeian strata it aspired to rule on the other” (Fraser, 
1992: 114).    
In particular, the rationality of the bourgeois press has been questioned, with Curran 
claiming “the newspapers celebrated by Habermas were engines of propaganda for 
the bourgeoisie rather then the embodiment of disinterested rationality” (1991: 40).  
Eley (1992) draws a Gramscian conclusion from this account: that the rise of the 
bourgeois public sphere marked a shift from a force-based era of rule to one 
characterised by consent elicited through more subtle repression. “The official 
public sphere, then, was, and indeed is, the prime institutional site for the 
construction of the consent that defines the new, hegemonic mode of domination” 
(Fraser 1992: 117).  As such, we should follow Fraser’s lead in seeking ways to 
conceive of contestation of this hegemony, in terms of both theory and praxis 
(which is one of the central aims of this thesis and its focus on hacktivism).   
Through Habermas’s characterisation of class-based exclusion from the bourgeois 
public sphere as essentially innocent of purposive power play, he ignores the way in 
which rational-critical communication is founded on intentional exclusions and 
repression (Roberts & Crossley 2004: 11).  This point re-emerges in the discussion 
of further, more theoretical criticism. 
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6.1.3.2 Gender-based exclusions 
 
As noted, Structural Transformation does go some way towards recognising class 
exclusion, which is more than can be said of its treatment of exclusions based on 
gender.  Numerous critics (Calhoun 1992; Dahlgren 1991; Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; 
Garnham 1992; Landes 1988; Ryan 1992; Thompson 1993) have identified a 
systemic exclusion of women from the bourgeois public sphere, proving the starting 
point for a body of feminist public sphere theory, and undermining the sharp 
distinction between public and private that provides the basis for the public sphere 
ideal conceived in Structural Transformation.  Habermas does go some way 
towards accepting these criticisms in his later work (1992), but not far enough to 
resolve the structural instabilities they highlight.  As Calhoun says, this failure is 
typical of a general “thinness of attention to matters of culture and the construction 
of identity” within Habermas’s work on the public sphere and deliberative 
democracy (Calhoun 1992: 34).   
The literature of Fraser, Eley and Ryan provides the sharpest insight into this issue.  
All three locate the “structural underpinnings of gender inequality along the private-
public axis” (Ryan 1992: 260), in that “the same structural transformation that gave 
definition to a public realm designated women a second species of citizens and 
marked out around them a social space called the private” (ibid.: 67).  In the 
eighteenth century, as part and parcel of the association of rationality with the 
public sphere, as opposed to the private world of the family and economics, 
femininity came to be associated with the private realm, and masculinity with the 
public.  “The new category of the “public man” and “his “virtue” was constructed 
via a series of oppositions to “femininity”, which both mobilised older conceptions 
of domesticity and women’s place and rationalised them into a formal claim 
concerning women’s “nature”” (Eley 1992: 309).  The very constitution of the 
bourgeois public sphere was based on this gender-ideological dichotomy.   
Habermas’s view of the bourgeois public sphere as the public sphere, and the 
emphasis implicitly placed upon the superiority of a singular public sphere, is thus 
exposed as even more ideological.  As Ryan shows through her assessment of 
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eighteenth and nineteenth century American political life, there was in fact a range 
of highly inventive female public spheres in existence, which arose in response to 
this systematic exclusion from the mainstream.  The reality of multiple and 
competing publics is once again brought to light, underlining the need for any 
reconceptualization of the public sphere to allow for the existence of multiple 
contestatory publics arising in response to exclusion from or opposition to the 
‘mainstream’ or dominant public. 
Furthermore, this structured gender exclusion was not the exclusive domain of the 
bourgeois.  The same occurred within the plebeian and radical public spheres, due 
to the new capitalist regime forcing women and children out of the home and into 
the workplace in order to help support the family.  This undermined the masculine 
role of patriarch and breadwinner, and was seen as upsetting the natural order.  The 
desire to keep women ‘in their place’ was thus linked to economic desires and 
anxieties, and resulted in a reassertion of masculinity as linked to publicness within 
the working classes as well (Eley 1992: 314-316).  Ryan’s identification of both 
bourgeois and working class American female public spheres corroborates the 
multi-class character of this phenomenon. 
 
6.1.4 An over-pessimistic analysis of the contemporary media and public 
sphere 
 
We have covered Habermas’s “over-rosy portrayal of the emergence and early 
character of the public sphere”; now we must address his “unduly pessimistic 
characterisation of the present” (Golding 1995: 28).  Criticism has been leveled at 
Habermas’s gloomy view of the contemporary media and public sphere, and lack of 
attention to audience or citizen activity and agency (Calhoun 1992; Curran 1991; 
Dahlgren 1991; Garnham 1992; Golding 1995; Kellner 2000; Roberts & Crossley 
2004; Thompson 1993).  As Dahlgren says, “while we cannot ignore the dominance 
of the mainstream media, we should be careful not to exaggerate unnecessarily their 
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homogeneity or monolithic character”, lest our pessimism become crushing rather 
than inspiring, and leave us apathetic or paralysed (1991: 9).  Habermas is arguably 
guilty of exactly this.  His characterisation of the modern electronic media as 
stultifying and hypnotic is completely untempered by any attention to audience 
agency.  Citizens are seen as passive dupes, a perspective that has been refuted by a 
large body of research into active audience theory (Curran 1991: 42).  This 
tendency is a clear product of his Frankfurt School background.   
Promisingly, Habermas does acknowledge this deficiency in later work: “[M]y 
diagnosis of a unilinear development from a politically active public to one 
withdrawn into a bad privacy, from a ‘culture-debating to a culture-consuming 
public’, is too simplistic.  At the time, I was too pessimistic about the resisting 
power and above all the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally much 
differentiated mass public whose cultural usages have begun to shake off the 
constraints of class” (Habermas 1992: 438).  However, his work in Beyond Facts 
and Norms (1996) exhibits a return to the idea that the mass media are a hopelessly 
negative influence on the public sphere, as do his more recent articles (for example, 
Habermas 1996) and he “does not discuss the normative character of 
communication media in democracy or suggest how a progressive media politics 
could evolve” (Kellner 2000: 15).  Kellner suggests that his idealisation of print 
media and denigration of electronic media may stem from the fact that he is simply 
more familiar with, and is much more firmly ensconced within the world of letters.  
Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that this totalising disparagement of non-
print media is neither accurate nor useful. 
In relation to this, he has also done very little work in accounting for the rise of the 
Internet – his idea of electronic media remains largely confined to broadcasting 
technologies. While we must bear in mind that he is of advanced age and is no 
longer as prolific as he once was, this is nonetheless a serious inadequacy.  While 
the hyperbolic laudation of the Internet as a technology currently overthrowing the 
old world order and replacing it with a new democratic era is to be avoided, there is 
no doubt that it has enabled new forms of organisation and communication that do 
have significant democratic value.  Yet Habermas has only addressed the 
capabilities in a glancing and dismissive fashion.   
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The publication of his keynote speech to the 2006 International Communication 
Conference provides some insight into his opinion of the Internet (Habermas 2006), 
but this brief mention is in an endnote – the very placement of it suggests extreme 
disregard.  In this self-categorised ‘passing remark’, he claims that the only 
democratic benefit of the Internet is that it “can undermine the censorship of 
authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion” (ibid.: 423). He 
categorises all other online communication claiming democratic value as 
“parasitical” and “fragmented” – online debates only promote political 
communication through “crystallizing around the focal points of the quality press”, 
and chat rooms and their ilk “lead to the fragmentation of large but politically 
focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics.”  The 
examples he uses to make these points are specific and unrepresentative, thus 
undermining his general conclusions, and his claims of fragmentation completely 
ignore the multiple issue or community ‘belongings’ and extensive issue and 
interest interconnections facilitated and even extended by the Internet.  As Bruns 
summarises:  
 
Habermas’s obvious aversion to accepting the Internet as part of the 
public sphere, or (more to the point) to modifying the public sphere 
model for the network age, is as inexplicable as it is unfortunate; with 
Net-based communication now a staple of everyday discussion, debate, 
and deliberation on political as well as virtually all other topics, it serves 
only to undermine the public sphere concept itself. As responses even to 
the limited references to the Internet in his ICA speech show, 
Habermasians are clearly hanging out for a more considered approach to 
addressing the question of incorporating the Net into the public sphere 
model… 
(Bruns 2007) 
 
In the complex and populous modern world, the media and media platforms such as 
the Internet are necessarily the main platform for public spheres, and a subtler and 
less dogmatic approach is necessary in order to unravel their true significance and 
scope within this role.  Indeed, the theorisation of a public sphere model that allows 
for these new technologies and that recognises an active and participatory citizenry 
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is the primary intent of this thesis, with hacktivism providing a specific portal into 
the ways in which active and engaged citizens can generate much more 
‘communicative power’ online than Habermas gives them credit for, as well as 
avoiding the isolation and cyberbalkanization that he seems to regard as so 
inevitable.  
 
6.2 Theoretical criticisms and reformulations 
 
Clearly, the Habermasian public sphere has been roundly criticised on grounds of 
historical inaccuracies, but there is also a large body of literature criticising the 
more abstract theory of the public sphere ideal Habermas extracts from Structural 
Transformation and his later work.  Some of this feeds off historical criticisms, 
some arises independently, and much leads to innovative new reformulations of the 
public sphere concept.  As stated in the introduction to this section, the networked 
nature of the responses to Habermas’s work requires laying one’s allegiance with a 
particular strand of thought in the interests of argumentative cohesion and strength.  
The school of thought seen as the most legitimate and thus adopted and discussed 
has been variously described as ‘postmodern’ (Roberts & Crossley 2004: 14), 
‘poststructuralist’, ‘agonistic’ (Dahlberg 2007a), and ‘radical’ (Dahlberg 2007b), 
and also exhibits a strong feminist component.  All these labels are appropriate, but 
the core of what defines this theoretical strand hinges upon its treatment of power 
and difference.    
While agreeing with the underlying principles of the Habermasian public sphere and 
the deliberative theory of democracy it espouses, the Habermasian treatment of 
underlying societal power structures is seen as totally inadequate.  In order to 
effectively deal with these issues, a new theoretical conception based around the 
notions of multiple public spheres, discursive contestation, a deeper engagement 
with identity and difference, and an expansion of legitimate forms of debate must be 
hypothesized.  To achieve this, the public/private dichotomy underlying the 
Habermasian public sphere is questioned, as is the focus on exclusively rational-
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critical deliberation intended to secure a consensus on matters of common interest.  
Given that this field of theory combines aspects of all its proposed titles – 
radicalism, agonism, postmodernism, poststructuralism – none of these titles, on 
their own, seem particularly appropriate.  As such, the admittedly highly non-
descriptive moniker of ‘neo-Habermasian public sphere theory’ will be used.  There 
are, of course, multiple instances of what could legitimately be called ‘neo-
Habermasian’ conceptions of the public sphere, but within this text, the term will be 
used to describe the intersections of the literature about to be discussed. 
 
6.2.1 Nancy Fraser and ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’ 
 
The critical feminist Nancy Fraser is arguably the ‘mother’ of neo-Habermasian 
public sphere theory.  In ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the 
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’ (1992), a mere three years after 
Structural Transformation was published in English, she laid out the solid 
foundations upon which a host of other theorists have built.  In it, she recognises the 
public sphere as an “indispensable resource” for democratic theory (1992: 109), but 
contends that “the specific form in which Habermas has elaborated this idea is not 
wholly satisfactory” (ibid.: 111).  Drawing upon the alternative histories of Landes, 
Ryan and Eley (1988; 1992; 1992; respectively), and the previously discussed 
historical criticisms that they inform, Fraser attempts to answer the consequential 
question of whether the Habermasian public sphere is best seen as  “an instrument 
of domination or a utopian ideal” (Fraser 1992: 117).  Her answer is that it is 
neither; it is a valuable concept that is simply predicated on erroneous assumptions, 
and as such should be “reconstructed rather than jettisoned” (ibid.: 2).  This ‘call to 
action’ is the critical engine of this thesis, and her theory provides the backbone for 
the generation of the neo-Habermasian framework.  
 
 
 163 
6.2.1.1 The impossibility of bracketing status differentials 
 
The first of these erroneous assumptions is that it is possible for participants in the 
public sphere to ‘bracket’ their private status differentials.  As discussed, the 
bourgeois public sphere was effectively closed to the proletariat and women, as well 
as racial minorities.  However, Fraser argues that even if perfect formal access had 
been ensured, informal inequalities would have persisted due to the impossibility of 
the idea of status bracketing.  Inequalities were ingrained within the very fabric of 
the rational-critical debate privileged within the bourgeois public sphere, in that 
“discursive interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by 
protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of 
status inequality.” (ibid.: 119).  That is, the rational-critical mode of speech was the 
domain of the bourgeois male, and as such, would have given them an immediate 
advantage within deliberations with non-bourgeois non-males.   
Fraser argues that this inequality persists in contemporary relations between sexes: 
even though women are now granted access to public deliberation, they tend to be 
disadvantaged due to the propensity for men to be more aggressive and prolonged 
speakers.  This gender inequality can be generalised into racial and ethnic 
inequality, in that minorities may frequently find that they lack the ‘legitimate’ 
mode of speech, and as such, are marginalised in public discourse.  An insistence 
upon the bracketing of social inequalities within public discourse is, therefore, 
counterproductive.  Rather than creating a ‘level playing field’, it generally “works 
to the advantage of dominant groups in society and to the disadvantage of 
subordinates” (ibid.: 120).  Furthermore, contemporary political economy, and in 
particular, the corporate and mediated public sphere, means that those discursively 
subordinate groups also tend to lack access to the means of participation – as do 
other, varied minority or alternative sub-populations.  “[P]olitical economy enforces 
structurally what culture accomplished informally” (ibid.).  As such, bracketing is 
nigh on impossible when deliberation occurs with arenas “pervaded by structural 
relations of dominance and subordination” (ibid.).  The comprehensive 
‘unbracketing’ of private status would work towards more equal deliberation, but 
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the only way equality could truly be ensured is through the total elimination of 
systemic social inequalities (ibid.: 121).  
 
6.2.1.2 The value of multiple public spheres: The birth of the 
counterpublic 
 
The second Habermasian assumption questioned by Fraser is that having one 
overarching public sphere is good for democracy, while having a multiplicity of 
smaller spheres is not.  This assumption is revealed through Habermas’s 
interpretation of the emergence of multiple smaller publics as heralding the decline 
of the public sphere as such.  Yet, given the deep and structured stratification of 
society, and the impossibility of bracketing status differentials within deliberation, a 
theory that accommodates “contestation among a plurality of competing publics” is 
infinitely preferable (ibid.: 122).  A plurality of “subaltern counterpublics” is 
needed; “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests, and needs” (ibid.: 123). Fraser’s elucidation of this idea 
has firmly established the notion of counterpublicity as an integral component to 
any modern conceptualisation of the public sphere.  Counterpublics provide 
subordinated groups with spaces in which to hone their deliberative skills, by 
deliberating on their own needs in an arena free from elite supervision.  Once they 
have attained adequate deliberative power, they can engage with other counter- or 
dominant publics, and more successfully oppose continued subordination (ibid.).  
This opposition may entail both deliberation and more direct forms of contestation – 
an extremely significant advance on Habermas’s strict procedural constraints, and 
one that is central to public sphere theoretical interpretation of hacktivism. 
Fraser makes it clear that counterpublics, despite being explicitly oriented against 
domination and towards the expansion of discursive space, are not necessarily 
“virtuous” – various right-wing causes provide clear illustration of this.  We may 
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not agree with all counterpublics; they may not be ‘pretty’ – but their existence and 
recognition is, nonetheless, tremendously valuable. This is certainly the case with 
hacktivism – we may not always agree with hacktivists’ causes or even their 
methods and conduct, but this does not mean that they have no democratic 
legitimacy. Pluralist democracy in action is an inherently messy and conflictual 
process, as is presently made abundantly clear through a discussion of Chantal 
Mouffe’s agonistic public sphere thesis.  
However, Fraser also pre-empts the accusation that counterpublics tends towards 
being separatist enclaves, asserting that all true publics are predicated on the intent 
to increasingly broaden the circulation of their discourse. Hence, subaltern 
counterpublics are doubly significant: “On the one hand, they function as spaces of 
withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and 
training grounds for agitational activities directed towards wider publics” (ibid.: 
124).  Their ability to offset gaps in ‘participatory parity’ stems from the 
relationship between these two functions.  Furthermore, because the very definition 
of a public relies on its members being diverse in some way, internal reification is 
limited, and citizens may potentially belong to multiple publics (ibid.: 127).  In 
addition, the fact that public spheres not only construct public opinion, but are also 
“arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities” (ibid.: 125) is 
acknowledged. 
This identification of the dual internal and external functions of publics and 
counterpublics is an important structural component of this thesis, in that it focuses 
on the external activities of hacktivist groups rather than their internal cohesion- and 
solidarity-making efforts, which have been previously explored by such scholars as 
Samuel. Her internal typology provides the basis for the case study sampling, but 
these studies then focus on the externally-oriented publicity work done by the 
groups in question.  The issues of incomplete internal reification and participation in 
multiple simultaneous publics also emerge as important issues within the public 
sphere theoretical investigation of hacktivism undertaken in this researcb.  
 
 166 
6.2.1.3 Questioning the barrier between public and private 
 
The third erroneous Habermasian assumption is that public deliberation should 
always be oriented exclusively towards the public good, at the expense of private 
interests.  Fraser interrogates these terms, and comes to the conclusion that the 
boundary between the public and the private realms is dynamic, and interpreted 
differently by various individuals and groups.  The definition of exactly which 
issues are of concern to everyone is as needy of deliberation as the final decision 
made regarding each issue.  Therefore, truly democratic public deliberation requires 
“positive guarantees of opportunities for minorities to convince others that what in 
the past was not public in the sense of being a matter of common concern should 
now become so” (ibid.; 129).  This ability to mobilise public attention towards and 
deliberation upon what would otherwise be non-publicly examined issues is yet 
another significant facet of hacktivist activity. 
Furthermore, the existence of a consensus regarding the common good cannot be 
presumed in advance – sometimes one will emerge, and other times, not.  
Judgments about just what is and is not open for discussion cannot be made in 
advance of deliberation.  As such, within our stratified society, “any consensus that 
purports to represent the common good… should be regarded with suspicion, since 
this consensus will have been reached though deliberative processes tainted by the 
effects of dominance and subordination” (ibid.: 131).  The idea of a ‘common good’ 
masks the actuality of a ‘dominant good’.  Fraser thus exposes the terms ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ as ideological, in that they may be used to “delegitimate some interests, 
views, and topics and to valorise others” (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 167 
6.2.1.4 Questioning the separation of the public sphere(s) from the state 
 
The final Habermasian assumption problematised by Fraser is his insistence that a 
functioning public sphere requires a clear separation between civil society and the 
state.  If ‘civil society’ is interpreted as a nexus of non-governmental, non-
economic, and non-administrative associations, then it certainly should be kept 
separate from the state in order to protect the autonomy of the public spheres.  But 
the problem with this is that it renders the public spheres ‘weak’ in the Barber-esque 
sense (1984; 1998), in that they have no decision-making powers.  The question is 
then how accountable the ‘strong’ publics of the parliament are to the ‘weak’ public 
spheres, and how this accountability can best be fostered.  Fraser has no real 
answers to this, but it is clear that any formulation of the public sphere that assumes 
a strict demarcation between civil society and the state is “unable to imagine the 
forms of self-management, interpublic coordination, and political accountability 
that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society” (ibid.: 134). 
Fraser (1995) somewhat abandons this fourth concern, but, significantly, identifies 
her strand of public sphere theory as postmodern, in opposition to the modernism of 
Habermas (1995: 288).  She also provides a useful summation of the requisite 
characteristics for any postmodern theory of the public sphere: 
 
a) A postmodern conception of the public sphere must acknowledge that 
participatory parity requires not merely the bracketing, but rather the 
elimination, of systemic social inequalities; 
b) Where such inequality persists, however, a postmodern multiplicity 
of mutually contestatory publics is preferable to a single modern public 
sphere oriented solely to deliberation; 
c) A postmodern conception of the public sphere must countenance not 
the exclusion, but the inclusion of interests and issues that bourgeois 
masculinist ideology labels ‘private’ and treats as inadmissible.   
(Fraser 1995: 295) 
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6.2.2 Beyond Fraser 
 
 
Fraser provides an invaluable springboard for further thinking about the 
postmodernisation or radicalisation of public sphere theory.  As such, her theoretical 
revisions provide a useful framework with which to explore the rest of this field, 
and they structure the following section, which reiterates, advances and refines her 
core assertions. 
 
6.2.2.1 Multiple public spheres 
 
6.2.2.1.1 The concept of the counterpublic 
 
As previously mentioned, there has been widespread support for and continuation of 
Fraser’s theme of the importance of counterpublics23 (Benhabib 1996; Butsch 2007; 
Calhoun 1992, 1997; Crossley, 2004; Dahlberg 2007, 2007a, 2007b; Downey 2007; 
Downey & Fenton 2002, 2003; Downing 2007; Dryzek 2000, 2001; Eley 1992; 
Fraser, 2005; Kahn & Kellner 2004, 2005; Keane 2000; Kowal 2002; McLaughlin 
2002; Poster 2001; Robbins 1993; Roberts & Crossley 2004; Ryan 1992; Schiller 
2007; Warner 2002). 
Fraser’s peers, Eley and Ryan (both 1992) both provide historical evidence to 
support the contention that the concept of multiple publics was both far more factual 
and much more useful in terms of the acknowledgment and management of 
                                                
23 It is worth noting that Negt & Kluge did actually posit this idea 20 years earlier in the German 
publication of Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and 
Proletarian Public Sphere (1972).  However, this text, both because of its 20-year delay in being 
translated into English, and the fact that Fraser’s counterpublic sphere theory is significantly 
more grounded and powerful, is much less frequently referenced within the counterpublic sphere 
tradition.  It is probably also worth mention that there is, apparently, a large body of literature on 
the public sphere in the German language.  For literacy reasons, this remains inaccessible. 
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ingrained and systemic societal power differentials.  However, Eley not only 
provided historical fuel for Fraser’s theory, he also identified the way in which 
Gramsci’s argument that hegemonic projects were strongly centred not just in state-
citizen dealings, but within civil society as well, could be analogised into multiple 
or counterpublic sphere theory.  Dominant groups do not only exert their power 
through state functions, but in a more pervasive and subtle manner within civil 
society – the commercial media oligarchy being a prime example of this hegemonic 
function.  The goal is to articulate their own conceptions of the world in such a way 
that they appear and become normative, while simultaneously engaging in the 
project of neutralising rather than explicitly suppressing opposing perspectives.  
However, any hegemonic project is necessarily ongoing, in that it is based within a 
pluralistic society stratified by class relations (Eley 1992: 323), thus providing 
conceptual room for the fracturing or threatening of hegemony.   
Indeed, hegemony is never definitely secured or static, and is always open to 
contestation. “The dominance of a given social group has to be constantly 
renegotiated in accordance with the fluctuating economic, cultural, and political 
strengths of the subordinate classes” (ibid.: 324).  Eley saw this renegotiation as 
occurring within the mainstream or dominant public sphere, with counterpublic 
spheres functioning as counterhegemonic projects, constantly contesting and 
eroding the stability of the dominant or hegemonic sphere.  Eley thus contributes 
significantly to neo-Habermasian public sphere theory, not just by highlighting 
historical inaccuracies within Structural Transformation, but by also identifying 
ways in which the concept of the Habermasian public sphere needs to be “clarified 
and extended” in order to properly grasp hegemonic power relations (Eley 1992: 
331).  In line with this argument, the reconceptualization of public sphere theory to 
allow for an exploration of the ways in which hacktivists generate 
counterhegemonic projects is a core goal of this thesis. 
Like Eley, Downey & Fenton believe that “[c]ounter public spheres may provide 
vital sources of information and experience that are contrary to or at least, in 
addition to the dominant public sphere thereby offering a vital input to democracy” 
(2002: 10-11).  Their contention that counterpublic spheres tend to emerge 
predominantly in response to crises in the dominant public sphere links in with 
 170 
Eley’s discussion of hegemony, in that counterpublics functioning in a 
counterhegemonic manner are likely to be able to establish a firmer grounding and 
presence within cracks in the façade of the dominant public spheres’ hegemonic 
project. “When the dominant public sphere is felt to betray or is no longer capable 
of allowing for critical rational engagement then trust is diminished allowing 
counter public spheres the opportunity to flourish” (ibid.: 9).   
Warner reiterates this relationship between multiple publics, power differentials, 
and ideological or hegemonic struggle, stating that “some publics are more likely 
than others to stand in for the public, to frame their address as the universal 
discussion for the people” (2002: 117).  Thus the importance of counterpublics is 
their ability to and orientation towards “actively and effectively contest[ing] the 
discursive boundaries of the mainstream public sphere” (Dahlberg 2007a: 57). 
Downey and Fenton later make it clear (2003) that this interpretation is drawn from 
a shift within Habermas’s work, from seeing the public sphere at rest towards 
seeing it in a constant state of flux (Habermas 1996).  He postulates that when civil 
society groups mobilise to bring concerns from the periphery of the public sphere 
towards the centre, “the structures that actually support the authority of a critically 
engaged public begin to vibrate.  The balance of power between civil society and 
the political system then shifts” (ibid.: 379).  Again, this can be seen in terms of an 
ongoing hegemonic struggle.   
However, Downey & Fenton make the point that no counterpublic can escape the 
context of existing “industrial-commercial” public spheres; indeed, the very term 
‘counterpublic’ implies that their orientation is towards challenge as opposed to 
complete escape (Downey & Fenton 2003: 193).  Again, Warner’s treatment of this 
issue is similar: “A counterpublic maintains at some level, conscious or not, an 
awareness of its subordinate status.  The cultural horizon against which it marks 
itself off is not just a general or wider public but a dominant one” (2002: 119).  As 
such, a degree of interaction with the mainstream media is seen as an almost 
unavoidable component of successful counterpublic strategising (Downey & Fenton 
2003: 193).   
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Echoing Fraser, they reassert the fact that counterpublics are not necessarily 
virtuous or progressive, but also go further in emphasising that a multiplication of 
the number of counterpublics does not necessarily mean a multiplication of 
counterhegemonic power.  For this to transpire, interconnections and solidarities 
between publics must occur (ibid.: 194).  This echoes a much earlier assertion made 
by Laclau & Mouffe (1985) that only ‘chains’ of political activity linking through 
society and binding different spheres together can achieve any success with regards 
to the articulation of counter/hegemonic projects24.  If this is not forthcoming, “the 
oppositional energy of individual groups and subcultures is more often neutralised 
in the marketplace of multicultural pluralism, or polarised in a reductive 
competition of victimisations” (Downey & Fenton 2003: 194). 
Downey later continues this discussion alone (2007), suggesting two amendments to 
Fraser’s concept of the ‘subaltern counterpublic’ (1992).  He disagrees with the 
inclusion of the term ‘subaltern’, arguing that some counterpublics may possess 
relatively powerful participants, and also makes the point that the dual nature of 
counterpublics is not necessarily always in perfect balance.  By this he means that 
for any given counterpublic, the balance between their inner group dynamic and 
their outwards-oriented public dynamic may be dysfunctional – they may be 
significantly better at one than the other (Downey 2007: 117).  Moreover, he adds to 
his previous discussion (with Fenton) on the relationship between crises in the 
dominant public sphere and the emergence of counterpublics:  
 
During normal circumstances they are mostly excluded from the public 
sphere entirely or appear occasionally as freaks.  During times of crisis 
and elite division, however, through skilful dramaturgical self-
presentation they may penetrate the barriers of the public sphere and 
influence broader public opinion and may have some influence on elites 
and political decision-making… The extent of this depends very much, 
however, on the severity of crisis in the systems world, the ability of 
those systems to address the crisis, and the ability of elites to 
incorporate some of the demands of counter-publics.  
(Downey 1992: 118) 
 
                                                
24 Mouffe’s continued engagement with public sphere theory will be investigated in the next section. 
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6.2.2.1.2 Transnationalising the public sphere 
 
McLaughlin (1994) extends the multiple publics theme in a slightly different 
direction by criticising the nationalistic focus of the Habermasian public sphere.  
She claims that this conception of the public sphere has been outwitted by 
globalisation, and by evolutions in real world public spheres – formal and informal 
politics are increasingly transnational, and public sphere theory needs to be brought 
into line with these developments (McLaughlin 1994: 156).  In order for this 
“glaring omission” to be rectified, public sphere theory must begin to engage with 
the “ways in which the public sphere has been reshaped through the globalising, 
mediated forms of communication that constitute the representational infrastructure 
for today’s public spaces” (ibid.: 157). 
Calhoun (1997) follows this lead, arguing that the Habermasian Westphalian-
national public sphere ignores the “eternal reality” that citizens have always had 
many more societal group allegiances than just that oriented towards their nation 
state (1997: 89).  Maintaining an insistence on the unitary public sphere, and 
rejecting multiple public spheres as divisive, is in fact an attempt to repress or 
obscure the difference that is so integral to publics, and serves only to undermine 
the spheres’ functional capacity (ibid.: 81-82).  Calhoun does, however, equally 
caution a blind faith in counterpublics that fails to emphasise the necessity for 
interpublic discourse, in that “democracy requires discourse across basic lines of 
difference” (ibid.: 81), and a failure to allow for this is no better than an insistence 
on a unitary, overarching public sphere. 
Keane (2000), in his criticism of Garnham and the Westminster school’s insistence 
on national public service broadcasting as the best contemporary realisation of the 
public sphere, concurs with Calhoun. “The ideal of a unified public sphere and its 
corresponding vision of a territorially bounded republic of citizens striving to live 
up to their definition of the public good are obsolete” (Keane 2000: 76).  However, 
he goes one step further, in asserting that public sphere theory should visualise “a 
complex mosaic of differently sized, overlapping and interconnected public 
spheres” encompassing subnational through to supranational spaces and relations 
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(ibid.: 76).  He proposes an analytical frame with which to assess real world 
situations by defining three levels of public spheres; micro, meso, and macro.   
Micropublic spheres are defined as those existing at the subnational level, and 
having dozens to thousands of participants, with Habermas’s coffeehouses and 
salons seen as prime examples.  These may or may not emerge into the wider world 
of publicity and media, with this latency seen as a strength rather than a weakness.  
 
Although they appear to be ‘private’, acting at a distance from official 
public life, party politics and the glare of media publicity, they in fact 
display all the characteristics of small group public efforts, whose 
challenging of the existing distribution of power can be effective exactly 
because they operate unhindered in the unnewsworthy nooks and 
crannies of civil society.  
(Keane 2000: 78)   
 
Mesopublic spheres have millions of participants, and exist at the nation state level, 
corresponding with the familiar Habermasian public sphere.  They may also exist 
slightly within or outside the boundaries of the nation state; for example, at the 
regional level, or between neighbouring states who share a language or history 
(ibid.: 79).  Macropublic spheres exist at the supranational or global level, and may 
have millions or even billions of participants.  These categories may seem 
somewhat rigid, but Keane is careful to explain that they are not intended as 
“discrete spaces… they rather resemble a modular system of overlapping networks 
defined by the lack of differentiation among spheres” (ibid.: 87). 
Additionally, Fraser herself has discussed this transnationalisation at length (2005).  
Criticising her (and others’) earlier work for not going far enough towards 
questioning the Westphalian-national frame enclosing the Habermasian public 
sphere, she sets about interrogating the stability of the six Westphalian-national 
institutions and concepts that Structural Transformation is based upon: state 
sovereignty; economy; citizenry; language; literature; and communications 
infrastructure.  What emerges is a picture of the comprehensive erosion of the 
Westphalian-national basis of the Habermasian public sphere. 
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No longer unified in a single institutional locus, sovereignty is being 
disaggregated, broken up into several distinct functions and assigned to 
several distinct agencies, which function at several distinct levels, some 
global, some regional, some local and subnational… If public sphere 
communication is by definition addressed primarily to states, it cannot 
today serve the function of rationalising sovereign domination, as the 
latter is often exercised elsewhere, by non-state actors and trans-state 
institutions.  
(Fraser 2005: 4) 
 
Similarly, the Westphalian-national economy is increasingly subsumed within 
globalised economic structures, typified by transnational conglomerates and 
financial markets.  As such, an exclusively national public sphere is totally eluded 
by the processes that govern contemporary economic relations (ibid.).  Due to 
migrations, disapora and dual-citizenship arrangements, there is a similar disjunct 
between citizenship and language, and Westphalian nation states (ibid.).  The 
importance of national literature has also declined, partially because of increasing 
cultural hybridity within print media, and partially because of the increasing 
dominance of global visual media and entertainment.  This has been facilitated by a 
corresponding globalisation of the communications infrastructure through 
privatisation, concentration and conglomeration, and new technologies such as the 
Internet (ibid.: 5).  As such, Fraser concludes that both a horizontal and vertical 
multiplicity of counterpublics is necessary, rather than merely horizontal, as in 
Fraser (1992), in clear resonance with Keane (2000).   
A cohesive public sphere theory taking all these issues into account leaves us with a 
vastly more flexible and plural understanding of the concept of the public sphere.  It 
“is no longer understood as a singular deliberative space but a complex field of 
multiple contesting publics, including both dominant and counter-publics of various 
forms” (Dahlberg 2007a: 60), thus acknowledging, accounting for, and theorising 
the contestation of societal power differentials much more adequately than the 
unitary Habermasian public sphere.  Furthermore, it has been de-territorialised to 
account for the functions and relations of an increasingly globalised and networked 
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world.  This de-territorialisation is especially important with regards to hacktivism, 
given that it can be practiced on any of Keane’s theorised levels, which can be seen 
as meshing with or complementing the various hacktivist geo-participation 
alignments delineated by Samuel (2003).  Given the common hacktivist focus on 
digital rights (which are often linked in with global or at least transnational 
political-economic and particularly neoliberal issues and discourses) and this 
thesis’s specific focus in on campaigns for digital freedoms, this theoretical 
transnationalisation is absolutely essential to the research project at hand.  
Furthermore, it is essential to any conception of the public sphere that wishes to 
comprehend the complexities and multivalent realities of our increasingly 
globalised society. 
Continuing onwards, this improved theoretical functionality is further extended 
through the comprehensive discussion and critique of the public/private dichotomy 
at the heart of the Habermasian public sphere. 
 
6.2.2.2 Further eroding the public/private dichotomy 
 
6.2.2.2.1 The impossibility of bracketing status differentials and the 
failures of rational-critical debate 
 
Much support has also been given to Fraser’s contention that any attempts to 
bracket status differentials within the public sphere are counterproductive, and that 
an insistence upon exclusively rational-critical debate contains its own exclusionary 
mechanisms (Bohman 1997; Calhoun 1997; Dahlberg 2007, 2007a, 2007b; 
Dahlgren 1995; Downing 2001; Dryzek 2000, 2001; Eley 1992; Garnham 1992; 
Hoggett & Thompson 2002; Kellner 2000; Montag 2000; Mouffe 1993, 2000, 
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2000a, 2005; Poster 2001; Rabinovitch 2001; Ryan 1992; Squires 1998; Thompson 
1993; Walzer 2002; Warner 1992, 2002). 
Eley speaks of Habermas’s erroneous idealisation of rational critical debate (1992: 
319), and Ryan concurs, asserting that Habermas clearly did not anticipate “the 
fundamental critiques that feminism, in combination with postmodernism, would 
level against key elements in his model and his history, especially his confidence in 
an abstract rationality” (Ryan 1992: 262).  Her history of the systemic exclusion of 
women from the historical public sphere not only exposes the exclusionary basis of 
rational-critical debate, but also identifies the need to remain open to the possibility 
of non-rational communication as a necessary component of public sphere theory 
that is truly oriented towards total inclusiveness.  She argues that sometimes, 
political acts can be just and reasoned despite having no apparent virtue, civility, or 
logic, such as those carried out by the female participants in the New York Draft 
Riots of 1863.  Her history “challenges us to listen carefully and respectfully for the 
voices of those who have long been banished from the formal public sphere and 
polite public discourse.  Those most remote from public authorities and 
governmental institutions and least versed in their language sometimes resort to 
shrill tones, civil disobedience, and even violent acts in order to make themselves 
heard” (ibid.: 285-286).  This is clearly of immense relevance to hacktivism, given 
its sometimes-illegal methods and often non-rational modes of discourse. 
Warner (1992, 2002) continues this argument, conceptualising rational-critical 
publicity and the bracketing of status as a form of self-abstraction.  The intention is 
that “the validity of what you say in public bears a negative relation to your person.  
What you say will carry force not because of who you are but despite who you are” 
(Warner 1992: 382).  However, the ability to self-abstract is a differential resource, 
in that some are better able to do so than others; hence, “[t]he very mechanism 
designed to end domination is a form of domination” (ibid.: 384).  Successful self-
abstracters tend to be white, male, educated, propertied, and heterosexual; as such, 
rational-critical discourse and status bracketing compromise rather than ensure the 
public sphere ideal of inclusiveness.  As Mouffe has also argued, “[t]o the excluded, 
“the ‘neutral’ principles of rational dialogue are certainly not so” (1993: 145). 
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The bourgeois public sphere is a frame of reference in which it is 
supposed that all particularities have the same status as mere 
particularity.  But the ability to establish that frame of reference is a 
feature of some particularities.  Neither in gender nor in race nor in class 
nor in sexualities is it possible to treat different particulars as having 
merely paratactic or serial difference.  Differences in such realms 
already come coded as the difference between the unmarked and the 
marked, the universalisable and the particular… the two sides of any of 
these differences cannot be treated as symmetrical… without simply 
resecuring an asymmetrical privilege.  The bourgeois public sphere has 
been structured from the outset by a logic of abstraction that provides a 
privilege for unmarked identities: the male, the white, the middle class, 
the normal.  
(Warner 1992: 383) 
 
Garnham (1992) and Thompson (1993) make the important observation that this 
criticism of status bracketing and rational-critical debate is not just applicable to 
Structural Transformation – it applies equally to Habermas’s later theory of 
communicative action. “This discourse-centred concept of democracy places its 
faith in the political mobilisation and utilisation of the communicative force of 
production… it anchors the validity of norms in the possibility of a rationally 
founded agreement on the part of all those who might be affected, insofar as they 
take on the role of participants in a rational debate” (Habermas 1992: 447; italics 
in original).  It is thus as equally problematic as Structural Transformation, leading 
Thompson to maintain, “it would probably be sensible for Habermas to tone down 
some of his stronger claims in favour of a more modest approach” (1993: 256).   
Kellner (2000) also criticises this shift in thinking, in that its ahistorical and 
universalistic perspective does not account for the contingency, subjectivity, and 
constructedness of language. “Meanings and uses shift over time, while different 
societies have their own language games and forms of language and communication 
which are subject to a multiplicity of varying social forces and powers” (Kellner 
2000: 11).  As such, language and communication are integrally embedded in 
systemic power relations, and are therefore susceptible to being used for domination 
and manipulation.  Language is, therefore, a hegemonic force, and an “imperfect 
model for rationality and democracy” (ibid.: 12). 
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Young (1996) adds another feminist voice to this line of criticism of mainstream 
public sphere and deliberative democracy theory.  The insistence upon rational-
critical arguments amongst status-bracketed individuals, while intending to secure 
inclusiveness, fails to acknowledge social power, and the de-equalising effect this 
can have on participants’ confidence in their right to speak, as well as the 
privileging of some forms of speech over others (Young 1996: 122).  As such, 
“[d]espite the claim of deliberative forms of orderly meetings to express pure 
universal reason, the norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate 
as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people” (ibid.: 123).  
The rational-critical norms of deliberation are culturally specific and must be 
learned, informing a speaking style that tends to be highly correlated with social 
privilege.  The focus on impassionate and disembodied deliberation, and literal as 
opposed to figurative language further reinforces this privileging of white, male, 
upper-class participants.  Hence, those who are not socially privileged also tend not 
to possess the skill of rational-critical communication and are disadvantaged within 
deliberation.  They may even ‘drop out’ altogether due to feelings of frustration and 
intimidation (ibid.: 124).  Furthermore, it can be argued that passion may actually 
benefit reasoned deliberation aimed at understanding – a line of reasoning that 
would seem to inform hacktivism, particularly in its more confrontational forms: 
 
Reason without passion is reason without energy or dynamism.  For 
example, if cut off from aggression, reason lacks bite and sharpness.  
The constructive use of aggression underpins the capacity to cut through 
superfluous or misleading detail and get to the heart of an issue, the 
ability to get hold of an argument and critically dissect it, and the ability 
to hold on tenaciously to a vital truth when counter-arguments are flying 
around.  
(Hoggett and Thompson 2002: 114)25 
 
To counter this, Young proposes a wider understanding of the forms and styles of 
speech involved in political discussion, defining this revised theory as 
                                                
25 See also Walzer (2002). 
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‘communicative’ rather than ‘deliberative’ democracy.  She proposes that the 
repertoire of speech acts be expanded to include greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling.  
Greeting is seen as a useful way in which to establish trust and respect amongst 
participants, and to acknowledge one another in their individual particularity.  It 
includes expressions of leave-taking, as well as lubricating forms of speech such as 
mild flattery and deference which can be used to overcome any counterproductive 
outbreaks of hostility (ibid.: 130).   
The inclusion of rhetoric is proposed in response to Young’s view that “the 
opposition between rational discourse and rhetoric… denigrates both the 
situatedness of communication and its necessary link to desire” (ibid.: 131).  It is 
not enough just to speak – one must also be listened to.  Rhetoric has its place in 
maintaining the attention of the listener/s, as even “[t]he most elegant and truthful 
arguments may fail to evoke assent if they are boring” (ibid.).  Finally, storytelling, 
or narrative, fosters understanding across difference by explaining “to outsiders 
what practices, places, or symbols mean to the people who hold them… Through 
narrative the outsiders may come to understand why the insiders value what they 
value and why they have the priorities that they have” (ibid.: 132-133).  Hence, 
narrative is an important means of expressing need or entitlement, and also of 
contributing to social knowledge within deliberation (ibid.: 133).  Young’s theory of 
communication thus contributes to the conception of a public sphere that allows for 
more inclusive communication across wide cultural and socio-economic positions.  
Young later embellishes her argument through an idealised, imaginary discussion 
between a Habermasian deliberative democrat and an activist (2001), again aiming 
to “sound a caution about trying to put ideals of deliberative democracy into 
practice in societies with structural inequalities” (Young 2001: 671).  The 
deliberative democrat decries activism as mere interest group politics, and as having 
no place within the public sphere.  In contrast, the activist makes the point that 
activism is not self-interested, it is universalist rather than partisan, and as such, 
cannot be reduced to an undemocratic competition between interests.  Furthermore, 
the activist does not deny the importance of deliberation, but views activism as a 
necessary means of garnering attention that could not be accessed through 
deliberation alone. “Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are most 
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appropriate for getting citizens to think seriously about that that until then they may 
have found normal and acceptable.  Activities of deliberation, on the contrary, tend 
more to confer legitimacy on existing institutions and effectively silence real 
dissent” (ibid.: 675).  As such, it is often more productive to remain outside of these 
institutions and protests against the socio-economic structural inequalities that 
condition them and participation within them (ibid.: 679).   
This is obviously of massive significance to hacktivism, and, indeed, all forms of 
online activism.  In our commercially mass-mediated societies, the privilege of 
being heard within the mainstream media is reserved for a privileged few. These 
few are, for the most part, elite sources, as has been widely explained by such 
theories as Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) Propaganda Model, and supported by 
both their and screeds of other empirical research.  Hacktivism seeks to overcome 
this elite ‘attention economy’, garnering attention through controversial and/or 
performative modes of communication and subverting the traditional hierarchies of 
access to public communication, by ‘hacking into’ the mainstream media (Vegh 
2003) and thus commanding the attention of both political economic power elites 
and the general citizenry.  They thus gain a hearing for viewpoints that would 
otherwise likely be ignored if they were voiced through traditional ‘polite’ channels 
and modes of communication. 
Furthermore, the labeling of activists as unreasonable is exposed as a common 
power ploy used by societal elites to discredit activism and protest – which is 
certainly true in the case of hacktivism, as is evidenced by the abundance of 
research into its problematic conflation with the ‘darker side’ of hacking in general.  
It is argued that on the contrary, activists are generally very principled and reasoned 
about their causes, but have come to the conclusion that “discursive arguments 
alone are not likely to command attention or inspire action” (ibid.: 676). In 
socioeconomically stratified societies, it is antidemocratic to insist that weaker 
strata should ‘play’ strictly within the rules and forums set by societal elites who 
will be able to dominate the proceedings with their interests and perspectives” 
(ibid.: 678).  The agenda, deliberative scope and constraints of such proceedings are 
generally dominated by hegemonic discourses (ibid.: 685-687), and as such, are 
better contested externally, so as to avoid the legitimation that entry confers (ibid.: 
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682).  Furthermore, this contestation is sometimes best effected through non-
discursive modes. The goal of the activist is “to make us wonder about what we are 
doing, to rupture a stream of thought, rather than to weave an argument” (ibid.: 
687).  As such, deliberative democracy and public sphere theory needs to 
understand itself primarily as “a critical theory, which exposes the exclusions and 
constraints in supposedly fair processes of actual decision making, which make the 
legitimacy of their conclusions suspect”, and should move towards seeing the 
communicative sphere as far more “rowdy, disorderly, and decentred” (ibid.: 688) – 
a goal that this research fully supports and indeed, intends to instantiate. 
Bohman (1997) reiterates Garnham (1992) and Thompson’s (1993) critique of the 
ideal proceduralism based on rational-critical debate of Habermas’s later work, and 
his and other deliberative democrats’ erroneous assumption that these procedures 
will give “every citizen the equal opportunity to voice his or her reasons and to 
reject ones offered by others; and… ensure that dialogue is free and open and 
guided only by ‘the force of the better argument’” (Bohman 1997: 322).  In actual 
fact, ideal proceduralism fails to “capture the myriad ways in which deliberation 
may fail” (ibid.: 323) because it is guided by an inadequate conception of equality 
of political opportunity.  Just because someone is granted formal equality does not 
mean that they will be accepted or treated as equal.  Furthermore, rational-critical 
deliberation “clearly requires highly developed capacities and skills related to 
cognition and communications” (ibid.: 325), capacities which tend to be possessed 
by more socially advantaged citizens (ibid.: 325-326). That is, rational critical 
debate requires a form of cultural capital that is differentially allocated within 
stratified societies.  
“Deliberative democracy should not reward those groups who are simply better 
situated to get what they want by public and discursive means.  Its standard of 
political equality cannot endorse any kind of cognitive elitism”; but unfortunately, 
this is exactly what ideal proceduralism achieves (ibid.: 330).  It results in the 
cumulative disadvantaging of politically impoverished or ineffective citizens.  
These citizens are publicly excluded, in that they cannot initiate deliberation or 
participate effectively in the public sphere.  However, they are simultaneously 
politically included, since the ‘common good’ being discussed in the public sphere 
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impacts upon their existence, but “because they cannot initiate deliberation, their 
silence is turned into consent by the more powerful deliberators who are able to 
ignore them.  Asymmetrical exclusion and inclusion succeed by constantly shifting 
considerable political burdens on the worst off, who lack the resources, capabilities 
and social recognition to mount a challenge to the conditions which govern 
institutionalised deliberation” (ibid.: 321).  Rational-critical debate is once again 
exposed as a source of the perpetuation rather than elimination of domination and 
oppression – it is a legitimising force for dominant views. 
Calhoun (1997) also criticises Habermas’s view that private differences and status 
differentials are irrelevant, in line with the previous literature, as does Montag 
(2000), who sees the Habermasian dichotomy between reason and force as 
ideological.  ‘Reasoned’ argument is constantly and irredeemably built on the 
foundations of “broader relationships of forces in a society characterised by a 
perpetual, if latent, civil war that renders some dominant and others subordinate… 
Behind reason, force; behind rational-critical debate the unceasing struggle of 
“pressure and counter-pressure”” (Montag 2000: 143-144).  Hence, the 
Habermasian dichotomy between reason and force is ideological in that it obscures 
the forces constantly underpinning the differential deployment of legitimate reason. 
Dryzek (2000, 2001), like Young (1996, 2001), proposes an increased tolerance to 
various communicative forms and practices, and differentiates himself from 
mainstream deliberative and public sphere theory by proposing a theory of 
‘discursive’ democracy (Dryzek 2000: 1).  He also departs somewhat from the 
notion of counterpublics and interpublic contestation.  Instead, he conceives of an 
‘umbrella’ public sphere enveloping a constellation of competing discourses 
(Dryzek 2001: 657), which is, arguably, not that far removed from counterpublic 
theory.  In line with Young, he argues that rhetoric has a valid place within the 
public sphere, in that it has the ability to “reach a particular audience by framing 
points in a language that will move the audience in question” (Dryzek 2000: 52).  
Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement are given as a convincing 
example: “Without the emotional appeal the argument would have fallen on deaf 
ears.  Such transmission is fully consistent with the orientation of communicative 
action to reciprocal understanding, so there is no need to banish it to the realm of 
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strategic action, as Habermas would” (ibid.).  This is not to say that rhetoric does 
not have the possibility of coercive or manipulative use, just that it can play an 
important transmission function in reaching actors whose frames of reference are 
very different to the speakers’, and who may not be at all sympathetic (ibid.: 54). 
However, while agreeing in principle, he is critical of the form of Young’s criticism 
of rational debate, in that “[t]he empirical validity of Young’s claims about the 
degree to which these three forms of communication equalise across difference 
depends on the hierarchies within argument, greeting, rhetoric and storytelling 
compensating for, rather than reinforcing, one another” (ibid.: 67).  He argues that 
greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling, as well as other forms of communication, are 
acceptable so long as they are capable of inducing reflection, do not involve 
coercion or the threat of coercion, and connect the particular to the general (Dryzek 
2001: 660).  Young’s categories, as well as argumentation in general, do not 
necessarily satisfy these conditions (Dryzek 2000: 68). 
Storytelling can be coercive if elites constrain the forms of narrative that are 
acceptable, and if a story is about something purely individual then there is no point 
hearing it.  Similarly, greetings can be overly individualistic (for example, secret 
handshakes), and can also be coercive, such as the Maori haka.  Rhetoric, as is well 
known, can be coercive when employed by emotional manipulators or demagogues 
(such as Hitler), and can become bogged down in particularism unless it actively 
seeks to broaden its frame of reference or span multiple frames (ibid.,: 68-70).  
Equally, Habermas’s ‘forceless force of the better argument’ is only forceless if it 
occurs between equally communicatively capable participants.  “When such 
equality does not hold, then in practice some individuals will be able to make their 
argument prevail as a result of denial of access to the premises of argument to other 
individuals” (ibid.: 70). 
However, it is argument that Dryzek sees as central to deliberative democracy, in 
that it provides a means of breaching impasses that may occur with the other forms 
of communication, and it is a necessary component of collective action in response 
to social problems.  Greeting, rhetoric and storytelling are all valid inclusions, but 
their status is slightly different in that they are not essential (ibid.: 71).  Overall, 
“deliberative authenticity exists to the extent that communication induces reflection 
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on preferences in non-coercive fashion.  Provided that this standard is met, the kinds 
of communication admissible can be quite wide-ranging, and contestation in 
particular should be welcomed for its ability to induce reflection” (ibid.: 76). 
Dryzek also makes the important point that democratisation does not always have to 
be sought via the state, contrary to the assumptions made by most mainstream 
deliberative democrats.  He criticises Habermas’s newfound concentration upon 
elections and law making (Habermas, 199626).  He argues that his theory of 
communicative action is based upon “a naïve, civic-textbook version of democracy” 
(Dryzek 2000: 26), in which the state is dedicated and responsive to its citizens, 
ignoring the tendency for modern states to increasingly serve elite, corporate 
interests over its citizens (Keane 1998: 34, in McLaughlin 2004: 167). Indeed, 
Dryzek states that Habermas can no longer be classed a critical theorist, as he no 
longer believes that the state and economy (system) can be democratised any further 
(Dryzek 2000: 26).   
He also criticises the way Habermas has “turned his back on extra-constitutional 
agents of both democratic influence and democratic distortion” (ibid.).  Democracy 
“does not have to be confined to the formal institutions of state or the constitutional 
surface of political life.  Accepting such confinement means accepting a needlessly 
thin conception of democracy and a needlessly tenuous account of deliberative 
legitimacy” (Dryzek 2001: 665-666).  It is sometimes much better for 
counterpublics (or counter discourses, in Dryzek’s theory) to remain within civil 
society; oriented by a relationship to the state, but not seeking any share in state 
power (Dryzek 2000: 93).  
 
If a group leaves the oppositional sphere to enter the state then dominant 
classes and public officials have less to fear in the way of public protest.  
There may be democratic gain in this entry, but there is also democratic 
loss in terms of a less discursively civil society, the erosion of some 
existing democratic accomplishments, and a reduced likelihood of 
further democratisation in future.  Moreover, the democratic gain is 
itself uncertain… such gain can only be secured when the defining 
                                                
26  “Informal public opinion-formation generates “influence; influence is transformed into 
“communicative power” through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is 
again transformed into “administrative power” through legislation.” (Habermas 1996: 28) 
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interest of the entering group can be connected quite directly to an 
existing or emerging state imperative.  
(Dryzek 2000: 80-81) 
 
 
Political power can be exerted within civil society in numerous ways, especially 
because it is a far less constrained space than the state (ibid.: 96).  It can affect the 
way terms are defined and issues are framed within political discourse, rather than 
through the “direct leverage of one actor over another. The relative weight of 
competing discourses in civil society can have major implications for the content of 
public policy” (ibid.: 94).  Social movements can permanently alter political culture 
by legitimating certain forms of protest action, and through the introduction of 
issues into the public agenda.  Policy-oriented deliberative arenas can be established 
within civil society, and “protest within civil society can create fear of political 
instability and so draw forth a governmental response” (ibid.).  Furthermore, civil 
society actions can generate cultural change, with repercussions for wider power 
relations.   
These points highlight the strengths of hacktivism as a form of political 
communication, with the importance and validity of maintaining a vibrant public 
sphere existing in separation and opposition to the state once again underlined.  
While much hacktivism is indeed somewhat oriented towards one or more nation 
states, it is just as likely to be oriented towards ‘elite, corporate interests’ (often in 
combination with a state focus), thus comprehending and opposing the increasingly 
close-knit elite political-economic alliances present within global modernity.  In 
such an environment, focusing entirely upon state structures, let alone seeking to 
capture some modicum of state power, is a misguided (and extremely difficult) 
objective – indeed, as Dryzek argues, hacktivists retain much more agility and 
counterhegemonic power by remaining firmly outside the institutional political 
system.  They retain the freedom to both introduce new issues into the public arena 
and frame them in their own terms, and can also incite enough public unrest that a 
governmental response is forced.  Hacktivism is also arguably being established as 
an increasingly recognised (if not entirely condoned) form of activism, with recent 
actions undertaken by the group Anonymous more and more often described by 
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multiple news sources as ‘activism’ (as opposed to cyberterrorism or hacking) and 
with the word ‘hacktivism’ gradually entering the vocabulary of mainstream media 
outlets such as the BBC (‘Anonymous hacktivists say Wikileaks war to continue’ 
2010). 
Dahlberg is the most recent addition to the multitude of voices critiquing the 
impossibility of effectively bracketing status differentials within the public sphere 
or spheres of debate, as well as the Habermasian insistence on rational-criticality.  
Originally what might be described a ‘staunch Habermasian’27 (2004, 2005), he 
accepted the discussed field of public sphere theory as highlighting some important 
issues, but as constructing its criticisms of Habermas on an under-sophisticated 
reading of his works, particular his later theory of communicative rationality.  He 
does raise some valuable issues in these earlier works, which are based on an 
extremely sensitive and deep reading of Habermas, although his counter-criticisms 
of the criticisms made by what he classes ‘difference democracy theory’, are, at 
times, arguably based on forced theoretical contortions in defense of Habermas.   
However, Dahlberg now considers mainstream or Habermasian public sphere 
theory, while “pay[ing] more attention to power than some critics argue”, as failing 
to “adequately theorise the power relations involved in defining what counts as 
legitimate deliberation” (Dahlberg 2007: 47), and his recent works emerge from 
what he calls ‘agonistic’ public sphere theory (2007, 2007a, 2007b).  He has 
become fully engaged in the project of radicalising the public sphere concept.  
However, this does not mean that he has totally abandoned mainstream public 
sphere theory as useless; rather, he argues that it has not gone far enough.  While it 
conceives of power deriving from coercive action, instrumental or strategic action, 
technical limitations and social inequalities, it does not adequately acknowledge the 
disciplining and negative power it enforces through legitimising only rational-
critical deliberation, and the way in which this privileges those whose native modes 
of communication (generally Western, masculine modes) are closer to this ideal 
(Dahlberg 2007: 131, 2007a: 53).   
                                                
27 In the sense that he subscribed strongly to Habermas’s later theory of communicative action or 
rationality. 
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While sophisticated mainstream deliberative democrats do acknowledge this 
phenomenon, they see it as resulting from ‘cultural bias’; it is simply another kind 
of ‘distorted communication’ that advantages some participants due to their cultural 
context instilling them with more ‘legitimate’ voices (Dahlberg 2007: 131).  
Furthermore, they see the idealised public sphere norm (or, indeed, any idealised 
norm) as fallible and open to reinterpretation.  Hence, any application of this norm 
will likely have anti-democratic effects in the form of exclusions.  Nonetheless, they 
do believe that the perfection of the normative conception of and realisation of the 
ideal form of the public sphere is theoretically possible. 
In contrast, this is where poststructuralist critics disagree. They see meaning as 
inherently unfixed and therefore all rational communication as, necessarily, a 
failure.  While this difference in belief does not translate into an understanding of 
power and exclusion within the public sphere that is any different from mainstream 
theory (in that both assume that the ideal public sphere is never realised), it makes a 
huge difference with regard to how the inevitable exclusions from the public sphere 
are dealt with: 
 
The deliberative democrat focuses upon how to achieve more rational 
critical debate within communicative spaces, while their 
feminist/poststructuralist critics focus on the power and exclusion 
involved in the institution of such communication… By ignoring this 
politics, the deliberative position fails as a radically democratic norm, 
which must account for how all voices can participate in political 
processes.  
(Dahlberg 2007: 132) 
 
 
This is why mainstream deliberative or public sphere theory has no place for “non-
deliberative activist protest actions. Such actions are not recognised in the 
deliberative model’s emphasis on reciprocal, respectful communication” (Dahlberg 
2007: 133).  However, as Dahlberg argues, agonistic public sphere theory (to use 
his term) expands the repertoire of legitimate modes of communication to 
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potentially allow this kind of action (given that it meets certain basic criteria, as 
Dryzek has made clear), primarily through the deployment of the counterpublic 
concept.  It does not deny the central role of deliberation; it simply adds the idea of 
discursive contestation to the emphasis on deliberative politics. Rather than simply 
accepting rational-critical deliberation as the only legitimate form of discourse, neo-
Habermasian public sphere theory allows for both discursive radicalism and 
interdiscursive contestation.   
Drawing on poststructuralism and a post-Marxist understanding of discourses as 
“socially contingent systems of meaning, which form the identities of subjects and 
objects”, each discourse is seen as fundamentally predicated upon exclusion 
(Dahlberg 2007b: 835). “There is always an ‘outside’ to discourse, a set of 
meanings, practices, identities and social relations, which is defined by exclusion 
and against which discursive boundaries are drawn” (ibid.).  Discourses are 
therefore fundamentally political, in that they are involved in constant hegemonic 
struggles over the limits of everything, including what can be counted as 
‘legitimate’ deliberation (ibid.).  As such, discursive radicalism is that against which 
the norm of rational-critical debate is defined – the ‘radical other’.  This struggle 
between the ‘normal’ and the ‘radical’ is constant, preventing discursive or 
hegemonic closure of the boundaries of legitimate public sphere deliberation.  
Counterpublics are the space in which radical discourses are practised and 
solidified; made ready for interpublic or interdiscursive contestation with other 
counterpublics and the dominant public sphere (Dahlberg 2007a: 54-55): 
 
The agonistic public sphere understanding, through the key concept of 
counter-publics, makes central both intra-discursive deliberation that 
constitutes publics (as against interest groups) and inter-discursive 
contest that challenges deliberative exclusions.  The result is a 
radicalised public sphere conception, radicalised in relation to the 
deliberative model in that it extends public sphere theory to include 
politics associated with voices excluded from mainstream public 
spheres.  The radicalised conception gives democratic legitimacy to 
voices and struggles from outside what is deemed within any particular 
political context to be ‘legitimate’ deliberation.  
(Dahlberg 2007: 140-141) 
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As such:  
 
…protest is very much a communicative act when undertaken with the 
aim of raising issues for deliberation rather than to coerce.  The use of 
signs and banners, street demonstration, guerrilla theatre, dance and 
song, offline and online sit-ins, cyber-parody, graffiti and posters, etc. 
utilise creative and sometimes ‘disruptive’ forms of rhetoric through 
which marginalised groups can gain a hearing for their voices and call 
into question more dominant positions.  
(Dahlberg 2005: 119-120). 
 
 
This argument aligns with Young’s previously discussed call for the inclusion of 
activism and other more ‘rowdy’ and passionate forms of communication within the 
public sphere (1996, 2001), and is similarly essential to an understanding of the 
public sphere that can help us explore hacktivism’s role in modern democracies.  
Hacktivism most certainly aims to raise issues for deliberation through creative, 
performative and often disruptive forms of direct online protest, thus garnering 
attention for marginalised or counterhegemonic discourses and opinions, and calling 
positions of dominance or hegemony into question. 
Overall, Dahlberg rounds off a convincing critical body of theory based on the 
futility and counter-productivity of Habermasian public sphere theory’s insistence 
upon the bracketing of status within the public sphere, and its similarly erroneous 
focus on exclusively rational-critical deliberation at the expense of forms of 
contestation.  However, there is a final subsection of criticism that must be 
addressed before we can provide a full understanding and thus concise explanation 
of neo-Habermasian theory. 
 
 
 
 
 190 
6.2.2.2.2 Democratic advantages in allowing private interests into the 
public sphere, and the failure of consensus 
 
Neo-Habermasian theory also follows Fraser’s (1992) lead in problematising 
Habermas’s strict demarcation between public and private and his insistence that 
private issues have no place within the public sphere, as well as her questioning of 
the possibility and legitimacy of consensus (Benhabib 1996a; Calhoun 1994, 1997; 
Daniel 2000; Dahlberg 2005, 2007, 2007a, 2007b; Dryzek, 2000, 2001; Felski 
1989; Gould 1996; Lyotard 1984; Mouffe 1993, 1996, 2000, 2000a, 2005; Sassi 
2000; Ryan, 1992; Warner, 1992). Through allowing for contestation as well as 
deliberation within public sphere theory, we have already implicitly questioned the 
need for all public sphere communication to be oriented towards consensus.  
Similarly, through exposing the impossibility of bracketing status differentials, we 
have also problematised the notion that the private world should be kept totally 
separate from the public sphere.  We will now investigate both of these issues in 
more explicit detail. 
 
6.2.2.2.2.1 Allowing private interests into the public sphere  
 
Ryan (1992) once again proves a starting point, with her discussion of the history of 
the emergence of American female public spheres illustrating that “the notions of 
interest and identity need not be antithetical to the public good… In practice, 
inclusive representation, open confrontation, and full articulation of social and 
historical differences are as essential to the public as is a standard of rational and 
disinterested discourse” (Ryan 1992: 285).  Indeed, women only gained 
emancipation and entry into the mainstream public sphere through articulating their 
personal interests and desires through counterpublics, arguing towards equality and 
admittance into the mainstream.  The same could be said for the argument for 
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universal and unrestricted internet access – over the last few decades, it has moved 
from something viewed predominantly as a private concern, towards a right that is 
increasingly ratified by national legislation and vigorously defended as a public 
good when threatened. 
Warner (1992, 2002) concurs with the importance of facilitating the ability to 
introduce ‘private’ interests into the public sphere, and generalises this issue 
outwards to include multiple fields of private differentiation: “Neither in gender nor 
in race nor in class nor in sexualities is it possible to treat different particulars as 
having merely paratactic or serial difference” (Warner 1992: 383).  These private 
issues and interests require introduction rather than elimination within the public 
sphere if it is to be a truly egalitarian discursive arena or network of arenas. “To 
make the distinction between private and public is to determine the subjects of 
common discussion and decision and thus the borders of politics” (Sassi 2000: 95), 
when a truly democratic public sphere theory requires that these borders be kept 
open to contestation. “Democratic publicity requires positive guarantees of 
opportunities for minorities to convince others that what was not public in the past 
should be so now” (ibid.: 93).  As such, counterpublics need not only be formally 
political, but may be based around cultural and identity issues as well (Warner 
2002; Schiller 2007). 
Calhoun agrees, arguing that Habermas’s perception of the degradation of the 
public sphere in Structural Transformation is partially based upon a failure to 
acknowledge that the public sphere concept has dual functionality – it is oriented 
not only towards ‘problem-solving’ but also towards ‘world-disclosing’ (ibid.; see 
also Calhoun 1997:82).  The problem solving function of the public sphere has 
arguably degenerated somewhat, but it is difficult to make the same argument about 
its world-disclosing function, in that public discourse has not become a “less vibrant 
source of understanding, including self-understanding”(Calhoun 1994: 34).   
Furthermore, this world-disclosing role is not limited to political culture, as many 
cultural and identity-based issues are increasingly and fundamentally linked to 
political struggles.  As Benhabib notes, there has been widespread shift away from 
formal-governmental politics and strictly socio-economic preoccupations, towards a 
politics increasingly oriented around identity and difference (Benhabib, 1996a: 4).  
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This movement gives us a reason to be less despairing in the face of increasing 
disengagement from and disillusionment with formal politics (Blumler & Gurevitch 
1995; Eliasoph 1998; Putnam 2000; Sandel 1996).  When we look at these ‘new’ 
politics, “we can see various signs that suggest that many people have not 
abandoned engagement with the political, but have rather refocused their political 
attention outside the parliamentary system”, with politics becoming “not only an 
instrumental activity for achieving concrete goals, but also an expressive activity” 
(Dahlgren 2007: 57). 
These identity-based politics, primarily in the form of the so-called ‘new social 
movements’28, have come under some criticism, with Gitlin (1995) claiming that 
they are a weak substitute for ‘real world’ politics based upon economic 
inequalities.  He argues that identity-politics are destructive in that they fragment 
the ‘left’, ignore core issues of economic inequality, and provide no means for 
broad unification against the dominant capitalist powers; thus, bringing democracy 
to a new crisis.  However, as Giroux asserts, this criticism is characteristic of a 
totalizing view of class that cannot conceive of culture and class as being 
intertwined (2000: 257).  It sees social class as static, as opposed to dynamic and 
negotiated, and ignores the historical use of class politics to demean issues of 
gender, race and sexual orientation (ibid.: 254).  Class is actually lived through 
modes of race and gender; hence, the new social movements are part of a class-
based politics, not external to it (ibid.). “Social group designation and experience is 
meaningful for the expectations we have of one another, the assumptions we make 
about one another, and the status we assign to ourselves and others.  These social 
group designations have serious consequences for people’s relative privilege or 
disadvantage” (Young 1997: 386). 
When Habermas “treats identities and interests as settled within the private world 
and then brought fully formed into the public sphere, he impoverishes his own 
theory”, just as he does when assuming that these interests and statuses can be 
bracketed (Calhoun 1994: 35).  Social movements (of all kinds) are seen as having a 
                                                
28 Movements arising from the Sixties onwards, such as environmentalism, women’s rights, and 
sexuality-based movements.  These movements are seen as ‘new’ in that they are not explicitly or 
exclusively class-based.  They do not limit themselves to seeking material gain, but challenge the 
very notions of politics and society (Della Porta & Diani 2006: 8-9).  See also Melucci (1982, 
1989, 1996). 
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strong role in relation to this, in that they are important for restructuring identities as 
well as issues.  They are also “crucial to reorienting the agenda of public discourse, 
[and] bringing new issues to the fore.  The routine rational-critical discourse of the 
public-sphere cannot be about everything all at once.  Some structuring of attention, 
imposed by dominant ideology, hegemonic powers, or social movements, must 
always exist.  The last possibility is crucial to democracy” (ibid.: 37).  Hacktivism 
in support of digital rights (or indeed any cause) is clearly intended to effect this 
‘structuring of attention’, bringing their chosen issues to the notice and 
consideration of elites and the citizenry at large through performative publicity-
generation. 
And indeed, Habermas’s later theory of communicative action does see new social 
movements as an integral part of the public sphere, arising in response to the 
systemic colonization of the lifeworld.  This colonization has disturbed traditional 
forms of life, thus catalyzing the questioning of many previously unquestioned 
aspects of society.  This questioning has occurred in a political context, in that 
systemic intrusions into the lifeworld serve to politicize it; thus, every day life has 
become politicized (Roberts & Crossley 2004: 9). “[N]ew social movements form 
new, critical publics.  By means of communicatively rational engagement they call 
the system into question and set the agenda for a normative revitalisation of it” 
(ibid.).  However, he still does not acknowledge that actions within the public 
sphere may actually be constitutive rather than merely reflective of private identity, 
which is a mistake, as “in varying degrees all public discourses are occasions for 
identity-formation” (Calhoun 1997: 86). 
 
6.2.2.2.2.2 The impossibility of consensus 
 
Thompson (1993) initiates further criticism of Habermas’s orientation towards 
consensus through rational-critical debate, arguing that in a contemporary pluralist 
democracy, the emergence of a legitimate consensus is unlikely.  However, it is 
Chantal Mouffe who makes the largest contribution towards critiquing the 
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possibility of eradicating disagreement within the public sphere.  Drawing on her 
post-Marxist29 work with Ernesto Laclau (1985), she has reiterated her theory of 
agonistic pluralism in multiple pieces of literature (Mouffe 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2000a, 2005).  Mouffe summarises that, for Habermasian public sphere theory, “the 
process of deliberation is guaranteed to have reasonable outcomes to the extent that 
it realises the condition of the “ideal discourse”: the more equal and impartial, the 
more open the process is, and the less the participants are coerced and ready to be 
guided by the force of the better argument, the higher the likelihood that truly 
generalisable interests will be accepted by all those relevantly affected” (Mouffe 
2000a: 5-6).   However, the Habermasian belief that obstacles to reaching this 
legitimate rational consensus are empirical; that is, that due to the constraints of 
social life it is unlikely that citizens will ever be able to transcend personal interests 
enough to attain true universal rationality; is erroneous (ibid.: 6). 
In actual fact, the obstacles to rational consensus are ontological (Mouffe 2000a: 
13).  A “nonexclusive public sphere of rational argument where a non-coercive 
consensus could be attained” is an impossibility (Mouffe 1996: 255), because the 
presence of difference, seen as an impediment to be overcome, is the very thing that 
makes deliberation possible and necessary (Mouffe 2000a: 13).  Difference is 
actually the key to deliberation.  If a true consensus were ever reached, the need for 
deliberation and thus the deliberative public sphere would instantly disappear:   
 
…the belief that a final resolution of conflicts is eventually possible, 
even if envisaged as an asymptotic approach to the regulative ideal of a 
free and unconstrained communication, as in Habermas, far from 
providing the necessary horizon of the democratic project, is something 
that puts it at risk… [P]luralist democracy contains a paradox, since the 
very moment of its realisation would see its disintegration.  It should be 
conceived as a good that only exists as good so long as it cannot be 
reached.  
(Mouffe 1993: 8) 
                                                
29 Post-Marxism links in with ‘new’ identity-based politics, in that it turns away from the strict 
Marxist focus on class, towards a more complex understanding of political identity (Dyer-
Witherford 2007: 193).  However, in addition, socio-political identities are conceived in a 
poststructuralist or postmodern sense as being unfixed.  Instead, they are constantly redefined in a 
fashion relative to all other identities.  Political movements arise due to antagonisms between 
different signifiers that define themselves against one another. 
 195 
As such, “pluralism is not merely a fact, something that we must bear grudgingly or 
try to reduce, but an axiological principle.  It is taken to be constitutive at the 
conceptual level of the very nature of modern democracy and considered as 
something that we should celebrate and enhance” (Mouffe 2000: 19). 
Furthermore, power can never be eliminated from social relations, due to the fact 
that all social objectivities or identities are based upon acts of exclusion, and will 
always bear traces of this constitutive exclusion.  In other words, as was already 
argued by Dahlberg, identities are premised upon a we/they dichotomy, so each and 
every ‘we’ contains traces of the ‘they’ it is defined against (Mouffe 1993: 2-3).  
Power is therefore an ineradicable and intrinsic component to any identity, rather 
than an externality.  In addition, this ‘we/they’ relationship always contains the 
possibility of degradation into an antagonistic friend/enemy dichotomy.  
Antagonism, then, can never be eliminated, and constitutes an ever-present 
possibility within politics (Mouffe 2000: 12).   
As such, Mouffe argues for a democratic model that places issues of power and 
antagonism at its very centre, designating it a model of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (2000: 
97).  This model sees the main task of democratic politics as not to attempt to 
eliminate power and antagonism, as this is impossible, but to try and defuse it and 
constitute it in more democratic terms.  Enemies must be transformed into 
adversaries, and antagonism into agonism (Mouffe 2000a: 16).  An adversary is 
defined as “somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas 
we do not put into question” (ibid.: 15).  We acknowledge them as a legitimate 
opponent in that they share an orientation towards the democratic principles of 
liberty and equality; however, we both conceive of these terms differently in terms 
of meaning and implementation, and as such, we are unable to resolve our 
disagreement via rational deliberation.  Hacktivism is arguably an example of 
Mouffe’s call for the transformation of antagonism into agonism – it avoids 
violence, but retains passion, and vigorously contests the ideas of opponents without 
ever seeking to annihilate them or permanently deny them the right of response. 
This conception of agonistic plurality sees no possibility of a rational consensus, as 
we are engaged in “a struggle between opposing hegemonic projects which can 
never be reconciled rationally” (Mouffe 2005: 21).  An agreement can only be 
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found if one or both of us undergoes a “radical change of political identity” (Mouffe 
2000a: 15), given that “the very condition for the creation of consensus is the 
elimination of pluralism from the public sphere.” (2000: 49).  However, this is not 
to deny the fact that alliances between subordinate groups - ‘chains of equivalence’ 
based on their equally subordinate status - must be constructed in opposition to that 
which subordinated them (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2005: 53).  A failure to 
do this actually obscures the recognition of certain differences as relations of 
subordination (Mouffe 1996: 247). 
Young has taken a similar stance regarding the Habermasian orientation towards 
consensus (1996, 1997), in that it assumes that the participants in deliberation either 
“begin with shared understandings or take a common good as their goal” (Young 
1996: 120).  There are a number of problems with both of these assumptions.  
Firstly, it cannot be assumed that “there are sufficient shared understandings to 
appeal to in many situations of conflict and solving collective problems” (ibid.: 
125).  Secondly, and in line with Mouffe, Young argues that the assumption of a 
prior unity that merely requires rediscovering obliterates the need for deliberation in 
the first place.  Some Habermasian deliberative democrats respond to this second 
criticism by theorising unity (or consensus) as a goal to be worked towards, rather 
than something to be rediscovered.  The problem here harks back to the failures of 
rational-critical debate.  The theoretical consensus is oriented towards the ‘common 
good’, but as we have discussed, some groups (generally societal elites) are better 
positioned to control the definition of this ‘common good’ than others; thus, the 
status quo is reified (ibid.: 126). 
Rather than orienting debate purely towards consensus, Young argues that it should 
focus on attaining a minimum level of unity, and that engaging in deliberation with 
a spirit of openness and accountability is sufficient (Young 1997: 402).  Differences 
should be viewed as resources, rather than something to be transcended. In 
recognising that the others we are encountering are different - “[t]his does not mean 
that we believe we have no similarities; difference is not total otherness” - then we 
also recognise that there is something to be learned from them “precisely because 
the perspectives are beyond one another and not reducible to a common good” 
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(ibid.: 127).  In this way, the plurality that is a necessary condition of publicity 
(again, in line with Mouffe) is maintained.  
 
A conception of publicity that requires its members to put aside their 
differences in order to uncover their common good destroys the very 
meaning of publicity because it aims to turn the many into one.  
(Young 1997: 401) 
 
Rather than a falsely rational consensus, the end result of Young’s communicative 
democracy theory is a level of understanding based upon the self-transcendence 
privileged by deliberative democrats.  Personal perspectives are exposed as just 
that; the knowledge that one is arguing with diverse others requires one to frame 
arguments in ways that best bridge these differences in order to have any chance of 
success; and the expression and questioning of difference generates a greater social 
knowledge or subjectivity that increases participants’ “wisdom for arriving at just 
solutions to collective problems” (ibid.: 129).  She acknowledges that this is, 
indeed, an ideal, but argues that it can serve three important functions:  
 
…to justify a principle of the inclusion of specific group perspectives in 
discussion; to serve as a standard against which the inclusiveness of 
actual public communication can be measured; and to motivate action to 
bring real politics more in line with the ideal.  
(Young 1997: 404) 
 
Dryzek (2000, 2001) is also critical of the Habermasian focus on rational-critical 
deliberation in which “consensus remains the regulative ideal, an orientation to 
which real-world arrangements could aspire, though never actually reach” (Dryzek 
2000: 48).  In line with Mouffe and Young, he also argues that the attainment of 
consensus would eliminate all the difference or plurality that makes deliberation 
possible and necessary (Dryzek 2001: 661).  He believes that a focus on public 
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reason can be maintained despite this reason being plural, and ‘workable 
agreements’ generated.  
 
Workable agreements that can secure assent for different reasons are 
more plausible.  Discursive legitimacy is achieved to the extent of the 
resonance of such an agreement with the prevailing constellation of 
discourses in the degree to which this constellation is subject to 
dispersed and competent control.  
(Dryzek 2001: 665) 
 
Dahlberg (2005, 2007b) agrees with the characterisation of the emergence of any 
real-world ‘consensus’ as merely the hegemonic stabilisation of meaning made 
possible through domination or exclusion.  Discursive contestation is essential for 
questioning this consensus or hegemony, with consensus representing “simply one 
point in a dynamic process” (Dahlberg 2007b: 836) – no true, final consensus can 
ever be reached.  The means are infinitely more important than the end; that is; the 
process of deliberation and contestation is infinitely more democratically valuable 
than any of the temporary and flawed ‘consensual conclusions’ to this process 
(Dahlberg 2005: 127-128). 
 
6.3 The neo-Habermasian public sphere: A new normative ideal 
 
It should by this stage be abundantly clear that there is a broad support base for a 
reworking of Habermasian public sphere and deliberative democracy theory in a 
way that allows for a more adequate acknowledgement and contestation of societal 
power differentials.  We will call this reformulation ‘neo-Habermasian public 
sphere theory’, in that it retains the Habermasian public sphere as its departure point 
or core, but expands and sensitises it in new ways, thus more effectively 
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comprehending issues of power and difference.  In the words of Ryan, it allows 
publicness to “navigate through wider and wilder territory” (1992: 286). 
Neo-Habermasian public sphere theory is defined by the following: 
 
1. The theorisation of multiple public spheres: 
a. These spheres and the discourses constituting them are defined 
against or in opposition with one another, and with the dominant 
public sphere or spheres.  As such, they are known as ‘counterpublic 
spheres’. 
b. These spheres may range in size/scope from sub-national to supra-
national. 
c. They are public in that they have an outwards orientation – they aim 
to engage with other public spheres – as well as an inwards, group-
solidarity-based orientation. 
d. Because demarcating an a priori boundary around what issues may 
be included within the public spheres is exclusive, and status-
bracketing is impossible, counterpublics may be based around a 
range of concerns, and these concerns may be fully articulated within 
the public spheres.  In effect, everything can be political if it is 
determined as such through deliberation. 
 
2. The realisation that exclusively privileging rational-critical debate as the 
only mode of legitimate communicative action within the public sphere is 
exclusionary: 
a. As such, multiple modes of communication are deemed legitimate, 
including contestation and diverse forms of deliberation. 
b. However, these diverse modes of communication should still be 
judged in accordance with how well they fulfill a normative ideal of 
deliberative legitimacy. This ‘deliberative authenticity’ exists to the 
extent that communication induces reflection on preferences in a 
non-coercive fashion (Dryzek, 2000, 2001). 
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c. Achieving truly rational consensus is impossible in that it eliminates 
plurality, and any ‘consensus’ actually attained will always based 
upon exclusion and hegemonic stabilisation.  ‘Workable agreements’ 
or temporary consensus will suffice, but should always remain open 
to contestation.  The processes of deliberation and contestation are 
what have true value. 
d. Communicative action does not necessarily need to be oriented 
towards the state – it can have powerful effects within civil society. 
 
 
This updated theory of the public sphere (or spheres, to be more precise) is far more 
realistic, useful, and flexible that its original incarnation within Structural 
Transformation.  Rather than presenting a contradictory, dated, and unattainable 
ideal, it provides us with the tools needed to investigate the contemporary world and 
particularly the contemporary mediated landscape of political communication, and 
of effectively comprehending and hopefully contesting the lines of power running 
through the societies in which we live.  We now have a theoretical lens through 
which we can investigate the phenomenon of hacktivism. 
The final three chapters interpret three cases of hacktivism through a neo-
Habermasian theoretical lens. Rather than being randomly selected, these case 
studies focus in on a particular subject of contention – the ongoing and intensifying 
struggle over the development and control of the Internet.  Hacktivist incidents from 
each category of Samuel’s typology – political coding, performative hacktivism, 
and political cracking – are subjected to a critical discourse analysis guided by the 
concerns of neo-Habermasian public sphere theory.  This analysis focuses on both 
the forms of the hacktivism, and on the texts produced by it.  This attention to both 
discursive form and discursive content is structured by a focus on issues of diverse 
access to speech and attention and thus communicative power.  However, let us first 
pull together the two threads of neo-Habermasian public sphere theory and 
hacktivism, thus establishing that hacktivism is indeed a legitimate form of neo-
Habermasian public sphere communication and solidifying the foundation upon 
which the following analytical chapters rest. 
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6.4 Hacktivism: A legitimate form of neo-Habermasian public sphere 
communicative activity 
 
As has been explored within this chapter, as long as activism (including hacktivism, 
or indeed, any form of communicative activity) fulfills the requirement of inducing 
preference-reflection in a non-coercive fashion, it is an entirely legitimate mode of 
participation within the neo-Habermasian public sphere. The goal of the activist is 
“to make us wonder about what we are doing, to rupture a stream of thought, rather 
than to weave an argument” (Young 2001: 687). ‘Repertoires of electronic 
contention’ utilizing ‘conventional’ and ‘disruptive’ tactics (Costanza-Chock 2001) 
can be understood as constituting different modes of internet-based counterpublic 
spheres, which are then further defined by the discursive struggles they elect to take 
part in, and the discourses they articulate.   
These mobilisation outcomes or modes of activism range from tactical Internet use 
focused on information creation and diffusion, and the organisation and co-
ordination of ‘street’ mobilisations (conventional mobilisation and cultural 
outcomes), to collective or individual action using the Internet itself as a platform 
for activism. This latter ‘disruptive’ category encompasses various tactics or 
‘cultural outcomes’, such as site redirection/alteration/imitation, various floods 
(such as email or form), client or server-side denial-of-service attacks, and the use 
of trojans or viruses, and political software development; that is, different forms of 
hacktivism. Unless these conventional and disruptive tactics morph into violence 
proper, and/or are used by governments or militaries (thus becoming cyberterrorism 
or cyberwarfare), they would seem to fulfil the neo-Habermasian public sphere 
requirement of being intended to provoke non-coercive reflection on any 
preferences or opinions one might have formed regarding a given issue. 
As such, hacktivism would appear to fulfil the neo-Habermasian requirement of 
provoking reflection on political preferences in a non-coercive manner, and it most 
certainly intends to destabilise the dominance or hegemony of more powerful 
discourses or publics.  It is temporarily disruptive, but it does not result in human, 
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infrastructural or serious financial casualties, it does not violently force or coerce 
preference alteration, and it does not seek to annihilate enemies, but rather to 
dispute adversarial discourses.  Indeed, this is true for all non-violent activism and 
protest, both online and offline. As Dahlberg has contended: 
 
[P]rotest is very much a communicative act when undertaken with the 
aim of raising issues for deliberation rather than to coerce. The use of 
signs and banners, street demonstration, guerrilla theatre, dance and 
song, offline and online sit-ins, cyber-parody, graffiti and posters, etc. 
utilise creative and sometimes ‘disruptive” forms of rhetoric through 
which marginalised groups can gain a hearing for their voices and call 
into question more dominant positions.  
(Dahlberg 2005: 119-120) 
 
Hacktivism therefore merits analysis as a counterpublic activity, constituted as it is 
by counterhegemonic discourses oriented towards the contestation and 
destabilisation of targeted dominant or hegemonic publics.  We should seek an 
improved understanding of how these counter-discourses are propelled into wider 
consideration using online iterations of traditional protest activities.  Allowing 
contestatory forms of non-coercive communication into the public sphere, rather 
than requiring all participation to fulfil rational-critical criteria, goes some way 
towards counteracting or at least challenging the differentials of communicative and 
political power present in the tremendously stratified societies within which we 
exist, and is thus an important objective.  It is telling that the Kiwicon attendee who 
indicated that he had been involved in hacktivism defined it in a manner that 
signalled his implicit agreement with this theoretical perspective:  
 
[Hacktivism is] exercising an implied right towards political discussion 
through circumvention of electronic mediums. […] [It provides an] 
equal medium in order to express yourself.  
(Farrell 2007a) 
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As such, the remainder of this thesis will explore how hacktivism functions as a for 
of online counterpublicity intended to provoke political preference reflection, and 
destabilise dominant publics and thus threaten hegemony, through a critical 
discourse analysis of the three previously outlined, theoretically sampled case 
studies.  That is, the analysis will address the second research question: 
 
How does hacktivism, through discursively constructed and externally 
oriented publicity, function as a counterpublic sphere or 
counterhegemonic project oriented towards the provocation of political 
preference reflection and the destabilisation of a given dominant or 
hegemonic public? 
 
 
Each case study interprets an instance of hacktivist activity through a neo-
Habermasian lens, investigating the way in which they provoke political preference 
reflection in aid of the destabilisation of a given dominant or hegemonic public.  
The following chapter examinees the political coding group, Hacktivismo, with the 
subsequent two chapters then focusing on the New Zealand-based performative 
hacktivism of the Creative Freedom Foundation, and the political cracking carried 
out by a subsection of the group known as Anonymous. 
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Chapter 7 
Political coding: The case of Hacktivismo 
 
7.1 Context 
 
Hacktivismo is a hacktivist group that emerged as an offshoot project of the 
prominent Texas-based hacker group and DIY media organisation, the Cult of the 
Dead Cow (cDc).30 The cDc have a reputation as “the elite of the hacker world” 
(Samuel 2004a: 88), and are also one of the oldest groups of hackers.  The then-14 
year old hacker, Grandmaster Ratte’31, co-founded the cDc with Franken Gibe and 
Sid Vicious in Lubbock, Texas, in 1984, and their name stems from their original 
group space – an abandoned slaughterhouse in their meat-packing home town, 
which served as a hangout for Lubbock youths in general (Einhorn 2002).  They 
were one of the first groups to attach a specific political agenda to hacking, and also 
recognised the role of the media in helping them disseminate this agenda – as such, 
they have been much more visible (through media appearances) than many other 
hacker groups.   
Prior to the emergence of Hacktivismo, the cDc gained notoriety for developing 
Back Orifice, a programme that exploits (with the intent to draw attention to) some 
major security holes in versions of the Windows OS to allow remote network 
administration.  The initial version worked with Windows 95 and 98, and a more 
recent version, Back Orifice 2000 (B02k), supports Windows XP and 2000.  They 
are also known for their ‘Goolag’ campaign, which criticised Google’s decision to 
censor its Google.cn searches (under the direction of the Chinese government) in 
order to gain entry into the Chinese market), as well as similar compliance by 
                                                
30 Much of the information in this section comes from the Cult of the Dead Cow Communications’ 
and Hacktivismo’s main websites – www.cultdeadcow.com and www.hacktivismo.com - and 
will not be referenced directly, as it would generate too many inline citations. However, direct 
quotes and material from other sources will be referenced as normal.  Furthermore, cDc rather 
than CDC is the Cult of the Dead Cow’s preferred acronymic style, and is therefore what shall be 
used. 
31 Almost all Hacktivismo members, in line with political coders in general, use pseudonyms or 
handles rather than their real names. 
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Microsoft, Yahoo! and Cisco (see Figure 4).   (It is worth noting that Google have 
now pulled out of China, through diverting all Google.cn requests to the uncensored 
Google.hk domain.) 
 
Figure 5: The cDc's Goolag campaign logo32 
 
 
Figure 6: An ‘easter egg’ (surprise content) within Torpark, one of 
Hacktivismo's projects, showing (left, top, right) Hacktivismo, cDc and Ninja 
Strike Force imagery33 
 
                                                
32 Image from: http://w3.cultdeadcow.com/cms/2006/02/cdc-launches-gl.html 
33 Image from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Torpark_DEADBEEF_eegg.gif 
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The cDc also function as an alternative media outlet, producing their own books, 
online texts, music, and videos.  They are one of what is now a triumvirate of cDc 
entities, the other two being the Ninja Strike Force and Hacktivismo.  Formed in 
1996, the Ninja Strike Force is a group of specially selected, elite cDc hackers who 
are dedicated to achieving the various offline and online goals of the cDc.  
Hacktivismo, who are the focus of this case study, were formed in 1999.  These 
three groups together constitute cDc Communications (see Figure 5). 
 
 
7.1.1 The emergence of Hacktivismo 
 
Hacktivismo describe themselves as an international ‘special operations group’ and 
were founded by the cDc’s ‘Foreign Affairs Minister’, Oxblood Ruffin, and 
sponsored by the cDc. They “view access to information as a basic human right” 
and are “also interested in keeping the Internet free of state-sponsored censorship 
and corporate chicanery so all opinions can be heard” (‘The Hacktivismo FAQ 
v1.0’).  They state that they are “trying to intervene to reverse the tide of state-
sponsored censorship of the Internet through the inventive use of code… [and] 
favour using disruptive technologies that comply with the spirit and original intent 
of the Internet” (‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’).  As of July 2001, they had five core 
official members – Ruffin, Bronc Buster, The Pull, Mixter, and Drunken Master 
(a.k.a. Paul Baranowski), as well as a wide cohort of contributors from all over the 
world: 
 
Our numbers include I.T. professionals, lawyers, human rights workers, 
and students.  We live in the United States, Canada, Europe, Israel, 
Taiwan, Korea, and the Peoples Republic of China. Hacktivismo also 
has informal layers of support that collect network intelligence and will 
assist with application distribution, and document translation.  The one 
thing that can be said of the Hacktivismo network is that it is truly 
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international.  We're the United Nations of hacking, except without the 
bickering and cheapskates who won't pay up.   
(‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’) 
 
Ruffin will only extend membership invitations to individuals once they have 
invested a lot of time in Hacktivismo projects, keeping the core membership 
reserved for a dedicated elite.  Ruffin has a PR background, having worked for the 
United Nations for 10 years, and is (relative to the other hackers in the cDc) “not in 
the least technical” (Ruffin, 2002, in Samuel 2004a: 90).  He was invited to join the 
cDc in 1996 (again, membership is by invitation only) after making contact with 
one of their members, Death Veggie.  Ruffin is described as the one who took the 
term and concept of hacktivism and ran with it (although it was reportedly first 
coined by cDc member Omega, who initially used it jokingly to describe on-line 
protest actions).  Ruffin, however: 
 
…appropriated the word and began using it with a straight face; then 
many journalists, fading stars of the Left, and eventually script kiddies 
picked up on it, all claiming to know what hacktivism meant.  It has 
been a noun in search of a verb for some time now.  Oxblood once 
defined hacktivism as "an open-source implosion", and now he's added 
"disruptive compliance" to its range of description… [that is,] using 
disruptive technologies that comply with the spirit and original intent of 
the Internet.  The Internet is a commons with its own field of operation.  
It's all about freedom and bringing the world together… Hacktivism is 
the use of technology to advance human rights through electronic 
media.  
(‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’) 
 
 
 
This ‘straight-faced’ use of the word led to the creation of Hacktivismo, following a 
conversation amongst cDc members at the 2009 DEF CON hackers conference 
(Samuel 2004a: 90).  Ruffin recruited the five core members of Hacktivismo from 
within and without the cDc, with the collectives aim being the creation of a tool to 
circumvent the state-sponsored firewalls limiting and controlling citizens’ Internet 
 208 
access in countries like China and Saudi Arabia.  (Firewalls are Internet censorship 
filters acting as intermediaries between user and the rest of the Internet.  When a 
user in a country with a national firewall enters and requests a URL or web address, 
the request is sent to the firewall, which checks whether the requested website is on 
a list of those banned by the government.  If it is not, the request is then fulfilled, 
but if it is, the user will be sent a page conveying that the material they are trying to 
access is prohibited by their government.) 
 
7.1.2 Peekabooty and the ‘Hacktivismo Declaration’ 
 
The ‘Peekabooty’ project was the culmination of this objective - a distributed anti-
censorship network application that would allow users to bypass governmental or 
corporate firewalls: 
 
…inside countries where the Web is censored... The theory behind it is 
simple: bypass the firewalls by providing an alternate intermediary to 
the World Wide Web… A user in a country that censors the Internet 
connects to the ad hoc network of computers running Peekabooty. A 
small number of randomly selected computers in the network retrieves 
the web pages and relays them back to the user.  As far as the censoring 
firewall is concerned, the user is simply accessing some computer not 
on its “banned” list. The retrieved Web pages are encrypted using the de 
facto standard for secure transmission in order to prevent the firewall 
from examining the Web pages’ contents. Since the encryption used is a 
secure transaction standard, it will look like an ordinary e-business 
transaction to the firewall.  
(‘About the Peekabooty Project’, in Samuel 2004a: 92) 
 
 
Peekabooty was ‘demoed’ at DEF CON in 2001 as one of the conference’s major 
highlights, (Greene 2001), but the project itself ended in abortive conflict, with its 
chief developer, Drunken Master (a.k.a. Paul Baranowski) leaving the Hacktivismo 
team and taking Peekabooty with him.   
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However, despite this internal ruction and the loss of the initial project itself, 
Peekabooty set Hacktivismo on the road of ‘political coding’ – indeed, they 
epitomise Samuel’s category and she discusses them extensively (2004a).  They 
developed and articulated a ‘mission statement’ for their goals and operations, 
which was distributed prior to the unveiling of Peekabooty, on the 4th of July, 2001.  
In a press release entitled “A special message of hope: An international 
bookburning in progress”, the group outlined their dismay at the capricious and 
wide-ranging governmental- and corporate-led internet censorship of what they 
describe as “otherwise lawfully published material”: 
 
Free speech is under siege at the margins of the Internet. Quite a few 
countries are censoring access to the Web through DNS [Domain Name 
Service] filtering. This is a process whereby politically incorrect 
information is blocked by domain address -- the name that appears 
before the dot com suffix. Others employ filtering which denies 
politically or socially challenging subject matter based on its content.   
Hacktivismo and the CULT OF THE DEAD COW have decided that 
enough is too much. We are hackers and free speech advocates, and we 
are developing technologies to challenge state-sponsored censorship of 
the Internet.   
Most countries use intimidation and filtering of one kind or another 
including the Peoples Republic of China, Cuba, and many Islamic 
countries. Most claim to be blocking pornographic content. But the real 
reason is to prevent challenging content from spreading through 
repressive regimes. This includes information ranging from political 
opinion, "foreign" news, women's issues, academic and scholarly works, 
religious information, information regarding ethnic groups in disfavor, 
news of human rights abuses, documents which present drugs in a 
positive light, and gay and lesbian content, among others […] 
We are sickened by these egregious violations of information and 
human rights. The liberal democracies have talked a far better game 
than they've played on access to information. But hackers are not 
willing to watch the custodians of the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
turn them into a mockery. We are willing to put our money where our 
mouth is.   
Hacktivismo and the CULT OF THE DEAD COW are issuing the 
HACKTIVISMO DECLARATION as a declaration of outrage and a 
statement of intent. It is our Magna Carta for information rights. People 
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have a right to reasonable access of otherwise lawfully published 
information. If our leaders aren't prepared to defend the Internet, we are.  
(‘A special message of hope’ 2001) 
 
 
The press release then reproduced the Hacktivismo declaration in full.  This 
declaration will be dealt with in detail within the textual section of the analysis, but 
some introductory discussion of it is merited here.  As the cDc and Hacktivismo 
have themselves summarised, it is a document that condemns state-sponsored 
censorship of the Internet, with the primary objective of “[g]etting some sort of 
discussion going around information rights” (emphasis added) – a significant 
statement considering the analytical focus on the group’s counterpublicity.  The 
document cites Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (which 
has previously been discussed in terms of Internet rights as fundamental human 
rights) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
both of which are “internationally recognized documents that equate access to 
information with human and political rights”.  Hacktivismo also state 
“unequivocally that reasonable access to lawfully published material on the Internet 
is a basic human right; that [they are] disgusted with the political hypocrisy and 
corporate avarice that has created this situation” and that they are going to “step up 
to the plate” and do something about it (‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’).   
As stated in ‘A special message of hope’ (2001), this “lawfully published material” 
includes such things as political opinions, international news, information on 
women’s rights, academic and scholarly texts, religious opinions, information 
regarding human rights abuses, and gay and lesbian content.  They do recognise that 
some information should be restricted, but, in line with the hacker ethic (Levy 
1984), believe that most information wants to (and indeed, should be) free: 
 
Essentially [it] cuts out things like legitimate government secrets, kiddie 
porn, matters of personal privacy, and other accepted restrictions.  But 
even the term "lawfully published" is full of landmines.  Lawful to 
whom?  What is lawful in the United States can get you a bullet in the 
head in China.  At the end of the day we recognize that some 
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information needs to be controlled.  But that control falls far short of 
censoring material that is critical of governments, intellectual and 
artistic opinion, information relating to women's issues or sexual 
preference, and religious opinions.  That's another way of saying that 
most information wants to be free; the rest needs a little privacy, even 
non-existence in the case of things like kiddie porn.  
(‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’) 
 
It is interesting to note that beyond political and intellectual information and 
opinion, much of the material that Hacktivismo describe as ‘falling far short’ of 
being censorship-worthy falls within what has traditionally been the private realm.  
Hacktivismo’s support for the freedom of discussion and information dissemination 
regarding these issues effects their meta-level transposition into the realm of the 
publicly political – that is, the wider political issue of informational freedom 
automatically catapults censored issues across the private/public boundary and into 
a state of public relevance. 
 
7.1.3 Hacktivismo’s projects 
 
Following the breakdown of the Peekabooty project, Hacktivismo’s “stepping up to 
the plate” has consisted of Ruffin directing the development of a whole new 
generation of anti-censorship tools, with the development team continuing to grow.  
The group now claims more than 40 members (Samuel 2004a: 92), including Cindy 
Cohn, who serves as Legal Director and General Counsel for the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, a renowned international non-profit digital rights advocacy and legal 
organization (who was named as one of the National Law Journal’s top 100 most 
influential American lawyers in 2006, and one of the top 50 most influential women 
lawyers in 2007 (‘EFF’s Staff’)).  Clearly, the group is significantly more high-
powered and better connected than most hacker or hacktivist collectives, 
presumably due, at least in part, to Ruffin’s background in public relations.  They 
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have launched several projects over the last decade, each of which conforms to the 
goals stated in the ‘Hacktivismo Declaration’. 
 
7.1.3.1 Camera/Shy 
 
Camera/Shy is a steganography tool, and was released in 2002 at the Hackers on 
Planet Earth (H.O.P.E) convention in 2002 as Hacktivismo’s first completed 
project.  Steganography is a subset of cryptography that involves information being 
encoded within image files, and Camera/Shy is a stand-alone, Internet Explorer-
based web browser that interprets and displays information hidden within .gif image 
files – as Ruffin stated “You can hide pretty much any digital content in a digital 
image. You can have a picture of Jiang Zemin, and you can hide a picture of the 
Dalai Lama in it” (Einhorn 2002).  Like Peekabooty, it was developed for 
“democracy activists operating from behind national firewalls”, and “allows users to 
trade in banned content across the Internet”: 
 
Sometimes hiding the truth is the best way to protect it, and yourself. 
Designed with the non-technical user in mind, Camera/Shy's "one 
touch" encryption process delivers banned content across the Internet in 
seconds. Utilizing LSB steganographic techniques and AES-256 bit 
encryption, this application enables users to share censored information 
with their friends by hiding it in plain view as ordinary gif images. 
Camera/Shy is the only steganographic tool that automatically scans for 
and delivers decrypted content straight from the Web. It is a stand-
alone, Internet Explorer-based browser that leaves no trace on the user's 
system. As a safety feature Camera/Shy also includes security switches 
for protection against malicious HTML. Picture that. 
(Katt 2002) 
 
Camera/Shy was released as open source, under the GNU General Public Licence, 
and is dedicated to Wang Ruowang, a Chinese dissident. Hacktivismo have received 
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emails from users in Iran, China, and the United Arab Emirates, thanking them for 
distributing Camera/Shy (Einhorn 2002; Ruffin 2004b, in Samuel 2004a: 188) 
 
7.1.3.2 The Six/Four System 
 
The Six/Four System, named for the date of the Tiananmen Square massacre, was 
released in 2003, and is similar to Peekabooty in that it allows users to circumvent 
firewalls by ‘tunneling’ through them.  It uses ‘trusted peers’ or intermediaries, who 
provide a securely encrypted relay mechanism for users to get through to censored 
content.  Because it uses strong encryption, and the US government regulates the 
export of cryptography tools, Hacktivismo went through the process of obtaining 
US government approval, with Six/Four thus becoming the first product of a hacker 
group to be granted such approval. 
 
 
7.1.3.3 The Hacktivismo Enhanced-Source Software License Agreement 
(HESSLA) 
 
Hacktivismo also created a software licence agreement as a corollary to the 
Six/Four System, which was written by Ruffin and Eric Grimm, an attorney with 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  The Hacktivismo Enhanced-Source Software 
Licence Agreement (HESSLA) was inspired by the GNU General Public Licence, 
the most used free software licence.  The HESSLA is a legal agreement that is 
intended to bind the users and modifiers of software licensed under it to certain 
political terms of use – namely, that they do not use or modify the software to 
violate human rights or spy on other users.  The Free Software Foundation have 
criticised it as due to these ethical restrictions, it is no longer technically a free 
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software licence, and as a copyright based source licence, restrictions on its use are 
not legally enforceable (‘The HESSLA’s problems’).  However, Ruffin has stated 
that Hacktivismo will be satisfied if they “deter at least some of the ‘evil-doers’ 
from using [their] software” (Ruffin 2004b, in Samuel 2004a: 96). 
 
7.1.3.4 Scatterchat 
 
ScatterChat was released in 2006, under the HESSLA, and is again a project 
intended for “non-technical human rights activists and political dissidents operating 
behind oppressive national firewalls” (‘ScatterChat Press Release’ 2006).  It is a 
secure instant messaging or chat client, and provides encryption and secure file 
transfers through integration with Tor.  Tor is an ‘onion router’ (indeed, Tor stands 
for ‘The Onion Router’), which creates a network of encrypted ‘tunnels’ that are 
resistant to ‘traffic analysis’ (which uses packet data to infer who is talking to 
whom over a given network).  As the Tor Project explains: 
 
 The idea is similar to using a twisty, hard-to-follow route in order to 
throw off somebody who is tailing you — and then periodically erasing 
your footprints. Instead of taking a direct route from source to 
destination, data packets on the Tor network take a random pathway 
through several relays that cover your tracks so no observer at any 
single point can tell where the data came from or where it's going. 
(‘Tor: Anonymity online’) 
 
As such, ScatterChat is designed to allow users such as human rights activists and 
political dissidents to communicate anonymously and securely in hostile 
environments. As described by the lead developer, “[t]he anonymity and encryption 
that ScatterChat provides ensures that both the identities and messages of activists 
remain a mystery, even to well-funded totalitarian governments.” (‘ScatterChat 
Press Release’ 2006). 
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7.1.3.5 Torpark or the XeroBank Browser 
 
Torpark (v.1.5.0.7) also utilises Tor, and was also released in 2006 under the GNU 
General Public Licence in 2006 as a joint cDc/Hacktivismo project with Steve 
Topletz.  The current iteration of the browser (v 3.9.10.24) is now called XeroBank 
(xB), and is developed by Topletz, after being rebuilt from the ground up in 2007.  
Torpark and xB are highly modified variants of the Firefox Portable web browser, 
and can be run from portable media such as USB flash drives, or on internal hard 
drives.  They use Tor to anonymise the connection between the user and website 
being visited.  Torpark is dedicated to the Panchen Lama, in a nod to China’s 
continued persecution of and interference with the Tibetan spiritual leader’s 
dynasty.  Like the other Hacktivismo projects, it is intended to protect users from 
hostile governments and data thieves, as its press release explains: 
 
“We live in a time where acquisition technologies are cherry picking 
and collating every aspect of our online lives,” said Hacktivismo 
founder Oxblood Ruffin. “Torpark continues Hacktivismo’s 
commitment to expanding privacy rights on the Internet. And the best 
thing is, it’s free. No one should have to pay for basic human rights, 
especially the right of privacy.” 
(‘Hacktivismo releases Torpark for anonymous, portable web browsing’ 
2006) 
 
7.1.4 Hacktivismo and the cDc today 
 
Hacktivismo have been quiet in the last few years, but most of their software is still 
freely available on open source software hosting sites such as SourceForge 
(‘SourceForge’).  The cDc are still very much alive, as the activity on their website 
and public ‘Bovine Dawn Dojo Forum’ attests.  They also released the ‘Goolag 
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Scanner’ in 2008, a web auditing tool that uses Google to check websites for 
security vulnerabilities so that they may be patched: 
 
"It's no big secret that the Web is the platform," said cDc spokesmodel 
Oxblood Ruffin. "And this platform pretty much sucks from a security 
perspective. Goolag Scanner provides one more tool for web site owners 
to patch up their online properties. We've seen some pretty scary holes 
through random tests with the scanner in North America, Europe, and 
the Middle East. If I were a government, a large corporation, or anyone 
with a large web site, I'd be downloading this beast and aiming it at my 
site yesterday. The vulnerabilities are that serious." 
(Katt 2008) 
 
 
Ruffin continues to be an active spokesperson for Internet-based human rights, 
speaking out over the planned extradition of the ‘Pentagon hacker’, Gary McKinnon 
(McKinnon suffers from Asperger’s Syndrome and clinical depression, and Ruffin 
and McKinnon’s supporters argue that extradition is a disproportionate response to 
his crimes (which he committed while looking for evidence of UFOs) and is likely 
to severely impact his mental health, with possibly fatal consequences) (Ruffin 
2009).  He is an active presence on Twitter (@OxbloodRuffin), and continues to 
criticise governments such as those of China and Iran for violating their citizens’ 
human rights, as well as those corporations and Western governments who either 
profit from these violations or stand idly by (Ruffin 2009b), and lauds the use of 
Tor and other technologies that have allowed the Iranian people to speak out about 
the recent election and quashed rebellion. 
 
7.1.5 Hacktivismo’s constellation of publics 
 
 
Hacktivismo can plainly be understood as a hacktivist counterpublic, using the neo-
Habermasian lense developed in the preceding chapter.  Cohering around the issue 
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of online freedoms and the opposition of censorship, they clearly outline their intent 
to mobilise their ideological discourse and generate discussion and deliberation 
through their Declaration and software projects – as quoted, they want to get 
through their FAQ objective of “[g]etting some sort of discussion going around 
information rights” (emphasis added) (‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’).  We may 
confidently assume that their intent is to provoke those who encounter their 
discursive publicity into reflection on their political preferences with regards to 
internet censorship, and as an analysis of their Declaration reveals, they invest a 
considerable amount of effort into attempting to convert this reflection in preference 
alteration in support of their point of view.  Their activities are non-violent and non-
coercive, and are, in fact, intended to free repressed citizens from the coercive and 
repressive regimes they exist within.  The following analysis extends upon this neo-
Habermasian interpretation, and explores the specific ways in which they effect 
their counterpublicity and thus attempt to threaten or fracture the dominant or 
hegemonic structures they oppose. 
 
 
7.1.5.1 Repressive regimes 
 
We can best conceive of Hacktivismo (and, indeed, any public or counterpublic) as 
existing in relation to what we imagine as a constellation of other publics, not just 
one singular public.  The primary dominant or hegemonic ‘publics’ Hacktivismo 
intend to counter are the generally authoritarian governments or ‘repressive 
regimes’ involved in censoring their citizens’ free and unhindered access to the 
Internet, through the use of firewalls and surveillance technology.  Of course, these 
regimes do not really constitute national publics at all – they hark back to the feudal 
structures pre-dating Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere.  They display their 
publicity before their people and the rest of the world, claiming to speak for them 
and their best interests, and denying them the rights of unhindered self-expression 
and self-determination.  They police the submission of their citizens through 
censorship and surveillance technologies that either directly obstruct their digital 
freedoms or generate an online panopticon – a self-disciplining climate of fear 
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where people submit to repression and ‘toe the line’ for fear of harsh reprisal if they 
behave otherwise.  As such, they are best described as pseudopublics rather than 
true publics. 
All of Hacktivismo’s projects are oriented towards helping citizens resist and escape 
from this kind of censorship and surveillance, and they make this goal explicitly 
clear in their project descriptions and press releases.  These repressive regimes are 
primarily identified as those considered by Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) (and 
other watchdog organisations) as ‘Enemies of the Internet’, and are, for the most 
part, authoritarian and/or communist states such as China, Iran, Cuba, and North 
Korea (‘Reporters Sans Frontières’). Any government practicing online surveillance 
that leads its citizens to self-censor either the discourse they seek or the discourse 
they express online, or that directly censors and controls what Hacktivismo define 
as the ‘lawfully published material’ their citizens may have access to, is a dominant 
or hegemonic pseudopublic whose stability and control Hacktivismo intend to call 
into question and destabilise through their hacktivist counterpublicity.   
As part and parcel of this, their counterpublicity is also oriented towards the 
transnational but geographically based technology corporations that aid these 
repressive regimes in their censorship and human rights violations.  These 
corporations are search and web service corporations and service providers such as 
Google, who self-censored their Google.cn domain at the request of the Chinese 
government, and have only recently ceased this operation, and only after suffering 
Chinese hacker attacks on their own servers and intellectual property.  Continuing 
examples are Microsoft’s Bing and Yahoo! Search (which is powered by Bing) who 
continue to censor their Chinese operations in line with Beijing’s directives.  They 
also include hardware corporations such as Cisco (America), Nokia (Finland), and 
Siemens (Germany), who have provided firewall and surveillance technologies to 
China (Cisco) and Iran (a joint venture between Nokia and Siemens, quite possibly 
because American firms are not allowed to trade with Iran) (Ruffin 2009; Rhoads & 
Chao 2009; Zeller 2006).  Ruffin describes these corporations as “Gadarene 
swine…Already fat and greedy beyond belief, the Western technology titans are 
being herded towards the trough” (Ruffin 2002).  These corporations arguably do 
not constitute publics or even pseudopublics in and of themselves, as they have no 
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detailed ideology beyond the neo-liberal political-economic ideology of the profit 
motive über alles - but they provide the essential technological support mechanisms 
for the dominant national governmental publics or repressive regimes, and as such, 
are implicated in and critiqued by Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity against these 
regimes. 
 
7.1.5.2 Hypocritical Western governments  
 
Hacktivismo perceive the next level off involvement to be constituted by those 
liberal Western governments, such as those of America and various European 
nations, who sanction or condone these corporate actions and the repression they 
effect through remaining silent, while simultaneously and publicly decrying the 
repressive regimes these corporations support - liberal governments who are 
described by Hacktivismo as having “talked a far better game than they've played 
on access to information” (‘A special message of hope’ 2001). This “governmental 
douchebaggery” (Ruffin 2009) is seen as not only hypocritical and amoral but also a 
threat to global security, in that it perpetuates the existence of repressive and 
unstable states within the international community: 
 
With billions of dollars in government budgets at their disposal, when 
are the world's liberal democracies going to put some of their resources 
into opening up the Internet? We know they don't care about human 
rights policy when it conflicts with jobs at home; but what about 
international security? As Beijing continues to play the patriotism card 
domestically, a more open Internet could diffuse traditional xenophobia 
through greater one-on-one interaction on-line. 
(Ruffin 2002) 
 
Hacktivismo clearly see these liberal governments as being in political-economic 
collusion with these technology corporations – ignoring their distasteful activities 
for the sake of their domestic economies and the profit coming in from the 
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totalitarian governments who are commissioning the construction of firewalls and 
surveillance technology.  Operating under the same neoliberal objectives as the 
corporations, these governments wordlessly accept the ‘dirty money’ flowing into 
their economies from the systems of global capitalism, while simultaneously and 
vocally castigating the sources of this revenue for the maltreatment of their citizens.  
Once again, they are more pseudopublics than true publics – they parade their 
support for informational freedoms and human rights in front of their domestic 
voting and international publics to win support and ‘buy’ legitimacy, while 
prioritising their corporations’ bottom lines above any practical or effortful 
upholding of these democratic ideals.  They parade their democracy before the 
people, but fail to actually endorse it at an international and conceptual level. 
 Furthermore, these governments themselves are certainly not innocent of 
attempting to regulate and control the Internet. The current global governmental 
negotiations regarding the installation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) are a notable current example.  ACTA seeks to establish international 
standards on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, particularly those 
regarding Internet copyright infringement, and its negotiations have (like so much 
media regulation) been cloaked in secrecy and lacking in any true democratic 
accountability to the citizens of the nations involved. Cognizant of this kind of 
behaviour, Hacktivismo are quick to remind us that we should also be worried about 
our own governments, and the trends towards governmental control of the Internet 
in general: 
 
Q: Who cares if Iraq or Cuba censors the Internet?  It ain't nothin' to me.  
A: Substitute the word control for censor.  The fact that dictators are 
ham-fisted and obvious is only a testament to their arrogance and 
contempt for humanity.  All governments want to control the Internet in 
one form or another.  The United States, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia - just to name a few - have all enacted 
legislation governing use of the Internet, some of it very bad.  
(‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’) 
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7.1.5.3 The global citizenry, or dispersed global ‘public of publics’ 
 
This reminder that it is not only authoritarian states that are practicing Internet 
censorship and surveillance, and that Western citizens should ‘keep an eye on’ their 
own governments, speaks to a wider global and non-specific ‘public of publics’ of 
Internet users that Hacktivismo wish to engage with – a concept more easily 
grasped and even visualised if we recall Keane’s theorized ‘global modular 
network’ of public and counterpublics, operating at multiple (micro-, macro- and 
meso-) levels (2000).  This aspect of the neo-Habermasian model is also useful for 
imagining the wider constellation of publics that Hacktivismo exists in relation to, 
including those of the repressive regimes, technology corporations and liberal 
governments.  Coming up with any concrete explanation or visualization of this 
highly interconnected network of publics, both counter- and pseudo-, is a task 
beyond this thesis’s reach, but as long as can understand that this constellation is 
both networked, multivalent, and dynamic, Keane’s rather elegant theory has 
fulfilled its purpose. 
As previously elucidated, Hacktivismo’s desire to provoke political preference 
reflection amongst a dispersed global citizenry is made explicitly clear in the 
explanation provided for their Declaration: 
 
Hopefully people will read it and think it's a good thing, or a total piece 
of crap.  Getting some sort of discussion going around information 
rights is the primary objective.  
(‘The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0’) 
 
 
They aspire to incite a wider public discourse about Internet censorship and 
“information rights” – to have more people join the debate over the freedom of 
information and discursive expression on the Internet.  Indeed, mobilising their 
ideological discourse into wider publicity and thus catalyzing discussion and 
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deliberation within the dispersed global public of publics is their ‘primary objective’ 
– one could argue that they are a textbook case of a self-aware and externally 
oriented counterpublic.  They thus enact Calhoun’s argument for the importance of 
interpublicity (1997: 81) – that counterpublic discourses must traverse across basic 
lines of difference and engage with other publics in order to truly fulfil their 
externally-oriented component. 
Obviously, they seek to not only inform and provoke political preference reflection 
amongst this non-specific agglomeration of citizens, but to (hopefully) convert 
some of these citizens into supporters of their cause (although they do recognise the 
inevitability of a plurality of positions through their statement that some may think 
their Declaration is a “total piece of crap”, seemingly agreeing with Dryzek about 
the centrality of argument to deliberation and political preference reflection (2000)). 
Their counterpublicity (in terms of its constitutive discourse or ideology, if not 
form) is intended to be self-replicating or viral, through provoking not just 
contestation and political preference reflection but also political reference alteration.  
That is, they do not necessarily want more members for Hacktivismo, but they want 
others to support the ideology Hacktivismo enacts counterpublicity in aid of - to 
“think it’s a good thing” and to mobilise some form of public support for it - and 
thus become part of a wider and agglomerative ‘public of counterpublics’ opposed 
to the curtailment of Internet based information rights.  This public of 
counterpublics, by virtue of each public’s shared core ideology, would be linked by 
‘chains of equivalence’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985), and thus the discursive strength or 
counterpublicity that each public brings to bear on the dominant publics would be 
amplified – the public of counterpublics will be more than the sum of its parts. 
We can therefore see that Hacktivismo, as a counterpublic constituted by a general 
discourse in support of Internet-based information rights as part and parcel of the 
wider maintenance of human rights, are committed to attempting to destabilize or 
threaten the cohesion of two categories of dominant public: primarily, the specific, 
nationally dominant state publics of repressive regimes and of hypocritical Western 
governments, as well as the corporate publics sanctioned by Western governments 
and aiding the repressive regimes in their censorship.  They are also attempting to 
provoke political preference reflection within a more dispersed global public of 
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publics, in the hope of engendering the formation of a wider public of 
counterpublics, collectively sharing and amplifying Hacktivismo’s catalytic 
counterhegemony.  
 
7.2 Text 
 
Having identified these targets and goals, we may explore how exactly 
Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity attempts to achieve them. Hacktivismo have 
obviously produced many texts to accompany their projects, in the form of press 
releases, media statements, and general website material and news.  However, as 
previously stated, the ‘Hacktivismo Declaration’ is the discursive matrix for almost 
all of these secondary materials.  Most of the press releases accompanying their 
software paraphrase it, and these press releases also direct readers to Hacktivismo’s 
webpage, where the Declaration is both reproduced in full, and paraphrased 
throughout the various sections of their website. The Declaration is a purposefully 
expressed, coherent, formal system of belief – an ‘intellectual’ as opposed to ‘lived’ 
ideology (Billig et al 1988, in Barker & Galasinski 2001).  It comprehensively 
defines Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity through discourse, and as such, is the 
logical text for critical linguistic analysis.  It is reproduced in full below, preserving 
original formatting, with reference/paragraph numbering added in bold: 
 
THE HACKTIVISMO DECLARATION 
assertions of liberty  
in support of an uncensored Internet   
DEEPLY ALARMED that state-sponsored censorship of the Internet is 
rapidly spreading with the assistance of transnational corporations,  (1) 
TAKING AS A BASIS the principles and purposes enshrined in Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that states, 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
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regardless of frontiers", and Article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that says,  (2) 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:  
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
b. For the protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals.  (3) 
RECALLING that some member states of the United Nations have 
signed the ICCPR, or have ratified it in such a way as to prevent their 
citizens from using it in courts of law,  (4) 
CONSIDERING that, such member states continue to willfully suppress 
wide-ranging access to lawfully published information on the Internet, 
despite the clear language of the ICCPR that freedom of expression 
exists in all media,  (5) 
TAKING NOTE that transnational corporations continue to sell 
information technologies to the world's most repressive regimes 
knowing full well that they will be used to track and control an already 
harried citizenry,  (6) 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that the Internet is fast becoming a method 
of repression rather than an instrument of liberation,  (7) 
BEARING IN MIND that in some countries it is a crime to demand the 
right to access lawfully published information, and of other basic human 
rights,  (8) 
RECALLING that member states of the United Nations have failed to 
press the world's most egregious information rights violators to a higher 
standard,  (9) 
MINDFUL that denying access to information could lead to spiritual, 
intellectual, and economic decline, the promotion of xenophobia and 
destabilization of international order,  (10) 
CONCERNED that governments and transnationals are colluding to 
maintain the status quo,  (11) 
DEEPLY ALARMED that world leaders have failed to address 
information rights issues directly and without equivocation,  (12) 
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RECOGNIZING the importance to fight against human rights abuses 
with respect to reasonable access to information on the Internet,  (13) 
THEREFORE WE ARE CONVINCED that the international hacking 
community has a moral imperative to act, and we  (14) 
DECLARE:  
THAT FULL RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS INCLUDES THE LIBERTY OF 
FAIR AND REASONABLE ACCESS TO INFORMATION, 
WHETHER BY SHORTWAVE RADIO, AIR MAIL, SIMPLE 
TELEPHONY, THE GLOBAL INTERNET, OR OTHER MEDIA.  
(15) 
THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENTS TO 
FORBID THE PUBLICATION OF PROPERLY CATEGORIZED 
STATE SECRETS, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, AND MATTERS 
RELATED TO PERSONAL PRIVACY AND PRIVILEGE, AMONG 
OTHER ACCEPTED RESTRICTIONS. BUT WE OPPOSE THE USE 
OF STATE POWER TO CONTROL ACCESS TO THE WORKS OF 
CRITICS, INTELLECTUALS, ARTISTS, OR RELIGIOUS FIGURES.  
(16) 
THAT STATE SPONSORED CENSORSHIP OF THE INTERNET 
ERODES PEACEFUL AND CIVILIZED COEXISTENCE, AFFECTS 
THE EXERCISE OF DEMOCRACY, AND ENDANGERS THE 
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS.  (17) 
THAT STATE-SPONSORED CENSORSHIP OF THE INTERNET IS 
A SERIOUS FORM OF ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC 
VIOLENCE AGAINST CITIZENS, IS INTENDED TO GENERATE 
CONFUSION AND XENOPHOBIA, AND IS A REPREHENSIBLE 
VIOLATION OF TRUST.  (18) 
THAT WE WILL STUDY WAYS AND MEANS OF 
CIRCUMVENTING STATE SPONSORED CENSORSHIP OF THE 
INTERNET AND WILL IMPLEMENT TECHNOLOGIES TO 
CHALLENGE INFORMATION RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.  (19) 
 
The Hacktivismo declaration works to not only declare Hacktivismo’s intellectual 
ideology to readers, but to provoke political preference reflection that will hopefully 
result in both sympathy for their cause and actions, and disapproval and dissent 
against the dominant publics they aim to counter.  It functions as a detailed 
elucidation of the counterpublicity embedded within their software projects; that is, 
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the text distills the intent behind the form of their hacktivism.  It does this by 
categorically identifying and negatively characterising the dominant publics against 
which Hacktivismo is oriented, and by constructing a positive self-presentation for 
Hacktivismo themselves. 
 
7.2.1 Identification and negative characterization of dominant publics 
through text 
 
The repressive regimes against which Hacktivismo orient their counterpublicity are 
identified in a non-specific manner within the Hacktivismo Declaration, in keeping 
with the fact that they are numerous, and they are all perceived as equally 
reprehensible.  Rather than speaking of specific “states sponsoring censorship”, the 
Declaration utilizes nominalisation, transforming the representation of the multiple 
processes or actions of censorship by specific states into a noun, or a thing.  This 
noun, “state-sponsored censorship of the Internet”, is used four times within the 
declaration (in paragraphs 1, 17, 18 and 19), thus underlining Hacktivismo’s focus 
towards it as their main bone of contention.  This nominalisation of the process of 
censorship and repression and general use of non-specific nouns also occurs in other 
forms, such as “the world’s most repressive regimes” (6), “some countries” (8), “the 
world’s most egregious information rights violators” (9), “human rights abuses” 
(13), “the use of state power to control access” (16), and “information rights 
violations” (20).   
We can interpret these constructions as being both efficient, in that they mean that 
Hacktivismo do not have to identify each and every repressive regime against which 
they are oriented, and in that it means that the Hacktivismo declaration will not 
require future revisions to ensure that it remains current (if more states begin to 
practice Internet censorship or if some currently doing so cease and desist).  
However, it also highlights the fact that Hacktivismo are oriented primarily against 
a particular kind of national discourse or public – they are not opposed to specific 
national publics per se, but to governing pseudopublics which fulfill a particular 
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criteria or who do a particular action.  They are pursuing a cause, not a specific 
nation or nations.  Their counterpublicity is primarily oriented towards a particular 
kind of discursive abuse – that is, a particular process - and secondarily, and by 
extension, towards those national pseudopublics or repressive regimes which enact 
this abuse. 
This efficient non-specificity is continued through the use of collective nouns and 
nominalisations such as “member states of the United Nations” (4, 5, 9), “the 
assistance of transnational corporations” (1), “transnational corporations” (6), 
“governments and transnationals” (11), and “world leaders” (12).  At no point in the 
declaration is a specifically named actor singled out – Hacktivismo identify diverse 
and unnamed actors as dominant publics or supportive agents against which they 
are oriented by what they do, rather than who they are.  (However, one might argue 
their dedication of pieces of their software to Chinese dissidents and a Panchen 
Lama signals a significant focus on China as their ‘most wanted’ repressive 
regime.) 
Furthermore, Hacktivismo repeatedly characterise what these dominant publics do – 
that is, their censorship of the Internet - as exceptionally negative.  Repressive 
regimes, with the assistance of technology corporations:  “have signed the ICCPR 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], or have ratified it in such a 
way as to prevent their citizens from using it in courts of law” (4), they “continue to 
willfully suppress wide-ranging access to lawfully published information on the 
Internet, despite the clear language of the ICCPR that freedom of expression exists 
in all media” (5), and they “track and control an already harried citizenry” (6).  The 
adverb “willfully” indicates that they purposively deny their citizens access to 
material that they are legally allowed access to, and in doing so, ignore, defy or 
subvert an internationally agreed-upon covenant, thus breaching human rights and 
breaching the rules of a wider global citizenship.  In doing so, Hacktivismo invite us 
to see these regimes as both arrogant, in that they seem to believe that they are 
entitled to operate outside the bounds of these international treaties; and as rogue-
states, operating outside the bounds of international law and thus delegitimizing 
themselves within or ex-communicating themselves from the international 
community, and from all the benefits that this community-belonging confers.  
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Despite this being a rather toothless notion (as China certainly continues to enjoy all 
the benefits of a globalised economic system, as do other such regimes), it certainly 
does considerable work towards establishing these kinds of states as ‘other’, as not 
belonging, and therefore being both threatening and alien.    
Hacktivismo also see these repressive regimes as akin to hunters - they track and 
control their citizens as if they were prey, cruelly denying them freedom and agency 
and worsening the stress and persecution they have already inflected upon them.  
The adverb “already” signals to the reader that this censorship is a continuation of a 
history of abuse and repression, simply the latest episode in a procession of 
violations.  The use of the possessive pronoun “their”, and of material clauses 
utilising the verbs “suppress”, “track” and “control”, indicate that these regimes 
have ownership over the citizens in their nations, and can do with them what they 
will.  The fact that what they choose to do, and to do knowingly, is to inflict severe 
and unpleasant restrictions upon their citizens elaborates upon the discourse of 
othering through explicitly delineating the cruelty and inhumanity characterising the 
governing bodies of these regimes. 
Hacktivismo paint the effects of this censorship in even more vivid terms.  Initially, 
they merely hypothesise, through the use of the modal auxiliary “could” (10), that 
“denying access to information could lead to spiritual, intellectual, and economic 
decline, the promotion of xenophobia and destabilisation of international order” 
(10).  However, this lone instance of supposition is soon discarded in favour of 
assertions of facticity.  Internet censorship “erodes peaceful and civilised 
coexistence, affects the exercise of democracy, and endangers the socioeconomic 
development of nations” (17); “is a serious form of organised and systematic 
violence against citizens, is intended to generate confusions and xenophobia, and is 
a reprehensible violation of trust” (18).  The material clauses utilising such verbs as 
“erode” and “endanger” make a factual claim that Internet censorship is a 
destructive force.  It is dramatized as a corrosive substance that destroys or eats 
away at a multitude of positive abstract nouns - peace, civilization, democracy, 
socioeconomic development and trust, with the only things it actually “generates” 
or gives birth to rather than destroys being the negative abstract nouns of confusion 
and xenophobia.   It destroys all that is desirable and civilised and fosters only 
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disorder, hatred and fear.  The reader is presented with an image of the chaotic, 
hellish existence that would result from the widespread application of such 
censorship, and of the national hells that it has already spawned. 
The adjectives “organised” and “systematic”, as well as the verb “intend” underline 
the purposive nature of this destruction and chaos - censorship is a direct and 
intentional affront to democracy and to global harmony and prosperity.  The 
repressive states engaging in Internet censorship know the negative consequences of 
their behaviour, but do not care, and perhaps even revel in them. The Declaration 
also describes state-sponsored Internet censorship as “violent” and “reprehensible”, 
both exceedingly strong adjectives that further emphasize the destruction occurring 
and the need for our concern and censure, through grounding and amplifying our 
impression of its severity with connotations of forceful physicality.     
Hacktivismo also describe the alterations and subversions these repressive regimes 
have wrought on various specific aspects of the world in terms of corruption and 
degradation.  They have turned the Internet into “a method of repression rather than 
an instrument of liberation” (7), and made it “a crime to demand the right to access 
lawfully published information, and of other basic human rights” (8).  Hacktivismo 
thus characterise the actions of repressive states as cancerous forces, infecting good 
things and actions and corrupting them into their binary opposites. What was once a 
freeing, emancipatory technology is distorted into a tool for repression, and the 
legal assertion of one’s basic human rights is inverted into a criminal act.  
Hacktivismo’s description of Internet censorship as “rapidly spreading” (1) extends 
these connotations of cancer and malignancy – it is a virus, out of control and 
capable of global infection if we do not do something to halt its progression. 
The unspecified transnational corporations supplying censorship technology are 
also strongly negatively characterised, as they “assist” (1), and “continue to sell” 
(despite “knowing full well” the consequences) (6) their wares to these destructive 
regimes.  They do not merely provide the tools for censorship; they help to install it, 
with the purposive connotations of “assist” underlined by their knowledge of what 
they are doing.  They are the willing and informed helpers of destruction and 
corruption, privileging profit over human rights and morality.  They are encouraged 
by, and take advantage of global neoliberal policies that have removed most 
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boundaries to global trade, and export their software and hardware to anywhere that 
will turn them a profit. Paired with these traitorous corporations are other UN 
member state governments and “world leaders” (12) who repeatedly “fail” to do 
anything, let alone anything timely, to help (9, 12), and who are thus involved with 
both the repressive regimes and the transnational corporations in “colluding” (11) – 
purposefully and deviously co-operating – to maintain the “status quo” (11) of 
governmental and corporate dominance.  Thus their description as “world leaders” 
is rendered ironic; they are not leaders but failures.  
Through this series of negative characterisations, Hacktivismo bundle together the 
three categories of pseudopublic they have identified as adversaries, with the 
discursive work done to condemn each thus also working to infect the others by 
proximity and association.  They are established as an overarching entity or ‘public 
of pseudopublics’ to be opposed, with Hacktivismo clearly orienting themselves and 
their counterpublic discourse towards their opposition and destabilisation – they 
comprise a powerful political-economic hegemony that Hacktivismo are very much 
invested in threatening and hopefully fracturing. 
 
7.2.2 Positive characterization of Hacktivismo through text 
 
Hacktivismo’s negative characterisation of these hegemonic pseudopublics is 
counterpoised by the textual work they do to characterise themselves in a positive 
light, and thus worthy of support.  Indeed, the very nature of the Hacktivismo 
Declaration, composed as it is by a series of formal declarative statements, works to 
establish Hacktivismo as a figure of authority – they speak to us, and we listen. 
(This, of course, also has the effect of grounding their negative characterisation of 
the dominant publics in an impression of reputability).  This air of authority is 
deepened by the intertextual components of the Declaration.  They have not only 
borrowed from the discursive form or ‘speech genre’ (Bakhtin 1986) of a formal 
legal declaration, with its connotations of trustworthiness and authority, but have 
actually reproduced components of two extremely well-known and well-regarded 
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legal declarations on informational and expressive rights (Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and “taken them as the basis” for their own 
declaration (2, 3).  The placement of this intertextual component in the first section 
of the Hacktivismo Declaration immediately works to give the reader the 
impression that Hacktivismo are a serious and principled group of individuals, 
cognizant of and well-versed in international law, and thus worthy of our attention 
and consideration.  This impression is prefigured by the gravitas of the document’s 
subtitle – the rather grand sounding “assertions of liberty in support of an 
uncensored Internet”.  By aligning themselves with these tenets of international law, 
and by working to confer an air of authority upon their discourse, Hacktivismo seek 
to instill their counterpublic with some modicum of power – a strategy that is also 
helped through their diverse membership, which includes well-regarded and 
prominent legal professionals.  Downey’s reminder that counterpublics may 
actually include some relatively powerful participants (2007) is extremely pertinent 
in this case.  
Hacktivismo continue this positive self-presentation and claim to power with the 
stream of active declarations utilising mental and behavioural processes that 
comprise the structural frame of the first section of the declaration (1-14).  They 
have removed themselves from these framing clauses – rather than saying “We are 
deeply alarmed”, they omit the personal pronoun “We”, leaving the reader to make 
the logical assumption that it is indeed Hacktivismo who are declaring these things, 
as it is, after all, their declaration.  It also depersonalizes their discourse, with the 
effect of it assuming a more disemobodied and rational air of authority – they are, in 
fact, engaging in what Warner calls self-abstraction (2002), removing their personal 
identities from their discourse in favour of a rational-critical approach.  Due to the 
relatively powerful and educationally privileged nature of their membership, they 
are capable of mobilising this kind of differentially distributed mode of 
communication.   
This, in combination with the capitalization of these mental and behavioural 
processes, serves to highlight the thoughtful and serious cognitive work that 
Hacktivismo are doing in constructing and expressing their intellectual ideology.  
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They are “recalling” (4, 9); “considering” (5); “taking note” (6); “taking into 
account” (7); “bearing in mind” (8); and “recognizing” (13).  Furthermore, they are 
“deeply alarmed” (1, 12); “mindful” (10); and “concerned” (11).  Clearly, this 
declaration is not something that they have taken lightly – they have been 
monitoring and mulling over the increasing “state-censored sponsorship of the 
Internet”, doing extensive mental and intellectual work, and the subject is 
something they care deeply about and are seriously engaged with.  Their conviction 
that “the international hacking community has a moral imperative to act” – to 
oppose and resist this censorious behaviour rather than failing to act like the “world 
leaders” have (12) – is self-inclusive, and prefigures the course of action they 
propose in the second section of the declaration. 
They continue to present themselves as thoughtful and serious in the second section 
of the declaration (15-19), in which they explicitly identify themselves with the 
pronoun “we” (16, 19).  This section is also fully capitalized, again drawing 
attention to Hacktivismo as the active authors of the document.  Their declaration 
that “full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms includes the liberty of 
fair and reasonable access to information” (15) implicitly informs us that they, in 
contrast to those actors involved in censoring the Internet, do have full respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms – they are the ones reminding or informing 
us of what this respect involves, thus placing themselves in a position of moral 
responsibility and authority.  Their “recognition” that governments do have to 
impose some “acceptable restrictions” on what information their citizens have 
access to shows us that they are reasonable and considerate individuals – they are 
not reacting out of pure anti-authoritarian sentiment but out of a genuine concern 
about censorious behaviour that goes beyond the pale. They use the pronoun “we” 
in identifying their opposition to the ‘unreasonable’ censorship of “the works of 
critics, intellectuals, artists, or religious figures”, thus underlining the personal 
investment they have in opposing this limitation of human endeavour and 
expression (16).   
This positive self-representation as thoughtful, concerned, personally invested, and 
morally and intellectually authoritative individuals provides the raison d'être for the 
course of action Hacktivismo propose in the final paragraph of the declaration.  
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They will “study” (with its connotations of industriousness and academic integrity) 
“ways and means of circumventing state sponsored censorship of the Internet” and 
will “implement technologies’ (which carries connotations of cleanness and 
efficiency) to “challenge information rights violations” (19).  They will invest time 
and effort in researching and creating various technological fixes to counter the 
Internet censorship of repressive regimes, thus signaling to the reader that they are 
hard working and genuinely invested in this issue.  In the absence of any other 
individuals in positions of responsibility ‘stepping up’ and fulfilling their 
responsibilities by doing something about the destructive and regressive practice of 
state-sponsored Internet censorship, Hacktivismo let us know that they are going to 
be the ones who ‘do the right thing’, and take action to oppose this reprehensible 
activity, and those who perpetrate it.  They are clearly the heroes of the declaration, 
and the governments (both repressive and impotent) and corporations are the 
villains. 
Hacktivismo thus definitely establish the positive self-presentation of their 
counterpublicity and negative other-presentation of the dominant pseudopublics of 
repressive regimes and hypocritical Western governments through the textual 
component or content of their hacktivism.  However, it is through the form of their 
hacktivism, and its ‘hacking’ or subversion of the dominant patterns of access to or 
power over discourse that they launch this textual component into wider circulation. 
 
7.3 Access and control 
 
7.3.1 Code is speech 
 
Before we explore these subversions of access and control, a quick word must be 
said about the status of Hacktivismo’s software as discourse capable of being 
analysed.  Conducting a discourse analysis of this software may seem impossible.  
While programming code does indeed share many attributes with written text, in 
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that it comes in different languages, and has what can be understood as lexico-
grammatical and lexical components, it clearly cannot be subjected to an analysis 
based on systemic-functional linguistics, not does it have images or other readily 
interpretable semiotic elements. However, Hacktivismo’s projects can be 
understood as both the embodiment of and delivery mechanism for the central 
ideology expressed in their declaration, and as such, are an integral component of 
Hacktivismo’s hacktivist discourse. 
In line with this, there is a strong argument for understanding source code as a form 
of speech.  The FLOSS movement (one of the generations of hackers, as we have 
already discussed, and one who share close evolutionary ties with hacktivism, in 
that they are both politically engaged) has and continues to assert that not only is 
code a form of speech, it is entitled to the same protection as free speech.  This 
code/speech association has stabilized as the result of the FLOSS movement’s 
recent constitutive resistance to the “excessive copyrighting and patenting of 
computer software”, but programmers or hackers have been making the connection 
since the early nineties (Coleman 2009: 433).  There is no room to go into great 
detail here (although the topic is a fascinating one), but in summary, what had 
existed as an implicit claim was made explicit through the FLOSS movement’s 
involvement in several court cases hinging on the assertion that source code equates 
to speech, and should therefore be legally protected as such.  Although code was not 
found deserving of First Amendment protection in every case, it was legally 
accepted and established by the courts as a form of speech (ibid.: 447).   
Furthermore, and quite possibly of more importance, the “arrests, lawsuits and 
protests [surrounding these cases] helped establish as a cultural commonplace 
among F/OSS [FLOSS] developers and hackers the connection between source 
code and speech” (ibid.: 447-448; for more detail on this issue, see also Coleman 
2004).  Hackers see code as speech, and therefore software programmes as texts. If 
the creators of a particular kind of text genuinely believe and assert that it is speech, 
and provide a legally accepted rationale for this assertion, then I do not believe we 
should contest their definition, even if we cannot read or understand the language 
they are speaking in.  As such, we should understand Hacktivismo’s programmes as 
texts and what they achieve as speech, and even though we may not be able to read 
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their source code, we can certainly comprehend and analyse what this code 
achieves.  We can consider them as ‘speech acts’ or ‘performative utterances’ 
(Austin 1962) – the words and syntax used to build the programmes do not describe 
what they are going to do, they actually do it.  When programmers write code, it is 
“not to describe [their] doing of what [they] should be said in so uttering to be 
doing or to state that [they] are doing it: it is to do it” (ibid.: 64).  As such, we can 
analyse Hacktivismo’s software - the non-linguistic component of their hacktivist 
discourse – in terms of what it does, even though we perhaps cannot read the textual 
forms with which they accomplish this action. That is, we can analyse 
Hacktivismo’s various hacktivist projects in terms of how they actively subvert the 
dominant patterns of access to or power over political discourse. 
 
7.3.2 Destabilising repressive regimes and provoking political preference 
reflection through form 
 
In terms of countering repressive regimes and the corporations that support them, 
Hacktivismo’s various projects serve to undermine and subvert the absolute control 
that these regimes have over their citizens’ online engagements with and production 
of political discourse.  These dominant pseudopublics control not only what 
political ideas their citizens have access to, but also the political discourses their 
citizens can engage in or express.  In effect, they force their citizens to conform to a 
prescribed national politics, the limits of which are set by the government. They 
force their citizens to exist within a national pseudopublic (Habermas 1989) – one 
in which politics are displayed, but not truly participated in, because any citizens 
who disagree with the ideology of this dominant national public are both pre- and 
post-emptively silenced.  These repressive regimes use corporate technology to 
control every aspect of their citizens’ access to online political (and other kinds) of 
discourse, from planning, to setting, to the control of communicative events, to the 
scope and nature of audiences.  They may only access, engage with and produce 
discourse and political expression when, where, and how their governments allow 
them to, and in front of a governmentally prescribed audience.   Citizens of 
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repressive regimes are forced to engage with and take part in only prescribed 
discourses, in prescribed arenas, and with prescribed access to an audience.  All 
their categories of access are curtailed. 
Hacktivismo’s various projects serve to undermine the totality of this control.  They 
provide the citizens of repressed regimes with the means to plan their own access to 
and engagement with discourses that run counter the pseudopublic they are 
otherwise forced to be part of.  They give them the ability to choose their own 
setting for this discursive access and expression.  They allow citizens to have 
control over the communicative events they are a part of, in that they may access 
and discuss political ideologies or other modes of expression that run counter to or 
are censored by their national regime, and they also allow these citizens to access a 
wider audience for their dissident ideas, if they so wish.  The recent example of 
Iranians using Tor-based technologies and Web proxies to access and inform a 
global audience (via such censored technologies as Twitter and YouTube) of the 
violent repression of dissident speech occurring in Iran perfectly illustrates the kind 
of subversion of control that Hacktivismo’s projects enable. 
This subversion of control and power works at both functional and symbolic levels.  
At the functional level, Hacktivismo’s projects – their software-based 
counterpublicity – serve to ‘hack out’ spaces of discursive freedom within which 
Internet-based counterpublics can be instantiated.  The citizens of repressive 
regimes can use software tools such as Torpark and ScatterChat to escape the 
control of their governments, and construct their own counterpublics within what is 
otherwise a totally controlled arena.  They can escape (at least partially) from the 
national pseudopublics they are forced to conform to, accessing information and 
discourses, political and otherwise, from a wider global modular network of publics 
and counterpublics, using these spaces to solidify their own counterdiscourses and, 
if they wish, construct their own externally-oriented counterpublics that are critical 
of and work against the overarching and repressive pseudopublics that seek to claim 
them as acquiescent members.  They can subvert the control of their governing 
pseudopublics from within, inserting themselves within these spheres with the effect 
of placing internal pressure upon them and thus effecting cracks or fractures in their 
façade.  
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If extend this counterpublicity and fracturing of hegemony into the global domain, 
moving from having an internal orientation to an outwards orientation, they can 
convey their oppositional counterpublicity to the wider global modular network of 
publics, in the hope of informing and conversing with these global citizens and 
gaining sympathy for their plight.  Ideally, at least some of these global citizens will 
consequently form their own sympathetic counterpublics, linked by chains of 
discursive equivalence to those of these repressed but actively oppositional citizens. 
In this way, the pressure of combined or linked counterpublicity may be brought to 
bear on the repressive regimes from both inside and outside their nation states, as 
well as upon the Western governments and corporations who are complicit in their 
activities.     
Again, the recent case of the repression and online dissent in Iran, which garnered a 
wider global audience and condemnation of the government’s activities, provides an 
identifiable instance34 of this subversion of pseudopublic control and enabling of 
multiple and linked counterpublicity. This kind of modular networked 
counterpublicity serves to not only undermine the authority of these explicitly 
repressive regimes, but also the corporations and more subtly repressive Western 
states that either facilitate explicit state-political repression or stand idly by and 
allow it to occur or continue, while displaying a more democratic façade.  The 
multivalent counterpublicity hopefully enabled by Hacktivismo’s software thus 
works to threaten multiple levels of dominance, mounting a multi-pronged 
challenge to the political-economic hegemony they oppose. 
Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity is thus both functional and symbolic, undermining 
both the appearance and actuality of hegemonic control and uniformity that this 
public of pseudopublics works to project.  Hacktivismo’s programmes threaten what 
discourse analysts describe as the ‘face’ (Brown & Levinson 1987, following 
                                                
34 It is extremely difficult to track what actual effects Hacktivismo’s software has had in terms of 
allowing repressed national citizens to construct both internally oriented and externally oriented 
counterpublics.  Certainly, as previously stated, Hacktivismo have received communication from 
users thanking them for their products, so they are presumably being used to construct these 
internally oriented counterpublics – Tor related technologies, in particular, are known to be in 
common use.  However, it is generally too difficult to track how exactly various expressions of 
dissenting counterpublicity are emerging from such states as China and Iran, i.e. what software 
tools are being used to achieve this.  The recent situation in Iran was somewhat different, in that 
the much-hyped Twitter was involved; hence there is some knowledge of the specific means by 
which dissent was disseminated.  As such, it serves as a useful concrete example, in the absence 
of any identifiable examples stemming from Hacktivismo’s projects. 
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Goffman 1967) of these repressive regimes.  Face is defined as “the public self-
image that every member wants to claim for himself”, and is “emotionally invested, 
and [it] can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in 
interaction” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 321- 22). The concept of ‘losing face’, as is 
the case in its general usage, involves being embarrassed or humiliated.    Brown 
and Levinson go further, in defining two sub-types of face, and two attendant types 
of face-threatening acts or FTAs: 
 
negative face: the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his 
actions be unimpeded by others; 
positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at 
least some others. 
(Brown & Levinson 1987: 322; bold in original) 
 
 
The speaker in any given situation is generally defined as S, and the addressee as H, 
and the face of both may potentially be threatened or undermined by S’s discourse. 
Interactants are generally considered to be individual speakers, but as should be 
obvious, the concept of face works just as well for the ideologies discursively 
expressed by and constitutive of public spheres.  In the case of hacktivism, the 
hacktivists are clearly identifiable as S, and we are therefore concerned with the 
threats made to H’s face through hacktivist counterpublicity, with H consisting of 
the targets or dominant publics the hacktivists are attempting to destabilise.  Acts 
that threaten H’s ‘negative-face want’ “[indicate] (potentially) that the speaker (S) 
does not intend to avoid impeding H’s freedom of action”, and include such acts as 
orders, threats, the unwanted incurring of debt, and expressions of envy or anger.  
Acts that threaten H’s ‘positive-face want’ “[indicate] (potentially) that the speaker 
does not care about the addressee’s feelings, wants, etc.”, and include such acts as 
criticism, disagreement, the expression of violent emotion, the raising of divisive 
topics, and non-cooperation (ibid.: 324-25). 
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However, as Brown and Levinson note, “there is an overlap in this classification of 
FTAs, because some FTAs intrinsically threaten both negative and positive face 
(e.g. complaints, interruptions, threats, strong expressions of emotion, requests for 
personal information)” (ibid.: 325).  This overlap “clearly raises certain problems” 
and “[calls] into question whether such a clear distinction between positive and 
negative face is, in fact, a useful one” (Harris 2001: 463; see also Hernandez-Flores 
1999; Mao 1994).  As Harris goes on to state, “there are undoubtedly many 
discourse contexts, including much casual conversation, where positive and 
negative politeness strategies are very likely to co-occur” (ibid.).  Hacktivism, 
which often combines threats to H’s negative face, such as putting pressure on H to 
do something (or cease doing something) through requests, threats and warnings, 
and through expressing strong negative emotions that exhibit motivation for 
harming H or H’s goods; and threats to H’s positive face, such as criticism, 
accusations, challenges, irreverence, non-cooperation and the raising of divisive 
topics, is clearly such a discourse context or genre.  As such, becoming enmeshed in 
exactly what aspect of H’s face is being threatened by any given instance of 
hacktivism is counter-productive – the important point is that either through 
discursive content or form, or some combination of the two, hacktivism mounts a 
threat to the face of the dominant publics it engages with, in an attempt to provoke 
political preference reflection and destabilise these dominant discourses. 
Hacktivismo’s projects clearly and intentionally threaten the overall face of the 
pseudopublics of repressive regimes; indeed, they break the repressive national laws 
of these regimes, showing them to be both reprehensible and impotent.  Rather than 
writing a letter to Beijing, or signing a petition against Internet censorship, or any of 
the other usual and often ineffectual modes of communicative dissent against 
authoritarian regimes, they directly challenge their control and power by showing 
that their dominance can be undermined or bypassed, through enabling blatant non 
co-operation with their desire for control.  In doing so, they simultaneous criticise, 
express anger about, and exhibit disapproval of the operations of these regimes, as 
well as the Western governments and corporations that are complicit in their 
operations, by allowing dissident citizens within them to access and engage in taboo 
or divisive discourses.  Beyond this, Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity, and the 
dissident citizen counterpublicity their projects enable, also amplifies their critiques 
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by being simultaneously directed towards a wider global public of publics, with the 
intent of generating yet another level of sympathetic counterpublicity within this 
global arena. 
The subversion of legally mandated control and repression, that is, the transgressive 
nature of Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity, serves to propel their actions and their 
attached constitutive ideology, as expressed in the Hacktivismo Declaration and the 
press releases and other media statements that paraphrase it, into the global media.  
These media, in line with Habermas’s description of the refeudalisation of society 
and of the public sphere (1989), may also be considered to be a pseudopublic, in 
that they generally ignore topics and discourses not relevant to their elite 
governmental and corporatist motives and maintenance of power, and enable 
primarily the consumption of, rather than participation in politics.  However, the 
form of Hacktivismo’s hacktivism, like much successful activism, creates a 
spectacle, providing these media with a novel source of news, and thus enables 
Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity to ‘hack’ its way into the media pseudopublic. As 
Downey and Fenton remind us, successful counterpublicity relies upon this kind of 
effective interaction with or use of the mainstream media (2003: 193), in order that 
they may “actively and effectively contest the discursive boundaries of the 
mainstream public sphere” (Dahlberg 2007a: 57).  By bringing these issues into 
focus, and bringing concerns from the periphery of the mainstream public sphere 
and towards the centre, “the structures that actually support the authority of a 
critically engaged public begin to vibrate.  The balance of power between civil 
society and the political system then shifts” (Habermas 1996: 379), thus creating the 
possibility of hegemonic fracturing or destabilisation. 
The public counterpublicity or impoliteness Hacktivismo direct towards the public 
of pseudopublics they oppose through the form of their hacktivism (that is, with 
their software) is further amplified by the face-threatening challenges and negative 
characterisation inherent in their Declaration.  The discursive content of their 
hacktivist counterpublicity (including the extensive discursive work they do to 
establish their authority and authenticity) is propelled into the global media public 
by the transgressive form of their software.  The media coverage of their projects in 
various influential online technews publications (such as Wired, BoingBoing and 
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The Register), as well as more mainstream news sites (such as the BBC and 
Bloomberg Businessweek), and the fact that Oxblood Ruffin has written and 
continues to write articles for assorted influential online ‘technews’ publications 
(including BoingBoing, The Register, and Techradar) is testament to their “effective 
counterpublic strategizing” (Downey & Fenton 2003: 193), as the cDc ‘In the Press 
– Publications’ page of their website shows. 
This propulsion of discursive content into the mainstream through form generates 
multiple levels of agglomerative counterpublicity, not only censoring explicitly 
repressive regimes, but also the technology corporations that do work for these 
regimes and the hypocritical Western democracies that decry internet censorship 
while implicitly sanctioning it through welcoming the profit it generates, and 
sometimes even engaging in internet censorship themselves.  The operations of this 
public of pseudopublics are exposed as fallible, and their positive face is threatened 
through both the form and content of Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity.   
The inherent counterpublicity of Hacktivismo, and the consequent levels of 
counterpublicity they enable, is a purposive attempt to embarrass and humiliate 
these pseudopublics, with their purposive and politically charged impoliteness 
clearly intended as a form of counterpublicity oriented towards the destabilisation of 
political-economic hegemony. Furthermore, Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity creates 
cracks and fractures within which further counterpublicity can flourish.  The 
counterpublic sphere constituted by Hacktivismo’s embedding of their ideology 
within code is not only counterpublic in and of itself, but it also intended to be a 
catalyst for a further cascade of viral counterpublicity, through the provocation and 
hopefully alteration of political preference, generating a wave of dissident 
communication and counterpublics that are all ultimately oriented towards the 
destabilisation of the dominant publics and ideologies that they oppose. 
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7.4 Summary of Hacktivismo as a counterpublic 
 
We can thus see that both the discursive form and the discursive context of 
Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity work in combination, constructing Hacktivismo’s 
external counterpublicity, which attempts to both provoke political preference 
reflection and to destabilise the relevant dominant publics they intend to counter.  
The Declaration serves to legitimate Hacktivismo and their ideology as worthy of 
support, and to define and critique the dominant publics and the reprehensible 
behaviour against which they are oriented as counter.  Their software projects 
embody this critique and dissent, and propel it into a wider realm of publicity, thus 
amplifying the strength of Hacktivismo’s counterpublicity as a whole.  Their 
hacktivism’s potent combination of form and content, grounded in a multivalent 
subversion and manipulation of various hierarchies of communicative power and 
access, is what constructs both the basis and strength of their counterpublicity.  This 
powerful combination of content and form is a defining feature of hacktivist 
counterpublics engaging in successful (that is, visible) external publicity, as is 
further demonstrated in the following two case studies. 
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Chapter 8  
Performative hacktivism: The Creative Freedom Foundation and the New 
Zealand Internet Blackout campaign35 
 
8.1 Context 
 
The Creative Freedom Foundation are a group of artist-activists (Samuel 2004a) 
founded in 2008 by New Zealand artists and technologists Bronwyn Holloway-
Smith and Matthew Holloway, in response to proposed changes to New Zealand 
(NZ) copyright legislation and out of concern for the damage these changes might 
wreak upon the creativity of the NZ arts scene, the economy, and public rights36. 
These founders, and a third trustee, Luke Rowell, spearhead a diverse collective of 
NZ artists, including musicians, filmmakers, visual artists, designers, writers and 
performers, and are additionally backed by the support of thousands of NZ citizens, 
forming an extensive nationally-based counterpublic.  In terms of keeping the 
organisation alive, they are supported by “a network of members who often 
volunteer their time and skills to help with different aspects of the CFF” (Holloway-
Smith 2009). 
The CFF’s work is ongoing – they are currently involved in the NZ and 
international coalition aimed at opening up the ACTA negotiations and rendering 
the formation process of the legislation democratically accountable – but their 
original catalyst for formation was the proposal of the so-called ‘Section 92’37 
Amendment to the NZ Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act (CAA), 
                                                
35 In line with the principles of critical discourse analysis and disclosure in general, the author would 
like to state that she is a supporter or member of the Creative Freedom Foundation, and took part 
in the Internet Blackout. 
36 As in the previous case, much of the information on the CFF is taken from their website, and as 
such, inline citations will only appear when direct quotes or specific pieces of information from 
their site are used.  Inline citations will, obviously, be used as normal for all other sources.   
37 The contentious sections are actually S92A and S92C, not S92B or C, or any of the other 
subsections, but the shortened reference S92 is in common use in NZ, and will be used here for 
brevity. 
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which was passed in parliament in 2008 and was intended to come into effect on the 
28th of February, 2009. 
 
8.1.1 Section 92A and C of the NZ Copyright Amendment Act 
 
This Act would have implemented a ‘graduated response’ or ‘three-strikes’ 
approach aimed at countering copyright infringement. This approach takes various 
forms, but is based upon the premise that three accusations of copyright 
infringement will lead to the termination of the accused’s Internet connection by 
their relevant ISP. In the case of the CAA, these accusations were not required to be 
supported by legal proof, thus legalising termination without the need for a trial or 
for evidence to be held up to scrutiny in court.  This led to the amendments being 
described by many (including the Creative Freedom Foundation) as the ‘Guilt Upon 
Accusation’ laws, and indeed, the amendments rendered the legislation “arguably 
the world's harshest copyright enforcement law” (Saarinen 2009). As explained by 
one of New Zealand’s leading media and political bloggers: 
 
It is not only that this law denies the accused any due process, it is that 
it stipulates a penalty that no court would impose in adjudicating a 
copyright complaint even if infringement were proven. Remarkably, 
someone convicted in a court of law of handling child pornography via 
the internet would not suffer such a penalty. 
(Brown 2009a; emphasis in original) 
 
 
The amendments would have also changed the definition of an Internet service 
provider (ISP) to become “practically anyone with a shared connection or website” 
(‘Join the Internet Blackout’), thus rendering businesses, schools, libraries, 
governmental departments and many other organisations and individuals ISPs, and 
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as such, responsible for logging all connections under their purview in order to 
provide evidence for possible accusations of infringement. This provoked 
widespread ire, with libraries voicing particularly strong opposition, as the logging 
requirement “practically expects your organisation to know both data forensics and 
copyright law” (ibid.) – an instance of massive and inappropriate burden shifting 
from copyrights holders onto any entity providing Internet access.  
The ‘three strikes’ approach is one of the mechanisms being lobbied for by the 
entertainment industries in their efforts to reinforce copyright legislation by 
imposing ever-harsher penalties on infringers. In New Zealand, the Recording 
Industry Association (RIANZ) actually rejected a draft code of practice for ISPs 
written by the Telecommunication Carriers Forum that sought to neutralise some of 
the worst aspects of the new amendments as inadequate, stating that it made it too 
easy for those accused to dispute allegations of piracy (rather than just being guilty 
upon accusation), and did not go far enough towards protecting copyrights holders’ 
interests (Saarinenen 2009; Pullar-Strecker 2009). 
Business funded-studies carried out by the entertainment industry regularly claim 
massive losses due to ‘piracy’, such as the Microsoft-backed lobbying group the 
Business Software Alliance’s 2007 ‘Piracy Study’ claiming revenue losses of 
US$29 billion due to pirated software (BSA 2007).  Indeed, these claims have been 
remarkably successful in terms of attaining discursive dominance, with the idea that 
‘piracy is killing the film/music industry’ being frequently and unquestioningly 
mobilised within mass mediated public spheres.  This is hardly surprising, given the 
heavily concentrated and conglomerated status of the global media sector, with 
music and film studies economically interlinked with the news media and sharing 
the same ideologies and motivations. However, there is arguably little actual 
evidence to support these claims of industry annihilation, which form the basis of 
rights holders’ rationales for ever-tighter copyright legislation, in order to ‘protect 
artists’ (such as musicians and film makers, rather than the actual production labels 
and corporate rights holders).  A recent study by the United States Government 
Accountability Office dismissed many of them as being based on unreliable 
methods, and some industry bodies, including the MPAA, refused to divulge the 
details of their methodologies and calculations at all (USGAO 2009).  The fact that 
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media corporations such as Sony continue to have ‘record-breaking years’ in terms 
of box office returns casts further suspicion on industry claims of being crippled by 
Internet piracy (Masnick 2009), and it is arguable that their coining of the ‘piracy 
discourse’ is evidence of a sluggish and conservative corporate mindset that is 
unwilling to adapt (and invest in adapting to) new technological environments and 
modes of content delivery. 
The ‘3 strikes’ approach is intended to complement these media conglomerates’ 
ongoing litigious strategy of suing copyright-infringing websites (such as Napster, 
and more recently, The Pirate Bay) and individuals, and pushing for national 
adoptions of supranational legislation such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organizations (WIPO) treaties and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. 
(ACTA).  This international pressure to adopt such legislation domestically is 
driven by a neoliberal free trade agenda, with smaller nations allegedly being held 
to ransom by global powers, primarily the United States.  The CFF’s suspicion with 
regards to the drafting of S92, as described by one of their core members, is that the 
NZ government, like many others, was “concerned about New Zealand having 
signed various WIPO treaties and that the country might not get a free trade deal 
with the US unless the entertainment industry that vigorously lobbies the US Trade 
Representative gets its way”, thus NZ sovereignty was going to be “sold down the 
river” on the sly (Saarinen 2009).  
 
8.1.2 The Creative Freedom Foundation 
 
The CFF counterpublic was founded in late 2008 in response to the impending 
amendments. As Holloway-Smith described: 
 
As an artist I was concerned that those claiming to represent artists 
didn’t represent how I felt about the issue, and after conversations with 
other artists friends of mine who were equally concerned I quickly 
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became aware that there was need for independent artist representation 
on the issue. 
(Holloway-Smith 2009) 
 
 
They created a website, around which they constructed a core activist counterpublic, 
compromised of NZ artists, technologists, and other interested citizens, primarily 
through:  
 
…already established relationships. Some new ones emerged through 
mutual friendships and also through email contact. 
(Holloway-Smith 2009) 
 
 
The CFF’s primary and ongoing goals are to “encourage[s] and facilitate[s] 
discussion, provide[s] education, and seek[s] to answer emerging questions around 
issues that have the potential to influence New Zealand artists' creativity” (CFF). 
They also endeavour to act as advocates for artists’ views on these issues, and to 
foster a healthy, vibrant NZ arts community, and through these goals, “seek to bring 
Copyright Law into the 21st Century” (ibid.).  Their three main legislative concerns 
about which they aim to “spread the word” (‘Section 92’) are S92 (which they 
variously describe as the ‘Internet Termination Law’ and ‘Guilt Upon Accusation 
Law’), Digital Rights Management (‘DRM Free NZ’), and legislatively mandated 
Internet surveillance (‘No companies snooping on your Internet’), although we will 
focus exclusively on their first goal and the associated campaign in this analysis. 
They keep a ‘featured’ article by Nat Torkington, a NZ computer programmer and 
author, and their friend and co-member, in a fixed position at the top of their 
website’s page directory, with this article articulating the base of their 
counterpublic’s ‘intellectual ideology’, which is structured around their views on 
the Internet and current trends in copyright legislation. They regard the Internet as a 
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boon for artists, in that it provides “new opportunities to reach fans and new 
opportunities to earn a living”, and see the corporate media intermediaries pushing 
for increasingly punitive and restrictive Internet-related copyright legislation as “not 
safeguarding [artists’] interests” (Torkington 2008).  Rather, they see these 
proposed legislative changes as “fight[ing] progress” and “alienating fans rather 
than figuring out how to turn them into satisfied customers” (ibid.).   
  
 
Figure 7: The Creative Freedom Foundation's logo38 
 
 
8.1.3 The CFF’s intellectual ideology  
 
The website is thus the space in which the CFF discursively generate and maintain 
the base of their counterpublic, which includes explicitly articulating their overall 
                                                
38 Image from: http://creativefreedom.org.nz/library/creative-freedom-logo/logo.png 
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intellectual ideology (Billig et al 1988), and their specific intellectual ideology 
regarding S92.  They do much discursive work to characterise the impending 
legislation as exceedingly negative, by both establishing the importance of the 
Internet to everyday life and to human creativity, and articulating how the 
legislation will both erode the positive functions of the Internet, as well as 
contravene citizens’ rights to a fair trial, amongst other violations.  This discourse, 
by extension, characterises them as defenders of both Internet and citizen freedom. 
They are positive about the potential for technology to enable human progress, 
articulating their belief that “[i]n future years, the internet will continue to become 
more pervasive”, and outline its importance for easing the temporal and 
geographical burden of everyday activities such as banking, bill paying, education, 
and interpersonal communication (‘CFF’s Submission’).  They also see the Internet 
as “part of modern free speech”, and this, combined the with previously mentioned 
moving of essential services and utilities online, means that legislating terminating 
citizens’ Internet access is “too severe a punishment” and will only become 
‘increasingly unfair” (ibid.).  As such, copyright legislation must be “updated for 
the modern age”, and they argue that implementing S92 will only necessitate 
“revisiting a law that will be outdated in the near future” (ibid.). 
Indeed, they see Internet access as a basic human right, and “have grave concerns 
with recent trends in international copyright laws that bypass the traditional 
expectations of civil rights (such as due process)” (‘Section 92’). They describe S92 
as legislation that “forces the termination of internet connections and websites 
without evidence, without a fair trial, and without punishment for any false 
accusations of copyright infringement”, with public rights “drastically undermined 
by a law that automatically treats people as criminals” (‘What is copyright?’). They 
repeatedly describe the legislation in extremely negative terms, using strong 
adjectives such as disproportionate, “too severe”, “unfair” (‘CFFs submission’), 
“unjust”, “ripe for abuse”, and “dangerous” (‘Section 92’), and point out that similar 
overseas laws have been “used to limit free speech”, providing links to examples of 
this occurrence (‘Section 92’). 
They also see the Internet as a space for creativity, artistic endeavour and direct 
connections with fans, as well as community building, with these aspects being 
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particularly important for NZ as a geographically isolated nation, describing the 
Internet as “increasingly becoming the primary way we engage with the rest of the 
world” (‘Join the Internet Blackout’). They regard the current restrictive state of 
copyright law as restricting this creativity, by criminalising “[r]emixes, mashups, 
and digital citations [which] are valuable creative contributions to society” (‘How 
Copyright Is Harming Creativity’), and they underline their support for remix 
culture and creative freedom and sharing in the tools they use, with all content on 
their website licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0 NZ 
License, thus enabling free copying and remixing. 
The CFF see S92, specifically, as illegitimate in that it claims to be for the benefit 
of artists, when the opposite is true, and use the phrase or meme “Not In My Name” 
throughout their discourse, to distance themselves from the harmful legislation and 
underscore the dishonesty of its rationale. They repeatedly state that they do not 
want it pushed through “in the name of artists and protecting creativity” (‘Section 
92’), and explicitly support ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair use’ copyrights (‘What is 
copyright?’), condemning the legal protection of Digital Restrictions/Rights 
Management that removes rights citizens would otherwise have (‘DRM Free’). 
They are at pains to point out that “Copyright infringement is wrong” (‘Section 
92’), and that they do not “endorse or support copyright infringement that takes 
money away from artists, but instead [we] advocate Copyright reform for the 
benefit of New Zealand” (‘What is Copyright?’), thus establishing themselves as 
reasonable, and located on the right side of the law.  It is the poor form of the 
legislation that they are opposed to, not combating copyright infringement per se.  
They see legislation such as S92 as evidence of an entertainment industry that is 
slow or unwilling to adapt to a new environment, but believe that the onus is on 
them to do so, rather than trying to mould the Internet to suit their purposes, and do 
not believe that such “unworkable” industry models should be supported by 
“government intervention” (‘CFF’s submission’).  They quote Telecommunications 
Carriers Forum chief executive Ralph Chivers, supporting his description of 
governmental officials as being “technologically uneducated”, and being “taken for 
a ride by lobbyists putting their interests ahead of the nation” (‘Section 92’). 
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Indeed, they believe that S92 will actively “harm” (‘Our Goals’) and “stifle” (‘What 
is Copyright?’) creativity, in that “[a]rtists are already using the Internet effectively” 
(‘CFF’s Submission’) and the legislation will undermine their efforts by “simply 
pushing illegal downloading further underground” (‘Section 92’) and provoking a 
public backlash against artists that will “make it even more difficult to educate the 
public and convince lawmakers of the necessity of sensible laws to protect creators 
rights” (Australasian Performing Right Association member, Anthony Milas in 
‘Join the Internet Blackout’).  They see it as “corrosive to the public trust in 
copyright education that the artists benefit from”, and believe it “risks undoing the 
social contract that underlies copyright”, thus “encouraging illegal downloads and 
taking money away from the creative sector”, as well as potentially undermining 
NZ’s connection with the global creative community (ibid.).  Essentially, they see 
S92 as wholly counterproductive, and believe it will actually exacerbate the 
problems it is intended to combat. 
The CFF also emphasise the importance of subjecting the Internet to principles of 
democratic governance, calling for the defence of civil liberties in digital 
environments and greater public participation in legislature building, as opposed to 
the imposition of legislation like S92 from on high, with little to no public 
consultation. They repeatedly refer to democratic and human rights-based tenets, 
such as the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, the right to a fair trial, and 
the right to freedom of expression, all of which they describe S92 as contravening. 
They present themselves as defenders of these democratic principles, and actively 
promote increased citizen participation in political decision-making, asserting to 
their wider counterpublic that “[w]e should speak out about injustices like Guilt 
Upon Accusation” (‘Section 92’; italics in the original).  
They use hyperlinks to direct citizens to additional information, including online 
copies of the pertinent legislation, as well as contact information for relevant 
parliamentary representatives and tips on how to write an effective letter, urging 
citizens to “keep it polite and respectful, but firm - it's more persuasive that way” 
(‘Join the Internet Blackout’).  They emphasize the need for politicians to notice 
that citizens care about the law, urging New Zealanders to “[s]tand up and make 
[their] voice heard: Say NO to Guilt Upon Accusation laws” (‘Section 92’).  Their 
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focus is not on “pointing the finger at MPs”, but is rather on communicating their 
dissent and thus influencing them to “stop this unjust law” before it comes into 
effect (‘Section 92’). 
 
8.1.4 The functions of the CFF website 
 
The CFF are, primarily, an activist organisation, and as such, their website aims to 
facilitate the wide dissemination of relevant information in a concise and timely 
manner; enable the discursive creation and maintenance of a wider activist 
counterpublic, and lower participation thresholds by providing ideas, outlets and 
tools for their members. Different Internet technologies are used for supporting 
these activities, with the CFF website acting as an organisational hub for these 
various applications and uses.  They exploit the different communicative functions 
of web spaces identified by Stein (2009), using various web applications to provide 
information, promote interaction and dialogue, assist action and mobilization, make 
lateral linkages, serve as outlets for creative expression, and generate further 
resources for campaigns (ibid.: 752-753).   
The website functions as an alternative media site, providing background on the 
CFF and their work, as well as regular updates on progress, successes, and new 
concerns, such as the recent ACTA negotiations.  The information they provide 
strives to be clear and concise, attempting to decode somewhat impenetrable 
legislation into easily understood points, and explain why their cause is relevant to 
businesses and organisations who would be classed as ISPs, and artists and 
individuals (‘Join the Internet Blackout’) – making their intellectual ideology more 
accessible to readers and prospective counterpublic members. 
The website also provides a plethora of ways in which members of the 
counterpublic may keep up to date with the latest CFF news – one may subscribe to 
weekly newsletters; follow links to the CFF Twitter stream, CFF Facebook group, 
or CFF YouTube channel, or become the CFF’s MySpace friend. These latter social 
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networking technologies provide the added benefit of interactivity – counterpublic 
members can communicate with one another and with the core leaders of the 
counterpublic – something that is further supported by the website’s contact form 
and forums.  These different elements and technologies help build and maintain the 
internally oriented elements of the CFF counterpublic, by keeping individuals in 
touch with one another and promoting and enabling deliberation. Dialogue amongst 
CFF members is enabled and encouraged, building internal self-definition and 
solidarity, and refining their intellectual ideology or internal counterpublicity, as is 
communication with or towards the dominant publics that constitute their 
adversaries and targets (through such channels as suggesting that members of the 
CFF counterpublic write emails to the relevant members of parliament involved 
with the drafting and implementation of the law).  
As such, the CFF counterpublic clearly exhibited the internal and external functions 
described by Downey (2007: 117) from the outset of their formation. It also exhibits 
the benefits of diverse membership and incomplete internal reification discussed by 
Fraser (1992), with their intellectual ideology constantly being ‘fine-tuned’, 
rearticulated and expanded through the intra-member discussion facilitated by the 
website and other web technologies.  This ongoing process serves to flatten the 
hierarchy of the group somewhat, and also promotes the maintenance of familiarity 
and group solidarity.  Their external communication (by way of letters to members 
of government, etc) further promotes solidarity-generation, and also serves to 
circumvent the potential counterpublic cyberbalkanization that Habermas warns of 
(2006). Their engagement with dominant publics constructs the state of 
interpublicity (the presence of discourse across lines of difference) that Calhoun 
(1997) sees as vitally important in that it connects otherwise disparate and distant 
publics and counterpublics into a multi-directional and dynamic modular network of 
public dialogue and deliberation. 
However, in late February 2009, the CFF went a step further, amplying this external 
counterpublicity and deviating from the usual traditional channels of discursive 
dissent through engaging in an ingenious instance of performative hacktivism. This 
amplified counterpublicity took a somewhat hybrid form, in that it straddled the 
border between hacktivism and traditional activism.  This intensification of their 
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external counterpublicity - the NZ Internet Blackout (henceforth, the Blackout) - 
should be understood as a discrete mobilisational moment in the ongoing external 
orientation of the CFF counterpublic, but it was the event that most successfully 
enabled the far-reaching externalisation of the CFF’s counterpublicity, thus 
provoking widespread political preference reflection, and bringing destabilizing 
pressure to bear upon their adversaries in an attempt to fracture the hegemony of 
these dominant publics. 
 
8.1.5 The NZ Internet Blackout 
 
The idea for the Blackout stemmed from the 2009 Kiwi Foo Camp (13-15 February) 
(Torkington 2009), a yearly unstructured gathering or ‘unconference’ organised and 
attended by NZ media and technology industry people and policy makers (including 
the CFF founders), with many attendees being CFF members.  (However, it should 
be noted that the wider blackout form was not conceived at the Camp. It has been 
used previously; by the Coalition to Stop Net Censorship against the 
Communications Decency Act, and by the EuroLinux coalition against the directive 
for computer-implemented innovations generally referred to as the ‘Software 
Patents Directive’, amongst others.)   S92 was a main theme at the 2009 Camp, and 
led to the idea for and initiation of the Blackout aimed at opposing it, which 
commenced as the Camp finished.  The existing core members of the CFF 
counterpublic began ‘blacking out’ their Internet avatars (profile images) on social 
media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, as well as on a range of websites 
and blogs, stating that they were doing so in support of the CFF’s wider campaign 
against the ‘Guilt Upon Accusation’ laws.   
As technology and media experts and artists, many of these individuals were highly 
connected online, with large numbers of readers, followers and friends, and the 
Blackout phenomenon consequently spread like wildfire.  This was helped in no 
small part by NZ-based technologist and journalist Juha Saarinen, who asked the 
British actor, author and renowned lover of new technology, Stephen Fry, to 
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participate in the campaign via Twitter.  Fry was, at the time, the third most popular 
user of the microblogging site (MacManus 2009), and his ensuing participation was 
a huge boon to the externalisation of the CFF’s counterpublic, bringing it to the 
attention of a hundreds-of-thousands-strong global audience (see Figure 7 below). 
 
 
Figure 8: Stephen Fry's blacked out Twitter avatar and Bio referring his 
followers to the CFF website39 
 
By the time the CFF formally announced the Blackout via a press release and 
through their website and newsletter on February 16, 2009, there were already 
thousands of participants, and this number continued to grow in a viral fashion.  The 
press release and internal communications directed readers to the CFF website, 
which, along with the various social media platforms, served to both enable the 
joining and consolidation of new membership into the CFF counterpublic, and 
facilitated a viral mobilization of external counterpublicity by disseminating action 
alerts, coordinating the campaign, and enabling citizen participation.  
These modes of participation involved guidelines for traditional activist 
counterpublicity such as writing emails to pertinent governmental ministers or 
deputies, signing an online petition (which garnered over 17000 signatures, but is 
no longer online), and providing details of an offline demonstration to held on the 
steps of parliament, and of course, how to join the online hacktivist counterpublicity 
or Blackout. Website and blog owners were provided with instructions and tools for 
blacking out their sites or displaying banners and logos, with instructions and tools 
                                                
39 Image from: http://www.readwriteweb.com/images/stephenfry_twitter.jpg 
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also supplied for the blacking out of Twitter, Facebook, MySpace and Bebo pages 
and avatars. Cartoons, a satirical ‘copywrong song’ remix challenge, and lists of 
those involved added encouragement, reassurances of solidarity, and the 
carnivalesque energy often found at offline protests utilising mass involvement and 
performative or Situationist-inspired tactics.  
As a result, for the week spanning February 16-23 2009, the ‘lights went out’ all 
over the NZ Internet (Johnson 2009), and in various discrete international locations.  
The first 6 days of the CFF’s weeklong amplification of their counterpublicity 
primarily involved the blacking out of avatars on the previously mentioned social 
media platforms, which created a self-replicating cycle of counterpublicity, in that 
other Facebook and Twitter users would see a blacked out profile, follow the link 
attached to explain the blacking out to the CFF website, and thus be exposed to the 
CFF’s constitutive intellectual ideology, therefore being provoked into political 
preference reflection. Many of these readers did not just reflect, but altered their 
political preferences in response to the information provided on the site, and 
consequently joined the CFF counterpublic and blacked out their own avatars, 
resulting in more and more participants.   
It is impossible to quantify the number of people who blacked out their various 
avatars during that week, but they were numerous, as the ‘#blackout’ twitter hashtag 
during the time showed, and their number included not just Stephen Fry, but several 
other national and international technology and media opinion leaders, including 
Cory Doctorow, Leo Laporte, and Neil Gaiman, all well-known figures within the 
technology and literature community.  The CFF kept a partial record of participants 
in a forum thread on their site, which ran to 120 posts, and each post details at least 
one, and in most cases, several different participating sites or individuals, thus 
hinting at the magnitude of the counterpublicity (‘Groups/People joining the 
Internet Blackout’). 
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Figure 9: The CFF Blackout page (‘Blackout Homepage’) 
 
The last day of the weeklong protest involved blog and website owners redirecting 
requests for their homepages to a specially constructed page on the CFF website, 
stating that their page had been “voluntarily blacked out” in protest against the 
impending S92 legislation (see Figure 8), or placing a blackout banner on their 
homepage.  Some CFF members had been engaging in this activity all week, but the 
core action took place throughout the first half of this last day.  This final, more 
drastic stage of the Blackout was observed primarily within NZ, with a wide range 
of websites participating.  Blogs from both sides of the political spectrum blacked 
out their sites, including Kiwiblog, Public Address, Gotcha, The Standard, Not PC, 
No Minister and Frogblog, all of which are consistently rated amongst the top 10 
most popular blogs in the NZ blogosphere (‘TUMEKE! NZ blogosphere’).  Various 
members of parliament from both sides of the political spectrum also blacked out 
their personal blogs.  The NZ community news and raw news aggregation website 
Scoop.co.nz, which garners around 25000 visitors a day (including many journalists 
looking for story leads) participated (‘About Scoop’), as did the “[h]igh profile 
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mapping service provider” Zoomin.co.nz, which blacked out all its maps, thus 
symbolically “placing NZ in a perpetual state of virtual darkness” (Pilcher 2009). 
 
8.1.5.1 The Blackout as performative hacktivism 
 
This instance of performative hacktivism (Samuel 2004a) highlights the diversity of 
forms that hacktivism, and particularly performative hacktivism, can take, as well as 
the potential for the remixing of different forms, and their combination with more 
conventional forms of Internet-enabled activism (such as information dissemination, 
organising offline mobilisation, signing e-petitions and sending emails to members 
of parliament).  The blackout protest form is a hybrid, encompassing elements of 
both the conventional and disruptive (hacktivist) tactics outlined in Costanza-
Chock’s matrix of electronic repertoires of contention (2001).  It is conventional in 
that the citizen activists deploying it alter only their own web environment, but 
disruptive in that if these activists are website or blog owners, and particularly if 
their sites or blogs receive a lot of traffic, then their readers will be temporarily 
denied information they have come to expect on an ongoing and regular basis.   
In terms of hacktivism’s internal typology, it is situated within Samuels’ category of 
performative hacktivism, which is carried out by artist-activists (which the CFF 
founders and blackout initiators certainly are), and which takes a transgressive 
form; that is, it challenges the legal and political order but still exists in relation to it 
(2004a).  Akin to Downey and Fenton’s description of counterpublicity, it seeks to 
challenge the status quo rather than escape from it completely (2002).  It is a hack in 
the sense that it is an ingenious and creative use of technology in a manner not 
originally intended, and its element of illicitness stems from the way in which it 
breaks the “perceived rules” of blog and websites’ information flow (Turkle 1984), 
and mimics the more transgressive or outlaw forms of virtual sit-ins, defacements 
and redirects.  As such, it borrows from a multitude of different forms of 
hacktivism, not just those generally found within the category of performative 
hacktivism.   
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It uses a (voluntary) website defacement by means of redirection, a form usually 
utilised by Samuel’s category of political crackers (2004a) – indeed, as an article in 
The Guardian noted, ‘despite all appearances’, the blackout wasn’t “the result of a 
malicious hacker” (Johnson 2009).  This form is amalgamated with what Jordan and 
Taylor (2004) describe as Mass Action hacktivism’s (later subsumed into Samuel’s 
category of performative hacktivism) defiance of “the lack of physicality in online 
life, in favour of a mass collection of virtual bodies that are not yet present to one 
another” (ibid.: 69), but which provide the critical mass necessary for the hacktion 
to succeed. This second element is something that we would generally expect to see 
in virtual sit-ins, which are one of the main two commonly identified forms of 
performative hacktivism.  However, we may also understand it as utilising elements 
of the other common form of performative hacktivism – satire, such as that utilised 
by the Yes Men – in that it is essentially a satirical form of political cracking. The 
Internet blackout mimics site defacements or redirections, although magnified 
across a much broader range of sites, yet manages to avoid the illegality of such 
actions. 
As such, the blackout form remixes other forms of hacktivism and online activism 
in new but complementary ways.  It provides what we could call (borrowing from 
the description of political movements) a “third way” with the existing repertoire of 
electronic contention (Costanza-Chock 2001), which falls between the disruptive 
and conventional forms.  Only time will tell whether or not it is representative of a 
new era in performative hacktivism and online activism in general, but given the 
increasing usage of the blackout form (one was recently used to protest against 
Internet censorship in Australia); the emergence of such paradoxical and subversive 
phenomena as a Facebook group dedicated to helping people to delete their 
Facebook accounts (in protest against the site’s recent privacy woes), which at the 
time of writing had almost 50,000 members (‘How to permanently delete your 
Facebook account’); and the almost endless possibilities the Internet provides for 
creative expression and satire, one suspects that we have only just begun to see what 
imaginative forms of online political protest are possible. 
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8.1.6 The Creative Freedom Foundation’s constellation of publics 
 
As in the previous case of Hacktivismo, and as is apparent from their website based 
discourse, the CFF and their counterpublicity exist in relation to not just one 
dominant public, but in relation to several, which are aligned behind a primary 
dominant governmental public, as well as in relation to a wider national and global 
‘public of publics’. 
 
8.1.6.1 The New Zealand Government and politicians 
 
Clearly, the primary dominant public against which the CFF orient their external 
counterpublicity is that constituted by the New Zealand Government and politicians, 
who presume to speak for the citizens of New Zealand through the legislation they 
draft.  This dominant national public, if we are to use Habermas’s term, is once 
more a pseudopublic, in which politics are generally displayed before but not truly 
and thoroughly participated in by citizens (1989).  The now defeated Labour-led 
Government, headed by Prime Minister Helen Clark, were the ones who initiated 
the S92 legislative reform, which was supported by all the other NZ political parties 
apart from the Green Party. Upon their defeat in the 2008 NZ general election, the 
incoming National-led Government (headed by John Key) continued with the 
planned installment of the legislation, despite growing opposition from the other 
political parties, who appeared to gradually come to realise how poorly worded it 
was.  As previously mentioned, this poor wording left its interpretation open to such 
unnecessarily punitive measures as ignoring the honoured tradition of being 
‘innocent until proven guilty’, removing citizens’ Internet access without a fair trial, 
and placing the onus of implementing the legislation upon a group of very broadly 
defined ISPs, thus providing copyrights holders with their desired outcomes without 
them taking any real responsibility (Farrar 2009).   
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Thus, although the bulk of the NZ political parties (with the exception of the Green 
Party) originally constituted a broader dominant parliamentary public of publics, the 
chains of equivalence between them gradually eroded until the National-led 
Government were the lone dominant public in ultimate control and support of the 
legislation, with the other parties reorienting themselves as counterpublics 
(alongside the CFF and various other entities) opposing the legislation. Indeed, 
members of most of these political parties ultimately joined in the Internet Blackout 
in some way or another (Apostolou 2009), echoing the involvement of blogs from 
across the political spectrum.  As New Zealand functions under a mixed-member 
proportional (MMP) parliamentary system, this consolidation of the opposition and 
coalition parties generated a power bloc of greater magnitude than that of the 
National Party.  As such, National’s continued insistence on the passing of the 
legislation was truly representative or publicity being paraded ‘before rather than 
for the people’, as they were completely unable to claim any kind of representative 
majority. 
 
8.1.6.2 Copyrights holders and international neoliberal institutions 
 
The institutional bodies and corporations of the copyrights holders (such as RIANZ) 
also constitute a corollary dominant public or publics to the previous Governmental 
public, as do the more dispersed associated forces of international neoliberal 
institutions, who are continually agitating for harsher copyright legislation and 
attempting to force or coerce (through lobbying or free trade agreements) the New 
Zealand Government to adopt legislation that fits their own corporate political 
economic agenda.  As such, we can interpret the situation as involving some 
element of push and pull over a central public with the power to enact or block the 
ideologies of other counterpublics.  The NZ Government and politicians, and 
eventually just the National Party - the dominant public against which the CFF 
counterpublic was oriented - were and are in fact being simultaneously pressured by 
the publics of these rights holders and neoliberal institutions.  The CFF 
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counterpublic does not directly target these latter publics, but they are implicitly 
opposed or dissented against through the CFF’s orientation towards blocking the 
National-led Government from enacting legislation that works in the favour of 
rights holders and a neoliberal free trade agenda, at the expense of the good of NZ 
citizens.  Again, Keane’s  (2000) notion of a global modular network of differently 
sized publics and counterpublics is useful in conceptualising this situation.  
Although the CFF do not orient themselves directly towards these corporate and 
institutional publics, they are connected to them by the intermediary public of the 
New Zealand government, rearticulating the idea that the ‘global modular network’ 
of publics is linked by chains of not only equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) but 
also of influence and resistance, and that these interconnections and exertions of 
power can function both directly and indirectly.  This indirect opposition is arguably 
an extremely clever strategy on the part of the CFF – rather than directly tackling 
one of the immensely powerful yet diffuse primary agents of the refeudalisation of 
the public sphere (the mass media), they sought instead to maintain the freedom of a 
specific national enclave from their influence, thus embarking upon a 
counterhegemonic project of a more manageable size, relative to their resources. 
 
8.1.6.3 The wider national and global public of publics  
 
As in the case of Hacktivismo, and in continuation of Keane’s multi-leveled 
concept, the CFF counterpublic is also oriented towards a wider non-specific public 
of publics, predominantly national and particularly those in the arts community, but 
also international when and where possible.  They aspire to incite a wider discourse 
about S92 and similar copyright legislation, and to have more citizens join the 
debate about their own rights and the rights of all Internet users (and suppliers) who 
will be affected by this legislation.  They seek to not only educate and provoke 
political preference reflection within these diverse publics, but to hopefully convert 
some of the citizens they access into supporters of their cause. As with 
Hacktivismo, the CFF’s hacktivist counterpublicity was intended to be not just 
contestatory but also self-replicating or viral, through provoking not just one stage 
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or layer of political preference reflection but a self-reinforcing exponential flow, 
hopefully leading to widespread preference alteration.  However, unlike 
Hacktivismo, they did (and do) want more members for their specific counterpublic, 
to swell the ‘ranks of their disaffection’, and thus bring a more powerful discursive 
strength or counterpublicity to bear on the dominant public they oppose. 
We can therefore see that the CFF, as a counterpublic constituted by a general 
discourse against increasingly harsh and restrictive copyright legislation, and 
against the S92 Amendment specifically, intended for their Blackout campaign to 
both threaten the hegemony of the dominant public of the National-led Government 
and to also catalyse a wave of political preference reflection within a more 
dispersed and predominantly national (but also possibly global) ‘public of publics’.  
This second goal was in aid of the first, in that the amplification of their 
counterpublicity would bring more destabilizing pressure to bear on the National-
led Government, thus simultaneously destabilizing the forces of neoliberalism 
simultaneously attempting to sway the governmental public to their will.  Their 
counterpublicity was intended to serve as a buffer to this neoliberal political 
economic influence, not through direct opposition to the neoliberal institutions 
themselves, but through pressuring and hopefully fracturing the hegemony of the 
more readily accessible and local manifestation of this global influence – the New 
Zealand National government. 
 
 
8.2 Text 
 
Now that we have clearly identified these publics and goals, we may explore how 
the CFF counterpublic utilised the Blackout hacktivist form to achieve them.  The 
Cff’s website and blog Blackout redirect page (previously shown in Figure 8) is 
clearly the primary text worthy of closer analysis, as it formed the core of the 
hacktivist component of the CFF’s Blackout campaign – it was their most strongly 
externalised ‘public face’, and was the more detailed form or culmination of the 
associated mass blackout of Internet avatars.  The linguistic component from this 
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text is reproduced below, with reference numbering.  As the text was read primarily 
by the NZ readers of blogs and websites whose NZ owners, as members of the CFF 
counterpublic, had blacked them out in protest against S92 (as well as by those 
reading the widespread news coverage of the event), the analysis will follow this 
form; that is, it will be conducted as if we were one of these readers. 
 
This Website is Blacked Out 
This Saturday, February 28th, Section 92A of the Copyright Act is due 
to come into force. (1) 
This website has voluntarily been taken down in protest against this law, 
which will be used to disconnect New Zealanders from the internet 
based on accusations of copyright infringement, without a trial and 
without evidence held up to court scrutiny. (2) 
May we be very clear, we do not support or condone copyright 
infringement or illegal downloads. (3) 
But this blatant disregard towards the basic human right to a fair trial is 
completely unjust and unworkable and it has the potential to punish 
New Zealand businesses and individuals where in fact no laws have 
been broken. (4) 
Similar laws have been rejected in the EU as being against “a fair 
balance between various fundamental rights”; rejected in the UK due to 
“impracticalities”, and rejected in Germany as being “Unfit for 
Germany, Unfit for Europe”. (5) 
We don’t care who voted for the law in the first place.  We just want it 
stopped.  We call on the Minister responsible, National’s Simon Power, 
to do the right thing and repeal Section 92A immediately. (6) 
www.CreativeFreedom.org.nz  
 
 
As represented in Figure 8, the primary and overwhelmingly noticeable aspect of 
the text is not linguistic, but of a visually semiotic nature.  That is, it is black – the 
websites using it have been blacked out, or annihilated.  The CFF and their 
counterpublic used this blackness to symbolise a number of things.  It is emblematic 
of the barren wasteland that the Internet may become under repressive regulation, 
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and represents pre-emptive sorrow or mourning for censored creativity and freedom 
of expression.  The CFF also utilised the ‘blackness of the blackout’ due to the 
“’black’ theme [being] iconic in New Zealand”, and because “with the threat of 
internet termination there was the idea that New Zealanders’ connection with the 
world could be cut off and hence the ‘internet blackout’” (Holloway-Smith 2009). 
This dark void, so jarringly different from the usual content of most websites and 
blogs, is used not only to grab our attention, but also to underscore the seriousness 
of the discursive message overlaid upon it, and to plant the above connotations in 
our minds. 
The title of the message the CFF counterpublic embedded within this sea of 
blackness seems rather redundant, in that it essentially tells us what we feel we 
already know, but the passive nature of the sentence (in that no actor is identified) 
informs us that what we are seeing is not an accident – the blacking out has been 
done purposefully – but leaves us wondering who has actually done it.  As such, 
they prompt us to cease wondering whether there has been a technical glitch of 
some kind, and wondering where our expected web content is, and rather, begin 
wondering who has blacked the page out, and why.  After using the blackness – the 
notable and jarring absence of expected content - to catch our eye, and the title of 
the message to assure us that what we are seeing is purposive, the CFF then spend 
the rest of the text answering (to various extents) these questions of ‘who?’ and 
‘why?’ for us. 
The first sentence of the text appears to be a fairly unproblematic material clause, 
letting us know when and what legislation will be implemented, and signaling to us 
(through its primary placement) that this legislation is the reason why the page we 
are looking at is blacked out); however, the CFF’s use of the modal “due to” as 
opposed to “will” signals to us that there is a possibility that the implementation of 
the legislation may not happen (1).  In the context of the rest of the text, this leaves 
open a reason for protest – if the legislation was definitely going to happen, fighting 
the inevitable might seem pointless, but if it is only “due to” happen, with its 
implied question mark, then there is more reason for people to get involved and 
intervene to prevent this from actually occurring.  Furthermore, even though the 
usage is a relatively common one, the CFF’s choice of the word “force” rather than 
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“implement” or some other more neutral verb carries connotations of violence, 
arguably indicating that this legislation is not positive or beneficial, but will rather 
impose something unpleasant or undesired upon us. 
The CFF then let us know that the blacking out of the website we are attempting to 
read is voluntary; that is the owner of the site has done it on purpose, and has not 
been forced into displaying it (that is, their website has not been defaced by a 
hacker!) (2).  As such, whoever it is that owns the website or blog we are trying to 
read is immediately involved as part of what we are told is a “protest” action against 
the law mentioned in the previous sentence.  These site or blog owners, who we rely 
on for information and go to in order to hear about their opinion on matters, feel so 
strongly about the previously mentioned law that they have disrupted their usual 
operations, and denied us our usual access to their content, signaling to us that the 
law must be very bad indeed.  The CFF use the remainder of the sentence to 
confirm this suspicion, making a material and unmodalised statement (conferring 
facticity and authority) that this law will (not “may, or “might”) be used to deprive 
people of their access to the Internet based only on accusations of copyright 
infringement, unsupported by any trial or court-verified evidence.  Given the 
common understanding and usage of the meme that everyone has the right to a fair 
trial, not to mention the fact that we are obviously an Internet user, given that we 
are reading the text online, this immediately signals to us that this law is severely 
problematic – it may deny us a mode of access to information that we take for 
granted, through overriding what we generally understand as due or fair legal 
process.  The fact that the site we are currently reading has been rendered 
inaccessible by the Blackout serves to underscore this message by illustrating what 
we might come to expect if the legislation is implemented – that is, we may not be 
able to access information we rely on and take for granted. 
The CFF then signal that the protest is a collective action, supported by a group of 
people, rather than the blacked out site being a solitary action by the site owner, 
through the use of the pronoun “we” (3).  Furthermore, rather than simply telling us 
that they are reasonable and law-abiding, in that they “do not support or condone 
copyright infringement or illegal downloads”, they politely seek our consent for 
making this statement, through the use of “may”, thus underlining their reputability 
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as alluded to through their “very clear” statement of their position on the right side 
of the law.  Furthermore, through their nominalisation of the actions of infringing 
copyright and downloading content illegally (3), the CFF avoid being specifically 
accusatory against individuals who have been involved in these activities, and thus 
avoid explicitly alienating these potential new members of their counterpublic.  
Indeed, copyright infringers have more reason than most to be concerned about the 
legislation, although the CFF are careful to express their disapproval of this activity. 
Furthermore, it is not the status of these activities as illegal that is their collective 
concern – they are very clear in their support for them being so.  Rather, it is the 
proposed legislation’s methods of seeking to punish such activities, in that it will 
blatantly disregard such human rights such as that to a fair trial, it is unfair and will 
not even achieve what it is intended to achieve, and it will potentially punish both 
New Zealand business and citizens for no reason at all (4).  The lack of modality in 
making the first two points assures us that they are factual, and their verbosity – the 
law does not just disregard, it “blatantly disregards”, and is not merely unjust and 
unworkable, but completely so – emphasises the negativity of this impeding 
legislation.  The potentiality of the last part of the statement is somewhat cancelled 
out by the use of the phrase “in fact”, and the “New Zealand businesses and 
individuals” being punished are even further removed from any blame, through the 
passivisation of the laws being broken – they are kept linguistically distinct from 
any crime, signifying their actual status as innocent, and making their potential 
punishment appear even more unfair. 
The CFF use the next sentence to introduce intertextual support for their ideology, 
using quotes from unknown parties involved in critiquing similar laws in Europe 
and United Kingdom to further underscore the impracticality, unfairness, and 
unfitness of the legislation, as well as its violation of “various fundamental rights” 
(5).  Although we are not informed as to who these words come from (although they 
are reproduced and credited within the main website), the CFF use the fact that they 
are taken from critiques of laws that have already been rejected to provide a sense 
of protest solidarity – they establish a wider global imagined public of 
counterpublics opposing this kind of legislation, lending credibility and implicit 
support to the local protest.  The CFF’s use of this intertextual component also leads 
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us to understand that if we want to ‘keep up with’ Europe and the UK, important 
global regions that we traditionally look to as centres of sophistication (Europe) as 
well as being the location of (a large component of) our national origin (the UK), 
then we should also reject this legislation, as they have.  They characterise 
resistance to such laws as ‘normal’, therefore failing to resist them would, indeed, 
be abnormal. 
Up until this point, the CFF have been very careful to avoid pointing any fingers at 
specific individuals or organisations – it is the legislation itself that is problematic, 
and it has been divorced from the actors drafting and installing it though the use of 
passive sentence structures.  Like Hacktivismo, their counterpublicity is primarily 
oriented towards a cause, rather than a specific entity – entities or organisations are 
only implicated to the extent that they are involved with the subject of this cause.  
The law “will be used” (2) “based on accusations”, “without evidence held up” (1) – 
nowhere is any one actor specifically doing any of these actions.   The CFF use the 
last sentences of the Blackout text to consolidate this reason for this purposive 
avoidance of naming actors – “we”; that is, the group of people involved in the 
protest do not actually care who voted for the law, it is the law or cause itself that 
they are oriented against, thus avoiding any impressions of political partisanship, 
which might alienate some of their prospective supporters.  This strategy could also 
be argued as attempting an invocation of the menacing spectre of the unnamed 
‘other’ – a rhetorical figure that has a long history, particularly within extremist and 
radical political discourse (and also conspiracy theory), and which serves to add to 
the negative and threatening discursive construction of the legislation and its 
enforcers (whoever they may be). 
This use of anonymity, whether interpreted as threatening or not, signals that the 
CFF purposefully intend to be a counterpublic that spans the traditional political 
spectrum, thus keeping their doors open to a much larger cohort of possible new 
members, and not imposing a party loyalty-based political limit on the magnitude of 
their counterpublicity.  They are not interested in identifying who precisely is to 
blame for the legislation, they “just want it stopped” – and they want someone with 
the power to do so to step up and take responsibility for making sure this happens 
(6).  In the closing sentence, the individual in the position of taking on this 
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responsibility is finally named – the National Party’s Simon Power (the Minster of 
Commerce), with the CFF publicly requesting (rather than impolitely ordering him 
to do anything) that he “do the right thing” – the “right thing” being the immediate 
repealing of the legislation, which is thus oppositionally characterised as “wrong”. 
The text ends with a hyperlink to the CFF’s website, thus directing readers to 
further, more detailed information on the issue, and with the CFF’s logo, thus 
definitively establishing the name of the counterpublic involved in the protest action 
and dissemination of the Blackout message.  This logo and name serves as a 
signature to the message, assuring the reader that it comes from some known 
provenance, and that more information on its authors can be located if desired.  The 
hyperlink also serves to facilitate an ongoing cycle of counterpublicity, directing 
readers to the CFF website and providing them with instructions on joining the 
protest they have just been exposed to, thus hopefully swelling the ranks of the 
CFF, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the analysis.  The 
blackouts of Twitter and Facebook avatars used the same tactic but with less 
immediately available information, combining the eye-grabbing and symbolic 
blacking out of taken-for-granted information (in this case, the identities and self-
representation that are so essential to these social media platforms) with a hyperlink 
back to the CFF’s website, where the more detailed discursive formation of their 
counterpublicity and of ways to participate in it were available. 
The Blackout text’s ongoing focus on negatively characterising the legislation, as 
opposed to negatively characterising the primary counterpublic against which the 
CFF are oriented (the National Party) ties in with the discourse throughout the 
CFF’s website, which does exactly the same thing.  The CFF counterpublic 
purposefully avoid strongly and specifically threatening the face of the National 
Party within the content of their discourse, electing rather to characterise the 
legislation itself as exceedingly negative, and appealing to the good reason of the 
National Party (and particularly Minister Simon Power) in asking them to abolish 
what they view as a poorly constructed, impracticable and thoroughly excessive 
piece of legislation.  This, as previously mentioned, avoids alienating National Party 
supporters and other right-wing oriented citizens who might take umbrage at ‘their’ 
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party or side of the political spectrum being attacked, and thus may not have lent 
their support to the protest, even though they agreed with it in principle.   
The CFF also use this strategy to characterise themselves as eminently reasonable 
and politically objective, in that they do not muddle their discursively constructed 
counterpublicity with party bias – instead, they remain impartial and equitable at all 
times, and only want what is good for all of the citizens of New Zealand, not just 
those in support of a particular party or left/right political ideology.  Through their 
extremely negative characterisation of S92, they cast their opposition to it in an 
equally positive light.  They characterise themselves as a caring and principled force 
going into battle for the good of all New Zealanders, not just for a select minority. 
 
8.3 Access and control 
 
However, the form of the CFF’s counterpublicity did not echo the politeness 
apparent in the content of the their discourse.  The nature of the blackout, as a 
disruptive and spectacular form of performative hacktivism that constructed its own 
online discursive event, served to propel the CFF’s counterpublicity into a much 
wider arena than would have been provided by the usual channels of dissent to 
governmental activity.  The rejection of these usual modes of discursive dissent as 
insufficient, as well as the discourse carried by the Blackout’s form, both served to 
mount a direct challenge to the power and control of the dominant public, and the 
other publics attempting to influence it – effecting a powerful attempt at fracturing 
the hegemonic neoliberal discourse behind the legislation. As in the case of 
Hacktivismo, the form of the CFF’s hacktivism served to subvert the usual patterns 
of power and access to important channels and kinds of discourse, thus provoking 
widespread political preference reflection (and alteration), and threatening the face 
of the dominant publics they were opposed to, all in an attempt at destabilising the 
National-led government (and the forces of neoliberalism pressuring them through 
trade agreements and lobbying), and specifically, their implementation of S92. 
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8.3.1 The usual modes of communicative access regarding impending 
legislative changes 
 
In representative national democracies, there are clear and mandated ways in which 
citizens are supposed to engage with their parliamentary representatives, 
particularly with regards to new instances of proposed legislation.  Obviously, the 
usual way in which one shows disapproval of the actions of one’s government is to 
vote for an alternative party in a general election, in the hope that enough other 
people will share this voting preference, and thus force the current government out 
of power and usher a new one (and hopefully the party one prefers) in to power.  
General elections, while arguably the major way in which citizens of representative 
democracies register their engagement with and opinion of the political 
representatives and systems that govern them, are heavily controlled affairs.  The 
planning of elections is in the hands of the government and members of parliament, 
in terms of when exactly they occur, where and how voting may take place, and 
who may vote.   
Furthermore, the planned discursive agenda and indeed, general form of the election 
as a communicative event is limited to a restricted and binary kind of expression – 
citizens may either withdraw or offer their support for parties and members of 
parliament, and there is no provision for more nuanced and specific forms of 
discursive assent or dissent to, and deliberation of particular aspects of the 
representative politics at hand (thus Habermas’s accusations of pseudopublicity).  
Furthermore, the registering of one’s political preference through voting is forced to 
be a solitary affair, largely to protect voters from suffering coercion from other 
citizens or from party members, although this guaranteed isolation also has the 
effect of limiting the audience for one’s political choices and opinions.  Citizens are 
certainly free to disseminate their preferences as widely as they are able, but unless 
they possess some kind of privileged platform (generally requiring pre-established 
political capital or financial resources) that gives them access to the mass media, 
this dissemination is not likely to be very widespread.   
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Furthermore, given that elections are generally held several years apart – three 
years, in the case of NZ – even this limited response is not always timely or 
appropriate, with regards to particular instances of proposed legislation or 
governmental activity.  As such, alternative channels of dissent to particular 
proposed articles of legislation or intended forms of governance are left open.  
Politicians make their contact details available, so that citizens may contact them 
directly using emails or letters, and in the case of New Zealand, postal charges on 
mail to members of parliament are waived, thus marginally easing citizens’ access 
to their representatives.  Citizens who do contact their representatives directly are 
generally guaranteed a reply, but this reply is often pro forma, and there is little 
evidence to suggest that a few emails or letters expressing dissent to a particular 
political plan or piece of legislation have much, if any, impact on the final outcome 
of a particular direction of governance.  Additionally, these communications are 
generally expected to be constructed using formal, rational language and arguments 
(which, as discussed in the formation of neo-Habermasian public sphere theory, are 
differentially-available communicative resources), and these letters are once again a 
solitary affair, not capable of generating any wider and more visible 
counterpublicity, in and of themselves. 
Citizens may also make submissions to select committees, in certain instances, with 
these providing citizens with yet another chance to register their opinion on a given 
piece of legislation or parliamentary inquiry. However, as with general elections, 
the planning, setting and communicative dimensions of these committees are 
controlled by the parliament, thus reifying the pre-existing power of formal political 
representatives and structures of governance.  Citizens making submissions to these 
select committees are once again required to follow the communicative rules of 
access outlined by parliament, including utilising a specific, formal layout and tone 
within their submission documents.  Indeed, the NZ government provides an entire 
booklet on how these submissions should be structured and presented so that they 
are “easily read and understood by members of the committee” (‘Making a 
submission’).  Little thought is given to the fact that the strictures of this form 
(again, privileging formal, rational language and modes of argument) are 
differentially available to citizens, and citizens are expected to invest considerable 
time and effort in preparing their submission, without any financial or other 
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assistance, so that the submission may be ‘easily’ processed by officials who 
necessarily have access to rational modes of communication and who are 
recompensed for their time.  Once again, there is no guarantee that this time and 
effort will be met with any change of governmental plans, and the proceedings of 
most select committees are given little media attention, thus once more limiting 
citizens’ access to a wider audience. 
Citizens may also take the option of organising and circulating petitions against 
certain pieces of legislation, and submitting these petitions to parliament. If they 
manage to collect enough signatures, they may even (in the NZ context) force the 
government to administer a (non-binding) referendum to gauge the wider public 
opinion on a given matter.  However, once again, organising and disseminating 
petitions requires considerable time and effort on the part of the organisers, and 
without media attention, the social capital required to effect their wider distribution 
and support can be very difficult to achieve.  Even though the Internet has enabled 
petitions to be distributed and supported much more easily, they still require public 
attention if they are to be given any significant support. 
Furthermore, all this activity occurs in an environment in which governmental and 
parliamentary officials, as elite sources relied upon by the news media as regular 
sources of news, have much greater and indeed regular and institutionalised access 
to the media, and thus a much wider audience for their discourse, than do dissenting 
citizens or citizen groups.  They have much greater control over what issues acquire 
media coverage, and of the content of this media coverage, and citizens have few 
chances to participate in this mediated politics.  The mass-mediated pseudopublic of 
national governmental politics is “the court before which public prestige can be 
displayed, rather than in which public critical debate is carried out” (Habermas 
1989: 201).  Elite commercial forces also have privileged access to this mediated 
sphere and indeed, to the governmental pseudopublic itself (through lobbying and in 
terms of media conglomerates, through withholding or manipulating governmental 
access to and portrayal within the media), thus influencing and corroborating with 
national and international governmental pseudopublics.  
All the while, citizens are relegated to limited and largely powerless channels of 
political participation (including the consumption of mediated politics disguised as 
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true participation), and rely on this mediated political pseudopublic to inform them 
of the political world in which they exist.  Thus, citizens rely largely on the 
combined forces of state and economic elites for information about their political 
environment, with these elite forces having privileged access to both controlling 
which topics of discourse are displayed in the mediated political pseudopublic, and 
how these topics are discursively characterised.  The CAA is a case in point, being a 
piece of legislation clearly influenced by the entertainment industry, and, as is the 
norm for most media regulation (McChesney 2004b), received very little media 
coverage before the Internet Blackout campaign (and what little coverage it did 
receive was certainly only in the NZ media).  
 
8.3.2 Bypassing and manipulating these usual channels of communication 
 
It should be noted that the CFF’s Internet Blackout campaign involved elements of 
all these traditional activities of political participation; the core CFF counterpublic 
encouraged its wider membership to write letters to members of parliament, to sign 
an online petition registering their opposition to the installment of S92, and the core 
members prepared and delivered a submission to the select committee collating 
public input on the CAA, on behalf of the wider CFF counterpublic.  As such – it 
may be going to far to claim that rational-critical discursive strategies are always 
inherently pointless and should therefore be completely abandoned.  Nonetheless, as 
Eley (1992) argues, the failings that rational-criticality does exhibit can be 
ameliorated or even overcome by allowing more disruptive forms of 
communication into the public sphere, such as civil disobedience (and, of course, 
hacktivism), as long as we follows Dryzek’s advice in ensuring they remain non-
violent and non-coercive (200)).  The Internet Blackout component of the CFF’s 
counterpublicity employs precisely this complementary or intensifying purpose,  
serving to amplify the magnitude or mass of these usual channels of communication 
through generating a much wider level of subscription and utilisation than normal to 
these conventional modes of counterpublicity, and through generating its own 
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highly public and non-externally mandated expression of counterpublicity.  The 
CFF used the Blackout to generate this uncontrolled channel of discursive 
counterpublicity, and in doing so, regained control over all the levels of access to 
discourse, from planning, to setting, to control of the communicative event, and 
perhaps most importantly, to the scope of their audience.  As such, they enacted 
Young’s defense of the right to not only speak within the public sphere or spheres, 
but also be heard, as well as embodying her identification of passionate 
communication and activism as ideal modes of realising this right (2001). 
The Internet Blackout, as an instance of hacktivist and counterpublic activity, first 
served to propel the CFF counterpublic’s discourse into a wider national and 
international public of publics, thus once more providing evidence that hacktivism 
seems to attain a state of interpublicity, or discourse across lines of difference 
(Calhoun 1997) – as in the case of Hacktivismo, the form of the CFF’s discourse 
launched its discursive content into a wider circulation.  The core members of the 
CFF counterpublic generated a spectacle (the blacked out avatars), much like many 
other successful instances of protest and performative hacktivism, and utilised pre-
existing Internet based connective platforms (primarily Facebook and Twitter) to 
effect this spectacle, which looked much like an external hack but was in fact 
internally and voluntarily generated.  The interconnections central to these 
platforms were used to spread awareness of the protest action, directing an ever-
widening audience towards the CFF website, where they were exposed to the CFF’s 
intellectual ideology.  This ideology carefully constructed so as to negatively 
characterise the aspect of the dominant public against which they are oriented (that 
is, the National-led government’s proposed implementation of S92), and to 
positively self-characterise the CFF counterpublic, through their opposition to the 
law.   
Throughout this discursive self- and other- construction, the CFF were careful to 
avoid overly demonising the governmental counterpublic, instead thoroughly 
characterising the proposed legislation as utterly reprehensible and thus calling on 
the governmental public to exercise their inherent ‘good sense’ and annul it.  This 
tactfulness and positive self-presentation allowed the CFF counterpublic to avoid 
alienating any particular part of the political spectrum, and to be taken more 
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seriously by the audience they subjected to their wider counterpublicity.  This 
audience were thus prompted to reflect on their own political preferences, and, due 
to the carefully constructed positive self-presentation and negative other-
presentation encoded in the website, many of these audience members actually 
transformed or altered their preferences and elected to become members of the CFF 
counterpublic as well.  As such, the CFF engaged in a project of counterhegemonic 
publicity which generated a self-perpetuating cycle that transformed interpublicity 
into preference reflection, into preference alteration, then into additional 
counterpublic participation, which in turn led to further interpublicity. 
The successful creation of this cycle owed much to the CFFs thorough provision of 
new members with instructions and tools for contributing to the spectacle, with the 
form of the Blackout and the clear instructions of the CFF website dramatically 
lowering the barriers for these new members’ participation.  As these new members 
proceeded to black out their own avatars, they effected a new cycle of preference 
reflection and alteration, thus perpetuating the viral transmission of blacked out 
counterpublicity.  The use of Twitter and the novel form of the Blackout to garner 
the attention of various celebrities and opinion leaders, such as Stephen Fry, 
allowed this cycle of counterpublicity based on ever-increasing audience access to 
be massively amplified, and to break its way into not just a national, but a global 
public of publics, through ‘hacking into’ the news media.  Once more (as in the case 
of Hacktivismo), the CFF proved the ability for hacktivist counterpublics to be not 
only be relatively powerful (Downey 2007), but to also attract and utilise the skills 
or advantages of powerful public figures. 
The success and magnitude of the blacking out of avatars directed more and more 
citizen attention to the final day of website Blackouts, and also garnered news 
media attention to both the current avatar blackout and impending website blackout 
in both NZ and overseas.  During the week of the protest, the blackout was covered 
by the UK-based international newspaper and website, The Guardian (Johnson 
2009); the popular and influential international technology websites and blogs The 
Register (Williams 2009), ReadWriteWeb (MacManus 2009) and BoingBoing 
(Doctorow 2009), The Sydney Morning Herald (‘NZ blogs in copyright law 
blackout demo’); and several times in the New Zealand Herald and Stuff.co.nz 
 277 
websites (Pilcher 2009, Francis 2009, ‘Kiwi websites blackout in net law protest’), 
which together incorporate all of NZ’s main newspapers, as well as (more than 
once) by both main free-to-air NZ television evening news bulletins (see ‘Protesters 
say copyright law stripping rights’, ‘Blackout protest over controversial copyright 
law’ as examples). The participation of Stephen Fry was mentioned in much of this 
media coverage, underlining the importance of the CFF’s targeting of his 
participation (and that of other opinion leaders), and the use of Twitter also tapped 
into an ongoing media fascination with the platform, described by one reporter as 
the “news media’s Twitterphilia” (Williams 2009).  Downey and Fenton’s (2002) 
argument that counterpublicity is oriented towards challenging the status quo rather 
than completely escaping it and therefore necessitates engagement with the 
mainstream mediated public sphere once more proves extremely prescient. 
Of course, this media attention had the effect of provoking even more widespread 
political preference reflection, which led to the acquisition of even more members 
for the CFF counterpublic and participants in the blackout, lending an even wider 
publicity to the action.  The final day of hacktivism constituted by the website and 
blog blackouts, although transmitting the CFF’s intellectual ideology to many more 
New Zealanders and pointing them to the CFF website was, in the end, largely 
symbolic – the avatar blackout and knowledge that the website blackout was 
impending were enough to gain the critical mass of audience attention necessary for 
the CFF counterpublic to gain effect widespread preference reflection and 
alteration.  The blackout of the websites and blogs primarily fulfilled a promise of 
hacktivist protest, and underscored the internal solidarity of the CFF’s 
counterpublic, in that site and blog owners were willing to take their content offline 
and replace it with the blackout page, despite this, in many cases, equating to a loss 
of ‘click-through’ advertising revenue.  The website blackout was a concise 
summation of the CFF’s intellectual ideology, propelled into wider dissemination 
by the form of the hacktivism, and representing a statement oriented directly 
towards Simon Power and the National-led government.  All the preceding blackout 
activities pointed towards this final culmination, generating attention for it as the 
pinnacle of the hacktivism, although the publicity they received ended up 
disseminating its core message just as well as it did. 
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The core members of the CFF, much like the core members of other performative 
hacktivist groups such as the Electronic Disturbance Theatre and their FloodNet 
virtual-sit-in tool, ensured the success of their action (which relied upon significant 
participation levels) through lowering participation barriers by providing citizens 
and CFF members with all the tools they needed to effect the hacktivist action, and 
instructions on how and when to use them. In effect, they facilitated what we could 
think of as ‘hacktivism-by-proxy’ – the core members were the ones who actually 
planned, organised and enabled the hacktivist event, but they relied on the 
participation of a significant mass of citizen hacktivists to make it a success. 
Although this action was not illegal and did not disrupt the websites of the targeted 
dominant public or publics (in contrast to virtual sit-in tools such as the FloodNet) it 
achieved very much the same effect in terms of garnering significant media 
coverage or ‘hacking into the media’, thus projecting an amplified counterpublicity 
towards a dominant public, and gathering a wider audience to their website and 
provoking political preference reflection through both this new website audience 
and the media coverage.  Its disruptiveness was more akin to the satirical parody 
websites of the Yes Men, in that the CFF counterpublic creatively utilised their own 
web spaces to cause discursive disruption and thus publicise their intellectual 
ideology. 
Although the CFF website also encouraged its members to use usual channels of 
communicative access, such as writing letters or emails to pertinent members of 
parliament and signing a petition, they massively increased the levels of 
subscription to and thus force behind these actions, with Minister of Commerce 
Simon Power’s office reportedly being “taken aback by the volume of email on the 
issue” (Brown 2009a), and the previously mentioned petition garnering thousands 
of signatures in a relatively short period of time.  However, this amplification or 
flood of the usual channels of access for the presentation of alternative discourse 
was only made possible by the blackout itself, which generated an entirely new 
channel of communication, directed at both civil society and at the government. 
This served to operate as an uncontrolled form of discursive access (from planning 
to setting to control of the event to audience scope), thus bringing widespread 
counterpublicity to bear on the dominant public of the National-led government, 
and also putting more weight behind the CFF’s submission to the select committee 
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(which was backed by the thousands of virtual bodies constituting the CFF 
counterpublic at large). 
 
8.4 Summary of the CFF and the Internet Blackout 
 
As in the case of Hacktivismo, the form of the CFF’s hacktivism propelled its 
content into a state of viral replication, provoking political preference reflection and 
alteration via cyclical interpublicity and therefore generating a wave of viral 
counterpublicity which threatened or fractured the hegemony of the dominant 
National governmental pseudopublic, and of the neoliberal hegemony informing 
their legislative proposals.  This wave of counterpublicity served to act as an 
oppositional force or buffer against the powerful neoliberal pseudopublics 
simultaneously orienting themselves towards the Government, directing a flow of 
counterpublicity through the governments and towards these rival publics, and thus 
both identifying and contributing to a modular network of publics (Keane 2000) 
linked by chains of not only equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) but also 
resistance and influence.  The CFF used the inventive form of their hacktivism to 
endow their counterpublic discourse with much more power than the usual channels 
of discursive dissent and political engagement provide. They simultaneously 
flooded these usual channels and re-established citizen control over access to 
political discourse and participation through their creation of an alternative 
discursive channel which subverted or ‘hacked’ the usual modes of state and 
corporate discursive control. 
It would perhaps be going too far to assert that the CFF’s hacktivist-enhanced 
counterpublicity was wholly responsible for Prime Minster John Key’s 
announcement on the afternoon of 23 February 2009 (the final day of the blackout) 
that the implementation of S92A would be delayed until 27 March 2009, and his 
later announcement on 23 March 2009 that S92 would be scrapped and completely 
redrafted, given various favourable political opportunity structures, such as the 
newness of the National government and the fact that they had inherited the S92 
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legislation from their predecessors.  However, the CFF counterpublic certainly saw 
it (and indeed described it on their website) as a victory (‘Section 92A has been 
Delayed!’), in that they had achieved their cause, with the founders distributing the 
following message to the wider counterpublic: 
 
There is a lot of work ahead but I hope everyone involved takes some 
time out to celebrate this victory. This shows how modern online 
movements and efforts can result in real world change. We couldn't 
have done it without you -- we've been amazed and humbled by your 
support. Thanks everyone! 
(‘Section 92A has been Delayed!’) 
 
 
At the time of writing, the redrafted Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) 
Amendment Bill has just passed (23 April 2010) its first reading in the NZ 
parliament, with across-the-board party support.  The Bill still proposes Internet 
termination as a possible punishment for three instances of copyright infringement, 
but these three infringements would now have to be proven in a court of law, and 
the court will be required to take the effects of this termination on the user into 
account.  If termination is established as too severe a punishment, fines capped at 
NZ$15000 will provide an alternative. The Bill also provides a much more fair 
definition of ISPs and their responsibilities in cases of infringement. 
As of 2010, the CFF continue to be engaged with and foster more traditional forms 
of activism with regards to this issue, and as previously mentioned, are also heavily 
involved with coalition (or public of counterpublics) of NZ and international 
activities opposing the secretive negotiations and content of the ACTA.   
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Chapter 9  
Political cracking: Anonymous and Australian Internet censorship 
 
9.1 Context 
 
As will become clear, answering the question of who or what exactly Anonymous 
are is a nigh on impossible task.  They are not a group in the usually definable sense 
of the word; more a loose and amorphous collection of anonymous online global 
citizens, who have banded together in various ways and directions and claimed the 
collective title of Anonymous for themselves.  They are a leaderless collective 
phenomenon enabled by the networked structures and possibilities for anonymity 
provided online.  Their use of the title also indicates the value and power they place 
in collective anonymity, which is unsurprising given the illegal or borderline illegal 
nature of the actions of many of their factions or selective mobilisations.  However, 
given that this case study focuses on a particular instance of hacktivism engaged in 
by one of the (themselves vaguely defined and difficult to parameterise) factions or 
mobilisations of this complex group phenomenon, some explanation of Anonymous 
as an overall entity is required. 
 
9.1.1 Who are Anonymous? 
 
Unlike Hacktivismo or the Creative Freedom Foundation, Anonymous are perhaps 
best described as a concept or a meme that has been instantiated into an amorphous 
entity comprised of countless unnamed individuals, who periodically cluster into 
activist formations, both online and off.  That is, they are a loosely networked and 
extremely flexible counterpublic that periodically and autonomously mobilises into 
more discrete and specific counterpublic configurations, which are defined by the 
 282 
discursive struggles they engage in, and through their discursive self-presentation.  
In terms of their hacktivism, the common thread that binds them together despite 
their diverse membership and incomplete internal reification (states of being 
common to many counterpublics, as Fraser (1992) argues) is their opposition to 
information censorship, and particularly internet censorship. Their communal use of 
Anonymous as a mass noun stems from the ability and tendency for Internet users 
posting on forums, image boards, and other Internet sites to make comments and 
contribute to discussion without registering with their ‘real life’ identity or with an 
online persona – thus their contributions are attributed to ‘Anonymous’.  Obviously, 
not every person who contributes anonymously online is involved in the entity this 
case study is focused upon, but it is this widespread ability to participate 
anonymously in Internet communities and fora that has led to their adoption of the 
title. 
The members of Anonymous are comprised largely of sections of the userbases 
from Internet imageboards such as 4chan.org and 888chan.org.  Imageboards are a 
type of Internet forum or channel (hence, ‘chan’), which revolve around images, 
with users posting their own and commenting on those of others. Perhaps the most 
infamous of these boards, and one of the most widely trafficked (Sarno 2008), is the 
English-language board 4chan.org.  The site is home to a wide variety of posting 
activity, with a number of different sub-boards for different topics, including 
technology, sport, manga, and pornography, both traditional and hentai (sexually 
explicit cartoons and animations.  The site’s ‘/b/’ or ‘random’ board is perhaps its 
most notorious, as there are very few posting rules and all content is completely 
anonymous – it is not a place for those with weak constitutions or who are easily 
offended: 
 
[P]eople try to shock, entertain, and coax free porn from each other… 
Customs on /b/ include posts promising photos of personal degradation 
in return for certain kinds of porn or other helpful information; 
sarcastically asking for advice on teen romance; sarcastically 
asking/telling anything; pretending to have insider info or be privy to 
breaking news; posting image puzzles; and raiding other people's sites… 
/b/ has no rules; pretty much the only thing guaranteed to get a user 
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banned is child porn, and even that gets constantly joked about. Reading 
/b/ will melt your brain… 
(Douglas 2008) 
 
The /b/ or random board is widely credited with spawning some of the most 
persistent and well-know Internet memes (units of viral cultural information), 
including the immensely popular phenomenon of ‘LOLcats’ (which involves 
overlaying an image of a cat (and now, almost anything, not just cats) with an 
amusing caption). 
4chan and other image boards provide enough material for an entire research project 
in and of themselves, but the general point is that they are phenomena at the heart of 
a unique Internet subculture, and have served as the breeding ground for 
Anonymous.  The name or meme of Anonymous is taken in large part from the 
software structure of these boards, which often encourages and sometimes even 
enforces anonymous posting and commenting.  The anonymity and anarchic nature 
of these boards have combined to generate what one of their members has described 
as “the first internet-based superconsciousness” (in Landers 2008): 
 
Anonymous is a group, in the sense that a flock of birds is a group. How 
do you know they're a group? Because they're travelling in the same 
direction. At any given moment, more birds could join, leave, peel off in 
another direction entirely. 
(Anonymous member, in Landers 2008) 
 
This self-characterisation is accurate in identifying the dynamism inherent in the 
membership structures of Anonymous, and also in the organic, collective identity it 
conjures – considering the diversity and ‘weak ties’ between group members, it is 
quite remarkable how they manage to co-ordinate themselves (or at least 
subsections of the group at large) into effective and highly synchronized units 
capable of achieving some fairly sophisticated goals.  However, the claim to 
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‘superconsciousness’ goes somewhat too far – although it is iconic of the rather 
grandiose self-presentational discourses many Anonymous spokespeople tend to 
mobilise.  However, given the extremely diverse membership of the group and the 
fact that there have been several instances of group disagreement and splitting into 
different factions with regards to specific campaigns, if they are indeed a 
superconsciousness, they are one suffering from multiple personality disorder, with 
identities that only intermittently coalesce into a singularity.  Nonetheless, despite 
the technical inaccuracies of the descriptor, the ‘hivemind’ connotations it conjures 
up do go some way towards characterising the rather impressive feats of co-
ordination and single-mindedness they are capable of exhibiting. 
The apparently thousands-strong members of this so-called ‘superconsciousness’ 
use imageboards extensively to communicate and organise protest activities, as well 
as various Internet Relay Chat (IRC) networks and wikis, particularly Encyclopedia 
Dramatica (Davies 2008). They have also created a website (‘Why We Protest’), 
which focuses primarily on their protest activities against the Church of 
Scientology, and provides further forums for communication and mobilisation.  
Here, they provide a self-definition for their collective identity, which stresses the 
power they perceive themselves to hold in terms of their ubiquity and anonymity, 
and articulates their belief that their ideas and actions can influence society:  
 
We are a collection of individuals united by ideas. You likely know 
Anonymous, although you don't know exactly who we are. We are your 
brothers and sisters, your parents and children, your superiors and your 
underlings. We are the concerned citizens standing next to you. 
Anonymous is everywhere, yet nowhere. Our strength lies in our 
numbers. Our will as a whole is the combined will of individuals. Our 
greatest advantage is a knowledge of the fundamentals we share as 
human beings. This knowledge is a fruit of our anonymity… We are 
Anonymous. You can be Anonymous, too. Together, we can shape 
society. 
(‘Why We Protest’) 
 
Anonymous (or at least, various factions of Anonymous) have been involved in 
numerous instances of disruptive online activity, with the entity as a whole not 
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exhibiting any clear and unified political agenda.  Some of these actions have been 
little more than malicious trolling (activity and communication in online fora and 
communities intended to cause emotional upset or derail usual topics of discussion), 
such as the invasions and disruption of the teenage social networking site Habbo in 
2006 and 2007 (Singel 2008), and the ‘Youtube Porn Day’ on 20 May 2009, in 
which 4chan users flooded YouTube with pornography disguised as children’s 
videos (Cheng 2009).  However, other subsections of Anonymous have been 
involved with clearly articulated politically motivated counterpublic mobilisations, 
both offline and hacktivist.  As previously mentioned, these have been centrally 
concerned with the free flow of information online, and indeed, the group as a 
whole is increasingly known for this techno-political orientation; indeed, if there is 
one central or universal component of their claimed superconsciousness, it is their 
collective opposition to the curtailment of digital freedoms. 
 
9.1.1.2 Anonymous, activism, and hacktivism 
 
The most well-known and global of these activities, and of Anonymous’s activities 
overall, is their so-called ‘Project Chanology’, a protest movement against the 
Church of Scientology, which Anonymous perceives to be involved in Internet 
censorship, and see as a dangerous and repressive cult (‘Why We Protest’).  The 
movement began after the Church threatened YouTube with litigation based on 
copyright infringement after a video of actor and Scientologist, Tom Cruise, was 
leaked onto the website in January 2008, in which he vigorously extolled the virtues 
of the Church.  The video was part of a longer Church production, but they claimed 
that it had been pirated and edited so as to make it look like a piece of slightly 
lunatic propaganda. YouTube removed the video from their site in response to the 
threatened litigation (Vamosi 2008).  This prompted Anonymous to declare ‘war’ 
on the Church through a video response posted to YouTube on January 21 2008, 
which was followed by a campaign involving the defacement of various 
Scientology websites, ‘googlebombing’ to link Google searches for terms like 
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“dangerous cult” to the sites as search results, and virtual sit-ins and other forms of 
flood attacks, all intended to disrupt the Church’s online operations.  Aside from 
seeing the Church as a ‘dangerous cult’ involved in attempted Internet censorship, 
they also protest against its tax-exempt status, seeing it as an organisation that uses 
its members for financial gains, under the pretense of being a religious body 
(‘Project Chanology’).  Project Chanology was and is ongoing, but moved towards 
offline protest methods after the first month, with members of Anonymous regularly 
protesting outside various Scientology centres all over the world, many wearing the 
Guy Fawkes masks that have become emblematic of the group. Some of these 
simultaneous global protest dates have gathered up to 8000 protesters in over 50 
countries across the world (Ramadge 2008). 
They were also involved in a collaboration with the world’s largest torrent site, The 
Pirate Bay, creating the website Anonymous Iran (‘Anonymous Iran’), which 
provided support for Iranians protesting against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s alleged 
vote-rigging in the June 2009 Iranian Presidential election.  The site gave (and 
continues to give) these protesters tips on how to conduct online dealings 
anonymously, how to subvert the Iranian firewall and thus gain access to material 
banned by the government, how to launch various kinds of online hacktivism 
against pro-government websites, and also lists the best activist Twitter users 
(Schachtman 2009). Although the ‘Green Movement’ uprising appears to have been 
quashed, the site is still active, providing a forum for dialogue and solidarity 
between those in Iran and their supporters on the ‘outside’, as well as tools and 
information. 
Clearly, Anonymous is a many-feathered beast, capable of self-organising its 
diverse membership into a wide array of hacktivist counterpublics.  While these 
members are better described as hacker-programmers as opposed to artist-activists 
(Samuel 2004a), they have engaged in a wide range of activities that span both 
Costanza-Chock’s (2001) repertoire of electronic contention and Samuel’s 
hacktivist categories of political coding and political cracking, as well as engaging 
in traditional offline activism and non-political online mischief-making.  The fact 
that they are hacker-programmers coming together in a large online collective, 
utilising Mass Action forms of hacktivism such as virtual sit-ins (Jordan & Taylor 
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2004), which are generally used by performative hacktivists, but maintaining an 
outlaw orientation and using robust pseudonymity or anonymity, further highlights 
the permeability of Samuel’s (2004a) hacktivist typology.  While her matrix of 
origins and orientations and their related nymity practices appears to hold firm, the 
other variables of collaborative scope, collaborative size, and hacktivist forms are 
clearly (as she herself states) much more fluid, and if Anonymous is anything to go 
by, are only likely to become more so. 
Given that it is impossible to cover Anonymous’s many actions here, this chapter 
focuses in on one of their factional mobilisations into a hacktivist counterpublic. 
This counterpublicity took the form of a campaign against the Australian Labor 
government, and was in response to governmental plans to censor Australians’ 
Internet access.  It included both virtual sit-ins or DDoS attacks, as well as 
defacements, once again highlighting the permeability of Samuel’s typology.  For 
brevity’s sake, even though an undetermined faction of Anonymous as a whole 
effected this mobilisation, they will henceforth continue to be referred to as simply 
‘Anonymous’. 
 
9.1.2 Australian Internet censorship 
 
Before addressing the nature of Anonymous’s counterpublicity against the 
Australian Labor government’s plans for Internet censorship, it is useful to possess 
a brief understanding of these plans, and the problems with and wider opposition to 
them. 
Australia is the sole Western democratic state on the Reporters Sans Frontières’ list 
of ‘Internet Enemies’ and ‘Countries Under Surveillance’ (falling into the latter 
category) (‘Reporters Sans Frontières: Internet’).  As their website summarises, 
“[u]nder the guise of fighting child pornography, the government wants to set up a 
filtering system never before seen in a democracy” (ibid).  In 2008, the Federal 
Labor government, led by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, announced its plans to 
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undertake testing with the intent of eventually installing mandatory Internet filtering 
for all Australians.  This filter would be similar to those used in China and Iran, 
with a governmental ‘blacklist’ of banned sites being rendered inaccessible to 
Australian citizens.   
The primary legislation involved in this plan is the pre-existing Schedule 5 of the 
1992 Broadcasting Services Act, which currently vests the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) with the power to examine and rule 
on online materials using the film and video guidelines.  If the material is ‘refused 
classification’ under these guidelines (RC), and is hosted within Australia, the 
ACMA can order the material to be taken down.  If it is hosted elsewhere, the site is 
added to a blacklist enacted through ISP-level filters, with ISPs already being 
required to offer this filtering software to their customers (‘BSA 1992 Schedule 5’).  
In most parts of Australia, possessing (but not selling or distributing) RC material in 
film, publication or game form is completely legal  – only child pornography is (of 
course) illegal overall (National Classification Code 2005). 
However, the proposed new legislation, the existence of which was reaffirmed by 
Stephen Conroy (the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy and Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) on 15 December 
2009 (‘Measures to improve safety of the internet for families’), would require the 
mandatory implementation of this blacklist-based filter by all Australian ISPs, thus 
making accessing RC material online illegal, despite it being legal in offline forms.  
The blacklist itself is secret, comprised of the sites identified by the ACMA and the 
UK Internet Watch Foundation blacklist, thus total control over what Internet 
content Australian citizens are permitted access to would be held by a governmental 
agency (the ACMA) rather than a court, with no citizen consultation or transparency 
(‘Open Internet’). 
The scope of the proposed filtering is widespread – as is opposition to it.  While the 
stated primary purposes of the filter is to block access to child pornography and 
protect children online, the problem is that filtering will extend well beyond these 
aims: 
 
 289 
… thus creating an obvious potential for overblocking. Subjects such as 
aborigines, abortion, anorexia, or laws governing the sale of marijuana 
would all risk being filtered, as would media reports or medically 
related information on these subjects. 
(‘Reporters Sans Frontières: Australia’) 
 
 
Furthermore, the website Wikileaks (a site and project that Anonymous have 
increasingly exhibited ideological solidarity with, as evidenced buy their DDoS 
attacks against Visa and Mastercard following their involvement with denying 
Wikileaks monetary donations in 2010) published a ‘leaked’ copy of the blacklist in 
March 2009 (‘Australian government internet censorship blacklist’).  This showed 
that this ‘overblocking’ was indeed a problem, with some content on the blacklist 
not even being RC-rated material: 
 
…about half of the sites on the list are not related to child porn and 
include a slew of online poker sites, YouTube links, regular gay and 
straight porn sites, Wikipedia entries, euthanasia sites, websites of 
fringe religions such as satanic sites, fetish sites, Christian sites, the 
website of a tour operator and even a Queensland dentist. 
(Moses 2009) 
 
Concerns over the filters’ effects upon the Internet architecture and flow of 
information in general have also been raised, with some trials showing marked 
bandwidth flow performance and filtering accuracy errors (Jacobs 2008).  Other 
trials that Conroy claimed showed that filtering “can be done with 100 
percent accuracy and negligible impact on internet speed” (in Crozier et al 2009) 
were dismissed as lacking in any proper methodology or representativeness by 
expert Australian statisticians (Ramli 2009).  Furthermore (as has been argued in an 
independent expert report commissioned by the Howard government as well as a 
report commissioned by Conroy himself), much of the primary material purportedly 
targeted by the filter (child pornography) is located on peer-to-peer networks not 
covered by the filter, and filter circumvention software (similar to that created by 
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Hacktivismo) means that anyone truly dedicated to accessing such material is likely 
to be able to find a way to do so, filter or no (Sharp 2010; Moses 2008a). 
These issues, as well as more general objections to internet censorship of any kind, 
have informed widespread national and international opposition to the filter.  The 
US secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, spoke out about Internet censorship in 
January 2010, stating that it breached the (previously mentioned) UN Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (Hall 2010), and the Australian government has been 
specifically criticised as part of a wider global US diplomatic campaign against 
Internet censorship (Colgan & Elliott 2010; Sharp 2010).  This came shortly after 
Google expressed similar concerns, labeling the proposal “heavy handed” and 
stating they believe that “government should not have the right to block information 
which can inform debate of controversial issues” and that “exposing politically 
controversial topics for public debate is vital for democracy” (Flynn 2009). 
Electronic Frontiers Australia (‘EFA’), a non-governmental organisation 
representing citizens’ online liberties and rights, has consistently spoken out against 
the planned censorship, as has the similar Digital Liberty Coalition (‘DLC’) and the 
online political activism organisation GetUp! (‘GetUp’).  These three groups have 
collaborated and worked individually on a number of protest actions and 
organisation/mobilisation websites, including an Internet blackout campaign similar 
to that used by the CFF in the last week of January 2010 (‘The Great Australian 
Internet Blackout’) and online petitions. The three largest Australian ISPs have 
expressed disapproval of the planned legislature, on “technical, legal and ethical” 
grounds (Winterford & Hill 2008), with the managing director of one of them 
stating that Conroy “is the worst Communications Minister we've had in the 15 
years since the [internet] industry has existed” (Malone, in Moses 2008).  A number 
of opinion polls have also gauged wider public opinion on the filter as generally 
negative, especially amongst experienced Internet users and once respondents had 
been made aware of the limitations of the plans (Hearn 2010; LeMay 2010; Moses 
2009a); although it must be noted that there have also been polls which measured 
general approval for the proposed filter (‘Government websites hacked by 
Anonymous over censorship’). 
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9.2 Anonymous, Operation Didgeridie and Operation Titstorm 
 
Nevertheless, there is clearly ongoing and widespread opposition to the Australian 
Government’s proposed censorship plans.  However, Anonymous only entered this 
fray in late 2009 and early 2010, with two related instances of mobilisation into a 
hacktivist counterpublic.  Due to their dispersed nature and presence on a number of 
Internet fora or channels, as well as the fact that they mobilised twice, they left 
many traces of their organisational and mobilisational activity online.  However, 
given that our focus is on their external counterpublicity – that is, the elements of 
their mobilisation that effectively broke into a wider public of publics, the close 
analysis will centre on the central specially constructed text bearing their core 
‘intellectual ideology’, with this ideology propelled into this wider public through 
their hacktivism. 
 
9.2.1 Anonymous and Operation Didgeridie 
 
Their first hacktivist mobilisation occurred on 09 September 2009 with ‘Operation 
Didgeridie’, a multi-pronged event utilising virtual sit-ins and fax and email floods.  
It was organised using the usual Anonymous channels (IRC and imageboards), but 
planning and co-ordination details and flyers were also distributed on insurgen.info, 
a wiki used to organise what Anonymous refer to as ‘raids’ (hacktivism and general 
nuisance making) (‘Operation Didgeridie’), as well as another specially constructed 
website (09-09-2009.org, which is no longer online).  
The Operation Didgeridie page provided a detailed rationale for the proposed 
hacktivism, outlining the scope and nature of the planned Internet filter, and 
referring to the major tenets of the more widespread opposition to the filter.  The 
page explains that the filter will block “hundreds of legitimate sites” (including 
Encyclopedia Dramatica (ED), a satirical wiki much used by 4chan.org and 
 292 
Anonymous, thus cutting off Australian members of Anonymous from the rest of 
the global collective).  They also claimed that it would “slow down the Internet”, 
which runs in direct opposition to Anonymous’s constant assertions of the original 
hacker ethic that ‘information is free’.  Conroy (who Anonymous refer to 
irreverently as the “Minister of Interwebz Stuff”) is described as “a stupid 
overbearing religious fanatic”, and the government as “motherfucking censor-shits” 
who are worse than the Chinese government (perhaps the most widely criticised 
censorious regime), in that: 
 
NOT EVEN FUCKING CHINA HAVE BLACKLISTED ED!!! 
(‘Operation Didgeridie’) 
 
 
The site also reproduces a large body of text from the ‘No Clean Feed’ website 
created by EFA, which provides detailed information on and suggestions for actions 
against the proposed filter.  The material is bluntly identified as “shamelessly taken” 
from this site, and a hyperlink is provided, thus directing members of Anonymous 
to even more comprehensive information on the filter.  The reproduced text 
highlights the broad range of concerns in play - that it will lead to ‘overblocking’, 
and that the blacklist is secret, and is thus open to the perpetration of current and 
future free speech abuses by the government. It points out that no other democracy 
has a comparable scheme, and asks whether Australians really want their nation to:  
 
…join a censorship club in which Burma, China and North Korea are 
the founding members?  
(‘No Clean Feed: Learn’, as cited in ‘Operation Didgeridie’) 
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It also gives evidence that the filter will significantly slow down Australian Internet 
access; that it will not be able to block most of the content it is primarily intended to 
combat (such as child pornography); that it will be easily circumvented; that it is a 
waste of taxpayer money; and that it is not supported by the majority of Australians.  
This intertextuality and evidence of wider opposition to the filtering scheme 
provided support for the cause as a legitimate one, and presumably worked to 
garner stronger participation in the Operation from the wider Anonymous 
counterpublic. 
The importance of non-Australian members of Anonymous in the mobilisation is 
also stressed, through claims that if Australia enacts this legislation then the rest of 
the ‘free world’ may follow suit, thus affecting them all: 
 
YOU MIGHT SAY "YOU DONT CARE ABOUT AUSTRALIA" BUT 
IF THEY SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT IT IN AUSTRALIA USA 
WILL FOLLOW SUIT UNTIL ALL THE FREE WORLDS HAVE NO 
FREE INFORMATION. This is of the highest importance we must save 
the internet… if [the filter] is 'successful', then it may spread. 
(‘Operation Didgeridie’) 
 
The site also provided links to the specific virtual sit-in or DDoS software to be 
used, the URLs to be targeted (the Prime Minister’s website, the ACMA website, 
and Conroy’s Ministerial website) and the precise times for the attack (so as to 
ensure maximum critical mass).  It also provided instructions and contact numbers 
and addresses for fax and email floods, requesting that these channels be inundated 
with anti-censorship messages, as well as asking members to call talk-back radio 
stations to air their anti-censorship views (‘Operation Didgeridie’).  Much like the 
CFF’s website, the Operation Didgeridie site exhibits many of Stein’s identified 
communicative functions (2009), although it is not intended for a wider public of 
publics with the aim of growing the Anonymous counterpublic (like the CFF site), 
but rather to co-ordinate and mobilise pre-existing members of Anonymous.  It also 
once again illustrates the internal and external functions or orientations of 
counterpublics (Downey 2007), and the way in which counterpublics must 
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constantly work to negotiate and renegotiate their boundaries, thus generating a 
shared sense of investment and solidarity that can be translated into coordinated 
collective action. 
 
9.2.1.1 Text 
 
Operation Didgeridie was first publicly announced via YouTube on 08 August 2009 
(‘Message to the Australian Government’). This message was intended as a warning 
‘shot across the bows’, as is detailed on the Operation’s main page, which gave 
instructions to distribute the video link to media outlets to generate attention and 
thus hopefully provoke a response from the Australian government (‘Operation 
Didgeridie’).   If the government did not respond within the specified timeframe 
(which, unsurprisingly, they did not), then the instructions were to go ahead with 
the virtual sit-in and fax and email floods.  It is unlikely that any response from the 
government (let alone the meeting of Anonymous’s demands) was ever actually 
expected, and as such, the response window may be interpreted as primarily 
symbolic, providing an internal standard of behaviour for the counterpublic, and 
also giving them more time and a deadline within which to organise their hacktivist 
mobilisation and drum up publicity.  Indeed, Anonymous themselves describe the 
lack of response as “long-known” and “long-expected”, thus supporting this 
interpretation (‘Operation Didgeridie’).  The message text is reproduced below, 
with reference numbering. 
 
Hello, Kevin Rudd. We are Anonymous. We have been watching you. 
(1) 
 
It wasn't very long ago since you were elected, was it? The media hype 
surrounding your future government back in 2007 was incredible. Many 
of us Australians saw both you and Barack as beacons of potential to 
bring end to the conservative culture that currently swamps the USA 
and Australia. Many of us thought otherwise, and it turns out they were 
right. (2) 
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You, as a leader, have failed us. You are bringing an end to what is the 
greatest link between all people; the one thing that can cross all cultural 
boundaries, that can bring people together despite ethnicity, political or 
religious standings, class or nationality; the largest information transfer 
ever created. You, a democratically elected leader, have decided to do 
what only the most power-hungry of all tyrants dare: 
You have opted to censor the internet. (3) 
 
This is why we, Anonymous, have decided that this censorship plan 
should be among our primary targets for elimination. We have two 
demands that we consider central to our ideals: (4) 
 
Firstly: We demand the abolition of the censorship plan proposed by the 
current government. This includes the removal of all targets on the 
blacklist, and complete abandonment of any further plans and endeavors 
by the Australian Government to censor the internet. (5) 
 
Secondly: We demand the resignation of the Australian Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Stephen 
Conroy. This is a man who has no level of understanding of the topic he 
is dealing with. This is a man who readily supports the abolition of free 
speech in exchange for social security. This man and his policies go 
against everything Australia and the western world stand for. As we see 
it, Stephen Conroy is completely unsuitable of being a minister of 
Australia, and as such, we demand his dismissal. (6) 
 
Failure to meet these demands will result in our full-fledged wrath. This 
is not something you want to happen. (7) 
 
Anonymous is your final obstacle in this battle. We fight where no one 
else dares to fight. We ruin the lives of animal abusers and bring 
pedophiles to justice. We destroy the reputation of political and 
religious leaders alike. Our soldiers currently fight the cult of 
Scientology and the Iranian government. To us, you are just a step 
higher. We will create and make freely available methods to render your 
censorship plan useless, and let these methods be known to the entire 
Australian public by ways we will not reveal in this message. We will 
also leak updated versions of the blacklist as often as we can, ensuring 
that the people who voted you in know what is being withheld from 
them. (8) 
 
And as your people slowly begin to realize the veil that their own 
government is draping around them, they will realize that they voted a 
tyrant into power. 
This is when we will have succeeded in all our goals. (9) 
 
Information is free, Kevin. We, Anonymous, are not your friends. We 
are your doctors, your lawyers, your taxpayers, your brothers and 
sisters. We are everywhere. We may not be the best of people, but the 
one thing we will unceasingly fight for is the assertion that Information 
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is Free. (10) 
 
Heed our demands, Kevin. This is our nation which you encroach upon. 
These are uncharted waters for you and your colleagues. (11) 
 
Farewell. 
We are Anonymous.  
We are Legion.  
We do not forgive. We do not forget.  
We are not your friends. 
Expect us. (12) 
 
The video overlays time-lapse footage of clouds, the Anonymous iconography of a 
headless (and thus anonymous) business-suited figure (see Figure 9), as well as 
static images of Rudd and Conroy.  It is narrated by a computer-generated voice 
relaying a message directed at Rudd himself. The footage of clouds rushing 
overhead, the Anonymous businessman, and the robotic voice all contribute to their 
identification as an anonymous collective of faceless and nameless citizens – at no 
point do they show themselves as individuals.  This anonymous self-presentation 
works to establish an image of them as both ubiquitous and ephemeral – they are 
nowhere and everywhere all at once.  It also serves to underline the group’s self-
description as a kind of anti-individualistic hivemind – much like an ant colony, 
they would prefer we see them as a single entity rather than as networked 
individuals, with this image of mass singularity carrying more connotative weight 
and power than its networked counterpart.  Their constant and heavy usage of the 
pronouns “we”, “us” and “our”, as well as their identification as an “it” or a single 
object repetitively underlines this collective solidarity.   
Indeed, the only individuals shown are Rudd and Conroy, thus identifying them as 
the focus of the message and of Anonymous’s collective intellectual ideology 
concerning the planned censorship.  However, Prime Minister Rudd is unmistakably 
the primary intended recipient of the message. Anonymous hail him with “Hello”, a 
very personal and conversational form of address (1), and refer to him by his 
Christian and surnames throughout, rather than by his formal title, ‘The Honourable 
Kevin Rudd, MP’ (1, 10, 11).  This is arguably indicative of their lack of respect for 
him, in that they purposefully neglect to utilise his legal title, and instead address 
him as at least an equal, if not an inferior, if the rest of their missive is anything to 
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go by.  However, it is also possible to interpret this over-familiarity and pseudo-
friendliness as intended to connote a menacing proximity, particularly in 
combination with their self-presentation as ubiquitous and always observant.  
Whereas formal titles and forms of address establish hierarchies and distance, the 
combination of over-familiarity and menace serves to indicate that Rudd might be 
best to watch his back – indeed, as they later claim, their ranks could contain his 
neighbor, his doctor, or even his family. 
 
 
Figure 10: A screen capture from the 'Message to the Australian Government' 
video 
 
This direct, conversational tone is further highlighted through the use of a rhetorical 
question (2).  They state that they have been watching him since his election, where 
he was widely perceived as a “beacon of potential”, along with ‘Barack’ (who is 
also referred to colloquially rather than with honorary respect) (2).  They describe 
both leaders as ‘being seen’ by many citizens as capable of bringing an end to the 
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“conservative culture that currently swamps the USA and Australia” (rather than 
definitively being capable of this) – referencing a (partial) public impression of 
them as emblematic of a progressive, positive politics that will bring their nations 
up and out of the repressive quagmire of conservatism (a current political situation 
that is asserted as fact).  However, they then state that many of their members did 
not share this hope, implying that they were intelligent (or cynical) enough to pierce 
through a façade of political showmanship, before declaring that these suspicions 
did, indeed, ‘turn out’ to be well founded (2).  
They then detail the reasons for this warranted distrust, directly inform Rudd of the 
fact that he is a failed leader of democratic people (including “us”  - Anonymous) in 
that he is doing what “only the most power-hungry tyrants” do, and censoring the 
Internet.  They thus counterpoise Internet censorship with democracy, and link it 
(and Rudd) with totalitarianism (3), effectively negating his status as a democratic 
leader.  They describe the Internet factually as the ultimate unifying force, in that it 
is: 
 
the greatest link between all people; the one thing that can cross all 
cultural boundaries, that can bring people together despite ethnicity, 
political or religious standings, class or nationality; the largest 
information transfer ever created. (3) 
(‘Message to the Australian Government’) 
 
 
They constantly identify Rudd (“you”) as the active agent of this censorship, and 
indicate his actions are not forced but voluntary – he has “decided”, “opted” and 
‘dared’ to undertake a censorious regime (3), when he could have (and should have) 
decided otherwise.  Anonymous portray Rudd and his government as purposively 
eradicating this unifying force and sharing of information (3), willfully generating 
segregation and information poverty, by “draping a veil” around (9) and 
“encroaching” on the Australian Internet (11). This use of metaphor and the verb 
“encroach” suggests that Rudd is darkening and isolating Australia’s Internet 
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presence – the virtual Australia - and that he has no right to do so.  It is not his to 
manipulate as he wishes; it belongs to and is of the people, not to ‘leaders’ 
masquerading as democratic representatives.  This illegitimacy and lack of mandate 
is reinforced by the assertions that he is withholding information from those who 
voted for him (the wider public who collectively “own” him and his government, 
not the other way around) deceiving them into thinking they had voted a progressive 
leader into power when in actuality, they voted for a “tyrant” (9).  His actions are 
thus doubly subversive – it is not only what he is doing, but also the way he is doing 
it that runs counter to democracy. Anonymously constantly reiterate throughout (via 
onscreen text) that “it does not like” what it is currently seeing, repetitively 
underlining their unified deep disapproval of Rudd’s actions.  Their use of the 
personal pronoun ‘it’ serves to further underline both their anonymous and unitary 
nature.   
Anonymous state that this extremely negative state of affairs has thus become one 
of their “primary targets for elimination”, thus informing us that they have several 
other ongoing engagements, and referencing their wider industriousness and 
interests. They declare that have two related demands that they see as central to 
their anti-censorship ideology (4).  Their use of the imperative mood - demanding 
rather than asking - is an aggressive discursive move, implying that they feel their 
cause is strong enough and they possess enough power to be in a position to make 
such demands.  This is, of course, not actually the case – their status and history as 
hacktivists, and therefore capable of disruption, but not actually holding any 
institutional authority or coercive power over the government, renders their 
demands infelicitous (Austin 1962).  They are knowingly void performatives, 
carrying more of a symbolic than authoritative load.  They are intended to express 
further components of Anonymous’s intellectual ideology, and to generate an 
impression of authority or clout, without actually holding or generating the power 
necessary for their fulfillment. 
Their first demand is that the planned filter is not just toned down or tweaked, but is 
utterly “abolished”, or eradicated, and that all future plans for censorship are 
“completely abandoned” (5).  There are to be no half measures here; they see 
Internet censorship of any kind as utterly and always objectionable.  Second, they 
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demand that Conroy either resign or be dismissed from his ministerial position, 
signaling that they do not care how it happens, they just want him out of his office.  
They depict him as utterly ignorant, with “no level of understanding of the topic he 
is dealing with” and as being completely out of his depth – he does not understand 
the Internet or technical issues well enough to be attempting to enact its censorship 
(6).  He will not only exchange free speech for “social security”, but also do so 
“readily”, or eagerly, privileging stability over democratic ideals (6).  This 
statement brings to mind xxxs quote etc etc. He thus goes against all the ideals of 
Australia and the Western world, implying that he is more suited to authoritarian 
non-Western regimes such as China or Iran. When combined with these assertions, 
their repetitive use of the objectifying pronominal phrase “this is a man” in serves to 
amplify their distaste for him – he seems to be barely seen as human (6), and one 
can practically hear the contempt in their voices.  All these declarations (like those 
pertaining to Rudd) use no modality whatsoever – they are asserted as simple fact or 
truth.  The only non-factual statement is that Anonymous perceive or “see” Conroy 
as “completely unsuitable” for his Australian ministerial role, rather than asserting 
that he actually is unsuitable, but this perception is tied in to their previous factual 
declarations and their wider rationale for the necessity of  his removal (6).   
They go on to promise that failing to meet these demands will result in their ‘full-
fledged wrath” (7), which is warned of as something Rudd should wish to avoid as 
being akin to “uncharted waters”, and thus unfamiliar and potentially dangerous 
(11).  In doing so, they call to mind the world maps of antiquity that populated the 
then-unexplored oceanic regions with fabulous and terrifying creatures and the 
associated warnings that ‘here be monsters’.  The obvious deduction is that they are 
the beasts lurking within the unknown depths that the Prime Minister is already 
dipping his toes in, and that he would do well to retreat while he still has the chance.   
They also describe themselves as a “final obstacle” in Rudd’s battle, indicating that 
they realise he has already faced widespread opposition to his plans, but has 
traversed (or ignored) these previous obstacles (8).  However, he is now faced with 
an unmovable and ubiquitous mass of anonymous citizens from all walks of life, 
including such reputable professionals as doctors and lawyers, therefore they should 
be taken seriously, as a sample of respectable society, rather than being dismissed as 
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a fringe group (10).  They “are everywhere”, are as close at hand as his brothers and 
sisters, and they pay the taxes that fund government activity, thus have the right to 
voice their opposition – indeed, they are Rudd’s employers or superiors, despite his 
behaviour (10).  This characterisation and connotations of enemy infiltration ties in 
with the menacing familiarity of their casual mode of address – Rudd had best 
watch his back as they may already have him surrounded.  They go on to describe 
themselves as “Legion”, an archaic mass noun with militaristic overtones raised to 
proper noun status through capitalisation, thus further emphasising the magnitude, 
strength and internal cohesiveness of their counterpublicity (12), and continuing the 
connotations of warfare.  They neither forgive nor forget (12), but instead remain 
ever-vigilant – not only do they see themselves as a superconsciousness, they also 
as a kind of superconscience, monitoring society and keeping a track record of 
wrongs committed.  They will never give up fighting for their core ideal of 
informational freedom (10), and they are most certainly not Rudd’s friends (10, 12); 
rather, they constitute a formidable and persistent adversary.   
They describe themselves factually and actively as “fighting where no one else 
dares to”, “ruining” the lives of animals abusers and paedophiles (in reference to 
some of their past actions, where they posted the contact details of such individuals 
online), and “destroying” the reputations of political and religious leaders (with a 
clear reference to their anti-Scientology efforts).  Indeed, they describe themselves 
as “soldiers” in the fight against Scientology and the Iranian government, both of 
whom are also perceived as engaging in Internet censorship (8).  They clearly see 
themselves as involved in martial struggles against negative forces, with Rudd and 
his government being just one more, albeit slightly more powerful iteration of 
wickedness that they must overcome. The Australian government is thus implicitly 
equated to these other negative actors; indeed, they are not only as bad as 
paedophiles and authoritarian regimes, they are worse (presumably because they 
masquerade as a democratic entity). 
Interestingly, their use of violently negative vocabulary to describe their 
involvement in this struggle has the effect of undermining the positivity of their 
self-presentation. This implicit recognition of their reputation for mischief and 
unpleasantness, even if they are fighting for a greater good, is underlined by their 
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self-admission that they “may not be the best of people” (10).  They actively seek to 
establish themselves as a threat to the stability of the government and its censorship 
regime, drawing upon and even exaggerating their past actions and reputation, and 
promising that they will expose the Rudd government for the anti-democratic, 
deceptive and repressive force that it is (9), as well as creating and distributing 
software that will render any censorship actually undertaken impotent (8).  They 
underline the imminence of these actions with their parting message to “expect us” 
(12).  They take themselves rather seriously, as is evidenced through their formal 
and stylised self-presentation, as well as their use of archaic formal vocabulary such 
as “legion”, “heed” and “farewell” (11, 12). They desire that Rudd do the same, 
warning that he should take their demands seriously, and let the hacker ethic of 
information freedom prevail (10) – or else.  They see the Australian Internet as 
“their nation” (11) – a domain that belongs to citizens - thus further characterising 
governmental plans for censorship as illegitimate, and once more accentuating their 
claims to both represent and be constituted by ‘the everyman’ living next door, 
taking our blood pressure, or even sitting across from us at the breakfast table. 
Anonymous thus use their video to comprehensively characterise Internet 
censorship and its agents in a deeply negative manner.  The entire text is a concerted 
and strongly worded threat to the face of the government and its leaders – their 
actions are portrayed as deeply undemocratic and reprehensible, and worthy of no 
respect or obedience whatsoever.  However, unlike the CFF and Hacktivismo, 
Anonymous are less concerned about how they themselves are perceived – they 
recognise that their reputation as not always politically-motivated trouble-makers 
may precede them, and seek to counteract any criticism along these lines by actively 
conceding their imperfections.  They are content with establishing their motives in 
this instance as honourable, in that they are opposed to the destructive plans of the 
Australian government, and indeed, use the knowledge of their previous actions and 
aggressive self-description to imply that they are a dissenting force that should not 
be taken lightly.  They have already proved that they are capable of causing 
disruption, and essentially promise to focus these disruptive capabilities on the 
Australian government unless Conroy and the proposed filter are abolished. 
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9.2.2 Anonymous’s constellation of publics 
 
9.2.2.1 The Australian Government 
 
Once more, we can understand Anonymous as existing within a wider constellation 
of publics and counterpublics.  The dominant public against which Anonymous 
direct their counterpublicity is clearly that of the Australian government, 
spearheaded by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Minister Stephen Conroy.  While 
Anonymous are principally opposed to the Internet filter itself (as part of a broader 
opposition to Internet censorship of any kind), the government, and Rudd and 
Conroy in particular, are seen as the active agents of this proposed censorship, and 
are thus inherently bound up with the censorship itself.  The Australian ISPs who 
have voluntarily adopted the filter, as well as all those technology firms involved 
with trials and the planned implementation of the filter, may be seen as 
collaborating with the government in this planned censorship.  Although Google 
publicly opposed the filter on principle (despite their long-standing and only 
recently terminated kowtowing to the Chinese government’s demands that they 
censor their search functionality within mainland China), the filter is no threat to 
established economic interests, and indeed, its installation would prove profitable to 
those corporations involved in its installation.  Once again, the intersection of 
established political and economic interests and complicity creates a power bloc 
capable of overriding the principles of the freedom of speech and information in the 
online domain. 
As in the case of the CFF, the government is perceived as a pseudopublic, 
displaying politics and its political intentions in front of Australian citizens but not 
facilitating or taking any notice of these citizens’ attempts at ongoing participation 
in the political process. They are seen as undertaking a political project for which 
they have no mandate and which itself is inherently antidemocratic, and misleading 
the citizens they are ideally supposed to be democratically responsive to and thus 
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representative of.  Indeed, despite the fact that they should be honestly serving the 
citizens who voted them in and pay their salaries, they are instead maintaining that 
the proposed filter is for ‘their own good’, when in fact, it is likely to have 
widespread and significantly negative immediate effects upon them, and open up 
future possibilities for further governmental abuses of free speech.  Furthermore, 
they continue to display these political intentions in the face of widespread and 
significant opposition to the censorship, ignoring numerous national and 
international good arguments and advice regarding the many harmful likely 
outcomes of installing the filter, and persisting with their plans regardless – thus 
exposing the limits of the rational-critical Habermasian public sphere.  Indeed, they 
are the epitome of a pseudopublic – they claim to speak for their members, but are 
in fact, entirely unresponsive and uninterested in any opinions but their own, despite 
the transmission of widespread dissent from the periphery of society towards their 
governmental core.  Cracks in their hegemony have certainly emerged (Downey and 
Fenton 2002), but it would seem that the preceding instances of rational-critical 
deliberation and dissent have failed to truly exploit these fissures and exploit them 
to their fullest extent. 
 
9.2.2.2 Networked counter/publics 
 
As in the previous two cases, the Anonymous counterpublic is also oriented towards 
an interpublic engagement with a wider public of publics, primarily Australian, but 
also international when and where possible.  They aspire to incite a wider discourse 
about the proposed Internet filter, and about the behaviour of the Australian 
government as a dominant public, and to have more citizens join the debate about 
internet censorship both in Australia and generally.  They clearly see their role as 
educators, as is shown by their statements about exposing the government’s anti-
democratic betrayal of the “people” and the “Australian public” (‘Message to the 
Australian government’).  As in the previous cases, their counterpublicity is 
intended to be viral, provoking widespread preference reflection about the proposed 
 305 
filter that will hopefully transform into preference alteration, and thus a generate a 
wider oppositional counterpublicity oriented towards the government.  They do not 
necessarily want more citizens to join the Anonymous counterpublic – indeed, 
many citizens would not be interested in, capable of, or even approve of engaging in 
the day-to-day or occasional hacktivist activities of Anonymous.  However, 
Anonymous hope to inspire the creation of new anti-filter counterpublics or for new 
members to join the existing counterpublics constituted by activist groups such as 
Get Up! and the EFA.  The resonances between these groups and their discursive 
dissent generate discursive chains of equivalence, thus instantiating a discursively 
networked and collectively powerful public of counterpublics capable of fulfilling 
Downey and Fenton’s expectations (2002), and exploiting or enlarging the existing 
fractures in the hegemony of the Australia government, hopefully bringing them to 
a state of total hegemonic destabilisation or crisis. 
Indeed, they recognise that they are already part of such a modular network (Keane 
2000) of counterpublics, as is evidenced through their reproduction of the anti-filter 
arguments from the EFA website (‘No Clean Feed’).  They utilise this borrowed 
discourse or intertextuality to both enrich their own internal solidarity and help 
inform their external counterpublic mobilisation, as well as establish a state of 
inter(counter)publicity via discursive resonance.  Their hacktivism is therefore also 
intended to show solidarity with as well as gain wider externally-oriented publicity 
for this wider network of counterpublics, thus amplifying their collective discursive 
dissent.  In fact, these feelings of solidarity are evidenced by a link posted on the 
Operation Didgeridie website after the Operation itself had occurred.  The link is to 
a YouTube video summarising an anti-censorship campaign (as well as wider 
instances of criticism of the filter) built around an advertisement created by the 
GetUp!, which parodies the leading toothpaste brand name ‘Sensodyne’ (‘Internet 
Censorship Australia’).  The ad, which spread virally through Twitter (Moses 
2009d), ‘sells’ a fictional toothpaste named ‘Censordyne’ which claims to offer 
“unproven, ineffective relief from Internet nasties” and a “fresh multimillion-dollar 
flavour”, as well as prevent the dreaded “fast Internet”.  The videolink on the 
Anonymous website is accompanied by a rather jubilant message claiming that 
“Australia has received major attention from our project” (referring to the media 
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coverage of Operation Didgeridie) and expressing approval that ‘they’ (the rest of 
Australia) are “taking a stand on their own!” (‘Operation Didgeridie’). 
 
 
9.2.3 Operation Didgeridie goes ahead 
 
Although Anonymous’s ‘Message to the Australian Government’ was given little 
attention during the month preceding the hacktivism itself, the eventual Operation, 
carried out on 9 September, served to propel its message into the wider public, 
through the media attention the hacktivism garnered.  The video was not always 
referenced directly, but various other statements made by Anonymous, reiterating 
its core messages and tenets of their intellectual ideology (such as online flyers) 
were reproduced in the media coverage of their hacktivism.  Although the Prime 
Ministerial (pm.gov.au) and ACMA (acma.gov.au) websites were, by all accounts, 
only overwhelmed by the virtual sit-in for a few hours at the most, and there was no 
mention of the fax and email floods, the operation received widespread media 
attention.  Articles about the hacktivism were syndicated through many regional 
Australian newspapers and news websites, primarily through the national news 
agency, the Australian Associated Press (‘PM’s website hacked’).  The event was 
covered by ninemsn.com (‘Anonymous hacks PM’s website’), News.com.au 
(‘Kevin Rudd’s website hacked over Internet censorship’), The Sydney Morning 
Herald (Moses 2009b) and The Age (Flower 2009) online, which regularly rank as 
the top Australian news websites according to Alexa (‘Top Sites in Australia), and 
was also reproduced in New Zealand on the Stuff.co.nz website (‘Aussie PM’s 
website hacked by protester’).  It also received television coverage on ABC News 
(‘Rudd website attacked in filter protest’), 7 Network News (‘Website hacked’), and 
Sky News (‘PM’s website hacked’), with the video being given considerable airtime 
in some cases, and was covered internationally by the popular online technology 
magazine Wired (Zetter 2009) and the online edition of the German magazine Der 
Spiegel, one of Europe’s largest publications (Patalong 2009). 
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While the coverage often noted the illegality of the attacks and was critical of both 
the methods used to distribute Anonymous’s intellectual ideology and some of the 
group’s past actions, their anti-censorship message was often given support or 
acknowledged as a valid argument.  Some (although generally those from less 
mainstream publications) even went so far as to suggest that Anonymous (whatever 
their methods and reputation) were, on balance, less reprehensible than the Rudd 
government; with the following quote being exemplary of such less common but 
nonetheless extant opinions: 
 
I legally can’t say I’m in favor of what Anonymous is doing here, and I 
won’t be participating in the raid, however there will be many who 
support any effort to highlight the Australian Government’s attempt to 
introduce Chinese style censorship in a country that is suppose to be 
democratic and free.  
The means used here are illegal, but likewise so should any attempt to 
censor free speech in Australia be as well; Anonymous are no more 
criminals morally than the Rudd Government and Stephen Conroy are, 
and I wouldn’t be the only person to suggest that Rudd and Conroy are 
the bigger criminals in this case.  
(Riley 2009a) 
 
 
9.2.4 Anonymous and Operation Titstorm: A follow-up campaign 
 
However, despite this coverage, Anonymous did not feel that Operation Didgeridie 
had been appropriately successful, in that the sites were brought down for so short a 
time. In an IRC discussion held during the sit-in, Anonymous members involved 
called it a failure in this sense, although they were happy with the media attention it 
received (Moses 2009b).  As such, they indicated their plans for a second round of 
hacktivism shortly after Operation Didgeridie ended (Moses 2009c). 
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This second counterpublic mobilisation occurred 10 February 2010, and appears to 
have been organised using the usual Anonymous communicative fora such as 
imageboards and IRC channels, but it was also discussed in a thread on the primary 
Anonymous website (‘Operation Titstorm: Why We Protest’).  The planning was 
much more decentralised, with no evidence of a central website being used; instead, 
online flyers coordinating the event were disseminated using pre-existing channels 
of communication between Anonymous members (see Figure 10).  The event built 
upon the expression of their intellectual ideology already generated by the YouTube 
video, but also responded to further developments to the governmental censorship 
regime.   
 
 
Figure 11: The primary online flyer used to mobilise Operation Titstorm 
 
This second instance of hacktivist counterpublicity, dubbed ‘Operation Titstorm’, 
appears to have been catalysed by accusations made by the Australian Sex Party 
(ASP). The ASP were formed in 2008 and run on a policy platform comprised in 
large part of opposition to the proposed filter, as well as policies of general 
tolerance of free sexual speech and expression, including gender and sexuality 
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equality, which they see as “hallmarks of free and democratic nations” (‘Australian 
Sex Party Policies’).  Conroy has banned access to the ASP website from within 
several governmental departments, including his own, with the ASP criticising these 
bans as unconstitutional and an “anti-democratic way of conducting debate”, to no 
effect (Ozimek 2010). 
In a press release dated 27 January 2010, the ASP revealed that under governmental 
direction, the ACMA was beginning to refuse to classify pornography depicting 
female ejaculation and involving small-breasted women. The application of the RC 
status is based on claims that the ejaculation is actually urination (which is banned 
under the classification guidelines), despite increasing scientific study of the 
phenomena and evidence to the contrary (as cited by the ASP), or on claims that it 
is ‘abhorrent’ (with male ejaculation eliciting no such reaction).  The refusal to 
classify pornography involving small-breasted women stems from unclear 
classifications guidelines which state that pornography involving persons who 
“appear to be” underage must be refused classification, resulting in pornographic 
films involving women (established by mandatory FBI regulation to be well over 
18) “being banned because they have an A cup size” (Patten 2010).  The leader of 
the ASP argues that: 
 
Australian culture [is] being dumbed down in the sexual department and 
that political leaders [are] actively propagating an increasingly narrow 
window of acceptable sexual acts and cultures… all new appointees to 
the Classification Board and the Classification Review Board should 
undergo a short course in the latest scientific developments around 
sexuality and some sort of biology course to bring them up to date with 
the broad range of acceptable adult sexuality and body types. 
(Patten 2010) 
 
There is some confusion over whether this statement and its resulting viral 
transmission around the Internet was particularly well-founded, or more the result 
of a kind of inverted moral panic stemming from the wider climate of opposition to 
the filter (Brown 2010), but it certainly caught the eye of Anonymous, whose 
members, as previously mentioned, interact on websites and fora often filled with 
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pornography of all kinds.  The bans were seen as further evidence of the extension 
of the filter well beyond its stated aims of eliminating child pornography, and 
‘making a mockery’ of filtering trials involving only a small ACMA blacklist, as 
the change in classification trends would potentially add millions of sites to the list, 
a concern when bandwidth has been established to slow in direct proportion to the 
number of sites blocked (Riley 2010a). 
Rather than once more releasing a video warning indicating a month’s period of 
grace to reconsider, Anonymous emailed a press release to Australian journalists 
and news websites the day before the planned mobilisation, apparently adjusting to 
the rapidity of the news cycle and presumably learning from their previous decision 
to give the Australian government a chance to respond.   The release was addressed 
to “Australian Governmental officials, Members of Local and International Press, 
and the General Public”, and was sent on behalf of Anonymous as a whole, with the 
usual collective pronoun “we” utilised throughout.  It was reproduced in part (and 
occasionally in full; see Braue 2010) by various news reports prior to, during, and 
after the ensuing hacktivism, and drew strongly upon their central ideology, as 
already expressed in the previous ‘Message to the Australian Government’.  
However, it also added in new criticisms related to the recent trend in pornography 
classification. 
Anonymous again reiterated that they had been closely monitoring the activities of 
the Australian government over the last few years, “with particular focus on its 
stance towards Internet censorship”.  They declared that Australia’s laws on Internet 
censorship were “already amongst the most restrictive in the western world”, and 
that the government already filtered more content than “any other Parliamentary 
Democracy”.  They implied that Conroy’s proposal to legislate mandatory national 
ISP filtering (with the goal being to prevent Australians from viewing “illegal and 
unwanted content”) was evidence that he and “other elements within the 
Government” felt that they had not yet strayed far enough from democratic norms 
and the customary behaviours of other Western democracies. 
Anonymous declared their concerns with the proposed legislature to be “two-fold”.  
The first of their stated concerns was that Conroy’s utilisation of the term 
“unwanted content” is “completely unacceptable” due to its ambiguity, with the 
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only possible interpretation of it simply being content that Conroy and the 
government do not want to be seen.  This kind of ambiguously defined censorship 
based on complete governmental control is described as intolerable behaviour by 
any government, let alone a democratic one, with the release stating that “[n]o 
government should have the right to refuse its citizens access to information solely 
because they perceive it to be ‘unwanted’”. 
Their second and ‘more important’ concern was with the “steps already taken by the 
Australian government to control what their populous [sic] sees”, with specific 
reference to the recent furor over the refusal to classify pornography involving 
small-breasted women.  Drawing on statements made by the ASP, they argue that 
classification officials are utilising ambiguous legislative wording to conflate 
legitimate and legal pornography with child pornography, and thus add this legal 
pornography to the filter blacklist.  Echoing the ASP press release, they state that: 
 
Officials cannot claim that they believe the models in these movies are 
in fact underage, as the production the titles that have been affected are 
heavily regulated to ensure the age of the models. 
(Anonymous, in Braue 2010) 
 
 
They go on to raise the point that “this censorship of a natural body type” may have 
negative repercussions upon the self-image of Australian women (a concern that 
one cannot help but take with a grain of salt), but are honest in stating that their 
main concern is that the Australian government is trying to “mess with [their] 
porn”.  This is, of course, an unacceptable restriction to the free and unhindered 
flow of information online, and they will ensure that the government “will learn” 
that this is the case.  The press release ends with the usual Anonymous signature, 
that: 
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We are Legion.  
We do not Forgive.  
We do not Forget. 
Expect us. 
(Anonymous, in Braue 2010) 
 
 
Given their past hacktivism against the Australian government and the 
dissemination of a flyer coordinating the event for the following day, this promise 
of further action was taken seriously by the government and the media, and served 
to build considerable publicity for the actual mobilisation.  As promised, February 
10 saw several governmental websites once again knocked offline by what appears 
to have been a mixture of virtual sit-in style tactics and server-side DDoS attacks, 
although the exact nature of the event is somewhat unclear.  The information 
technology site The Register commented that the magnitude of the attacks was 
relatively low, and that they therefore appeared to be “hand-cranked rather than 
launched through zombie networks of compromised machines” (i.e. virtual sit-ins 
rather than server-side DDoS utilising botnets) (Leyden 2010a).  However, other 
sources, including the Operation’s discussion channel on the ‘Why We Protest’ site 
(‘Operation Titstorm – Why We Protest’), cite extremely large numbers of page hits 
per second, and refer to the use of botnets in the attack (Johnston 2010, Zorz 2010). 
Whatever the methods, the attacks were successful in overwhelming several 
governmental websites for a much longer period than during the previous Operation 
Didgeridie. The websites for the Australian Parliament House (APH) 
(www.aph.gov.au), the main Australian governmental website 
(www.australia.gov.au) and Communications Minister Stephen Conroy’s 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy website 
(www.dbcde.gov.au) were knocked comprehensively offline for an extended period, 
and the APH site continued to drop intermittently offline throughout the day and 
was very slow to load when it was actually online (Riley 2010, 2010a).  Kevin 
Rudd’s website was reportedly defaced with pornography (Marks 2010), a wide 
range of government servers were “flooded with traffic”, and various emails 
addresses within the Department of Parliamentary Services were also heavily 
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spammed with pornographic images and text (Davis 2010; Marks 2010; Moses 
2010).   
Although aware of the exact nature and timing of the disruptions, government 
officials were nonetheless powerless to prevent them, with their only strategy being 
to wait for the ‘storm’ to pass.  A spokesperson for the Department of Parliamentary 
Services stated that “[o]ur objective has simply been to bring the site back into 
operation after the attack.  They can’t last forever” (in Zorz 2010).  This was of 
course true; however, the APH website continued to be unavailable for most of the 
following two days (Davis 2010), with an Anonymous spokesperson going by the 
moniker ‘Coldblood’ stating that the action would continue until the group 
collectively decided it had gone on long enough: 
 
I believe that the government websites will remain down as long as we 
can keep them down. That could be anywhere from a few hours to a few 
months at the most… [the campaign will last] as long as the individuals 
that make up Anonymous decide that action needs to be taken to protect 
the freedom of the internet. 
(Anonymous spokesperson ‘Coldblood’, in ‘Australia cyber-attacks 
could last ‘months’: hackers’) 
 
 
The attacks once again garnered widespread national and international media 
coverage.  The Sydney Morning Herald gave extensive online exposure to the story 
(‘Australia cyber attacks could last 'months': hackers’; Davis 2010; Moses 2010), 
and Asher Moses’ series of articles were syndicated throughout several Australian 
news sites and were also carried by the New Zealand news site Stuff.co.nz (Moses 
2010a). The Australian newspaper website (‘Hackers ‘titstorm’ the PM and 
Parliament House’), ninemsn.com (‘Anonymous brings down government 
websites’), ABC News (‘Pro-porn protestors target government websites’) and 
News.com.au (‘Government websites hacked by Anonymous over censorship’) also 
provided the Operation with national media attention, as did a wide range of blogs.  
Internationally, it was covered by several technology and computer security sites, 
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including The Inquisitr (Riley 2010; 2010a), The Register (Leyden 2010; 2010a), 
Ars Technica (Cheng 2010), ZDNet (Ho 2010), and Wired (Kravets 2010), and was 
also covered by the American Broadcasting Corporation (‘Hackers disrupt 
Australian Government websites’), The Independent (Marks 2010) and multiple 
times by the BBC (‘Australia websites hacked in porn filter protest’;  ‘Political 
hacktivists turn to web attacks’; Vallance 2010). 
Although much of this coverage once again included criticisms of both Anonymous 
and their methods issued by both governmental officials and anti-
governmental/anti-censorship bodies such as the EFA (e.g. Crozier 2010; Moses 
2010), it did once again draw considerable public attention to the issue of Australian 
internet censorship and to the wider opposition to the government’s plans.  Media 
statements made by a spokesperson or several spokespeople for Anonymous 
articulated their belief in the effectiveness of the mediated counterpublicity 
generated by the attacks: 
 
“Maybe some people think the attacks are juvenile but it makes more of 
a message then signing a petition as the attacks cannot be ignored”… 
They said the aim of the attack was to make governments everywhere 
aware that they “can not mess with the internet and not have a backlash” 
(LeMay 2010a) 
 
 
The goal of today's attacks was to show the Australian Government that 
we are not afraid to act, and to raise awareness of the issue of internet 
censorship and our group's dedication to fighting it… Myself and the 
other protesters are quite satisfied with the results of our initial attacks.  
(Anonymous spokesperson, in ‘Pro-porn protestors target government 
websites’) 
 
 
[The campaign] allows us to impact something as large as a government 
with a handful of people… Going through the official channels you just 
get pushed aside, this way they have to listen…I believe it won't 
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completely get the government to remove the filter they are planning on, 
but as long as something changes - for example the list (of banned sites) 
being made public - we will have succeeded anyway. 
(Anonymous spokesperson ‘Coldblood’, in ‘Australia cyber-attacks 
could last ‘months’: hackers’) 
 
 
However, the spokesperson also stated that “the best thing the broader Australian 
public could do to protest against the filter was to sign the petition of Electronic 
Frontiers Australia and tell government officials that they disagreed with the policy” 
(LeMay 2010a), thus extending or underlining the counterpublicity of Anonymous’s 
actions.  This once more signals their recognition of their place within discursively 
networked public of counterpublics, and the increased counterhegemonic strength 
associated with such ‘chains of equivalence’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). 
As in the case of Project Chanology, Anonymous intended to move towards offline 
protests in the week following Operation Titstorm, attempting to capitalise on the 
publicity garnered through their hacktivism and to gain wider participation in their 
counterpublicity. This activity was dubbed Project Freeweb, and was intended to 
provide a chance for Anonymous members all over the world to take their 
opposition to internet censorship to the streets.  As Project Freeweb’s organisation 
page made clear, Anonymous are extremely cognizant of the necessity for 
successful counterpublicity to interact with the mainstream media, with a 
spokesperson thating that Operation Titstorm was: 
 
…aimed at disrupting Australian government websites related to 
Conroy's little project in order to get the media and general publics' 
attention. This has been very effective tactic for Anon in the past and 
has once again paid off big-time for the mission, garnering hundreds of 
additional troops for Project Freeweb and generating an abundance of 
news stories in national and international media along with mostly 
unanimous support from citizen journalists in the blogosphere.  
(‘Project Freeweb’) 
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The Project Freeweb street protests were held all over Australia on 20 February 
2010, but were not well attended (at least when compared with offline protests for 
Project Chanology).  However, given that these protests were apparently a 
secondary addition to the media attention previously gained by Operations 
Didgeridie and Titstorm, it is perhaps hardly surprising that (as the organisation 
website put it in typical Anonymous tone), “[n]obody showed up and those that did 
fucked off to the pub within the first hour.” (‘Project Freeweb’). 
 
 
9.3 Access and control 
 
 
Clearly, the discursive form of Anonymous’s counterpublicity echoed the 
impoliteness inherent in the content of their discourse.  Their disruptive and illegal 
political cracking-based Operations served to propel their intellectual ideology and 
its deliberate threat to the face of the Labor government into a much wider 
discursive arena than that provided by the usual channels of political dissent.  It also 
served to amplify this ideology and its impoliteness by exposing the government as 
technologically inept, as well as giving them what might be best described as a taste 
of their own proposed medicine – effectively temporarily filtering their online 
presence out of existence.  This rejection of the usual rational-critical rules and 
modes of political dissent vigorously challenged the apparent power and control of 
the governmental pseudopublic, thus subverting the usual patterns of access to 
important discursive channels and modes, and the power inherent within them.  This 
counterpublicity was oriented towards provoking widespread political preference 
reflection and alteration, thus generating the registration of widespread anti-filter 
sentiment through more lawful communicative channels.  It was also intended to 
show solidarity with the various other counterpublics involved in anti-filter protests, 
despite several of these counterpublics disapproving of Anonymous’ methods. 
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9.3.1 Bypassing and manipulating the usual modes of communicative 
dissent to legislative changes 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the usual modes of communicative dissent to 
legislative changes proposed by national governments (including voting, select 
committee submissions where available, and petitions) are fractured with problems. 
Their central failing is that they cumulatively advantage pre-existing power elites or 
dominant publics.  Like the CFF’s Internet Blackout, Anonymous’s Operations 
generated their own highly public and non-externally mandated expressions of 
counterpublicity, simultaneously bypassing and manipulating these usual channels 
of dissent. They utilised various forms of hacktivism to generate this uncontrolled 
discursive counterpublicity, thus regaining control over all the levels of access to 
discourse, from planning through to the scope of their audience.  By pre-alerting the 
news media to their planned Operations, they established a channel of access to a 
wide national and international audience for their intellectual ideology (albeit an 
audience somewhat contingent upon the overall success of their hacktivism).  The 
launching of the ideology or discursive content of their hacktivism was contingent 
upon the success of its form, with success measurable by the magnitude of 
disruption and therefore media coverage.   
Although Operation Didgeridie was only mildly successful in terms of disrupting 
the governmental websites it targeted, it was enough to ensure media coverage of 
the event, and thus effect the dissemination of Anonymous’s message.  The 
discursive content of their counterpublicity was launched into wider circulation by 
the DDoS attacks, with the form of the hacktivism itself underlining their ideology.  
Through knocking the governmental websites offline, even if only for an hour or so, 
Anonymous caused the government to appear technologically inept, in that they 
were unable to defend themselves from such attacks.  The implication was that if 
they were incapable of defending themselves from such disruptions, how could they 
possible be entrusted with the administration and installation of a national Internet 
filtering system?  Furthermore, if their governmental websites are so susceptible to 
such disruption, how reliable is such a system likely to be – surely it will be as 
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easily circumvented?  Moreover, Anonymous’s attacks effectively gave the 
government a taste of their own proposed medicine – effectively blacklisting the 
websites and their discursive content (if only temporarily), and censoring the 
dominant governmental publicity in favour of their own counterpublic discourse.    
As such, the discursive form and discursive content of Operation Didgeridie worked 
in combination to ‘hack into’ the news media, thus mounting a powerful critique of 
the Labor government, threatening their face, and exploiting pre-existing fractures 
in their hegemony.  This first Operation also served to prime the news media for the 
ensuing Operation Titstorm, in that the press release issued the day before the 
hacktivism began was taken seriously, and Anonymous’s ideology was given 
coverage before the Operation had even commenced. 
Due to its extended success in knocking several governmental websites offline, 
Operation Titstorm extended considerably upon the counterpublicity generated by 
Didgeridie.  The fact that this second Operation overwhelmed governmental 
websites for a period of three days further underlined the technological ineptitude of 
the Labor government, once again garnering widespread media attention for 
Anonymous’s discourse and intensifying the power of their counterhegemonic 
project.  The previously discussed and widely reported admission from a 
Department of Parliamentary Services spokesperson that despite knowing that the 
attacks were imminent, they had no means of protecting themselves from them, 
further highlighted this technological vulnerability and lack of control.  The other 
aspects of the hacktivism further underlined this technological critique, as well as 
adding a moral dimension relating to the reported over-censoring of pornography, 
with the inundation of the government with the very lewd material they were 
attempting to eradicate providing a further element of mockery to the situation.  
Overall, the form of Anonymous’s hacktivism both launched their intellectual 
ideology into widespread circulation, and underlined this ideology through its multi-
faceted symbolic critique.  Both Operations received widespread media coverage, 
both nationally and internationally, expanding hairline cracks in the governmental 
hegemony into full-blown fractures, and encouraging the expression of further 
dissent through more traditional channels. This latter goal was articulated by the 
spokesperson for Anonymous, who stated that “the best thing the broader Australian 
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public could do to protest against the filter was to sign the petition of Electronic 
Frontiers Australia and tell government officials that they disagreed with the policy” 
(LeMay 2010a), thus extending or underlining the counterpublicity of Anonymous’s 
actions and contributing to the combined power of the modular network of anti-
filter counterpublics, and signaling Anonymous’s solidarity with this wider 
network. 
 
9.3.2 The discursive construction of chains of equivalence 
 
Despite these feelings of solidarity and the fact that Anonymous and other anti-filter 
counterpublics such as EFA and Get Up! share almost identical intellectual 
ideologies – that is, the content of their discourse exhibits strong resonance, to the 
extent that Anonymous reproduced statements and information disseminated by 
EFA, and expressed elation over the anti-filter campaign run by Get Up! – it is 
worth noting that these non-hacktivist counterpublics were disapproving of the form 
of Anonymous’s counterpublicity.  While supportive of their cause, they were 
extremely quick to distance themselves from the attacks through media statements, 
expressing concerns that Anonymous’s methods would do more harm than good to 
the wider anti-filter campaign: 
Reports that attacks on Federal Government websites are being used to 
draw attention to the government’s plan to introduce a mandatory 
Internet filter are alarming, and any illegal action of this nature must be 
condemned…By attempting to bring down or deface government 
websites, a minority of Internet users have brought negative attention to 
what is a very important issue for Australians. 
It would be much more helpful for these people to put their efforts 
behind legitimate action to stop this ineffective and inefficient attempt 
at censorship by the Australian government. 
(Stop Internet Censorship co-founder Nicolas Perkins, in Perkins 2010) 
EFA naturally condemns these attacks - not only are they illegal, but 
they damage the cause by playing to stereotypes of filter opponents as 
juveniles motivated by a desire to keep the Internet safe for porn. They 
serve no purpose but to give the Government the moral high ground, 
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and distract from arguments about the ineffectiveness of the policy and 
its ramifications for free speech. 
It's easy to understand the frustrations that the Anonymous members 
feel - it's true that the censorship plan has been thrust on the Australian 
public without consultation, research or a coherent policy objective. But 
this campaign just serves for Anonymous members to get a little 
revenge. It certainly won't persuade anyone; rather, it will hurt the anti-
filtering campaign. 
(EFA Chair Colin Jacobs, in Jacobs 2010) 
 
 
There was also disagreement within the ranks of Anonymous itself, with a 
moderator in the Why We Protest online forum expressing concern over the use of 
DDoS attacks, and thus providing one instance amongst many of the incomplete 
internal reification of Anonymous’s ranks: 
 
To those of you who are doing some sort of news piece on this or were 
directed here, read the WHOLE post before concluding this site's 
position on this 
 
(here's a hint, we don't like the censorship from Australia, but we don't 
condone the ddos attack from other portions of anonymous)… 
we don't support their ddos attack methods, as they will get people v&40 
and it doesn't get much support from the public (which is needed to stop 
the censorship) 
(Anonymous moderator RedOrbifold in ‘Operation Titstorm – Why We 
Protest’) 
 
The Australian government themselves were (unsurprisingly) also extremely 
disapproving of the attacks, with a spokesperson for Minister Conroy describing 
them as “juvenile” (Flower 2010) and “totally irresponsible” in that they denied 
Australian citizens access to government resources located on the targeted websites 
                                                
40 v& is leetspeak for ‘vanned’, which refers to the unmarked vans used by the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies to take away criminals.  Therefore, ‘people getting vanned’ refers to people 
being arrested or taken away by the FBI or other law enforcement forces. 
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(Cheng 2010) – a rather hypocritical statement, one might argue!  Furthermore, the 
disruptions were only temporary compared to the relative permanence of the 
planned filter, and as several commentators pointed out (including a spokesperson 
for Anonymous) analogous sit-ins and blockade actions occurring ‘in real life’ have 
long been seen as justifiable and valid forms of protest when traditional channels of 
dissent are perceived as inadequate: 
 
Communications Minister Stephen Conroy responded by branding those 
who carried out the attacks "irresponsible". This is the stock response of 
officialdom to direct action that causes any form of inconvenience: 
however, such action has a long and distinguished pedigree, with 
supporters arguing it is absolutely justified where existing political 
mechanisms do not give voice to a significant point of view. 
(Ozimek 2010) 
 
A DDoS attack occurs when a website is bombarded by requests for 
pages - often by a network of computers under the control of the hacker 
- effectively taking it offline. They are illegal in many jurisdictions. 
But a member of Anonymous told the BBC that in his view the attacks 
were a legitimate form of protest.  
"When truck drivers go on strike they block all the roads. It's the same 
principle," said the man who identified himself as "coldblood".  
(Vallance 2010) 
 
 
Whether Anonymous’s hacktivist counterpublicity had a net negative or positive 
effect on the campaign against and on general public opinion about the proposed 
filter is impossible to quantify, although there is no doubt that they did considerable 
damage to the government’s hegemonic composure. However, the disagreement 
about their methods does raise the point that Laclau and Mouffe’s theorised ‘chains 
of equivalence’ between counterhegemonic discursive projects or between 
counterpublics perhaps rely not only on resonance between the discursive content of 
these projects, but also the form of their discursive counterpublicity.  Different 
groups see different forms of online protest counterpublicity as legitimate means to 
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achieving their stated cause, and the overall networked strength or solidarity of any 
public of counterpublics is likely to rely upon mutual approval of the forms of 
discourse utilised by those constituting the network as well as the ideologies or 
discursive content mobilised by these forms.  This interplay between any given 
online political group’s ideology and the specific technologies utilised in these 
ideology’s organisation and mobilisation has received some preliminary attention 
(see Kavada 2009), but it is an issue that strongly compels further investigation.  
 
 
9.4 The future of the Australian Internet 
 
Shortly after Operation Titstorm, in early March 2010, The Labor Government 
announced that the Internet filter legislation was still in draft stage, and unlikely to 
be introduced into parliament for debate in time for the legislation to be passed 
(assuming it receives enough cross-Senate support, which is by no means assured) 
before the next Australian federal election (Berkovic 2010). 
 
The Government will take the time to ensure that it gets the legislative 
framework right… Discussion with ISPs and owners of high traffic sites 
on the implementation of ISP filters are ongoing.  The Government is 
also considering the responses to the consultation paper on improved 
transparency and accountability measures which will feed into the 
legislative framework.  The Bill will be introduced when these 
processes are completed. 
(Spokeswoman for Senator Conroy, in Riley (J.) 2010) 
 
There was, unsurprisingly, some suspicion that the real reason for delay was due to 
“voter backlash” on the issue (Fitzgerald 2010), given the extensive 
counterpublicity directed at the Australian government by Anonymous and other 
activist organisations, coupled with critical receptions to other areas of their policy 
platform (primarily the mining tax).  
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At the time of writing, the deposition of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister and leader 
of the Labor party by Julia Gillard has cast further doubt on the likelihood of the 
filter going ahead.  Even if Labor win the 2010 election, they will lack the numbers 
to pass the filter legislation, with the Liberal-led coalition and Greens declaring 
their intent to vote against the policy or dump it in the case of election success 
(‘Coalition to dump ‘flawed’ internet filter’).  It appears that only time will tell 
whether the so-called ‘Great Australian Firewall’ will eventually be installed. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Overview 
 
10.1.1 Purpose, conceptualisation and inquiry 
 
 
The core purpose or objective of this thesis has been to assess the phenomenon of 
hacktivism through a public sphere theoretical lens. However, the fulfillment of this 
goal necessarily generated two subsidiary objectives, in that both of the primary 
research concepts - ‘hacktivism’ and ‘public sphere theory’ – are rendered 
ambiguous by a multiplicity of divergent understandings and articulations.  As such, 
both required considerable interrogation and definitive articulation and clarification 
before being combined and mobilised in the investigation and interpretation of 
empirical data, particularly the enduringly popular and continuously revised concept 
of the public sphere. 
Prior to summarising the objects and methods of inquiry into this objective, it is 
fitting to say something of the original inspiration for and conceptualisation of the 
research project.  At any level and scale, researching the role of media and 
communication in modern life presents an almost bewildering array of possible 
research objects, not to mention theoretical approaches.  The sheer volume of media 
artifacts and systems increasingly permeating almost all aspects of daily life, 
particularly within developed and post-industrial nations but also within their 
developing and industrial counterparts, gives media researchers an incredible array 
of options from which to select subjects or objects of research that resonate with 
their personal interests and priorities.  The predicament one faces is most definitely 
rooted in overabundance as opposed to scarcity. 
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So why hacktivism and the public sphere?  To begin with, my interest in hacktivism 
was piqued by its (generally brief) mention in academic texts focusing on the 
increasing usage of the Internet for the organisation and mobilisation of a wide 
range of social and political activism.  Further reading revelaed that there were 
relatively few texts dealing either exclusively or at least comprehensively with the 
phenomenon, and that these texts were being produced by a rather limited pool of 
authors who tended to repeatedly focus on the same incidences of hacktivism or 
hacktivist groups.  Hacktivism, as an emerging form of activist communication, is 
understudied (hardly surprising, given its relative newness), and there is an ever-
growing catalogue of hacktions that have completely escaped any examination 
whatsoever.   
Furthermore, although there has been some consideration given to the interpretation 
of hacktivism as a democratically legitimate form of communicative resistance to 
the forces of elite power and control now “wander[ing] in absence on the electronic 
pathways” (CAE 1994: 23), primarily in the doctoral theses of Vegh (2003) and 
Samuel (2004), no focused or clearly articulated attention had been given to 
hacktivism through the lens of public sphere theory.  In particular, there was a 
complete lack of interrogation into which strands of public sphere theory would best 
account for the phenomenon of hacktivism, thus allowing it to both be interpreted 
by and provide new directions for a theory of the public sphere more generally 
befitting of the modern mediated communicative environment.  A detailed and 
clearly articulated public sphere theoretical approach to conceiving of hacktivism’s 
contribution to political issues and discourses operating at multiple geopolitical 
levels, and of its constitution of an emergent form of communicative dissent to elite 
or hegemonic discourses was notably absent from the body of hacktivist/m research 
literature. As such, this uniquely unexplored nexus of communicative practice and 
theory provided the fresh research ground for this thesis. 
Beyond the absence of attention given to this intersection, the inspiration for 
combining its two vectors stems from a long-standing fascination with and passion 
for the wider ecosystem of creative and avant-garde forms of resistance to the elite 
control of mediated discourse and deliberation, from various forms of alternative 
media publications and traditional offline forms of activism, to performance art, 
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graffiti and culture jamming.  This interest is coterminous with a much broader 
enthusiasm for and belief in the importance of much more vigorous citizen 
participation in and discourse about political issues pertinent to us and the societies 
in which we live, both with one another and with our political representatives.  To 
put it simply, I do not believe voting is enough.   
This opinion can possibly be traced back to growing up amongst role models with a 
penchant for writing complaint letters to figures of authority, most notably 
politicians, and a wider familial belief in the importance of being outspoken about 
one’s beliefs.  The overwhelmingly pro forma responses to these letters and other 
polite and rational-critical forms of dissent have always struck me as both 
condescending and inadequate, hence my interest in more public and rowdy forms 
of opposition and political preference registration, which cannot be ignored or 
brushed aside to quite the same extent.  Surely, truly egalitarian political 
communicative participation requires the opportunity not only to speak, but to speak 
in one’s own preferred voice and to have one’s political preferences widely heard 
and deliberated upon, both by other citizens and by those in positions of political or 
economic power.   
This conviction underscores the attraction to public sphere theory, and while 
Habermas’s work is completely deserving of the copious amounts of attention it has 
been paid, there is no escaping the fact that this attention rightly includes 
considerable quantities of critique and reformulation.  Over the course of this 
project, the strength of my conviction in Fraser’s call for an ongoing reconstructive 
project (2005) has intensified, as has my belief in the need for a synthesis of the 
postmodern, radical or agnostic theoretical tradition.  This kind of synthesis is 
central to the articulation of a concept of the public sphere that accounts for the 
inherency of societal power stratifications and for an increasingly globally 
interconnected communicative environment. 
Given their shared origins and points of similarity, it seemed natural to combine 
these fields of interest, and thus fill a research lacuna that appeared more than 
worthy of attention.  Having broadly conceptualized the objects and theoretical 
mode of inquiry, the question then became one of which methodological framework 
to use.  The vast majority of existing research into hacktivism utilised a 
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combination of descriptive case studies and interview data, with one instance of 
content analysis used to quantify the changing media perceptions of hacking and 
hacktivism pre- and post-9/11 (Vegh 2003).  The methodology chapter of this thesis 
has already provided a detailed articulation of the process of deciding to utilise a 
qualitative method of inquiry, and in particular, to use a critical discourse analytical 
approach applied to three case studies, but it is useful and appropriate to re-
summarise the main factors informing this decision here. 
The use of case studies was informed both by their extensive usage in existing 
literature, and by the way in which a case study based approach allowed an in-depth 
investigation of a few purposively selected hacktivist incidents, rather than a 
glancing view of many.  Samuel’s hacktivist taxonomy (2004) provided an 
extremely useful scaffold for the theoretical sampling of the three cases used, but 
this sampling was also informed by a desire to address more recent examples of 
hacktivism, rather than relying purely on more well-known but increasingly dated 
hacktivist groups such as the EDT.  Hacktivismo, the group focused on within the 
first case study, have received much previous attention within the existing literature, 
and as such, provided a robust and well-documented initial case with which to test 
the critical discourse analytical framework devised.  However, the following two 
cases (the Creative Freedom Foundation and Anonymous) have, so far, received no 
or very little academic attention, thus fulfilling the goal of extending upon the 
existing body of hacktivist case study research. 
Although the move away from using interview data and towards analysing the three 
hacktivist group’s purposively constructed texts was certainly initially informed by 
difficulties with gaining interview access to hacktivists, this forced modification of 
the project’s methodological approach has ultimately become a strength of this 
research.  Although interview data has proved an important resource for other 
researchers of hacktivism, and should continue to be used as a resource wherever 
possible, relying on the textual artifacts produced by hacktivists to effect their 
counterpublicity rather than seeking out and generating new interview texts for 
analysis is actually more befitting of the intent of this thesis.  What hacktivists say 
in private and their reflections upon their activity are somewhat irrelevant to an 
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investigation of the way in which they discursively construct counterpublic 
challenges to hegemonic or dominant publics or pseudopublics.   
Furthermore, no previous attention has been given to hacktivism through an 
explicitly discourse analytical framework. Given that hacktivism is clearly an 
emergent form of multimodal discourse, which generates and utilises not only a 
large number of traditional linguistic texts, but also employs the many software and 
multimedia capabilities offered by the internet, it seems that that discourse analysis, 
critical or otherwise, provides an apt and peculiarly underutilized toolkit for its 
investigation and comprehension.  Furthermore, critical discourse analysis provides 
the tools and theoretical underpinning needed to craft a flexible and sensitive 
methodological framework that allows the neo-Habermasian theoretical framework 
generated by the first research question to both interpret and be extended upon by 
the empirical case studies.  Both the methodological and theoretical frameworks 
share a keen focus on issues of ideology and power, and on how discourse can be 
used to effect both the reification and challenge of these structures, thus they were 
easily amalgamated into a cohesive analytical lens capable of disclosing the 
information needed to answer the second research question. 
 
10.1.2 Theoretical framework and research questions 
 
The thesis had two primary research questions, the first of which generated the 
theoretical framework for the research.  This question and the theoretical synthesis 
project providing its answer stem from Fraser’s call (2005), much echoed by other 
public sphere scholars, for an ongoing reconstructive project that will not only 
remedy the practical and theoretical problems with the pre- and post-linguistic turn 
Habermasian conceptions of the public sphere, but will also continually bring the 
theoretical model into harmony with an ever-changing (particularly, an ever more 
global and mediated) communicative environment.  This question identified the 
postmodern, radical, or agonistic public sphere theoretical tradition as being the 
most appropriate to this task, and was expressed as follows: 
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R1: How can the critical democratic intent behind the Habermasian 
ideal of the public sphere be reconciled with both: 
a) the practical and theoretical criticism levelled at it, and  
b) the diverse reconstructive projects undertaken within the ‘post-
modern’ ‘radical’ or ‘agonistic’ public sphere and deliberative 
democratic theoretical traditions, which attempt to remain sensitive to 
issues of difference and power; 
in a manner that generates a concise, holistic and operationalisable 
definition of the public sphere, that accounts and is appropriate for the 
modern mediated communicative environment? 
 
This initial research question was answered through a process involving a thorough 
practical and theoretical critique of the traditional Habermasian conception of the 
public sphere, incorporating an articulation of the main tenets proposed within the 
postmodern, radical and agnostic reconstructive literature, and the subsequent 
delineation of the neo-Habermasian model – a concise and operationalisable 
definition of the public sphere that accounts for and is appropriate to the modern 
mediated communicative environment, and which provides a much heightened 
sensitivity to issues of power and difference. 
The critique section began with an exploration of the historical inaccuracies or 
practical criticisms of the Habermasian public sphere as elucidated in Structural 
Transformation; specifically, Habermas’s overidealisation of the internal function 
of the bourgeois public sphere; his lack of acknowledgement of the existence of 
multiple historical public spheres and of class- and gender-based exclusions 
inherent in the bourgeois public sphere; and his over-pessimistic analysis of the 
contemporary media and public sphere. Nancy Fraser’s theoretical criticism of the 
Habermasian public sphere (1992) was then summarised, with her central principles 
subsequently providing a framework for an extended theoretical critique and 
reformulation based on the theorization of multiple public spheres (particularly the 
transnationalisation of the concept and the idea of counterpublic spheres); the 
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erosion of the theoretical barrier between public and private (including the 
impossibility of bracketing status differentials and the failure of rational-critical 
debate); the democratic advantages in allowing private interests into the public 
sphere; and the failures of the ideal of rational consensus.   
It was made abundantly clear that there is a broad theoretical support base for a 
reworking of the public sphere concept in such a way as to enable it to much more 
adequately acknowledge societal power differentials, and to allow for the 
conceptualisation and interpretation of their contestation.  The synthesis of these 
critiques and theoretical reformulations generated a definition for what is defined as 
‘neo-Habermasian public sphere theory’, in that it retains the Habermasian public 
sphere as its departure point or core, but expands and sensitises it in order to 
effectively comprehend issues of power and difference.  As Ryan requested, it 
allows publicness to “navigate through wider and wilder territory” (1992: 286). 
Neo-Habermasian public sphere theory postulates the existence and recognition of 
multiple public spheres, operating at multiple levels and ranging in size from 
subnational to supranational (Keane 2000).  These spheres are discursively defined 
against or in opposition with one another, and with the dominant or hegemonic 
public spheres within any given discursive or regional arena.  As such, they should 
be referred to as counterpublic spheres, and are capable of operating as 
counterhegemonic projects.  As Keane proposes, we should imagine a global 
modular network of interconnected and overlapping public spheres, linked not only 
by flows of resistance, but also by what Laclau and Mouffe term ‘chains of 
discursive equivalence’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2000; 2000a; 2005).   
Every public sphere, be it dominant or a counterpublic, is public in that it has an 
outwards orientation – it aims to engage with other publics – as well as an inwards, 
group solidarity-based orientation.  Because the critique section reveals the 
demarcation of an a priori boundary around what issues may constitute public 
sphere discourses to be fundamentally exclusive, and exposes status bracketing or 
self-abstraction as a differentially distributed resource that re-privileges the already 
privileged, publics and especially counterpublics may be based around a range of 
concerns.  Issues and concerns previously confined to the arena of the private may 
be brought into the public domain if they are discursively established as of 
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legitimate political importance, and may be fully articulated within their relevant 
public spheres.  In effect, everything can be political if it is determined as such 
through discourse and deliberation. 
Furthermore, the neo-Habermasian framework contends that exclusively privileging 
rational-critical deliberation as the only mode of legitimate communicative action 
within the public sphere is inherently and substantially exclusionary.  As such, 
multiple modes of communication are deemed legitimate, including contestation 
and diverse forms of deliberation and debate.  This communicative action does not 
necessarily need to be oriented towards the state, but can have powerful effects 
within civil society.  However, these diverse modes of communication should still 
be judged in accordance with how well they fulfill a normative ideal of deliberative 
legitimacy. This ‘deliberative authenticity’ exists to the extent that communication 
induces reflection on preferences in a non-coercive fashion (Dryzek 2000, 2001).  
Finally, the achievement of truly rational consensus is seen as impossible in that it 
eliminates plurality, and any ‘consensus’ actually attained will always based upon 
exclusion and hegemonic stabilisation.  ‘Workable agreements’ or temporary 
consensus will suffice, but should always remain open to contestation, with the 
processes of deliberation and contestation recognised as the truly valuable core of 
the concept of the public sphere. 
This neo-Habermasian model provided the theoretical framework for the second 
research question, and for the empirical investigations into the nature of 
hacktivism’s counterpublicity required to answer it: 
 
 
R2: How does hacktivism, through discursively constructed and 
externally oriented publicity, function as a counterpublic sphere or 
counterhegemonic project oriented towards the provocation of political 
preference reflection and the destabilisation of a given dominant or 
hegemonic public?   
 
R2.1: How does the discursive form of hacktivism, as a counterpublic 
sphere or counterhegemonic discursive project, contribute to the 
 332 
provocation of political preference reflection and the destabilisation of 
a given dominant or hegemonic public? 
 
R2.2 How does the discursive content of hacktivism, as a counterpublic 
sphere or counterhegemonic discursive project, contribute to the 
provocation of political preference reflection and the destabilisation of 
a given dominant or hegemonic public? 
 
 
The neo-Habermasian theoretical framework was combined with a critical discourse 
analytical approach in order to analyse both the forms of and textual content 
produced by hacktivism, and thus answer these nested research questions.  This 
attention to both discursive form and discursive content was structured by a focus 
on issues of diverse access to speech and attention and thus communicative power. 
 
10.2 Findings and wider contributions 
 
10.2.1 Findings: Research question 2 
 
The findings or conclusions relating to the second research question draw from the 
empirical data generated by the case studies and critical discourse analysis 
conducted in Chapters 8 through 10.  The question is best answered in a bottom-up 
fashion; that is, each subsidiary component is best discussed separately before 
summarising the findings relating to the broader question. 
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10.2.1.1 Research question 2.2: Discursive content 
 
Research question 2.2 asks how the discursive content of hacktivism contributes to 
the counterpublicity or counterhegemonic projects generated by hacktivists, in order 
to provoke political preference reflection on a given issue and destabilise the 
dominant or hegemonic public dominating the wider discourse over or network of 
public spheres relating to the said issue.  The close critical discourse analysis 
conducted upon the texts central to each of the three case studies provided the data 
relevant to this component of the research question, through its focus on ingroup-
outgroup polarization, with the expected finding being that the hacktivists studied 
would routinely and fairly simply present themselves in a positive light in their 
textual artifacts, while simultaneously discursively constructing a negative portrayal 
of the groups they were opposed to. 
However, the analysis revealed that this was not actually the case, and that the 
discourses of the hacktivists studied were, in fact, much more nuanced in terms of 
their construction and portrayal of ingroups and outgroups.  Both Hacktivismo and 
the Creative Freedom Foundation invested considerable effort into constructing 
positive self-portrayals within their hacktivist discourse, but invested an equal 
amount of discursive work into making it clear that they were fighting for a cause, 
rather than against any specifically defined and negatively portrayed group.  Certain 
actions, such as Internet censorship and the erosion of human rights online, were 
described in overwhelmingly negative terms, but there was little to no negative 
identification or naming of any particular groups (such as political parties or states).   
This focus on a cause rather than on any exact opponent served various purposes. In 
the case of Hacktivismo, it ensures that their protest discourse remains up-to-date 
and appropriate to the evolving involvements of various nation states in the erosion 
and curtailment of digitally based human rights, and that it encompasses a broad 
and ever-changing roll-call of such offenders.  In the case of the Creative Freedom 
Foundation, their focus on cause rather than any given New Zealand political party 
or Member of Parliament ensured that their protest was able to garner cross-
spectrum support, and avoid alienating or offending the politicians they wished to 
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influence.  It also reflected the inherited status of the Copyright Amendments Act 
(from the Labour party to the new National-led government). 
However, no such delicacy or consideration of the face of their opponents was 
present in the anti-Australian Internet filter hacktivist discourse of Anonymous.  As 
well as exhibiting a cause-orientation in the same manner as the two preceding 
cases, they painted Kevin Rudd, Stephen Conroy, and the Labor government as 
extremely negative in no uncertain terms.  Anonymous invested considerable 
discursive effort into their explicit demonisation, with the offensive filter and its 
anticipated practitioners amalgamated into a holistic and much detested singular 
entity.  Much work was invested in the construction of explicit and sustained threats 
to the face of Rudd and his colleagues, with Anonymous deliberately flouting the 
conventions of politeness and exhibiting marked disrespect towards their 
unambiguously identified adversaries. Interestingly, they also elected not to 
construct a positive self-presentation within their discourse, instead acknowledging 
their wider reputation as pranksters and deviants, and even mobilising this negative 
status in order to add weight and discursive power to their promises of hacktivist 
repercussions. 
The differences in self- and other-presentation between the three groups may be 
attributed to a number of factors, some to do with the focuses of each instance of 
hacktivism and the practicalities inherent to these, and some to do with the 
reputation and nature of the hacktivists involved and the kind of hacktivist tactics 
they employed.  As already discussed, Hacktivismo’s software and protest is aimed 
at a number of nation state adversaries, hence it made practical sense for them to 
focus on cause rather than negatively portraying any particular one or number of 
these states within their discourse.  Furthermore, although their software does allow 
its users to break some national laws, it is not illegal per se, and is intended to 
enforce the stipulations of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
As such, their positive self-presentation is not undermined by criminality.  The 
Creative Freedom Foundation’s focus on cause rather than the negative portrayal of 
a particular opponent allowed them to garner cross-spectrum political support, avoid 
alienating the politicians they wished to influence, and took into account the 
inherited nature of the relevant legislation.  As with Hacktivismo, their particular 
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hacktivist tactics were not illegal, ensuring that their positive self-presentation was 
also free of destabilizing criminal associations.   
Conversely, Anonymous had a much more defined target in terms of the architects 
of the filter, which was reflected in the negative discursive construction of Rudd et 
al.  The vehemence of this negative othering and their own ambivalent self-
portrayal are also likely influenced not only by the fact that the group’s wider status 
precedes them, but also because of the criminality of the hacktivist tactics they 
deployed in their two operations.  DDoS attacks and page defacements are illegal 
actions, hence any positive self-presentation would have been undermined by this 
criminality, and any tempering of their discursive construction of the Labor 
government would have been rendered somewhat irrelevant. 
Rather than being simple textual constructions based on the expected uncomplicated 
dynamics of ingroup-outgroup polarisation, the discursive content of the hacktivism 
of the three case groups was actually rather sophisticated and artfully constructed, 
taking into account a wide number of factors and drawing on many discursive 
strategies for effecting their intended portrayal of themselves, their causes, and their 
opponents.  Although it is difficult to draw wider conclusions about the discursive 
content of hacktivism as a whole from three case studies, the lack of uniformity and 
the presence of reasonably equivalent levels of discursive sophistication and artistry 
does allow us to make the observation that hacktivists would appear to tend towards 
using the full discursive capabilities offered to them by the platform of the Internet, 
and by their relative freedom to construct rather elaborate, and in some cases, 
lengthy, protest discourses, in their efforts to provoke political preference reflection 
and destabilise the dominant or hegemonic publics or pseudopublics they oppose. 
 
10.2.1.2 Research question 2.1: Discursive form 
 
Research question 2.1 asks how the discursive form of hacktivism contributes to the 
counterpublicity or counterhegemonic projects generated by hacktivists, in order to 
provoke political preference reflection on a given issue and destabilise the dominant 
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or hegemonic public dominating the wider discourse over or network of public 
spheres relating to the said issue.  Unlike the variety of strategies present in the 
content of the three case groups’ discourse, the discursive form of their hacktivism 
served to provoke political preference reflection and effect the destabilisation of the 
relevant dominant or hegemonic pseudopublics in a broadly similar manner.  Each 
of the three groups used the discursive form of their hacktivism to threaten the face 
of their adversaries by subverting (to greater and lesser extents, and through a 
variety of different tactics) the usual rules and norms of access to and control of 
widespread public political discourse on their chosen issues of contention. 
These differing tactics and their effects have already been comprehensively detailed 
within Chapters 8 to 10; hence, a brief overview of the similarities and differences 
between each group’s subversion of discursive access and control is sufficient for 
fleshing out this conclusion.  All three groups used the form of their hacktivism to 
create the necessary spectacle for launching their discursive content into wider 
circulation – in effect, they used their communicative subversion to ‘hack into’ the 
mainstream media, and thus amplify their existing counterpublicity through 
garnering widespread reportage of their activities and discursively constructed 
intellectual ideologies.  This accomplishment constitutes a final instance of 
subverting the usual norms of access to and control of discourse in and of itself, in 
that the mainstream media is overwhelmingly dominated by the discourses of 
dominant or hegemonic publics, and is thus more often a platform for the ideologies 
of political or economic elites rather than citizen minorities or counter-discourses.  
However, each case group generated their initial hacktivist spectacle of 
communicative subversion in a slightly different fashion. 
Hacktivismo use their software to allow netizens, predominantly those in nation 
states with repressive and censorious digital regimes (such as China and Iran), to 
bypass their national firewalls and censors and thus both gain access to and 
contribute to repressed or prohibited information and discourses.  In doing so, their 
software allows citizens to regain control over all levels of access to and control of 
the discourses they engage with online, thus undermining the otherwise total 
authority and control held by the leaders of their relevant nation states – it catalyses 
further counterpublicity in a self-replicating or viral fashion.  This communicative 
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subversion constitutes a symbolic and practical threat to the face of these leaders 
and their dominant or hegemonic pseudopublic discourses, allowing dissenting 
citizens to bypass their authority, expose their lack of total control, and contribute to 
discourses criticizing such curtailment of the digital and human rights to free speech 
and expression.  As detailed in Chapter 8, this face-threatening by way of the 
exposure of weakness and fallibility is also extended to the corporations involved in 
constructing and supplying the equipment needed for such firewalls and censorship, 
as well as to the allegedly non-repressive Western governments who stand idly by 
and implicitly sanction such corporate activity.  This communicative subversion and 
attendant discursively constructed intellectual ideology, and their subsequent 
reportage in the mainstream media serves to provoke widespread political 
preference reflection and destabilise a variety of political-economic dominant or 
hegemonic pseudopublics through mounting a multivalent attack upon their public 
face. 
The Creative Freedom Foundation used their viral Internet Blackout campaign to 
flood significant sections of New Zealand’s Twitter and Facebook landscapes with 
blacked out avatars and links to their website, which details their intellectual 
ideology.  This viral social networking was used to generate widespread 
subscription to the final phase of their campaign, in which participating websites 
and blogs redirected their homepages to a blacked out page within the Foundation’s 
website which displayed a prepared statement explaining the reasons for the 
campaign and a link back to the site’s homepage. The structure of the campaign 
generated a form of viral counterpublicity even more pronounced than that 
produced by Hacktivismo’s software, in that it collected participants in a ‘snowball’ 
fashion, resulting in significant portions of the New Zealand Internet being blacked 
out in support of the Foundation’s fight against S92.  The participation of several 
notable opinion leaders and the overall levels of subscription to and visibility of the 
Internet Blackout not only generated an independent communicative channel for 
political dissent, and ensured widespread reportage of the Creative Freedom 
Foundation’s intellectual ideology, but also flooded the typical channels of 
communicative dissent (such as petitions and emails to Members of Parliament) 
with much higher levels of subscription than usual, and put the weight of thousands 
of virtual bodies behind the Foundation’s Select Committee submission.  While the 
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content of their discourse remained carefully polite, this subversion of the norms of 
access to and control of public political discourse threatened the face of the 
National-led government and the corporate rights holders pushing for the adoption 
of the opposed legislation.  Again, form and content combined to generate a 
multivalent, self-replicating and powerful counterpublicity that provoked 
widespread political preference reflection and alteration, thus destabilising the 
dominant or hegemonic pseudopublics and elite political-economic discourses 
driving S92. 
Anonymous used a combination of repeated and various DDoS or flood attacks and 
website defacements to forcefully threaten the face of the Rudd government by 
undermining their credibility and authority, both by revealing their inability to 
maintain the integrity of their own web presence (let alone successfully and 
judiciously administer a national Internet filter), and by launching the face-
threatening intellectual ideology contained within the discursive content of their 
hacktivism into a wide mass mediated circulation.  As such, their Operations once 
more combined form and content to generate a multivalent and highly visible form 
of hacktivist counterpublicity that provoked widespread political preference 
reflection and worked to destabilise the dominant or hegemonic national 
governmental pseudopublic, and thus erode support for them and their planned 
filter. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that hacktivist counterpublicity provokes political 
preference reflection and attempts to destabilise dominant or hegemonic publics or 
pseudopublics through a sophisticated and complex interplay between discursive 
content and form.  The various discursive forms of hacktivism not only implicitly 
threaten the stability of dominant or hegemonic publics and pseudopublics through 
their subversion of the usual norms of access to and control of political discourse, 
but are also capable of generating the viral reproduction and spread of 
counterpublicity; of launching hacktivists’ discursive content into wider circulation 
in the mainstream media; and of flooding existing channels of political dissent such 
as petitions and direct letters or emails to Members of Parliament with much higher 
subscription rates than usual.  In other words, the various hacktivist tactics or 
discourse forms utilised serve as a platform for the hacktivists’ intellectual 
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ideologies or discursive content, thus generating an emergent multivalent and 
multimodal discourse genre capable of generating a new mode of highly visible, 
often virally reproductive, and potentially very powerful protest counterpublicity. 
 
10.2.3 Further similarities and differences  
 
 
The previous sections have already made it clear that comparing and contrasting the 
three hacktivist groups provides a useful strategy for teasing out the conclusions to 
both of the subsidiary elements of the second research question.  However, this 
excavation of similarities and differences is also productive in terns of drawing 
forth further conclusions and findings from the empirical research that do not fit 
neatly into a discussion of the discursive form and content of the three groups’ 
hacktivism.  Beyond these similarities and differences, there are also other 
underlying theoretical threads which have emerged as central to the project, and 
which warrant some attention and discussion. 
 
10.2.3.1 Affinities between Hacktivismo, the CFF and Anonymous 
 
 
Despite there being many differences between the three groups assessed, they also 
exhibited some striking philosophical similarities, particularly with regards to their 
opinion of the public value of their methods and their shared political-economic 
perspectives.  Perhaps it is somewhat obvious, given that they voluntarily elected to 
use their given methods, but it is worth pointing our how clearly each group 
articulated their belief in the public value of their hacktivism, and in its ability to 
effect positive political change.  Even Anonymous, despite acknowledging that they 
might not be ‘the best of people’ and that they have used their skills to less-than-
progressive ends in the past, were adamant that their methods were ultimately in aid 
of the greater good, stating that they believed that any negative fallout from the 
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illegality of their hacktivism would be cancelled out by the negative publicity it also 
directed towards the Rudd government. 
 
Each group also shared an almost identical orientation towards the global forces of 
neoliberalism and their influence on digital rights and freedoms in different national 
and regional locations all over the world.    In particular, Hacktivismo and the 
Creative Freedom Foundation articulated almost identical anti-neoliberal ideologies, 
clearly identifying Western governments as completely in sway to the blind focus 
on profit and the maintenance of economic growth at all costs which forms the 
backbone of this political economic orientation.  This ideological perspective was 
less apparent within the particular Anonymous Operations focused upon, but this 
underlying thread has emerged much more strongly in several of their more recent 
activities, such as their DDoS attacks against the RIAA website, as well as those 
against Visa and Mastercard.  It would appear that hacktivism has very strongly 
inherited the anti-neoliberal opinions and beliefs that have been a core component 
of hacking since its first few generational iterations. 
 
10.2.3.2 Philosophical differences 
 
 
However, despite these similarities, the three hacktivist groups also exhibited some 
core differences in their underlying operational philosophies.  Hacktivismo and the 
CFF quite obviously took great care to avoid engaging in any specifically illegal 
activities, as one would expect from their categorisation within Samuel’s typology, 
and her identification that political coders (such as Hacktivismo) and performative 
hacktivists (such as the CFF) generally orient themselves in opposition to (elements 
of) mainstream society, but do not seek to exist completely outside these common 
socio-political structures or boundaries.  They utilise their agency to test or push 
against these overarching structures, in the hope of modifying them into what they 
see as a more equitable or acceptable form, but they do not seek to drastically 
transgress, nullify, or ignore the existence of these structural boundaries.  
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Hacktivismo certainly seek to transgress against the boundaries and governing 
structures imposed by totalitarian regimes, but they are careful to maintain a 
respectful consideration of the ideals and agreed-upon core structures of Western 
democracies. 
 
However, Anonymous show no such delicacy. As Samuel’s typology indicates, they 
exhibit the lack of respect for cultural norms common to most political crackers, 
deliberately and almost gleefully flouting common laws and standards of behaviour 
and decency.  While they are certainly cognizant the common structural boundaries 
of society they recognise them mainly through their deliberate transgression of these 
‘lines in the sand’, using their anonymity to enable their operation in fields of illegal 
behaviour located far outside of what mainstream society deems acceptable.  This 
basic lack of respect for the laws of the land places them at the most extreme end of 
the philosophical continuum inhabited by the three groups – a location that 
generates much disapproval but which is also quite possibly the best way in which 
to generate a maximum amount of publicity, given the intensity of the spectacle 
their hacktivism generates. 
 
 
10.2.1.3 Differences in orientation to external definitions of hacking 
 
 
These differences extend to the ways in which each of the groups orient themselves 
towards or against different external definitions of hacking, with Anonymous once 
more occupying the most extreme or laissez faire end of the continuum.  
Hacktivismo and the CFF seek to completely disown the dominant media discourse 
of the hacker as electronic criminal or bogeyman, with the CFF avoiding any 
explicit linkage with the terms ‘hacker’ or ‘hacking’ whatsoever.  They mobilised 
much-domesticated tactical and visual elements of common hacking techniques in 
order to utilise the sense of the spectacular that they impart, but they avoided any 
kind of linguistic connection with the practice of hacking whatsoever, with the 
exception of a few news reports which noted the visual similarities between the 
Blackout and DDoS attacks.  As such, they completely evaded entering into a 
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discussion about what exactly hacking is, and whose definition of the practice 
provides the most accurate reflection of reality. 
In contrast, Hacktivismo clearly have no such sense of linguistic squeamishness, as 
their name indicates.  Their software projects are also much more unmistakeably 
evidence of hacktivism’s genetic connection with hacking.  However, they also seek 
to disown, nullify, or subvert the dominant mass mediated discourse about hacking.  
They clearly articulate their subscription to the understanding of hacking as 
progressive proto-political exercise in aid of information freedom, with the hacker 
being a clever and somewhat rebellious but essentially altruistic figure engaged in 
enabling computers to be the mechanical agents of progressive social change.  
However, they do also exhibit a desire to borrow some of the publicity-friendly élan 
more commonly associated with the more criminal iterations of hacking, as is 
evidenced by their weak pseudonyms (e.g. Oxblood Ruffin, Grandmaster Ratte) and 
the rather grisly name of the parent group (Cult of the Dead Cow).  These linguistic 
tactics lend their hacktivism a kind of subversive mystique that is somewhat 
missing from the self-presentation of the CFF, and which arguably makes many see 
them as somewhat more of a serious force to be reckoned with. 
 
Anonymous clearly orient themselves much more firmly towards the ‘electronic 
bogeyman’ end of the definitional spectrum.  They do not appear to care whether 
they are called hackers, cyberterrorists, cybercriminals or hacktivists, as long as 
they are taken notice of and given sufficient public attention and media coverage.  
Rather than trying to engage in reputation management at any significant level, they 
instead seem to rely on their causes speaking for themselves, and thus establishing 
their activities as being aimed towards a greater societal good and state of 
progressive technopolitics.  They appear to actively court sensationalistic media 
descriptions that align them with the more criminal elements of hacking, welcoming 
the often intense publicity associated with the kinds of reportage this kind of 
‘naming’ enables.  One can only assume that they view the negative fallout as a 
necessary evil in garnering the kind of public exposure and thus counterpublicity 
they seek. 
 
They also engaged in much discursive work aimed at countering the negative side-
effects of courting this kind of attention, as did Hacktivism, with these self-
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presentation efforts also intended to counter some of the problems linked with the 
use of anonymity or pseudonymity – specifically, the ways in which these nymity 
practices can engender suspicions of a lack of genuine political investment.  The 
hacktivists sought to counteract these issues by aligning themselves with 
international human rights declarations and with “the people” or the masses; by 
stating that they come from all walks of life and therefore are a representative 
section of society; as well as doing much discursive work to undermine their 
opponents or what they are opposing.  Again, this shows that hacktivists are 
extremely aware of how they and their actions may be perceived and take great care 
to try and secure communicative legitimacy for themselves. 
 
 
10.2.4 Other findings and wider contributions 
 
 
This thesis has also generated empirical, theoretical and methodological findings 
and advances relating to issues both extending from and beyond those focused on 
and explored by the second research question.  These findings and contributions 
stem from the generative feedback loop constructed between the theoretical 
framework and empirical investigation, and are comprised of contributions made to 
both the broader field of hacktivism research, and also to the ongoing project of 
reformulating and extending upon public sphere theory. 
 
 
10.2.4.1 Hacking into the mainstream 
 
 
 
A more general finding emerging from the research is an intimation of the ways in 
which we might understand how hacktivist counterpublics (and indeed, 
counterpublics more generally) intervene in or cross over into dominant public 
spaces.  Following on from Keane’s elegant and intensely useful theorisation of a 
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global modular network of publics and counterpublics operating at multiple levels, 
and linked by both flows of resistance and also Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘chains of 
equivalence’, our dominant mental image may be of counterpublics as existing in 
oppositional isolation from or to the dominant publics and discourses they seek to 
contest.  However, considering the way in which the CFF and Anonymous 
mobilised their counterpublicity, this visual imaginary arguably requires some 
tweaking.  Rather than visualising counterpublics as always retaining some kind of 
oppositional distance to the dominant or pseudopublic (see Figure 11.1 below, left 
section), we may in fact be better served by a visualisation along the lines of the 
diagram shown on the right of Figure 11.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The relationship between hacktivist counterpublics (cp) and 
dominant publics (DP) 
 
 
As Figure 11 attempts to depict, hacktivist counterpublicity, particularly that 
generated by the CFF and Anonymous, is perhaps best conceived of as fracturing 
the hegemony of dominant publics by inserting itself into the domains of these 
dominant spheres, and negotiating them on their own terms, rather than allowing 
these dominant publics to retain control of the rules of engagement.  They do not 
challenge dominant publics just by butting up against them but remaining external, 
but by actually forcing their counterpublic into the midst of these dominant publics, 
cp 
cp 
DP DP 
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thus ‘hacking into them’ (and specifically, into the mainstream media) and thus 
fracturing them via internal rather than external pressure.  Rather than adhering the 
Habermasian rational-criticality inherent in these dominant spheres, and thus 
enduring the failures of rational-criticality and the pitfalls of mass mediated 
refeudalisation, they force a renegotiation of the boundaries of political 
communication, thus embodying and providing support for the expansions and 
solutions neo-Habermasian theory provides. 
 
 
10.2.4.2 Public sphere theory and human rights 
 
 
Neo-Habermasian public sphere theory also provides an interesting evaluative 
perspective upon the rights-based discourse that has interwoven much of this thesis, 
from its instantiation in Levy’s hacker ethics, to the focus on Internet rights and 
freedoms as a logical expansion of the existing framework provided by the united 
Nations and other entities.  While the neo-Habermasian perspective shares many 
similarities with this rights-based discourse, it also highlights some shortcomings of 
this latter focus.  The neo-Habermasian perspective goes much further than the 
rights-based perspective in that it speaks not only of the right to receive information 
and to articulate one’s political opinions and engage in political deliberation, but it 
also focuses on and attempts to guarantee the right to be heard.  Human rights-based 
discourses do not generally venture into this theoretical territory – the freedom to 
speak without persecution is seen as adequate, therefore it articulate a more negative 
conception of what free speech entails.  That is, it sees free speech as reliant upon 
the right to speak without your speech being interfered with, whereas neo-
Habermasian theory focuses on articulating a much more positive conception in 
which truly free speech only exists when we have secured not only the right to 
speak unimpeded, but also secured a guarantee that we will be heard.  The rights-
based discourse is thus rather devoid of considerations of power – it essentially 
boils down to the argument that “you have the right to say whatever you like but I 
have the right to completely ignore you”, whereas the neo-Habermasian perspective 
is much more concerned with the act of listening as well as speaking. 
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10.2.4.3 Counterperformance? 
 
 
This research has also identified the concepts of the spectacular and performative as 
entirely undervalued concepts within most public sphere theory, but as central to the 
agonistic and radical models that inform neo-Habermasian public sphere theory.  At 
the most basic level, and in connection with the previous section of discussion, 
successful and effective deliberation rests upon the ability for its participants to get 
one another’s attention.  This is as it should be and as it has been for quite some 
time – theatricality has long been a central component of political deliberation and 
communication, as is evidenced by a long history of political theatre, art, cartoons, 
song, activism and films, and hacktivism simply represents a continuation of this 
historical thread of performativity.  Arguably, the intention behind the utilisation of 
these concepts is that they not have any effect on deliberative authenticity 
whatsoever – they are intended as hooks, to reel in attention, with the political 
argument itself and claims of authenticity and reasoning either embedded within or 
drawn to the audience’s attention by the performance. 
 
No doubt there are those who will argue that politics should be serious and indeed, 
rational-critical, and for them, the element of performativity inherent in hacktivism 
is likely to make them unwilling to even listen to the argument being made by 
hacktivists.  However, in doing so they are ignoring this long and varied history of 
performative politics, as well as the fact that our governmental or parliamentary 
politics is increasingly theatrical, largely due to its hypermediation.  Indeed, there 
are so many different issues as well as frivolities clamouring for our attention and 
brain cycles within our modern society that the garnering of attention is growing 
ever-more difficult, thus theatricality, performance and spectacle is only likely to 
become more central to post-industrial politics. 
 
As such, it is hardly surprising that hacktivism quite self-consciously exploits the 
aura of the outlaw and the theatricality that it inherits from hacking, using these 
facets, along with techniques borrowed from situationism and traditional activism as 
the hook to draw people’s attention to their arguments and engage them in 
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deliberation.  This not only allows hacktivists to speak, but also be heard – thus 
going some way towards combating the huge communicative advantages enjoyed 
by the political economic elites within our societies.  As such, hacktivism arguably 
functions as a form of counter-performance.  Indeed, in a refeudalised world where 
performative publicity dominates the global modular network of public spheres, this 
adoption of the dominant strategy (in combination with a genuine desire to catalyse 
political deliberation) would seem to be an extremely adroit move for any 
counterpublic, not just hacktivists.  As such, a future direction for the refinement of 
neo-Habermasian public sphere theory will be to more firmly incorporate 
theoretical articulations of spectacle and performance, drawing upon the work of 
such theorists as Debord and the practice of situationism, thus hopefully enriching 
this theoretical lens even further. 
 
 
 
10.2.4.4 Expanding empirical and theoretical resources 
 
 
As previously discussed, hacktivism is a relatively recent phenomenon, and the state 
of research on the subject reflects this.  Overall, there is a dearth of knowledge on 
and investigation and insight into hacktivist activity and groups, with what research 
there is stemming from a fairly limited pool of researchers.  As such, one of the 
major contributions this thesis has made has been to add to the body of empirical 
knowledge of hacktivists, by conducting case studies into two previously ignored 
groups and their campaigns (the Creative Freedom Foundation and Anonymous).  
Furthermore, these case studies were located in Australasia, a location largely 
ignored within research into hacktivism.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
this thesis has established a new theoretical lens into the investigation of hacktivist 
activity.  The neo-Habermasian perspective facilitates an understanding of 
hacktivism that not only addresses its contributions to the global modular network 
of public spheres, but is also able to effectively grapple with the issues of ideology, 
hegemony, and discursive power and difference that underline every hacktivist 
event. 
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However, this theoretical perspective was not only informed and influenced by its 
intended application to the empirical investigation of hacktivist case studies, but 
also extended upon by this case study research.  The concept of viral 
counterpublicity was not originally conceived of by the neo-Habermasian 
theoretical framework, but was instead revealed or suggested by the case study 
research.  However, the concept proved invaluable in the interpretation of the 
hacktivism investigated, and would be equally useful to the neo-Habermasian 
analysis of a wide range of counterpublic activity, primarily online but potentially 
offline as well.  The empirical data and its analysis also revealed the potential 
inherent in the concept of ‘chains of equivalence’ between different but related 
counterpublics; hence, any future applications of neo-Habermasian public sphere 
theory to hacktivism and other forms of online counterpublicity should take care to 
remain attentive to these newly postulated components of the theoretical 
framework, as the viral spread of information and discourse and potential for 
interconnectivity are greatly facilitated by the networked structure of the Internet. 
 As such, perhaps the most significant achievement of this thesis has been its overall 
contribution to the ongoing project of reformulating and reimagining the theory of 
the public sphere.  It has generated a concise and operationalisable model of the 
public sphere that is grounded within an extensive pre-existing body of theoretical 
critique and reconstruction, and which is both flexible and progressive enough to 
account for such emergent forms of communicative activity as hacktivism.  
Furthermore, its application to this phenomenon has added new concepts to the 
public sphere theoretical toolkit, thus expanding the model’s functionality and 
sophistication with regards to comprehending the modern mass mediated 
communicative environment and the possibilities it enables for effective political 
dissent and counterpublicity.  Certainly, the neo-Habermasian model should not 
remain static – the project of reformulation requires constant attention and 
theoretical dynamism and evolution – but it does provide a comprehensive 
framework that is both immediately useful and undoubtedly capable of continued 
refinement and extension. 
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10.2.4.5 Expanding methodological resources 
 
 
Finally, this project has established some methodological innovations and advances 
that will hopefully prove useful to future researchers.  The argument that software 
code should be accepted as a form of speech, and thus as a form of analysable 
discourse, is not one that has (to my knowledge) been made before, and potentially 
opens up a whole new domain of artifacts for discourse analysis and interpretation.  
Similarly, the identification of hacktivism as a fascinating and still-developing 
discourse genre will hopefully bring it to the wider attention of the many critical 
discourse analysts with an interest in political communication and the possibilities 
for so-called positive discourse analysis. 
 
 
10.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 
 
10.3.1 Limitations 
 
The primary limitations on this research were resource- (time, funding and 
manpower) and geography- or nationality-based.  Hacktivism is an ever-expanding 
global phenomenon, and successful hacktivist events generate a diverse and often 
quite extensive corpus of possible texts for analysis.  One researcher is simply 
incapable of keeping track of all the new instances of hacktivism around the globe, 
particularly given the linguistic divides in place.  As such, the research was limited 
to focusing on English-speaking hacktivists operating in English-speaking nations, 
and was skewed towards my current location within Australasia.  As previously 
mentioned, this is actually rather fortuitous, given the lack of research into 
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hacktivism within the region, but it should certainly be recognised as a limitation, if 
not a weakness, per se. 
Obviously, the primary limitation stems from the time intensive and detailed nature 
of critical discourse analysis as a methodological strategy.  This imposed limits on 
the number of cases that could be adequately interpreted or analysed using the given 
theoretical and methodological framework.  Although I believe that the three cases 
used provide a strong template for the application of neo-Habermasian public 
sphere theory to hacktivism, there is no doubt that they are but a start.  The 
investigation of more cases would have been preferable, but was prohibited by 
resource limitations, as well as word count constraints.  Now that a theoretical and 
analytical framework has been established, more cases need to be addressed, and a 
wider understanding of hacktivism as neo-Habermasian counterpublicity 
established. 
Finally, and to reiterate a limitation previously made clear in Chapter 2, the 
methodological approach utilised, while being extremely powerful in some respects, 
does have its own inherent limitations.  Critical discourse analysis allows for a 
nuanced and sophisticated analysis that is able to comprehend the issues of power, 
ideology and difference so central to the neo-Habermasian theoretical framework, 
and which facilitates the smooth amalgamation of fine-grained empirical 
investigation and theoretical complexity and evolution.  However, like all discourse 
analysis, it is inherently interpretive, which introduces aspects of subjectivity less 
apparent in more quantitative approaches.  The incorporation of principles of 
systemic functional grammar or linguistics does go some way towards ameliorating 
this subjectivity, but can only go so far; hence, the analysis involved in this research 
is unavoidably infiltrated with my own conscious and unconscious interpretive 
biases.  As such, I have attempted to make my ideological stance explicit 
throughout the research, as is standard for any critical discourse analyst hoping to 
excavate and expose the power relations inherent in discursive phenomena and 
texts, but am mindful that full transparency is an unattainable ideal. 
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10.3.2 Future research 
 
 
Given these limitations, the ideal path for future research of this kind is fairly self-
evident.  More research power (time, funding and manpower) needs to be dedicated 
to investigating hacktivism as a contribution to the ‘global modular network’ 
(Keane 2000) of public and counterpublic spheres, and this research power needs to 
come from a variety of locations and incorporate much broader swathes of the 
world. Research collaborations between multiple researchers, based in 
geographically disparate locations and possessing a fluency in a wider range of 
languages would be the ideal.  This is really the only way in which a cohesive 
investigation or series of investigations into hacktivism as global phenomenon can 
be achieved.  Having more researchers dedicated to the task would also ensure that 
many more cases could be investigated, rather than continuing to languish in 
academic obscurity while Hacktivismo and their over-documented counterparts 
command the bulk of the attention!  The critical discourse analytical approach 
would also be well-served by a multiplicity of co-operating researchers, as each 
member added to the team would provide an additional check-and-balance to the 
interpretive nature of this methodological framework, as well as contributing a more 
culturally diverse foundation for this interpretive work. 
Having more research power would also increase the quantity of texts reasonably 
able to be subjected to the rather meticulous process of critical discourse analysis, 
thus enabling the analysis conducted upon each case study to become richer and 
deeper, as well as casting a wider net for the case studies selected.  Although I 
believe critical discourse analysis provides a nuanced and sufficiently detailed and 
power/ideology-sensitive approach to investigating cases of hacktivism, it would 
also be useful (if one had access to sufficient research power) to combine it with a 
content analysis of the initial hacktivist texts, both private/organisational (if access 
to them was available) and publicly distributed, as well as to reportage of the 
hacktivist event.  This would obviously require a research team capable of 
generating a sufficiently large but simultaneously cohesive sample of cases of 
hacktivism for it to be profitable to carry out such an analysis of the associated 
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texts, but if the resources and collaborative networks were available, it would allow 
for a rewarding inquiry into the protest topics most common to hacktivism, the 
vocabulary, memes and tones most commonly used in their discourse, the scope, 
content and tone of the responses to such events (following on from Vegh 2003), as 
well as allowing for cross-national comparisons between cases.  Such data would 
help generate a much more comprehensive ‘snapshot’ of possible global 
commonalities between diverse hacktivist groups and practices, as well as exposing 
differences and possibly providing a way to begin quantifying what components or 
factors are necessary for hacktivists to optimise the counterpublicity or 
counterhegemonic discursive power they generate. 
 
 
10.4 Finis 
 
 
In closing, the process of conducting research for and crafting this thesis has been 
extremely rewarding, and its research objectives are worth continuing with and 
extending upon, both theoretically and empirically. There is no doubt that it has 
been a steep learning curve, and has, at times, seemed an almost impossible task, 
but I suspect this is the case for most, if not all, doctoral degrees.  As my parents 
regularly suggest, perhaps one has to be a little mad to undertake one, and one of 
the major achievements would seem to be coming out the other end with one’s 
sanity reasonably intact!  However, such moments of doubt populate most 
worthwhile projects, and I find myself looking forward to using this research as a 
springboard from which to explore a whole host of new tangents and ideas.  This, I 
think, is the strongest sign that the writing of a thesis has been a personally fulfilling 
achievement and an ultimately successful endeavour – that rather than being 
oversaturated with its subjects, one ends up being filled anew with enthusiasm for 
them, and itching to make a start on further research – to learn more, and to go 
further. After all, hacktivism certainly is not showing any signs of slowing down or 
stopping, and neither should research into the phenomenon.  The same is 
undoubtedly true of public sphere theory; indeed, its functionality and value is 
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unwavering. As Fraser has stated, it is an “indispensable resource” for democratic 
theory (1992: 109), and as such, we have a responsibility to take the project of its 
reformulation seriously, and to see it as an ongoing journey rather than a 
destination. 
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